Hesiod: The Other Poet

ANCIENT RECEPTION OF A CULTURAL ICON

HUGO H. KONING

MNEMOSYNE SUPPLEMENTS MONOGRAPHS ON GREEK AND LATIN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

BRILL

Hesiod: The Other Poet

Mnemosyne

Supplements

Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature

Editorial Board

G.J. Boter
A. Chaniotis
K.M. Coleman
I.J.F. de Jong
T. Reinhardt

VOLUME 325

Hesiod: The Other Poet

Ancient Reception of a Cultural Icon

By
Hugo H. Koning



BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2010

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Koning, Hugo H.
Hesiod, the other poet : ancient reception of a cultural icon / by Hugo H. Koning.
p. cm. – (Mnemosyne supplements. Monographs on Greek and Roman language and literature, ISSN 0169-8958 ; 325)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-18616-3 (alk. paper)
1. Hesiod–Criticism and interpretation. 2. Memory–Social aspects–Greece–History–To 1500. 3. Hesiod–Influence. I. Title.

PA4011.K66 2010
881'.01–dc22

2010045139

ISSN 0169-8958
ISBN 978 90 04 18616 3

Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,
IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.

CONTENTS

Preface ix

Introduction 1
1. Memory Studies 2
2. Hesiod and Collective Memory 7
3. This Book 12
4. Getting Started: The Commemograms 18

PART ONE

HESIOD AND HOMER

Chapter One. Introduction: Equating Hesiod and Homer 25
0. Introduction 25
1. Lumping and Splitting 26
2. Modern Scholarship 28
3. Lumping in Antiquity 40
3.1. Hesiod and Homer in Time 40
3.2. Hesiod and Homer in Greek Society: Performance, Symposia, Schools 46
Appendix: The Hesiod-Homer Sequence 52

Chapter Two. The Boundless Authority of Hesiod and Homer 57
0. Introduction 57
1. The Authority of Homer 58
2. Herodotus on Greek Theology 63
3. Hesiod and Homer as Lawgivers 72
4. Dealing with Poetic Authority: Reactions and Counter-Reactions 82
4.1. A Frontal Attack on Fellows 82
4.2. Strategies of Defence 86
4.2.1. Selection 87
4.2.2. Altering the Surface 89
4.2.3. Allegorical Reading 91
4.2.4. The Freedom of Poets 93
4.2.5. Harmonization 96
5. Conclusion 102

Chapter Three. Hesiod and Homer: The Storekeepers of Knowledge 105
0. Introduction 105
1. Hesiod and Homer as Philosophers 106
2. Old Knowers: An Exclusive Category 109
2.1. Making Groups: The Sophists 111
2.2. Hesiod and Homer versus the Tragedians 116
2.3. Hesiod and Homer as Historians 119
3. Conclusion 125

PART TWO
THE 'REAL' HESIOD

Chapter Four. Introduction: Searching for Hesiod 129
0. Introduction 129
1. The Biographical Tradition 130
2. The Mechanisms of Memory 139
2.1. The Practice of Assimilation 139
2.2. The Catchword-Factor 144
2.3. The Principle of Snowballing 149
2.4. The Principle of Clustering 151
2.5. The Homeric Factor 153
2.6. The Persona's Paradox 155
3. Conclusion 158

Chapter Five. Ethics and Politics: The Common and the Arcane 161
0. Introduction: Hesiod the Wise 161
1. Hesiod's Demons 165
2. Justice and the City 172
3. People and their Dealings 177
4. Moderation and Simplicity 183
5. Conclusion 186

Chapter Six. Philosophy: Great and Small 189
0. Introduction 189
1. Natural Philosophy 190
2. The Problem of Revelation 200
2.1. The Attack on Revelation (Xenophanes and Heraclitus) .. 202
2.2. Revelation Modified (Parmenides and Empedocles) 210
2.3. The Use of Good Old-Fashioned Revelation (Protagoras and Prodicus) 217

3. Language and Truth 223
4. Conclusion 233

PART THREE

HESIOD VERSUS HOMER

Chapter Seven. Introduction: The Contest of Hesiod and Homer ... 239
0. Introduction 239
1. Lumping and Splitting Again: Polar Opposition 240
2. The Tradition of the Contest 245
2.1. The *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* 248
2.2. Other Contests 259
3. Hesiod versus Homer: Points of Divergence 267

Chapter Eight. Swords and Ploughshares 269
0. Introduction 269
1. Modern Scholarship 270
2. Fighting and Farming 276
3. The King and the People 284
4. Hesiod's Crossing and Homer's Expansion 290
5. Conclusion 294

Chapter Nine. The Other Poetics 297
0. Introduction 297
1. Truth and Fiction 299
1.1. Lying Muses 300
1.2. Homer as a Philosopher of Language 304
1.3. Believing the Poet 310
2. The Poet's Craft: Inspiration and Perspiration 318
2.1. Modern Scholarship 319
2.2. The Impact of Plato: The Manic Poet 324
2.3. The Hellenistic Hesiod: On Wine and Water 333
3. The Hesiodic Genre: The Rise of a Didactic Poet 341
3.1. The *interpretatio latina* 343
3.2. Hesiod in the Handbooks 347
4. Beauty and Style 350
5. Boundary Crossing 358
5.1. Crossing 358
5.2. Homeric expansion 363
6. Conclusion 366

Chapter Ten. Conclusion 369

Bibliography 383

General Index 403
Index Locorum 415

PREFACE

In Greek mythology, the timespan of ten years is commonly used to indicate that something took a very long time. The writing of this book took a long time, too. It started in the winter of 2000 as a doctoral thesis, which I finally defended at Leiden University in February 2010. During this period, many people helped me in many ways, and I am very grateful that they did.

My thanks go out first of all to my supervisor, Professor Ineke Sluiter, who despite my status as a self-funded PhD candidate always managed to keep me involved in the academic community. Her patience and guidance were crucial to the development of both the research and the researcher. I also wish to thank Dr Marlein van Raalte, who read several chapters and offered much-appreciated comments. I am happy that she agreed to take a seat in my examination committee, just as Professor Glenn Most, Professor Irene De Jong, Professor André Lardinois, Professor Jeroen Bons and Dr Casper de Jonge. Professor Barbara Graziosi and Dr Helen van Noorden stimulated me with fruitful suggestions, and I owe thanks to Dr Johannes Haubold and Professor George Boys-Stones for inviting me to the 2006 conference on Plato and Hesiod, which opened my eyes in several ways. Furthermore, I would like to thank the Stanislas College for allowing one of their teachers to spend so much time on his thesis, and NWO for offering me a grant to concentrate on the writing of this book for a full year. I thank Mark Heerink for being a friend and study-companion.

Lastly, I am very grateful for the love and support of my friends, my family and Joëlle.

This book is part of a greater upsurge of interest in reception in general and that of Hesiod in particular. It is my wish that it can be of help in further understanding these fascinating subjects.

Hugo Koning
Leiden, October 2010

INTRODUCTION

This is not a book about Hesiod. Instead of offering a historical appraisal of the poet or a literary analysis of his principal works, the present study examines the role of Hesiod in the ancient imagination. The central question is concerned with the way that Hesiod was given shape in the collective memory of the Greeks. Hence, this study deals with the processes of remembering and forgetting that created his image, with its meaning and relevance to Greek identity, and more particularly with the different manifestations of his image in Greek literature. This book, then, is about 'Hesiod';[1] it conceives of and investigates the poet as a concept in later literary-critical discourse, as a *locus* that was informed with values and qualities, and more generally as a cultural icon constructed and reconstructed by later Greek authors who employed him in their own texts.[2]

The present study is thus concerned with the ancient reception of Hesiod, but its theoretical framework is mostly derived from collective or cultural memory studies. In the first section of this introduction, therefore, I will discuss some of the most important approaches and findings of this particular discipline. Section 2 will then demonstrate how helpful the main notions of memory theory can be in understanding and explaining the ancient imagination of Hesiod. In section 3, I will briefly describe how this book is organized, while section 4 presents some preliminary findings of interest, and looks ahead to the rest of the book.

---

[1] Throughout this study I will speak of Hesiod even when strictly speaking I mean 'Hesiod', i.e. the Hesiod as imagined by the Greeks; maintaining the inverted commas throughout the book would become too tedious. In what follows, the context should always immediately make clear which Hesiod I am referring to: the actual poet or his ancient image.

[2] In this book I will not not draw a sharp distinction between 'the man' and 'the works', both for the sake of convenience and for the obvious reason that such a distinction hardly existed in ancient views anyway, the reconstruction of which is my main interest. As Lefkowitz (1981) and others have amply shown, the ancients generally believed that the work of an author reflected his person: this means that biographical data were both deduced from the work itself and put to use in interpreting it. Obviously, such circular reasoning was especially well-practiced when relatively little was known of the author through other sources (as in the case of Hesiod).

1. *Memory Studies*

Collective or cultural memory studies constitute a notoriously broad field, incorporating various disciplines with their own methods and approaches. Nevertheless, they are all based on the primary observation that remembering is a social act. As was argued by sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945), universally regarded as the founding father of collective memory studies, individuals create and recollect their private memories within a social or cultural framework; from this observation, it was only a small step to demonstrate the great importance of this social or cultural framework for memories shared by groups.[3] Because of this common point of departure, collective memory studies are based on a large consensus about their main focus and 'objective': they are concerned with investigating the way groups of people construct a shared past. As is suggested by this formulation, two notions are of central concern to this type of study.

The first is the observation that the past, as remembered at any given moment, is a *construction* of those alive in the present: some events are forgotten, others are highlighted; some related events are separated, and unrelated ones are connected.[4] This process is partly unconscious, but also partly conscious and intentional. The second notion of crucial importance relates to group identity: a common past (or a past, at least, constructed as common) and the recollections shared by a group provide its members with a sense of belonging. Such memory goes beyond the experience of a person's own lifetime: a modern Greek can 'remember' the battle at Thermopylae as easily as the Olympiakos championship of 2009. In all such cases, recollection makes a person part of a community.

Evidently, these two notions of construction and identity are interconnected since, as is often observed, the past (i.e. the content of collective memory) is virtually always shaped so as to benefit the group in one way or another. Just as a resumé for a job interview is constructed to make the candidate appear eminently suitable for the new position, a collective past is often formed with a view to the present needs of the group.

---

[3] For a fine summary of the essentials of Halbwachs' theory see Coser (1992) 21–28.

[4] We 'transform essentially unstructured series of events into seemingly coherent historical narratives', says Zerubavel (2003) 13, leaning on an influential essay of Hayden White (1978), who claimed that historians turn historical events into a narrative by techniques also used for the emplotment of a novel or a play. The past that is in our heads and in our history books is no 'truth', but a construct, and therefore liable to change.

In other words: the past is created in the present, and those who do so usually have a certain goal; in this context, the term 'intentional history' is sometimes used.[5]

Collective memory studies constitute a relatively new branch of modern research,[6] especially since Halbwachs' theories laid dormant for a while. His findings, however, were injected with new life by theorists like Pierre Nora, who put collective memory back on the scholarly agenda even though they developed Halbwachs' ideas in a wholly new direction, very influential though not directly relevant to the present study.[7] Despite the relative youth of collective memory studies, however, their main theoretical tenets have quickly developed thanks to well-aimed criticism from opponents who were rightly sceptical about the often rather sweeping claims. This critique has led to serious modifications, which

[5] Cf. Gehrke (2001) 285.

[6] See for a brief history and an excellent summary of collective memory theory also Kirk (2005) 1–24.

[7] The new theorists (mostly sociologists and anthropologists) defined memory, as a human *modus* of experiencing the past, by opposing it to history, the other *modus*. While memory re-enacts, relives, and continues the past, history—so the theory goes—stores and recollects, and treats the past as something lost. The historical view of the past was regarded as voluntary, incomplete, relative, detached, asocial and analytic; memory was thus defined as involuntary, complete, absolute, incarnate, social and unconscious (a useful discussion of the dichotomous view can be found in the first chapter of Finnegan 1988). The mode of memory came to be associated with archaic communities, often illiterate, while it was claimed that its disappearance in modern society was due to the rise of history. Nora famously claimed that it is because modern societies are so hopelessly forgetful that they are trying to organize their past with history; modern memory has thus become a matter of explicit signs, the so-called *lieux de mémoire*. These must be understood as the death-throes of memory, since it is the true mission of history 'to suppress and destroy memory' (Nora 1989 9). The much-debated relationship between history and memory has long dominated the field, but has now waned into the background due to several theoretical objections, the most pertinent of which, in my view, is to downplay the difference between history and memory itself: the two are rather inextricably linked than irreconcilably opposed, cf. e.g. Olick and Robbins, who pointed out that 'as historiography [the written expression of the historical view of the past] has broadened its focus from the official to the social and cultural, memory becomes central "evidence" ' (1998 110); moreover, many collective memory studies use examples from historiography to demonstrate how memory is constructed (some even argue that 'collective memory [is] an expression of historical consciousness' which has 'found one kind of expression in national or collective histories', Crane 1997 131). I am leaving this debate aside, since the present study is concerned with the ancient Greeks, who were largely untroubled by the acceleration of history and the concurrent 'data overload' that Nora found so characteristic of modern times. Nevertheless, the effort of Nora and his followers has been very important as a catalyst to the development of collective memory studies.

have made the theory considerably more viable, complex and interesting. Three aspects of the theory that were criticized and subsequently reconsidered are of particular interest to us.

The first point of critique was fueled by the obvious observation that groups cannot remember anything: naturally, only individuals are equipped with the hardware to create and recollect memories.[8] The theory of collective memory came dangerously close to assuming a great and single collective mind, and theorists were rightly cautioned not to be led astray by their own metaphor. As a result of this critique, scholars found two strategies to improve on the earlier, more simplistic view. One of these focuses on the *creation* of collective memory, and the individual's role in that process. This approach is exemplified by Jan Assmann, who argued that in every community at some point in time certain people come to be considered as experts on (a particular piece of) the past, and are thus allowed to play a decisive role in shaping it.[9] That version of the past then achieves definite form through institutionalization of some sort (one can think of religious festivals or other holidays), through which collective memory is periodically renewed and so preserved.[10] This focus on the interaction between individual and collective is the first way to counter the simple notion of the great and single group mind.

The other strategy is less concerned with the individual's creative powers but focuses on his or her *recollection* of collective memories instead. It has been shown that individuals participate in group memories on different levels and in different compositions, the so-called 'memory communities'. Since a single person can belong to several groups (a family, a

[8] This was already pointed out by Halbwachs himself: 'The individual remembers by placing himself in the perspective of the group, but one may also affirm that the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in individual memories' (Halbwachs in Coser 1992 40).

[9] According to Assmann (2000), esp. 37–44, there are two kinds of collective memory: 1) communicative memory, which is concerned with recent events and is formed and renewed by the live interaction of witnesses who are all regarded as equally competent, and 2) cultural memory, which deals with a primal or otherwise absolute past and is ceremonially kept alive by special experts who have some way or another solidified this past in code (by writing, for instance). These experts appear about forty years after a memorable event has taken place and witnesses become scarce: during this 'crisis of memory', the memory of the past must be transferred to permanent media, or it will be lost.

[10] One form of such institutionalization is the enshrinement of culturally important texts, on which see more below; in fact, Assmann pays much attention to the process of canonization (Assmann 2000 52–61).

club, a city, a nation), his or her memories are multiple. It is now widely held that persons and groups remember different things in different contexts, which has left the phantom idea of the homogeneous group mind largely abandoned.[11] Perhaps even more importantly, this notion of multiplicity can easily accommodate the fact that different groups within a larger community often entertain incompatible interpretations of the past, and adopt and 'invent' new versions for their own (present) purposes. Memories can be seen to give birth to counter-memories, and 'wars over collective memory'[12] turn out to be the rule rather than the exception. Collective memory, then, should not be considered static and univocal, but rather as dynamic and pluriform; there is no truly 'definite form' (as argued by Assmann and others), but instead conflicting traditions stand side by side.

The second point of critique on 'old school' collective memory studies was concerned with their presentist interpretation of the past: the studies suggested that each present constructs a wholly new and distinct version of past events. It was soon recognized, however, that memory is more than a mere 'series of snapshots taken at various times and expressing various perspectives'[13] (the consequence of the presentist approach when held in extreme form). The various versions of the past interact, and memory takes hybrid forms. Take, for instance, the memory of the Cheruscan general Arminius, who massacred three Roman legions in the famous Teutoburgerwald battle of 9 AD. As the *liberator Germaniae*, he was remembered in many forms: as a symbol of German freedom and unity in the mid-19th century, as a stout defender of German values against Mediterranean influences in the French War, and as an icon of German (racial) supremacy during the second World War. But even though these versions of Arminius are all decidedly different, the obvious emphasis on his martial qualities forms a common ground between them, creating continuity amid the several 'snapshots'. Not surprisingly, the memory of Arminius as a war hero lives on today, despite recent attempts to create a radically new memory of him by wholly demilitarizing and depoliticizing the icon, for instance through the production of the Arminius garden gnome.[14] And so memories can be seen to respond

[11] Cf. Alcock (2002) 15: 'This insistence on multiplicity avoids the danger of reifying some monolithic, mystical group mind'.

[12] I borrow this term from Mendels (2004) 37.

[13] Coser (1992) 26; cf. Alcock (2002) 95 attacking the notion of a 'zero-sum competition between different, preexisting versions of the past'.

[14] For an extensive and very illuminating overview of the (use of the) 'myth' of

to each other, one memory leading to an (adapted) other. The 'wars' over collective memory are not only fought between contemporaries, but also over time.

The pervasive continuity of collective memories functions as a warning against an overestimation of the present's power to shape the past. Even though memory is creative, it is still bound to a significant degree by (historical) reality: certain views and reconstructions are impossible, because they clash too violently with the known facts or the general consensus about them (just as the ancient tragedians may shape their mythical subject-matter as they see fit, but must remain true to a certain unalterable core of the story). Sure enough, there is no 'infinite malleability of the past',[15] and memory is formed by both present and past.[16] In fact, many historical figures, who knew they would one day be only a memory, took special care to influence the way they would be remembered: kings erected monuments, emperors appointed poets, and artists laid the foundations for their own reputation.[17]

One other major point of critique remains—concerned not so much with the theory or method of collective memory studies, but rather with its usefulness. In recent years, collective memory studies have been criticized for being rather predictable. No matter what the particular subject was (Solon, the history of the Acropolis, or the Holy Grail), the generalizing conclusion of almost any study is that 'the past is constructed not as fact but as myth to serve the interest of a particular community'.[18] Such critical voices argue that it is not only the content of collective memory, but also (or perhaps mostly) its dynamics that are of interest. A study that focuses only on the content of the representation runs the risk of forgetting all about transmission, diffusion and the reasons for either receiving or rejecting particular parts of the past. The focus on the *what*-question tends to neglect the (at least as interesting) questions of *how* and *why*. Confino is one of the theorists pointing to several

---

Arminius (or Hermann) see now the catalogue of the 2009 Mythos exhibition (Berke e.a. 2009), part of the *Ausstellungskooperation* celebrating the 2000th anniversary of the *Varusschlacht*.

[15] Olick and Robbins (1998) 128–130.

[16] Cf. Kirk (2005) 14: 'the past cannot be reduced to a mythical projection of the present.'

[17] See e.g. Kapsis (1989) on Hitchcock but especially Lang and Lang (1990) on the 'reputational dynamics' of etchers from the 19th and early 20th century.

[18] Confino (1997) 1387. See on myth as ideology in narrative form e.g. Lincoln (1999) *passim* and Csapo (2005) 262–315.

dangers of such a one-sided approach. A scholar, he argues, 'may read into the symbolic representation what he or she has already learned by other means'. Similarly, focusing on content may blur the fact that any representation, especially one evolving over time, is created by 'wars over memory': 'historical actors simultaneously represent, receive, and contest memory'.[19] This third point of critique is perhaps the most pressing of all, and it seems that no universal response has yet been formulated. In the next section, I will explain how I propose to deal with it.

2. *Hesiod and Collective Memory*

It is time now to zoom in on the main subject of the present study, and explain how collective memory theory is relevant to understanding Hesiod's image in antiquity. As has often been demonstrated, memories need anchors. Many scholars point to the importance of places, buildings, and artefacts as keepers and generators of memory. The same goes for persons from either myth or history: 'eine Wahrheit muss sich, um sich in der Erinnerung der Gruppe festsetzen zu können, in der konkreten Form eines Ereignisses, einer Person, eines Ortes darstellen'.[20] Culturally important figures from the past, just like events or places, are brought to the fore and constructed according to present needs. A good example is provided by Mendels, who showed that in 411 BC three different political factions in Athens all claimed the figure of Solon to find 'ideological terms of reference that would enable them to endow their present political actions with legitimacy'.[21]

The culturally important figure from the past central to this book is Hesiod, and in accordance with the above-given method and objective of collective memory studies, this study will thus investigate the way the Greeks constructed their image(s) of Hesiod to conform with the 'present' need of their own memory communities. Hence, two notions are essential to my approach: 1) that of Hesiod as a construct, and 2) that of Hesiod as providing a sense of identity. Regarding the first: obviously, the idea of an author as a construct is already familiar from reception

[19] Confino (1997) 1400; 1398–1399.

[20] Assmann (2005) 38 citing Halbwachs; see also Kirk (2005) 18 'images of archetypal persons and events embody a group's moral order'.

[21] Mendels (2004) 31; cf. e.g. the study of Pelikan (1997) on the many images of Jesus, or that of Gribble (1999) on Alcibiades.

studies (which in some way or another search for the meaning of a text in the interaction between the author's intent and sociohistorical context on the one hand and the readers' own beliefs, values and paradigms on the other) and theories of intertextuality (which in one way or another locate the meaning of a text in its complex and often many-layered relation with the reader and especially other texts),[22] to which collective memory study is comparable in this aspect at least. Nonetheless, the present approach differs from these disciplines in its view of Hesiod as the product of a millennium-long process of conscious and unconscious remembering and forgetting.

The second notion concerns Hesiod's role in the construction of group identity, i.e. his status as a 'cultural icon'. As an ancient poet whose stories were endlessly retold by Greeks of all times and places, Hesiod was of central importance to the formation and preservation of that body of codes, values, and wisdom that could be labeled 'Greekness'. In a way comparable to Homer and his poems, Hesiod and his works constituted a 'fixed standard of reference' for all Greeks,[23] which gives these two ancient poets a unique place in the Greek imagination. We know that the wandering *aoidoi* or 'bards' in ancient times generally embodied 'the collective memory (...) of the group';[24] but the proto-typical bards Hesiod and Homer remained the central anchors of group identity long after they themselves were gone. At an early stage in Greek history, Hesiod and Homer achieved canonical status. From that moment on, the Greeks spent much interpretative labour on keeping the canonized works alive, bridging the gap between their moment of enshrinement and the present. This process entails that the poems were solid and untouchable but at the same time 'modeled, invented, reinvented, and constructed by the present'.[25] In a sense, they are 'stable things,

[22] See on the 'productive' relationship between the text and its reader (whether or not an author himself) in reception studies e.g. Eagleton (1983, esp. ch. 2) and Machor and Goldstein (2001) ix–xvii and 1–6; for theories of intertextuality see the fundamental studies of Broich and Pfister (1985) 1–30 and Conte (1986) 23–95, and the more recent discussions by e.g. Hinds (1998, esp. ch. 1 and 2) and Van Tress (2004) 1–23 (with bibliography).

[23] Gehrke (2001) 304.

[24] Sluiter (1997) 156; see for general studies e.g. Havelock (1963), Svenbro (1976). Cf. also DuPont (1999) 61 on the Greek construction of an imaginary Greece 'with its own mythical authors': '[the Greeks] believed in Homer, Hesiod, and Anacreon as they believed in their gods, for both groups vouched for their culture'.

[25] Assmann (1997) 9; see on the enshrinement of a culture's classics Assmann's (2000) introduction and first chapter, esp. 56–59.

landmarks of continuity'; but 'the commemorative activities that surround them, and the interpretations placed upon them, can vary remarkably over time'.[26] Canonical texts are central to the sense of identity and continuity of a mnemonic community, and Hesiod's works, as we shall see, are continuously shaped and reshaped to provide for those needs.

Naturally, this study attempts to avoid the major theoretical pitfalls discussed in the first section. Staying clear from the monolithic group mind, much attention will in fact be paid to the fact that multiple and conflicting constructs of Hesiod existed side by side, not only between groups or individuals, but even within the works of individual recipients. Such caution is especially called for in the light of the very limited set of evidence: so whenever I speak of the 'Greek' view of Hesiod, or Hesiod's image 'in antiquity', it is important to realize that such generalizations are in fact constructs too, based on a selective set of representations that can be widely apart, both generically and chronologically so. Furthermore, there are two ways in which I hope to keep away from the dangers of presentism: on the one hand, by demonstrating that Hesiod is not 'infinitely malleable', and that his actual poems remain a determining factor for his image (not least because Hesiod himself did his best to lay the groundworks for his future reputation); and on the other hand by identifying certain traditions of reception that warrant the continuity of Hesiod's image.

Most effort, perhaps, has been spent to circumvent the final point of critique, i.e. that collective memory study focuses overmuch on content and produces predictable results. In an attempt to avoid this particular trap, this study has developed two distinct but related strategies. First of all, the reception of Hesiod is not studied in isolation but related to the ancient image of Homer; and secondly, some recent theories on the way memories are created (so-called 'mnemotechnics') are adapted and applied in a new way to the present investigation.

As for the first strategy: by drawing the figure of Homer into this book on the reception of Hesiod, this study attempts to sharpen its focus on the *process* of cultural memory, concentrating on the interaction between the images of two cultural icons. As we have seen above, memory is never static and given, but is continually given shape by many different and sometimes conflicting factors and forces. It was an initial survey of

[26] The description of monuments by Alcock (2002) 28 fits canonical texts equally well.

the research material that led to the main hypothesis of this book, i.e. that among the factors determining the memory of Hesiod—and thus his use and functions in a given text—the most important one is his (represented or imagined) relationship with Homer, to whom Hesiod was rather uniquely connected in the Greek imagination. There is a dynamic interaction between their representations that accounts for the fact that some aspects of Hesiod and his poems are forgotten, while others are highlighted and passed on.

The involvement of Homer in this study will thus help us to focus on the 'how' and 'why' of the collective memory of Hesiod, and not only on the actual 'what' of Hesiod's representation. This central concern for the process of memory is reflected in the organization of the book, which is divided into three Parts, each dealing with one particular type of relation between the *loci* Hesiod and Homer as found in our source texts: Hesiod when presented together with (i.e. comparable to) Homer, Hesiod when mentioned alone (i.e. without Homer in the immediate context), and Hesiod when presented in opposition to Homer. Fortunately, the reception of Homer—in contrast to that of Hesiod—has been the object of several rather large-scale studies, most of them quite recent;[27] to some degree, these studies have functioned as an example, and it is largely from them that I have taken the ancient image of Homer presupposed in this book. Even so, sometimes my own findings will argue for modification of Homer's image as well.

The second strategy is concerned with the use of recent theories on the psychological and especially social processes determining how memories are created.[28] Particularly useful to the present investigation are two concepts connected to the mnemonic process called 'periodization', i.e. mankind's tendency to divide the past into conventional blocks of history. In this process, certain historical data are grouped together since they are classified as belonging to the same 'block': this is the concept of assimilation or 'lumping'. It is such lumping that, for instance, has made modern scholars regard both Thales and Democritus as 'presocratics' (even though Democritus was a contemporary of Socrates and in fact even outlived him). By contrast, other data are separated by means of watershed

[27] In 1954 Mehmel could still claim that there were no studies on the relation between Homer and the Greeks (16), but fortunately things have changed. Especially useful books on the subject are Lamberton and Keaney (1992) and Graziosi (2002), which was a source of inspiration for the present study.

[28] For theories of mnemotechnics I am especially indebted to the (compact yet) extremely rich and stimulating book of Zerubavel (2003).

events: this is the concept of differentiation or 'splitting'. A good example of such a watershed is Alexander's campaign of conquest, which has created the modern notion of the 'classical' and the 'hellenistic' age as two conventional 'blocks' of history. As Zerubavel has shown, the concepts of 'intraperiodic lumping' (by which historical persons, events and currents are raked together under one heading) and its opposite, 'interperiodic splitting' (by which historical data are opposed by emphasizing the watershed(s) between them), to a large degree construct a people's history and identity.[29]

As it turns out, the concepts of 'lumping' and 'splitting' are extremely helpful in clarifying the collective memory of Hesiod, for they can also be applied to the constructs Hesiod and Homer. The dynamics underlying 'cutting up the past'—as Zerubavel calls this construction of history with 'an unmistakably social scalpel'[30]—and 'cutting up the poets' (so to speak) are essentially the same: both are mental acts, dependent on a social framework, organizing the past and thus shaping our present and our identity. In a manner very similar to the 'lumping' of historical data, the concepts Hesiod and Homer can be assimilated through emphasizing their similarities, or differentiated by exaggerating their dissimilarities and focusing on the distinctive features. As we will see, one ancient tradition in fact constructed such a lumped image, picturing Hesiod and Homer together, while another tradition would rather present a split picture of Hesiod and Homer as opposite concepts. Naturally, I do not wish to claim that there is an exact correspondence between the memory of past periods and that of dead poets, but the principles of remembering and forgetting are largely comparable. In the course of this book, this process will be examined in more detail.

The process of lumping and splitting is central to this book as a way of understanding the relationship between Hesiod and Homer. Apart from this process, some other mnemonic principles will be explored with regard to the reception of Hesiod alone. They are discussed in chapter 4 (on which see further below), but recur throughout the book.

[29] See ch. 1.1 for a more detailed discussion of such assimilation and differentiation.
[30] Zerubavel (2003) 96.

3. *This Book*

This study of the role of Hesiod in the Greek imagination presents an overview of Hesiodic reception in literary sources covering about one millennium. I have collected explicit references to Hesiod from texts dating from the seventh century BC to around 300 AD, searching through the works of about two hundred ancient authors of widely different calibre, including some twenty Roman writers; on rare occasions, epigraphic material and papyri have been used.[31] The sheer bulk of the references (about 1200 in total) has allowed me to track developments over time, and map the wider resonance of certain views. The regrettable but inevitable concomitant of such a scope is the focus on explicit references, and the rather general nature of my observations: an in-depth analysis and close reading of all the relevant passages turned out to be an impossible task, and the same goes for a thorough historical contextualization of all the sources.

Obviously, the large amount of data needed some form of classification in order to be meaningful. Two such criteria proved to be extremely useful in this respect. The first is the presence or absence of Homer, announced above, which provides the basic division of this book into three Parts, corresponding to the three distinct ways in which Hesiod appears in Greek literature: when associated with Homer, when alone (i.e. without Homer), and when opposed to Homer. These are the three fundamentally different Hesiods that can be found throughout antiquity, though not, it should be said beforehand, in equal measure. Of all the ancient references to Hesiod that I have collected, 31 percent in some way or another presents Hesiod and Homer together, 60 percent mentions Hesiod alone, while only 9 percent pictures the two poets as opposites. This unequal division may seem to cast doubt on my main hypothesis, but only apparently so: as we will see, mere numbers can only offer a quantitative indication, whereas the references themselves must always be examined in context. One reference in Plato, for instance, can be more

[31] Some collections of references were helpful in creating the database, such as those contained in Buzio (1938), West (1966) and (1978), and Most (2006), though all only partially so: Buzio's reception study only deals with the seventh to fourth century BC; the lists of *loci similes* in the editions of West (largely based on the labours of Rzach) mention only quotations (and no other references), and Most's selection of testimonia in the Loeb series appeared too late (though his admittedly incomplete collection still has much to offer, as it contains the greatest part of the most interesting references, including some very obscure ones).

important to (the construction of) Hesiod's image than ten references in the Homeric scholia. Moreover, the three different Hesiods interact and define each other: the image of Hesiod alone, for instance, is seriously influenced by the image of Hesiod when opposed to Homer—and such observations can never be gathered from quantification alone.

The Hesiod who is associated with Homer will be discussed first, for this Hesiod is conveniently familiar to us because of some extremely well-known passages that explicitly combine the two poets. At the same time, however, a fresh reading of these and other passages will demonstrate that this Hesiod has often been misunderstood, mostly through scholarly focus on Homer whenever the two poets are mentioned together. This Part will illustrate the use of my own particular methods and perspective, and in unsettling some modern notions of Hesiod paves the way to the second Part, which is concerned with Hesiod alone. This second Part will demonstrate, I hope, the validity of my tripartite approach, since we will clearly see how this second Hesiod differs from the first one. This Part will also show that Hesiod—even in contexts that treat of him alone—can never be wholly detached from Homer: even when Hesiod is at his most Hesiodic, the other poet still looms in the background. The second Part thus leads up naturally to the third and final Part, in which we shall see how these Hesiodic qualities change and radicalize when Hesiod is opposed to Homer.

Apart from this fundamental division in Parts, a second criterion is used to organize the material and further subdivide the book, and that is an ancient distinction of the qualities of the poet *qua* poet. When evaluating poetry, the Greeks themselves recognized that there were three more or less separate aspects concerning their poets' σοφία (a word often translated as 'wisdom' but perhaps here better understood as 'mental excellence'): 1) 'moral and educational integrity', 2) 'knowledge and factual accuracy', and 3) 'technical skill and aesthetic/emotional impact'.[32] In this study, these three categories or 'areas of mental competence' are translated as 1) the ethical and political orientation of the poets; 2) their status as knowers generally and philosophers in all but the ethical sense; and 3) the representation of their poetical skill and stylistic/aesthetic qualities. The different categories of σοφία are treated separately in the three Parts, at least as far as possible. The ethico-political quality of Hesiod, for instance, is first discussed when he is together with Homer (chapter 2),

[32] I borrow this neat description from Griffith (1990) 188–189, see also ch. 7, p. 249.

then when Hesiod is alone (5), and again later when he is opposed to Homer (8). In some cases, however, this convenient manner of organization had to be abandoned, as will be pointed out in the general outline of the book below.

The first Part, on Hesiod and Homer together, begins with an introductory chapter (1) dealing with the principle of 'assimilation'—not historical, as has been explained above, but applied to the poets—, and then proceeds to investigate how Hesiod and Homer were 'lumped' together in antiquity. We will see here that the role of Hesiod's poetry in society was comparable to that of Homer's poetry, and that it was natural for the Greeks to picture Hesiod as combined with Homer. Chapter 2 examines the combination of Hesiod and Homer more thoroughly and focuses on the ethico-religious importance of the poets (σοφία-type 1). We will find here that moral and religious authority is a quality that both defines and connects the poets to a very high degree. Hesiod and Homer are in this respect traditionally credited with extraordinary prescriptive powers, since they are often imagined as legislators. This exceptional status, however, elicits both positive and negative responses from Greeks who either follow or criticize (particular parts of) their poetry. Chapter 3 (on σοφία-type 2, philosophy and 'factual accuracy') focuses on the poets' reputation for historical and geographical knowledge, which sets the two apart from other literary sources. On the other hand, we will also see that in the field of philosophy proper Hesiod and Homer are a very rare combination. Instead of assimilation, we find differentiation here, an observation that looks ahead to chapters 6 and 9.

The second Part deals with Hesiod alone, and begins with a theoretical chapter (4) on the different factors that together make up the image of Hesiod in antiquity. We will find that the ultimate starting-point of Hesiod's reception, i.e. his poetry itself, in fact prevents 'infinite malleability'; a similarly restrictive factor is the connection between Hesiod's work and *vita* (or constructed 'life'), which appears to be closer than is usually believed. But there are other factors at play as well, for instance mnemonic processes such as lumping and splitting, and in this chapter an attempt is made to analyze them. Chapter 5 deals with the ethico-religious orientation of Hesiod when he is alone, which turns out to be largely political in nature (in the sense of 'connected to the polis'). The scope of this Hesiod's poetry, when seen from this perspective, narrows down to warnings against anti-social behaviour and the propagation of justice and reciprocity, characteristics that earn him the sobriquet 'wise'.

In this process, as we shall see, the original context of Hesiod's poetry, that of the small rural community, wholly disappears as his advice on reciprocal behaviour is updated and transformed to fit the new polis-based society. That the past is regularly adjusted to fit the present is also shown by chapter 6, which focuses on Hesiod's image as a philosopher. This Hesiod, we will find, was given shape as a rudimentary thinker concerned with the very things in which his recipients were primarily interested: physics and cosmology, epistemology and the gathering of knowledge, and the truthfulness of language. Through the same processes of memory that modernize and update the poet, he is formed so as to express a coherent and consistent philosophy.

The third Part, on the ancient opposition between Hesiod and Homer, begins with a discussion of the text that originally sparked my interest in the reception of Hesiod: the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (chapter 7). The brief discussion, I hope, furthers our understanding of this intriguing text, but is mostly meant as a way to highlight the most important differences between Hesiod and Homer as they were perceived in antiquity, i.e. differences with regard to content (fighting versus farming), ethico-political orientation (king versus people) and effect on the audience (reason versus emotion). The first two of these three differences are treated in chapter 8, which will focus on how Hesiod and Homer are employed as evaluative terms in a much wider cultural grid of social and political values. In this chapter, we will also see how certain Hesiodic features that had received little attention otherwise are amplified through the opposition with Homer. Hesiod, it turns out, 'radicalizes' by being opposed to Homer, an effect that we will encounter again in chapter 9 (the final chapter). As was indicated above, this chapter is different than the others because it examines all three Hesiods under the single heading of poetry and style; in the case of this most truly 'poetic' kind of σοφία, separate treatment would have been too strained, all the more so because the chapter on the poetic evaluation of Hesiod and Homer together would have been virtually empty: as it turns out, the poets *qua* poets are almost always constructed as antithetical, and it is often through opposition that Hesiod's poetic qualities are reinforced or defined. In this kind of σοφία most of all, Hesiod will prove to be 'the other poet'.

Obviously, the structure of the book reflects its main theme: the three fundamentally distinct ways the Greeks imagined and constructed the cultural icon Hesiod. But there are some other threads that run through the book as a whole. One of these is the state of modern scholarship

and its relation to ancient views. Even though this is a book about the place of Hesiod in the ancient Greek imagination, all chapters deal with the views of modern scholars, often by presenting a short *status quaestionis* in the first paragraph. The modern views discussed do not only concern the reception of Hesiod (and, to a lesser degree, of Homer), but also deal with Hesiod and his poems themselves. I believe it is worthwhile to occasionally compare ancient and modern views and interpretations of Hesiod; in some cases, we will find that modern readers know nothing more or better than the Greeks themselves. Furthermore, comparing ancient and modern readings reveals that *all* reception and interpretation are liable to the same sort of fluctuations over time; in order to demonstrate this, relatively much attention will be paid to a somewhat older layer of Hesiodic scholarship (from about 1930 to 1975), which can than be compared with more recent notions.

Another main thread is my occasional problem with modern scholarship's focus on Homer, a characteristic I will refer to as 'Homerocentrism'. Throughout the book I will argue that Homer should not only be regarded as a foil to Hesiod, defining his image, but that the dynamic relationship between them works the other way around as well, at least to some degree. In earliest times, Hesiod was almost Homer's peer, of near-equal standing and importance; and even though this status slowly (but irrevocably) diminished over time, his poetry was in antiquity never regarded as the relatively uninteresting quasi-epic that modern scholars often (implicitly rather than explicitly) made of it in the 20th century, and occasionally still do. We will see, however, that Homerocentrism, understandable as it may seem, sometimes unnecessarily and incorrectly downplays or 'forgets' Hesiod, in certain cases leading to serious misinterpretation. In a sense, my own approach to study the ancient reception of Hesiod in relation to Homer may seem Homerocentric as well; but it is in fact a re-appraisal of this relation which will, I hope, put Hesiod in his own and proper place, and avoid undue focus on Homer.[33]

[33] I will briefly illustrate what I mean with 'undue focus'. Homerocentrism in most cases simply leads to Homer receiving a disproportionate amount of attention. This is what happens, for instance, in Brenk's (1986) study of demonology, a subject on which Hesiod is a very important source; nonetheless, Brenk spends ten pages to discuss Homer, and glosses over Hesiod in only one paragraph. Another example is Libanius-translator Norman rendering Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ὅμηρος as 'Homer and Hesiod' (Lib. *Or*. 16.46). In other cases Hesiod is simply overlooked. Collins (2004), for instance, in his recent study on competition in Greek poetry, says of Isocrates' reference to Homer and Hesiod (*Panath*. 18 and 33) that 'for the most part, the attacks of Plato, Xenophon, and, indirectly, Isocrates, are limited to a rhapsode's ability to understand and interpret Homer' (221 n.9), apparently forgetting that Hesiod is mentioned in the very passage he is commenting

The last of the main threads running through the book as a whole is the story of the slow disappearance of Hesiod. In the archaic and early classical period, Hesiod and Homer stand side by side, as poets of almost equal status and importance; slowly but surely, however, Homer becomes the Greek cultural icon *par excellence*, so much so that during the Second Sophistic he is even generally regarded as the authority on themes and subjects that were traditionally associated with Hesiod. This development is caused by several things, notably Plato's concept of inspiration and Aristotle's notion of poetic craftsmanship, which are further discussed in the final chapter.

I will conclude this section with three remarks concerning the nature of the ancient sources in this book and the way I have dealt with them. First of all: I treat as references to Hesiod those ancient text passages that either explicitly mention his name or his works, obviously quote him, or otherwise allude to him in a way that makes it clear beyond reasonable doubt that Hesiod is indeed referred to.[34] This is not because I do not believe in more structural, more implicit or generally more sophisticated references—on the contrary, such references abound in Greek literature, and a good example of the benefit of their study both for the understanding of Hesiod in particular and of reception in general is provided by the recent collection of articles published as *Plato and Hesiod*.[35] It is the scope of the present study, however, which has largely prevented me from finding or paying much attention to such references to Hesiod; the result is an inevitably large blind spot, which most regrettably includes virtually all

---

upon. (This type of Homerocentrism is in fact quite frequent. See also e.g. Else (1986) 12 stating that the *Symposium* honours Homer for his legacy (though Hesiod is also mentioned in *Symp*. 209c–e, the passage he quotes), and Zeitlin (2001) 204 saying 'Greek intellectuals' pointed to Homer (together with Musaeus and Orpheus) as 'founders of civilization and masters of *paideia*.') In more extreme cases, Hesiod is wholly absorbed by Homer, losing all individuality; thus Mehmel claims that Heraclitus dislikes Homer for his polymathy, although Heraclitus in fact attributes that quality to Hesiod (Mehmel 1954 21). In such cases, our disproportional focus on Homer distorts the ancient picture.

[34] I generally count as references those passages that apart from a certain thematic resemblance copy at least two words from the Hesiodic source text. I mostly follow ancient sources claiming that an author referred to Hesiod (as for instance Plu. *Mor*. 275A claims that Antimachus (fr. 51 Matthews) 'follows' Hesiod), although they can be over-quick to regard something as a reference (see for instance the scholia and Suda calling Ar. *Pl*. 253 a parody of *WD* 41). I do not include passages taking over certain historical, geographical, or genealogical data in Hesiod without the above-mentioned textual reinforcement.

[35] Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010).

of tragedy.[36] I do not presume to have written 'a full history of Hesiod's Nachleben';[37] I do presume, however, to have found almost all explicit references to Hesiod in antiquity, and to present a fair account of them.

The second point concerns the quantity of the references. As we will see in the next section, the number of references to any Hesiodic verse (or group of verses) is on the whole rather small, perhaps even disappointingly so. Most verses in Hesiod's poems are never referred to at all, and the verses that *are* mentioned by later Greeks are usually referred to only once or twice. Only some fifty verses or so are (much) more popular. Such small numbers naturally raise questions concerning their value: if a verse is mentioned twice, it could be a matter of chance instead of something significant. Determining the value of such references must thus always go beyond mere quantification and include an examination of their context, which is what the present study in fact aims to do. Nonetheless, numbers can occasionally be revealing, indicating larger trends that would perhaps go unnoticed in studies with a more specific focus. This holds especially true when the numbers are all integrated into one overview, as is the case with the figures and the table presented in the next section.

Third and finally: in dealing with references to Greek (or Latin) I have always provided a translation as well. When no further reference is given, the translation is taken from the Loeb series (except those of Plato and Aristotle, for which I used the editions of Cooper and Barnes, respectively). In some cases, I adapted translations, and sometimes I produced translations of my own; this is always indicated in the notes.

4. *Getting started: The Commemograms*

In order to get a preliminary idea of the scope and focus of Hesiod's reception I have created two so-called 'commemograms'. The term commemogram is used by Zerubavel for a diagram indicating which dates in a people's history are annually celebrated. It is a visual way of demonstrating what periods are (ritually or ceremonially) remembered, considered important, and are thus 'identitätsfundierend'; Zerubavel speaks

[36] Occasionally, however, I did find a place for some of the more implicit references (i.e. the references that do not meet the criteria set out in n.34 above) that I chanced upon in the course of my research.

[37] See Solmsen (1949) 103–106 for his view on what such a history should look like.

of 'mnemonic density'.[38] By way of introduction, I have fashioned commemograms of the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, which indicate which lines are quoted and how often. In these commemograms, the 'sacred mountains and profane valleys' will reveal not on which periods 'nations are most intensely focused mnemonically',[39] as is the case with Zerubavel's diagrams, but which of Hesiod's verses were considered most memorable, and, of course, which were virtually forgotten. It should be noted that *both* are of great interest to our investigation:[40] the image of Hesiod is to a large degree constituted by the passages that are quoted and so passed on. In fact, the commemograms of Hesiod's works show some remarkable mountains and valleys, and as such provide a good introduction to a more detailed study of Hesiod's reception.

In the following two figures, the horizontal axis indicates the line numbers of the poems, while the number of references are given on the vertical axis. To keep the commemograms from becoming too abstract, the different parts of the poems (divided according to a modern understanding of them) are indicated in the alternating light and dark planes as explained in the legend below. The first figure presents an overview of the so-called mountains and valleys of the *Theogony*, the second of the *Works and Days*.

It is immediately obvious from the commemograms that the references to the *Theogony* are far less numerous than those to the *Works and Days* (see on this further below). Secondly, the references to the *Works and Days* are spread far more evenly than those to the *Theogony*. In figure 1, there is one considerable peak around the verses dealing with Chaos and the beginning of the universe (line 116–120), and some attention focusing on the proem (containing Hesiod's tale of how he met the Muses) and on the part dealing with the gods who are born immediately after Heaven and Earth; the rest of the poem, however, is apparently considered far less quote-worthy and is thus almost wholly given up to oblivion. No attention is paid to the story of the birth of Zeus, almost none to the hymn on Hecate, and surprisingly little to Zeus' fight with the Titans or with Typhoeus. This extremely narrow focus is rather consistent through time. If the *Theogony* is a poem about Zeus' rise to power, as is often supposed by modern scholars,[41] that is apparently not how the Greeks remembered it.

---

[38] Zerubavel (2003) 25–26.
[39] Zerubavel (2003) 28. See for his commemograms in general 25–34.
[40] See also Gross (2000) on the importance of forgetting.
[41] So e.g. Nelson (1998) 43 *et passim*.




Fig. 1. References to the *Theogony* in antiquity (700 BC–300 AD)

Legend
a – Proem (1–115)
b – Chaos & the First Gods (116–122)
c – Offspring of Gaia and Uranus (123–153)
d – Castration of Ouranos (154–210)
e – Offspring of Night (211–232)
f – Offspring of Pontos and Gaia (233–336)
g – Offspring of Ocean and Thetys (337–370)
h – Offspring of other Titans (371–414)
i – Praise of Hecate (415–452)
j – Birth of Zeus (453–506)
k – Zeus and Prometheus (507–616)
l – Titanomachy (617–731)
m – Tartarus (732–819)
n – Zeus and Typhoeus (820–880)
o – Unions of Gods and Women (881–962)
p – Unions of Goddesses and Men (963–1020)

References to the *Works and Days* are spread more evenly, and the valleys and mountains are less outspoken. This broader view seems to be consistent through time as well (even though the data for the archaic and hellenistic period are rather scanty), which perhaps points to a fuller and more inclusive knowledge of the *Works and Days*. Nevertheless, certain passages are still notably more 'dense' than others: there is more interest in the passages dealing with the two Erides, with Justice, with successful living and with advice on marriage and other matters; there is less attention to the tale of the five races, to the advice on farming and the seasons, and there are almost no references to the section on good and bad days—the *Works and Days* thus seems to be not primarily remembered for their works and days. This is a striking observation which must be accounted for. Another interesting observation concerns the *place* of the peaks: quite a few correspond rather neatly to the 'joints' of our modern division of the poem. This may indicate that the Greeks too (and perhaps in a way similar to us) thought of the *Works and Days* as a complex poem dealing with many different themes.[42]

[42] Incidentally, the commemogram of the *Th.* also 'peaks' at such a joint; cf. Hunter (2008) 154 on *Th.* 115–116 as 'the beginning of 'the poem proper."




Fig. 2. References to the *Works and Days* in antiquity (700 BC–300 AD)

Legend
a – Prayer to Zeus and the Muses (1–10)
b – Two Kinds of Eris (11–41)
c – The cause of Ponos (42–105)
d – The Five Races (106–201)
e – The Hawk and the Nightingale (202–212)
f – Justice (213–285)
g – Rules on Work and Life (286–382)
h – Farming: Times and Tools (383–447)
i – Plowing, Sowing, Harvesting (448–492)
j – Seasons and Activities (493–617)
k – Commerce and Seafaring (618–694)
l – Marriage and other Advice (695–764)
m – Good and Bad Days (765–828)

A final word concerns the quantity of the references. The *Works and Days* appears to be the more popular poem since the references to it outnumber those to the *Theogony* by more than 2 to 1: the commemograms feature 554 references to the *Works and Days* against 239 to the *Theogony*. Even though quantification alone should be treated with caution, such numbers at least appear as evidence against the notion that the Greeks considered the *Theogony* as Hesiod's most important poem. It is also interesting to subdivide these numbers from a diachronic perspective, as is done in the following table:[43]

Table 1: distribution of references to Hesiod through time

	Archaic	Classical	Hellenistic	2nd Sophistic
Works and Days	37 (8 %)	97 (18 %)	48 (9 %)	344 (65 %)
Theogony	5 (2 %)	26 (11 %)	49 (21 %)	158 (66 %)

[43] In this table the Roman references (25 to the *WD* and 1 to the *Th.*) are left out.

Two observations are directly evident. First, the number of references rises through time, becoming disproportionally large during the generally quote-eager Second Sophistic (in both cases, about two thirds).[44] Second, something unique happens during the Hellenistic period: the number of references to the *Works and Days* decreases, while the *Theogony* is mentioned more often. The numbers suggest that this is the only period in which Hesiod's poems are considered equally important.

As has been stressed several times, the commemograms are based on numbers that have come about within certain parameters, and this means they are of limited value for the understanding of Hesiod's reception. They leave out the context, do not indicate the relative importance of a reference, and do not show how one reference relates to another, in short: they do not explain anything. Nevertheless, the commemograms can be of use, because they do show rather clearly that some parts of Hesiod are forgotten, while others are remembered; they suggest that ancient concepts of Hesiod may be very different from ours; and, perhaps most importantly, they provide us with a preliminary overview of the material and the first clues to our investigation. As such, the commemograms form a good introduction to a more in-depth study of the ancient collective memory of Hesiod.

[44] It should be borne in mind that the numbers in table 1 do not contradict the earlier-mentioned trend of Hesiod's growing unimportance *in relation to Homer*; even though the number of references to Hesiod during the Second Sophistic is extraordinarily high, the number of references to Homer in this period was much higher.

PART ONE

HESIOD AND HOMER

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: EQUATING HESIOD AND HOMER

0. *Introduction*

Martin West begins the Prolegomena to his monumental commentary on the *Theogony* with a motto taken from Zimmern: 'Besides Homer, there is Hesiod'.[1] The motto is aptly chosen at the head of an enterprise devoted to demonstrating that Greek oral poetry consists of more than the heroic poems of Homer alone: 'Hesiod's *Theogony*, no less than the *Iliad*, is a representative of an ancient and widespread type'.[2] West's introductory remarks are clearly meant as a (timely) call to widen our view beyond Homer, and understand Hesiod on his own terms.

I hope West will not take it amiss when I point to the ambiguity of Zimmern's words, which taken by themselves could equally well mean the complete opposite, namely that Hesiod belongs at Homer's *side*, as if they were two of a kind, or some inseparable duo. It is with this particular conception of Hesiod, i.e. as a poet equated with Homer, that Part One is concerned. In this Part we will examine the representation of Hesiod when he is mentioned together with Homer, i.e. contexts in which both poets are coupled so as to form some sort of unity. Some well-known examples are Xenophanes' attack on the anthropomorphic representation of the gods by 'Homer and Hesiod', or Herodotus' claim that 'Hesiod and Homer' gave the Greeks their religion.[3] Throughout this study I will use the terms 'together' and 'comparable' to denote this type of relationship.

In Part One I will investigate what caused the Greeks to picture Hesiod and Homer together, what their purposes were in doing so, and in what specific respects the two poets were imagined to be comparable. These questions will be addressed in chapters 2 and 3, where we will find

---

[1] The quote is from Zimmern (1915) 91. Fowler (2004b) 225 echoes the quote, but probably unwittingly.

[2] West (1966) 1.

[3] Xenoph. DK 21 B 11, Hdt. *Hist*. 2.53 (see on both more in ch. 2).

that the coupling of Hesiod and Homer goes hand in hand with their representation as educators, teachers of ethics and authorities on religion. We will see that the assimilation with Homer thoroughly affects the presentation of Hesiod, not only with regard to the themes and subjects ascribed to him, but also in the way he is treated. To give just one example: when Hesiod is together with Homer, he provokes far more negative responses.

In this chapter, however, I will not yet discuss the actual dynamics underlying the equation of Hesiod and Homer. First, it is necessary to (briefly) set out the theoretical background against which the first Part should be understood—in its barest essence, the theory of historical assimilation and differentiation derived from cultural memory studies but applied in a radically different way. This is the subject of the first section. In the second section, we will turn our attention to modern scholarship and give a short overview of how scholars from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards have understood the relationship between Hesiod and Homer.

In the third and final section, we will take a preliminary look at the ancient coupling of Hesiod and Homer. Instead of going into their thematic association, which will be left to chapters 2 and 3, we will focus on some of the other ways the Greeks connected Hesiod and Homer: for instance, the biographical tradition that placed the two poets in the same age and sometimes even the same family, and the sources that give their work a comparable place in Greek society. Perhaps of greatest interest here are the conscious efforts to harmonize Hesiod and Homer, and the more or less explicit indications for an ancient belief that their poems belonged to the same genre. Taken together, these three sections will give us the necessary background before we start investigating the thematic connections between the two poets.

1. *Lumping and Splitting*

In this section I will briefly set out how some of the theories and observations from the field of cultural memory studies can be employed to elucidate the ancient reception of Hesiod and its relation to Homer. Even though the dynamic interplay between two cultural icons has never (to my knowledge) been the object of any study in this field, cultural memory studies do provide some valuable insights and methods directly relevant to the present investigation.

As has been said in the introduction, cultural memory studies operate on the premise that memory of both individuals *and* communities is socially structured. Of greatest interest to our concern are two observations: 1) people tend to fit data from the past into certain culturally determined schemata, as demonstrated from the fact that the past is structured and narrated according to formulaic plotlines that are limited in number; and 2) remembering is informed by social norms of remembrance that to a large degree define what we should remember or forget.[4] These two mechanisms explain how we can 'cut up the past' into supposedly discrete periods, as Zerubavel phrases it,[5] and organize the whole of our past into conventional blocks of history that lead up to the here and now—and so explain who we are today.

In his chapter on historical discontinuity, Zerubavel shows how such periodization takes place: through the principles of assimilation and differentiation the differences between certain historical data—such as persons, events and movements—are downplayed, with the result that they coagulate into one conceptual whole. By contrast, the differences between certain other historical data are exaggerated, which leads to periodical boundaries. This is what Zerubavel calls 'intraperiodic lumping' and 'interperiodic splitting'.[6] For instance: because of our concept of the Middle Ages, Augustine and Chaucer are assimilated even though they are 900 years apart ('lumping'), while the discovery of America in 1492 creates an enormous conceptual rift (or 'watershed', as Zerubavel calls it) between the years 1491 and 1493 ('splitting').[7] We can compare, for instance, the 'lumping' of Archilochus and Solon (both situated in the archaic period), and the watershed commonly attributed to the activities of Socrates (resulting in the awkward term 'presocratics').

What is most relevant to us is the arbitrary or relative nature of this kind of 'social punctuation of the past'.[8] We need to see that conventional blocks are created from a present-day perspective and fulfill a certain present-day need for viewing the past. For instance, our concept of the 'classical period' conforms to the so-called 'rise and decline'-plotline we conveniently impose on antiquity, according to which one period

[4] See Introduction, p. 2.
[5] Zerubavel (2003) 96.
[6] Zerubavel (2003) 87.
[7] The examples are taken from Zerubavel (2003) 86–88.
[8] Zerubavel (2003) 83.

is regarded as the most interesting one; consequently, those before are labeled 'preliminary' or 'archaic', and those that come after as 'late' or 'decadent' (in a literal sense). A different perspective, however, or a different present-day need, can cause the re-drawing of boundaries and reconstruction of conventional blocks. For instance, the term 'presocratics' is nowadays (rightly) thought to be imprecise and even misleading, and the flourishing study of late antiquity has (rightly) argued for investigating that period in its own right.

I suggest that the theory of assimilation and differentiation can be of great help to our investigation. The principles that Zerubavel connects with historical periods we can connect *mutatis mutandis* to the poets as cultural icons. In the sources, Hesiod and Homer are sometimes differentiated or 'split': the differences between them are highlighted in order to present them as separate. Far more often, on the other hand, differences are downplayed or ignored altogether, and the poets appear as one 'block', so to speak. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that this '*personic* lumping', which is the subject of Part One, often coincides with a *historical* notion of coupling Hesiod and Homer as representatives of a long-gone age: it is especially Hesiod and Homer who the Greeks called 'the ancients' (οἱ ἀρχαῖοι or παλαιοί).[9]

The precise dynamics of assimilation will be further examined in chapters 2 and 3, where it will be shown when Hesiod and Homer are lumped together, on what grounds, in what contexts and to what purposes. First, however, we shall take a look at the lumping and splitting done by modern scholars.

2. *Modern Scholarship*

It has long been customary for modern scholarship to present a 'split' image of Hesiod and Homer. It is especially the standard reference books on Greek literature that vividly present the differences, which are exaggerated in order to make such splitting possible. I have found that the most important criteria of differentiation employed are quality, outlook, intent, subject matter, and the individuality of the author. I will now briefly illustrate these with examples from some of the best-known handbooks and other literature.

[9] See section 3.1 below, pp. 40–46.

The first area concerns the sheer quality of the poems. Schmid-Stählin (1929), who subdivide the chapter on *Das Epos* into *Das Epos in Ionien* and *Epos und Lehrgedicht im Mutterland*, say that 'der dankbarsten Gegenstände mutterländischer Sagenüberlieferung haben sich, bevor das Mutterland zu Wort kam, die ionischen Sänger bemächtigt und haben sie, vermischt mit allerlei neuen Motiven, in ihre grossen glänzenden epischen Prachtbauten eingegliedert'.[10] According to the handbook, these poems were transmitted to the mainland by the Homeridae, because 'es ist nicht wahrscheinlich, dass sie im Mutterland viel eigene künstlerische Initiative vorfanden'.[11] West too is very outspoken when comparing Hesiod and Homer with with regard to craftsmanship: 'It is as if an artisan with his big, awkward fingers were patiently, fascinatedly, imitating the fine seam of the professional tailor'.[12] There is in fact an almost endless list of more or less harshly derogatory remarks on Hesiod's relatively poor poetical capabilities.[13]

As for outlook: Lesky remarks that Homer and Hesiod were often taken together in antiquity (although he does not mention their ancient opposition), and then claims that 'in Wahrheit überwiegt dem Verbindenden gegenüber, wie es sich im Versmaß, epischer Sprache und rhapsodischer Tradition darstellt, weitaus das Trennende, das Hesiod sozial

---

[10] Schmid-Stählin (1929) 246.

[11] *Ibid*. The inferiority of mainland or Hesiodic poetry is here as elsewhere taken as an indication of Homeric priority (for a similar view in antiquity see below, pp. 42–43); such reasoning is rightly rejected by e.g. Martin (1984) 29 and Lamberton (1988) 21–22.

[12] West (1966) 73.

[13] See for instance Van Lennep (1823) iii '… there is no way of denying that the poetic merits of Homer, in variety, power and brilliance, exceed those of Hesiod' (my translation of the Dutch original); Banks (1879) x calls the *Th*. 'coarser and less delicate' than Homer; Paley (1883) v–vi 'Hesiod is eclipsed by Homer both in the choice of a subject and the treatment of it'—he describes the *WD* as 'matter-of-fact and unimpassioned poetry' and the *Th*. as 'certainly a dull poem' (*ibid*.), 'a compendium of dogmatic theology' (*ibid*.); Robert (1905) 472 finds Hesiod in comparison to the Ionians 'stammelnd' and without 'Anmut'; Aly (1913b) 30 calls the *WD* and *Th*. 'echte Flickpoesie'; Thomson (1914) 89 'who does not feel that [Hesiod's style] is not only a less masterly but a less developed thing than the art of Homer?'; Wilamowitz (1916) 473 speaks of a 'Disharmonie' between Hesiod's 'Begabung' and the Homeric form; Sellschopp (1934) 54 'Hesiod war kein Erzähler, ihm steht die Kunst der Darstellung nicht in dem Masse zur Verfügung, wie manchem homerischen Dichter'; Myres (1958) 19 describes the *Th*. as 'declining at times into a mere list of names, conventional and often prosaic in style'; Rose (1961) 58 'not of the transcendent genius of Homer, but of great talent'; Von Fritz (1962) 45 'es ist sehr oft wirklich Ungeschicklichkeit und Unbeholfenheit'; Sinclair (1966) xi 'such was his enthusiasm for his subject that he almost succeeded in writing a fine poem'; Mondi (1986) 25 calls Hesiod's compositional technique 'unrefined'. These examples must suffice here.

und geistig in eine andersgeartete Welt verweist.'[14] The poets are, according to Lesky, separated not so much because of any 'Entwicklung in der Zeit', but 'vielmehr hören wir bei Hesiod deshalb Anderes und Neues, weil er geographisch und sozial in einem völlig anderen Bereiche wurzelt'. Hesiod is 'so unionisch wie nur möglich'.[15]

Other factors of differentiation are subject matter and the intent attributed to Hesiod and Homer. Perhaps the most well-established and widespread notion concerning these poets is that Hesiodic poetry distinguishes itself 'essentiellement' from its Homeric counterpart because 'elle est didactique'.[16] Hesiod is commonly believed to be more reflective, and, according to Rose, 'is not trying to entertain, but rather to edify'.[17] This distinction is of course closely linked to the subject matter treated by Homer and Hesiod: while Homer is generally characterized as the war poet *par excellence*, the absence of martial themes in Hesiod's poetry is often stressed, sometimes leading to somewhat exaggerated claims.[18] It is easy to see how Hesiod and Homer could be opposed as the creators of *Gedankenepik* versus *Tatenepik*.[19]

---

[14] Lesky (1971) 113. Lesky does not treat Hesiod and Homer under the same heading: Homer features in the chapter on *Das homerische Epos*, while Hesiodic poetry makes out the first section of the next chapter on *Die archaische Zeit*.

[15] *Ibid*. See also Paley (1883) xii–xiii on Homer, 'the representative of the Asiatic and Ionic phase of life, and Hesiod, of the European and Hellenic', and Geffcken (1926) 58: despite the fact that Hesiod resembles Homer in language, 'ist er doch ein Mensch von anderer Rasse, von verschiedener dichterischer Struktur, erwachsen unter einem anderen Himmel, in anderen äusseren Verhältnissen, in einer völlig verschiedenen archaisch-religiösen Umwelt'. Mehmel (1954) 19 contrasts the 'homerische Welt', 'gelöster, lockerer, fast wie spielerisch, frei, oft unmoralisch, ohne Ernst, frivol—von einem freien menschlichen, geradezu aufklärerischen Geist durchdrungen' with 'der biedere, etwas schwerfällige, moralische und religiöse, nach Sinn und Nutzen fragende Ernst des böotischen Festlandsgriechen Hesiod'. Levy (1963) following the work of the anthropologist Redfield distinguishes between a 'great tradition', to which the bulk of the Homeric poems belongs, and a 'little tradition' which he calls the 'culture of the country folk'. See further ch. 8.2, pp. 267–284.

[16] Croiset (1910) 458.

[17] Rose (1961) 63; for more on the difference between heroic and didactic epic see ch. 9.

[18] Marsilio (2000) 59 suggests that there were 'two rival traditions: unlike the heroic poet's choice of 'war' (πόλεμος) as a subject, Hesiod composes poetry that exalts the spirit of 'work' (ἔργον).' Polarization sometimes leads to over-simplification; see the claim of e.g. Wade-Gery (1949) 91 that 'Hesiod is almost unique in Greece' because he 'practically never mentions war', or Hesiod's characterization by Kaczynska (1998) 45 as 'a Boeotian farmer, for whom all war-struggles are quite strange'; there is plenty of war and violence in the *Th*. and the fragments, especially of the *Catalogue*; cf. p. 279 n. 47.

[19] Geffcken (1926) 63.

The three 'watersheds' mentioned above—outlook, intent, and subject matter (and probably, more or less implicitly, quality too)—have made scholars doubt whether the poems of Hesiod and Homer belong to the same genre: François, for instance, discusses the use of the words θεός and δαίμων in Homer and Hesiod under separate headings, one called 'la poésie épique' and the other 'la poésie Hésiodique'.[20] The problem of classification, however, is usually solved by assuming an ancient common poetic tradition to have branched off into two distinct types or 'schools', one heroic, Ionian and Homeric, and the other that of Hesiod: 'the Boeotian school of poetry with its emphasis on catalogues, genealogies, concern for the daily realities of practical life [which] reflects the non-heroic aspects of Achaean oral poetry.'[21] The Boeotian School theory, traced to Grote by Myres and to Mure by Havelock,[22] attracted many scholars and still finds numerous adherents—it is a neat middle-ground position that explains similarities between the two poets and at the same time allows for significant differences due to (more or less) independent development.[23]

As to the fifth criterium: much has always been made of Hesiod's individuality, which is inflated so as to form a powerful contrast with the anonymous voice of Homer. The fact that Hesiod mentions himself in line 22 of the *Theogony* has often been interpreted in celebratory terms: Hesiod is hailed as the world's first fully self-aware poet, breaking away from Homeric anonymity, telling us with pride about a historically true personal experience.[24] The autobiographical statements in the *Works*

---

[20] François (1957) 21 and 56; they are the headings of chapters counting 35 and 2 pages, respectively. See also the handbook of Rose (1961), whose second chapter is called *Homer and the Ancient Epic*, and the third *Hesiod and the Hesiodic Schools*.

[21] These summarizing words are those of Notopoulos (1960) 191.

[22] Myres (1958) 91; Havelock (1963) 111 n.2. On the Boeotian school see also Pinsent (1985).

[23] See e.g. Thomson (1914) 89, who contrasts the 'ideally treated saga-stuff' with the 'long lists of mnemonic precepts for the farmer and generations of gods and heroes'; Rose (1961) 57–79 (esp. 67–69), Renehan (1980) 93, Lamberton (1988) 83–84; Dupont (1999) 61 saying that 'the rhapsodes of Boeotia put together a panhellenic theogony for Greece, that is to say a theological epic, under the name Hesiod'.

[24] See e.g. Aly (1913a) vi 'Die erste Persönlichkeit der griechischen Literatur, die uns in greifbarer Deutlichkeit entgegentritt, ist Hesiodos von Askra' (the very first line of his *Einleitung*); Trever (1924) 167 on the *WD*: 'if ever there was a piece of literature that had the personality of its author indelibly stamped upon every page, it is this poem'; Cadoux (1929) and Latimer (1930) take all details in Hesiod's poems as historical; Sellschopp (1934) 41 'Wir können hier zum ersten Male eine Persönlichkeit in ihrer historischen Gebundenheit erkennen'; Falter (1934) 14 'so streift er die Unpersönlichkeit der bisherigen Epiker ab und in voller Persönlichkeit vor den Kreis seiner Zuhörer hintretend erzählt

and Days have greatly strengthened this view of Hesiod as a historical 'Mensch von Fleisch und Blut';[25] many scholars took the poet's self-referential remarks at face value and devoted their attention to a detailed reconstruction of the particulars of Hesiod's life, especially his relationship to his brother and father, both assumed to be historical persons as well.[26] This firm belief in the historicity and individuality of Hesiod has at times led to far-going (and utterly unverifiable) speculations, such as those of Kambylis, who claims that Hesiod did not leave Ascra often, or of Marsilio, who suggests that Hesiod's father had wanted to become a poet but failed.[27]

To sum up: when the differences between Homer and Hesiod are focused on and blown up, Hesiod is pictured as the 'Antipode Homers', making any comparison between them 'ganz unzulässig; Homers und Hesiods Epik ist nicht in einem Atem zu nennen'.[28] Moreover, this split image is further enhanced by the almost universally acknowledged—though basically unverifiable—notion that Hesiodic poetry is younger than the Homeric poems.[29] Of course there have been several studies

---

er stolz seine Berufung und Weihe zum Dichter'; Jaeger (1945) 62–64; Latte (1946b) 152; Diller (1946) 141–142; Wade-Gery (1949) 81 'the first Greek poet to break the tradition of anonymousness and to talk about his own concerns'; Hesiod even 'delights in talking about himself', 84; Kirk (1962) 94 'he had a new awareness of himself as a person, as a poet, and as a Boeotian poet'; Havelock (1963) 97; Kumaniecki (1963) 86; Maehler (1963) 35 'Die neue Haltung ist gekennzeichnet durch seine durchaus unhomerische Selbstauffassung und das Verhältis zu seinem eigenem Dichtertum'; Kambylis (1965) 16 (the first 'über sich selbst und seine Kunst reflektierender Künstler'); Will (1965) 556 (what Hesiod tells us is not part of a 'thème littéraire', 'mais porte la marque de la réalité individuelle et vécue'); Häussler (1973) 120; Østerud (1976) 13; Fakas (2001) 50. West (1978) 33 argues that since the autobiographical information is 'dragged a little clumsily', 'we cannot help but believe what we are told' (cf. Cadoux 1929 261 claiming that 'the invention of such unwelcome details [i.e. the family drama of Perses] is in the last degree unlikely'); see also Most (1991), who argues for a protreptic function of the autobiographical information.

[25] Wilamowitz (1928) 161.

[26] See for a detailed discussion of the autobiographical reading Stoddard (2004) 1–33.

[27] Kambylis (1965) 47; Marsilio (2000) 37–39. There have also been some attempts to define the occasion for the performance of the poems. Jensen (1966) 10, for instance, believes the *WD* to have been the actual defence plea held by Hesiod in the historical trial against Perses, and claims that 'Hesiod may actually be guilty'; Wade-Gery (1949) 87 suggested that the poem recited by Hesiod in Chalcis (see *WD* 654–655) was the *Th.* (he is followed by e.g. West 1966 44–45 (and 1977 32), Janko 1982 94, Pucci 2009 55 and Clay 2009 86); according to Walcot (1960) 39 that poem may have been the *Catalogue*.

[28] Geffcken (1926) 62–63.

[29] Cf. Graziosi (2002) 104 speaking of a 'modern prejudice in favour of Homer's authority and antiquity', and Rosen (1997) 464–473. Some scholars, such as Wilamowitz

devoted to finding solid evidence for the priority of Homer over Hesiod,[30] but none of these have presented a clear and cogent case (which can incidentally also be said of the opposite argument, i.e. that Hesiod is the older poet).[31] But the notion still remains, though to a large degree assumed tacitly and left implicit—witness the many handbooks on ancient literature, introductions to ancient philosophy, articles on ancient thought or beliefs, studies on semantics, which all begin with Homer and after that treat Hesiod, suggesting a chronological sequence.[32] Much has also been written on the ways in which Hesiod presupposes Homer and supposedly responded to Homeric poetry.[33]

It is the combination of the split image and the notion of posteriority that have often caused scholars to present the relationship between Hesiod and Homer in terms of chronological development; this is true for all of the five criteria just mentioned. Much attention has been paid, for instance, to Hesiod's developed sense of justice, which is supposedly better suited to a more polis-centered society: his gods have a high moral standard (at least when compared to the morally neutral gods of the *Iliad*), and Hesiod's view on ethics is comparatively modern.[34] As for

---

(1916), Sellschopp (1934) and Wade-Gery (1949), believed Hesiod came after the *Iliad* but before the *Odyssey*; Finley (1979) 31 thinks Hesiod was 'a generation or two' later than the *Iliad* but contemporary with the *Odyssey*.

[30] See e.g. Edwards (1971), Neitzel (1975), Tsagarakis (1986).

[31] The chief adherent of this view is West (1966) 40–48, who names Bethe as the only one to have held this view before (47 n.1); in his edition of the *WD* he mentions Heitsch and Burkert as possible allies for the minority view (1978 vi).

[32] Books and articles with both poets in the title usually put Homer first; see below, p. 55.

[33] See e.g. Sihler (1902) xxx, saying that 'it is difficult not to conceive these [= Homeric] epics as a *fait accompli* when the Hesiodean poetry was making'; Jaeger (1945) 60, who states that 'Hesiod knew Homer's poetry from his youth, before he became a professional rhapsode (. . .). Every subject that he treats automatically enters the already fixed Homeric pattern'; Wade-Gery (1949) 92 speaking of Hesiod's 'profound' reaction to the *Iliad*; Sale (1961); Krafft (1963) 84 *et passim* mentions Hesiod's conscious 'Anklänge' to the Homeric poems; Verdenius (1983) 28 '[Hesiod] was in a position to compare different kinds of poetry, the narrative style of Homer and his own didactic style'; Tsagalis (2006) 93 *et passim* discussing 'Homeric echoes'. That the *idée fixe* of Homeric priority is hard to escape, is well exemplified by Lamberton, who in his 1988 monograph on Hesiod argues that the question of priority cannot be solved, while in his 1986 study on Homer (5 n.10) he still claimed that 'Hesiod (*Th.* 36–38) adapts the description of Calchas' wisdom to describe that of the Muses'.

[34] See e.g. Geffcken (1926) 63; Adkins (1960) 70–73 ('the *arete* of Hesiod is something new', 72); Adkins (1972) 23–35; Detienne (1963) 29; Claus (1977) 74 credits Hesiod with 'significantly more modern moral views' than Homer; Finley (1979) 141; Athanassakis (1992).

quality: Kirk is not alone in claiming that Hesiod's poetry 'belongs to a secondary stage of development', as 'the old formulas from the Ionian tradition, even when not varied, are combined with each other in a clumsy, redundant or colourless manner'.[35] And where genre is concerned: many have followed the well-known schematizing tendency of the handbooks that positions Hesiod somewhere on the transition between epos and lyric.[36] This very wide-spread developmental thinking can sometimes lead to circular or self-fulfilling argumentation.[37]

The current in modern scholarship to present Hesiod and Homer as split is strong and pervasive. However, during the last thirty years or so many traditional views in the Hesiod-*Forschung* have been strongly attacked, and it has been the (often unintentional) effect of these recent studies to 'lump' Hesiod and Homer together. Two trends have fueled this powerful countermovement: a more nuanced view on the splitting factors discussed above, and a better understanding of how oral poetry works. I will now briefly illustrate this.

To begin with the latter: although scholars were relatively quick to see that Hesiodic poetry was composed orally, just like that of Homer,[38] the idea of mutual influence was often still approached with a concept of written texts in mind. A good example of such an approach is the study of Tsagarakis, who derives one of his arguments to prove the priority of Homer from Hesiod's passage on Hephaestus creating Pandora; since Hephaestus is mentioned in the *Works and Days* without any introduction whatsoever, the passage must (the argument goes) postdate the *Iliad*, since it is there that Homer describes Hephaestus as a craftsman;

---

[35] Kirk (1962) 66.

[36] See e.g. Rzach (1913) 1179–1180, Geffcken (1926) 60; Barron and Easterling in Easterling/Knox (1985) 93.

[37] See e.g. Croiset (1910) 461, who argues that Hesiod must be later than Homer because it is 'presque une nécessité morale d'admettre que l'loeuvre d'imagination a précédé l'oeuvre de réflexion'; Mele (1979) 19 claims that Hesiod is later *because* he is more autobiographical; Walsh (1984) 31 speaks of 'post-Homeric self-consciousness'.

[38] According to Hoekstra (1957), Hesiod's epic diction is in the same state of development as that of Homer; see also Notopoulos (1960) and Edwards (1971) 193 ('in Hesiod as in Homer then, we are dealing with poems whose language and style show features which are best explained by reference to an oral tradition which these poets inherited and themselves practised'). Nagy (1992a) argues that the evolutionary model according to which the Homeric poems came into being could also be applied to Hesiod. Some believe Hesiod composed with the aid of writing; see e.g. Walcot (1961), a view he seems to abandon in Walcot (1962), and Most (1991).

Hesiod's references to Hephaestus thus 'presuppose some knowledge on the part of his listeners', and this 'background' information comes from Homer.[39] But this is clearly *not* how oral poetry works: the poems of both Hesiod and Homer 'go back' a long time, stem from the same source and very probably influenced each other over a longer period. As Lamberton says, 'to say that one imitates the other is meaningless, given the availability of the significant elements of the description in both the related traditions of song.'[40] The 'presupposition' Tsagarakis mentions goes *both* ways.

And then there are the factors of differentiation mentioned above—quality, outlook, intent, subject matter, and individuality. With regard to quality: some recent studies with a more sympathetic view towards Hesiod than, for instance, that of Paley, have been more alert to his craftsmanship, and sensitive critics have pointed to compositional structures and connections hitherto unseen. As a whole, Hesiod's poems are now more than ever appreciated for their value as literary works instead of as a *Fundgrube* for historians and anthropologists. An undisputable landmark in this development is Hamilton's insightful book *The Architecture of Hesiodic Poetry*, or, more recently, Clay's *Hesiod's Cosmos*. Slowly but certainly, it is going out of vogue to criticize Hesiod's artistic skills.[41] To the best of my knowledge, no-one has yet dared to call him equal to Homer in this respect, or even better, but he has at least come to be regarded as an artist in his own right instead of simply worse than Homer.[42]

---

[39] Tsagarakis (1986) 191 and 198; see also e.g. Solmsen (1949) 6 ('the heroic epos forms the starting point of Hesiod's interpretation of the world and of things divine and human').

[40] Lamberton (1988) 22. See Walcot (1963) 11–12 for very similar point, and Martin (1984), who also assumes a common source for the poems of Hesiod and Homer.

[41] Walcot (1966) 82 'the *Works and Days* is far from being the amorphous shambles that some believe it so be'; Beye (1972) 23–24 and 43 makes a stand for Hesiod's style; Thalmann (1984) 62 says the repetitiveness of the *WD*, the very characteristic for which it was so often criticized, contributes to a 'fine poetic texture'; Blaise (1996) sets out to show that 'incohérences' (256) in Hesiod are only apparent; Most (1991) 89 argues that Hesiod's adaptation of the Prometheus myth in the *WD* 'testifies not to his clumsiness' but instead 'leads us to admire Hesiod's audacity and resourcefulness in undertaking what turned out in the end to be an impossible challenge'. Verdenius (1962) 159 went so far as to call the *WD* a 'Meisterwerk der Weltliteratur'.

[42] An important step in the emancipation of Hesiod in this respect seems to have been the realization that Hesiod composed his poems (esp. the *WD*) by a technique of association instead of following some grand design or logical plan, i.e. in a way *different* from and not necessarily worse than Homer. See on this so-called 'assoziative Kompositionsprinzip' especially the study of Kumaniecki (1963), and further Van Groningen (1958) 283–303,

As to outlook, intent, and subject matter: traditional views on these subjects are challenged as well. It is slowly being realized, for instance, that there is far more to Hesiod than 'catalogues, genealogies, concern for the daily realities of practical life'; and besides, these elements are not restricted to Hesiod: there are plenty of lists, family-trees and *gnomai* in the poems of Homer as well. The Boeotian School hypothesis is under heavy fire.[43] Moreover, recent studies have pointed to the similarities in structure and content of certain Hesiodic and Homeric passages—a good case in point is Lardinois comparing the whole of the *Works and Days* to a typical 'angry speech' in the *Iliad*.[44] Differences between the poems of Hesiod and Homer are of course still recognized, but several scholars try to understand both the archaic period and their poems better by seeing Hesiod and Homer as complementary rather than in terms of development. One of the most forceful and most recent of these attempts at 'lumping' is *Homer: The Resonance of Epic*, in which the authors Graziosi and Haubold argue very convincingly that 'the Homeric and Hesiodic epics describe the same world, albeit from different perspectives and at different stages of development'.[45] The poems 'share an understanding of the overall shape of history', but whereas Hesiod gives a general account of the world, Homer 'zooms in' on crucial moments within that history.[46]

Kirk (1962), Verdenius (1962) and (1972), West (1977) 41–46, Thalmann (1984), and Fakas (2001) 72–76; Nagy (1992a) 29 notes on the Homeric poems that 'the attribution of their preeminence (…) to artistic superiority over other epics is merely an assumption' because there is hardly any material available for comparison.

[43] See e.g. Edwards (1971), who shows that Hesiod and Homer are both part of the same linguistic tradition and probably responded to each other; moreover, he detects few Boeotisms in Hesiod's language which he characterises as 'predominantly Ionic' (195; cf. Cassio 2009 saying that 'Hesiod the Boeotian composed in a basically Homeric dialect mixture in which the Ionic element was more prominent than in Homer', 192). See further e.g. West (1977) 26 '… we should look towards Ionia rather than to Dark Age Boeotia for precursors of the *Works and Days*'; Robb (1994) argues convincingly that the idea of the two schools is 'to view the poetic words surviving from Archaic Greece with the literate mentality of Alexandria and Byzantium' (257).

[44] Lardinois (2003); some precursors of his argument are Jaeger (1945) 66, who like Lardinois points to the speech of Phoenix in the *Iliad* and claims that the *WD* 'is directly descended, both in style and in tone, from the speeches of the Homeric epic'; Solmsen (1949) 80 says Hesiod followed 'the pattern set by Homeric speeches of advice (παραίνεσις)'; Krafft (1963) 92–93 speaks of the 'Mahnredentyp' as 'ein literarisches Genos' and refers to Munding and Dornseiff; Maehler (1963) 47 says that the 'Typus des Lehrgedichts' was created 'in Anlehnung an die Mahnreden, die παραινέσεις des Epos'.

[45] Graziosi and Haubold (2005) 36.

[46] *Ibid*. 41 and 38.

Age-old conceptions of Hesiod as the *Empfangende*[47] who counts on the audience's knowledge of the ultimate *fons et origo* Homer are forcibly brought down as it is shown that a) the Homeric poems often presuppose knowledge of facts and stories narrated in other poems, such as the *Theogony*,[48] and b) the narrator does not simply assume all kinds of background information but 'actively challenges his listeners to situate the story within a wider history of the cosmos'.[49] This is a radical break from the simplistic and one-way view of Tsagarakis and others, and presents a far more complex (and interesting) picture of mutual influence—two traditions responding to each other in presenting complementary viewpoints of the same world. This recent notion still allows for the poets' own and unique character, but at the same time stresses their active engagement with each other and especially their impact on the Greek audience, which must have perceived Hesiod and Homer as together in this sense. It appears that more and more scholars believe in such a 'lumped' view of Hesiod and Homer.[50]

---

[47] Cf. Lesky (1971) 113.

[48] Graziosi and Haubold point out that both the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* begin *in medias res* and do not give any summary of previous events; the poems thus 'carefully present themselves as part of a larger narrative' (40).

[49] Graziosi and Haubold (2005) 40. A good example is the use of patronymics, which 'remind us of the genealogical structure of the cosmos' (57). *Kronides*, for instance, reminds us of the origins of Zeus' rule, a story told by Hesiod. Patronymics 'assign to each person or god their place in the larger scheme of things and help to frame the narrative by lending it a temporal dimension' (58).

[50] Nussbaum (1960) 214 already said that 'the difference between them is a complementary one'; see further e.g. Thalmann (1984) xii speaking of 'a narrative and thematic continuum' and 'essentially a single view of the world'; Sihvola (1989) 9 not 'representatives of two contrary and competing ideologies but rather of two complementary viewpoints on the same culture'; Blaise and Rousseau (1996) 224–225 'le but de la *Théogonie* est de montrer que l'état réglé du monde qui constitue le cadre de l'*Iliade* (prise comme paradigme de la tradition épique qu'elle résume) n'est pas donné de toute éternité, mais qu'il a dû s'instaurer.' Hartog (2001) 22 states that 'Hesiod is normative and static, Homer is dynamic and narrative (...). Hesiod's poems strive to conceptualize the dividing lines; the *Odyssey* makes a story out of them'; Clay (2003) 1 'despite significant differences in style (...) archaic *epos* presents a coherent picture of the way men view their gods and their relationship to them, which, in turn, constitutes a fundamental component of their understanding of the cosmos and their place within it'. Murnaghan (2007) 100–107 explores the similarities between Odysseus and Hesiod; Most (1997) 120–127 argues that even the myth of the races, commonly believed to go back to Eastern sources, is more likely connected to the Homeric tradition. We can safely assume that the cyclic epics were part of the same process (see Dowden 2004). Foley (2004) 177–178 reminds us that there is a large 'understood, implicit context' in epic around the world. We should also remember that the epics of Hesiod and Homer are in all likelihood part of a common legacy as old as the neolithic period, see Walcot (1966) and West (1997).

Even his individuality, the most Hesiodic quality of Hesiod, has come under heavy fire over the last two or three decades. The image of the surly farmer-poet, taken so seriously during the first three-quarters of the 20th century, is now by most scholars understood as a poetic *persona* adopted for the purpose of moral instruction and advice. All autobiographical data are seriously doubted. It is now generally assumed, for instance, that the quarrel between Hesiod and his brother Perses, taken so literally in the past,[51] is fictive or at least need not be historically real; it serves as a suitable literary vehicle for Hesiod's poetry, and that is all that can be said about it.[52] In a similar fashion, Hesiod's self-proclaimed descent from a Ionian immigrant has been explained as a useful way of taking the position of the outsider.[53] With the historical brother and father gone, scholars went after the historical Hesiod. His name was unmasked as a telling *nom d'artiste*,[54] and some argued the whole encounter with the Muses was part of a hymnic proem that could be sung before any poem that rhapsodes wanted to present as belonging to the Hesiodic tradition.[55]

---

[51] See e.g. Rand (1911), who even tries to interpret the myth of the five races autobiographically; Van Groningen (1957); Will (1965), whose argumentation for a historical Perses is so weak it actually makes his point more improbable; Gagarin (1974b) and a considerably more nuanced view Gagarin (1992); Cook (1989) 170 who somewhat cryptically remarks he thinks 'the bibliographical remarks in *WD* are true or anyhow true enough', Rousseau (1996). These studies represent only a fraction of a larger trend to take all the autobiographical data literally.

[52] See Lamberton (1988) 27, who compares Perses to Theognis' Kyrnos, and Nagy (1979) 312 arguing that 'the *neikos* of Perses and Hesiod is in fact a formal context for engaging in blame as a positive social function'. The *communis opinio* today seems to be that it is at least possible that Perses is fictional, see e.g. Beye (1972); Griffith (1983) 57 'the character and behavior of Perses vary according to the rhetorical point that Hesiod wishes to make'; Athanassakis (1992), Bowie (1993) 23; Clay (1994) does not address the question of Perses' fictionality, but 'must dispute the common claim [commonly used to argue that the quarrel is a literary fiction] that the presentation of Perses is inconsistent' (24–25).

[53] See Martin (1992), an influential article though somewhat flawed (in my opinion) by the far-fetched Homeric parallels.

[54] Thomson (1914) 218 already stated that 'the name Hesiod is obscure. (...) it is perhaps a traditional name like Homer'. Nagy (1979) 296–297 argued that 'Hesiodos' means 'he who emits the voice' (restated e.g. in 2009 287); in Nagy (1992b) 120 he claims that the names of both Hesiod and Homer fit 'the semantic requirements of an epithet for a Muse'; he is followed by some, though I find the etymology proposed by Meier-Brügger (1990), 'he who enjoys the road', more convincing. See Most (2006) xv for an interesting middle ground position: perhaps Hesiod was named 'Enjoyroad' by his father, but 'resemanticized' his own name as 'Songsender' after his initiation. See for some ancient etymologies Most (2006) T27–29. The name of Perses is now also interpreted as a 'telling name', cf. e.g. Clay (2009) 74 ('Wastrel', from πέρθω).

[55] Cf. e.g. Rosen (1997) 481–483.

Even Ascra was probably unreal![56] All this leads to a conclusion nicely phrased by Lamberton: 'we must perceive Hesiod as a mask for many anonymous voices, all trained (...) to sound the same, to speak with the same identity, and to pass on the same traditions. (...) [Hesiod] is a composite that defies analysis'.[57] In this, he has become exactly like Homer.[58]

In this section I have tried to show that the history of scholarship on the relationship between Hesiod and Homer can be described in terms of splitting and lumping. The same situation can be discerned in antiquity as well, the Greeks either differentiating or assimilating Hesiod and Homer. This Part will focus on the process of lumping in antiquity, and the next two chapters explore texts from many different periods in order to find out how and when Hesiod and Homer were assimilated, and for what purposes. We will find that the Greeks were mostly moved by different reasons for lumping together Hesiod and Homer than we are (though there is of course a certain overlap). Generally speaking, it was mostly in the field of ethics and theology that the two poets were closely associated, and both gained the status of educator.

Before we proceed to these chapters, however, we will first briefly look at two other ways in which the poets were lumped by the Greeks: with regard to their temporal relationship, and the performance of their poems.

---

[56] This is implied by Nagy (1990) 74.

[57] Lamberton (1988) 35–36, and p. xiv on 'the impossibility of demonstrating conclusively the historicity or nonhistoricity of Hesiod'. Note the contrast with the claim of West (1978) 34 that 'no one supposes Hesiod to be an assumed character'. But note also the fervent 'anti-biographist' Stoddard (2004) arguing (esp. in ch. 2) that the Hesiodic narrator is more 'self-assertive' than the Homeric one.

[58] The historian Beloch (1912) may have been the first to claim that Hesiod is 'so wenig eine historische Persönlichkeit wie Homer' (312 n.1). Incidentally, it has sometimes been noted that parallels between Hesiod and Homer can also be drawn with respect to the history of their textual criticism, a more analytical phase (Jacoby, Wilamowitz, Nilsson, Murray, Solmsen, Rzach, Kirchhoff) preceding a unitarian one that seems to have begun somewhere in the sixties (Sale, Schwabl, Robert, Sinclair) and still constitutes the ruling paradigm today; see Hamilton (1989) 47–48.

3. *Lumping in Antiquity*

3.1. *Hesiod and Homer in Time*

Contrary to what some may believe,[59] the question of the chronological priority of either Hesiod or Homer was a vexed one in antiquity. Obviously, there was much at stake here: a competition in age is a competition in authority.[60] When Pausanias on his visit to Boeotia has described a statue of Hesiod on Mt. Helicon, he continues (9.30.3):

> περὶ δὲ Ἡσιόδου τε ἡλικίας καὶ Ὁμήρου πολυπραγμονήσαντι ἐς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον οὔ μοι γράφειν ἡδὺ ἦν, ἐπισταμένῳ τὸ φιλαίτιον ἄλλων τε καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ὅσοι κατ' ἐμὲ ἐπὶ ποιήσει τῶν ἐπῶν καθεστήκεσαν.
>
> 'As to the age of Hesiod and Homer, I have conducted very careful research into the matter, but I do not like to write on the subject, as I know the quarrelsome nature of those especially who constitute the modern school of epic criticism.'

According to Diogenes Laertius, the fourth-century philosopher Heraclides Ponticus wrote two books on exactly this topic ('On the age of Homer and Hesiod', Περὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου ἡλικίας),[61] and (Pseudo-)Lucian testifies to great uncertainty on the matter as well.[62] The Suda claims that all three chronological possibilities found their adherents: 'according to some, [Hesiod] was older than Homer, and according to others they were contemporaries; Porphyry and most of the others figure him to be a hundred years younger'.[63] But such variation nevertheless points to their connection: in antiquity Homer was almost exclusively dated in relation to Hesiod.[64]

---

[59] The claim of Østerud (1976) 13, 'it has been the practice ever since antiquity to range together Homer and Hesiod', is as broad-sweeping as that of Wilamowitz (1916) 305–306, 'die Gleichzeitigkeit der beiden Dichter ist in der alten Zeit allgemein anerkannt'.

[60] See Graziosi (2002) 102 and 109 (cf. Zerubavel 2003 103–110).

[61] D.L. 5.87; the book 'on Hesiod and Homer' Diogenes mentions in 5.92 is probably the same one. Heraclides supposedly concluded that Homer was older (fr. 177 Wehrli).

[62] The interlocutor in the *Praise of Demosthenes* claims that there is virtually nothing known about Homer's life, as 'they admit they do not even know for sure how he compared for age with Hesiod' (μηδ' ὅπως πρὸς τὸν Ἡσίοδον εἶχεν ἡλικίας σαφῶς εἰδέναι, *Dem.* 9). See also S.E. *M.* 1.204 and Seneca *Ep.* 88.6, who mentions the difficult question as an example of ill-directed study.

[63] ἦν δὲ Ὁμήρου κατά τινας πρεσβύτερος, κατὰ δὲ ἄλλους σύγχρονος· Πορφύριος καὶ ἄλλοι πλεῖστοι νεώτερον ἑκατὸν ἐνιαυτοῖς ὁρίζουσιν, Suda *s.v.* Ἡσίοδος (2.592).

[64] Graziosi (2002) 101.

One of the ways the ancients shaped this relation was by presenting Hesiod and Homer as related by kin. According to Proclus, the fifth-century historians Hellanicus, Damastes and Pherecydes claimed that both Hesiod and Homer were descendants of Orpheus; the family tree they provide makes them cousins and so contemporaries.[65] The fourth-century historian Ephorus came up with an original story that makes Hesiod an uncle of Homer;[66] according to another source, however, Ephorus made them cousins.[67] The *Certamen*, which of course depends on the assumption that Hesiod and Homer were contemporaries, mentions two other traditions, one that Homer was older, the other that Homer was younger and of the same family;[68] Homer is here made into the son of the river Meles and a girl who was the granddaughter of Perses, the brother of Hesiod.[69] The uncertain family ties even extend into the next generation: the father of the poet Terpander was said to be either Hesiod or Homer.[70] However, the tradition of their kinship, we must conclude, was firmly rooted.[71]

---

[65] FGH 4 5b; according to this genealogy, Homer's father Maeon and Hesiod's father Dius were brothers, both sons of one Apellis whose line is traced (through Melanopus, Epiphrades, Chariphemus, Philoterpes, Idmonis, Euclees and Dorion) back to Orpheus. See on such genealogies Harriott (1969) 101–102.

[66] FGH 70 3a. According to this tale there were three brothers from Cymae: Apelles, Maeones and Dius. Dius moved to Ascra for financial reasons, married Pycimede and became the father of Hesiod. Apelles had a daughter, Critheis, whom he entrusted to Maeones when he died. Maeones raped her, however, and then gave her in marriage to a certain Phemius from Smyrna. One day, when she was doing her washing somewhere close to the river Meles, she gave birth to Homer.

[67] FGH 70 3b.

[68] *Cert*. 44–45 (Allen): 'some say that [Homer] was older than Hesiod, other that he was younger and related' (ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν προγενέστερον Ἡσιόδου φασὶν εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ νεώτερον καὶ συγγενῆ).

[69] *Cert*. 45–53. In the stories that present Hesiod and Homer as related, Homer is almost never the older one (the only exception is Suda 2.592, where the text is doubtful). Perhaps rhapsodes in the Hesiodic tradition used the typically Hesiodic tool of genealogy to downplay the predominance of Homer; this might also account for the rather nasty tale that makes Homer a descendant of Hesiod's no-good brother Perses.

[70] Suda *s.v*. Terpander (4.527). Stesichorus too was called the (grand)son of Hesiod (Arist. fr. 565 Rose, Cic. *De Rep*. 2.20, Philoch. FGH 3 B 328 fr. 213, Suda 4.433); nevertheless he is often characterized as Homeric (D.H. *Comp*. 6.121 U-R, *AP* 7.75, Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.62, [Long.] *De Subl*. 13.3, Athen. 4.172e, *AP* 9.184).

[71] Enough, at least, to evoke a powerful counter-reaction by Proclus (*Chrest*. 1.6): 'And there are some who have written that he was the cousin of Hesiod: they are no experts in poetry, for Homer and Hesiod are as far from being related by birth as their poetry is different. In any case, they were not even contemporaries' (εἰσὶ δὲ οἵτινες ἀνεψιὸν αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος παρέδοσαν, ἀτριβεῖς ὄντες ποιήσεως· τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀπέχουσι τοῦ γένει προσήκειν ὅσον ἡ ποίησις διέστηκεν αὐτῶν).

Lefkowitz rightly points out that turning Hesiod into a relative of Homer expresses his importance,[72] though it is just as much—or perhaps even more—a way of expressing the idea that the *works* of Hesiod and Homer were akin.[73] The list of ancestors given by Hellanicus seems to imply a belief in a long tradition of singers[74] that was split in two with the birth of Hesiod and Homer, who are thus characterized as different but also—and this is the point of the genealogy—very much alike.

Although the question was never definitively resolved, the *communis opinio* among experts in antiquity seems to have been, much like today, that Homer was earlier. Apart from the passages already mentioned, there are few sources for the priority of Hesiod.[75] Xenophanes was the earliest to claim that Homer was older than Hesiod, and even the greatest fan of Hesiod in antiquity, Plutarch, had to admit that Hesiod was second to Homer 'in reputation as well as in time' (τῇ δόξᾳ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ).[76] The idea of Homer's priority is especially well-attested in the Homeric scholia; one of them even explicitly says that 'Hesiod has read Homer because he was supposedly later' (ἀνέγνω Ἡσίοδος τὰ Ὁμήρου ὡς ἂν νεώτερος τούτου).[77] The evidence for this overall idea mentioned by the scholia falls into roughly two, text-internal, categories.[78] The first is the

---

[72] Lefkowitz (1981) 5–6; it is a slightly Homerocentric remark.

[73] Clay (2003) 181–182 says that Hesiod himself points to his shared origin by telling us his father came from Cymae (*WD* 635–640), where Homer too came from (according to some). West (2003) 371 intriguingly suggests that the story of Hesiod's father leaving Cymae may be connected to that of Homer cursing the Cymaeans for not providing for him, saying that 'no poet of note should be born in the place to glorify the Cymaeans' (μηδένα ποιητὴν δόκιμον ἐν τῇ χώρῃ γενέσθαι ὅστις Κυμαίους ἐπαγλαϊεῖ).

[74] The genealogy contains some very telling names: Chariphemus is 'Pleasant-Speech', Philoterpes is 'Loves-to-Please', Euclees '(He who gives) Far Renown'; Idmonis may be 'Knowledge', Epiphrades is perhaps 'Thinker'.

[75] See the Parian Marble, FGH 239 A27 and 28, and further Accius (p. 578 Warmington) and the *Vit. Hes*. 2–5 Allen. Interestingly enough, Accius uses the same arguments as Tsagarakis (see pp. 34–35 above), but the other way around: Homer not mentioning that the Cyclops is one-eyed according to Accius clearly presupposes Hesiod. The fact that Hesiod is often mentioned after Orpheus and Musaeus and before Homer is sometimes taken as an (implict) statement on chronology; on this see Appendix A.

[76] Xenoph. DK B 13, Plu. *Mor*. 105D; others claiming the priority of Homer include Eratosthenes, Aristarchus, Apollodorus (on whom see Graziosi 2002 102), Cicero (*De Senect*. 15.54), and Velleius Paterculus (1.7.1). See further Allen (1915).

[77] Σ *Il*. 12.22 (A); see also Posidonius (fr. 459 Theiler), saying 'that Hesiod himself was born much later and corrupted many of Homer's verses' (αὐτὸν τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὕστερον γενόμενον πολλὰ παραφθεῖραι τῶν Ὁμήρου ἐπῶν, transl. Most).

[78] Arguments based on text-external data are extremely rare. One instance is Σ *Il*. 23.683 (T), where Homer mentions two boxers putting on a ζῶμα or 'girdle'; the scholiast

(not always correct) observation that Hesiod has borrowed a line or idea from Homer—when the presentation in Hesiod is (slightly) different, this is always interpreted as a mistake by Hesiod and a misrepresentation of the original idea. The most striking example is perhaps the notion of Pandora's box, said to go back to Homer's picture of Zeus dealing out bad and good from two *pithoi*.[79] The second is the observation that Hesiod, owing to mankind's gradual accumulation of factual information, seems to know more than Homer; for instance, he is familiar with the name of the river Nile (called 'Aegyptus' by Homer), and knows the entire Peloponnesus (instead of only a small part of it).[80] These two arguments may be representative for the ideas most current in schools and other places of education; for even though the Homeric scholia are of course biased in favour of Homer, similar observations are present in the Hesiodic scholia as well.[81]

The chronological watershed, however, should not be overemphasized. The same scholia make it very clear that despite the minor age difference Hesiod and Homer were largely regarded as comparable. Very much like modern commentaries, the scholiasts explain Homeric passages by adducing parallels from Hesiod, and vice versa. The poets are by far the most-referred to in each other's scholia, as the following tables make clear:[82]

---

argues that Hesiod must be younger since he depicts athletes naked, in accordance with a rule that was established later.

[79] Σ *Il.* 24.527–528a (A) and -b (T). See for other instances the scholia on *Il.* 4.59b (AbT), 5.741 (bT), 5.880 (bT), 11.36b (bT), 16.385 (T); *Od.* 1.8, 5.478, 7.54, 8.362, 9.106, 11.360; *WD* 317–318. The opposite situation, i.e. that of Homer being later and then supposedly correcting Hesiod, is extremely rare, cf. Philostr. *Her.* 25.7: 'Once when Hesiod was describing the shield of Kyknos, he sang about the Gorgon's form carelessly and not poetically (ὑπτίως τε καὶ οὐ ποιητικῶς); hence, correcting him, Homer sang about the Gorgon in this way' (transl. Maclean/Aitken).

[80] Σ *Od.* 4.477, *Il.* 9.246 (A). See also the scholia on *Il.* 8.368 (A) and 14.275–277 (A).

[81] See the scholia on *Th.* 338 (the Nile), 746, 927b, 1013, and *WD* 94a (the *pithos*) and 150b.

[82] The tables are based on the indices in the editions of DiGregorio (scholia on the *Th.*), Pertusi (*WD*), Erbse (*Il.*), and Dindorff (*Od.*). It is possible that the numbers somewhat overstate the case, since references in the Hesiodic scholia to other poets than Homer may have been more frequent but could have dropped out in the process of transmission because they were considerably less popular (I thank Barbara Graziosi for bringing this point to my attention).

Table 2: References to other authors in the scholia to the Hesiodic poems

	Author referred to					
	Homer	Pindar	Aeschylus	Euripides	Plato	Aristotle
Σ *Theogony*	31	1	0	3	5	2
Σ *WD*	47	1	2	3	28	5

Table 3: References to other authors in the scholia to the Homeric poems

	Author referred to					
	Hesiod	Pindar	Aeschylus	Euripides	Plato	Aristotle
Σ *Iliad*	84	51	28	34	22	47
Σ *Odyssey*	39	4	9	6	5	15

Parallels are sought and found on the level of word-meaning (e.g. an instance of *axulon* in Hesiod tells us how the word should be interpreted in Homer), grammar (e.g. Homer's use of a masculine dual for two female figures is matched by an instance in Hesiod), rhetoric or poetic speech (e.g. Homer's application of the figure *antiphrasis* is illustrated by a similar case in Hesiod), and content (e.g. Homer and Hesiod both tell us that one can benefit from a wise man).[83]

Even more interesting, however, are those cases in which the scholiast is consciously attempting to harmonize data provided by Hesiod and Homer, as if it were desirable that the two poets say the same. The scholion on *Iliad* 24.624 (A), for instance, remarks that the authenticity of the Homeric line is doubted because of a slightly deviant formulation in Hesiod. Similarly, the scholiast on *Iliad* 2.507a (A) believes Zenodotus was wrong to change the Homeric reading 'Arne rich in vines' to 'Askre' since Hesiod had clearly described his native town as an unpleasant place.[84] The scholiast on *Iliad* 11.306 (T) says that some read an 'or'

[83] Σ *Il.* 11.155 (A), 8.455a (A), 9.457 (T), and 13.733a (bT), respectively. Other examples are: on the level of word-meaning Σ *Il.* 11.736 (T), 18.100d (T), *Th.* 10, 28b, 713b, *WD* 37–38; on that of grammar Σ *Il.* 4.222a (A), 5.299b (T), 5.487 (test.), 18.488b (T); on rhetoric or poetic speech Σ *Th.* 22, 75, *WD* 104a (personification), 127b, 151a; on content Σ *Il.* 24.611 (bT), *Th.* 84, *WD* 171, 311–312, 712a. We may compare the practice of Aristarchus, who sometimes counts Hesiod among the *neoteroi* but still regards him as a 'treuer Eideshelfer bei Feststellung einer Mythologeme' (Roemer 1924 137); see also the comparative practice of Herodian (e.g. 1.404.6–10 Lentz, 2.10.22–25), who also assumes that Hesiod is younger (see 2.25.26).

[84] Cf. Strabo 9.2.34; see ch. 3, p. 122.

between Homer's ἀργεστᾶο Νότοιο ('the white South Wind') because Hesiod has mentioned the Argestos ('White') as a separate wind.[85] In two cases, the scholiast adduces a parallel from Hesiod without qualifying it as such, leaving the impression that he thought it was Homeric.[86]

'Lumping' practices like these seem to indicate that Hesiod and Homer were generally believed to be contemporary, or at least contemporary enough;[87] most Greeks probably thought, with Pausanias, that figuring out the exact temporal relationship between Hesiod and Homer should be left to the experts. There are some explicit and many implicit passages that assert the contemporaneity of the poets. Some of these are very early and affirm that the togetherness of Hesiod and Homer was a concept both old and widely shared: examples include Herodotus' famous statement on the poets inventing Greek theology about 400 years before his time, the early attacks on both Hesiod and Homer by Xenophanes, and of course the age-old tradition that the two had met in a poetic competition.[88] It is a common feature of all of these sources that Hesiod and Homer—whatever their own minor age difference may be—are *together* placed way back in time; and so a massive 'watershed' is created between them and the younger poets.[89] Hesiod and Homer, when they are together, are thus sealed off from the present and 'enshrined'[90] as the most important representatives of an age gone by. They become untouchable through their distance in time, which is of course connected to their canonical

[85] Some other examples are Σ *Il.* 2.496a (A), 11.710 (T), 13.484 (bT), 16.748a (A) and b (T), 23.638–642 (A). See for similar harmonizing also Str. 1.12.14 and Plu. *Mor.* 361B. A most interesting case is Porph. *Antr.* 30 who attributes a second *pithos* to Hesiod's account of Pandora (*WD* 94–98).

[86] Σ *Il.* 11.84 (T) and 15.713b (bT); in both cases a simple φησι (subject not specified) introduces the parallel; it is also possible that the scholiast supposed the reader would know it was Hesiod. There are some cases of Hesiodic phrases being attributed to Homer; see e.g. Ar. *Av.* 909–914, Max. Tyr. 35.1, and Jul. *Mis.* 347c.

[87] Cf. e.g. Max. Tyr. 4.3 and 17.3. Really big gaps are very rare; see Tzetzes' calculation that Hesiod was 400 years later in Most (2006) T2. Manilius *Astr.* 2.11–12 calls Hesiod *proximus illi* [= Homer], but this may refer to his reputation.

[88] On Hdt. *Hist.* 2.53 and Xenophanes see chapter 3; on the *Certamen* see chapter 8. Other explicit references are e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.1.3, Str. 7.3.7 (but Str. 1.2.34 makes Hesiod later than Homer), Clem.Al *Strom.* 1.21.107.5 (and in *Strom.* 1.21.117.4–5 naming the historians Euthymenes and Archemachus for a similar view), Philostr. *Her.* 43.2–7, and D.L. 1.38.

[89] See for more on this ch. 3.2, esp. pp. 111–119.

[90] The term is Assmann's (cf. Introduction, p. 8 n.25). See on Hesiod and Homer as a separate category ch. 3.2.

status. Just like their reputed kinship or the similarity of their poetry, it was the quality of being ἀρχαῖος that connected them in the Greek mind.[91]

3.2. *Hesiod and Homer in Greek Society: Performance, Symposia, Schools*

We know a great deal about Homeric poetry's place in society, which has been the object of thorough study. We know, for instance, that there were rhapsodes who called themselves the 'Sons of Homer' and recited the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* throughout Greece; figures like Plato's Ion show us that rhapsodes were also able to explain the poetry of Homer and demonstrate its relevance to society.[92] Recitals must have occurred both incidentally and during festivals, of which the Panathenaea are the best-known example. Such performances, however, were only one way in which the Greeks encountered Homer. Mothers would tell their young children his stories, which they then read and memorized in schools; and at a more advanced level, they were still studying Homer, but now for rhetorical purposes. Homeric tales formed the basis of much tragedy; furthermore, well-educated citizens quoted Homer regularly and showed off their familiarity with his work during symposia. In short, Homer was everywhere.[93]

Considerably less attention has been paid to the presence in society and practice of performance of the Hesiodic poems. This is of course partly due to the fact that there is much less evidence than in the case of Homer. Nonetheless, the evidence that we *do* have permits us, I believe, to reconstruct a largely comparable picture.

Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence proving the existence of a guild of 'Hesiodists', but it would be unwise to conclude that there was no such body of rhapsodes devoted to the recital of the Hesiodic poems.[94] Apart from the oral nature of the poems, which in itself allows for a transmission comparable to the Homeric ones, there are some other telling

---

[91] On either Hesiod and Homer themselves or their age being called ἀρχαῖος see e.g. D.Chrys. 36.33–35, D.L. 1.38, S.E. 1.204; another term for them is παλαιός, cf. Lucian *Astr*. 22, Max.Tyr. 26.2.

[92] See e.g. Rijksbaron (2007) 124–128 on the rhapsode as a ἑρμηνεύς (Pl. *Ion* 530c).

[93] See on the performance of the Homeric poems and their presence in everyday life e.g. Verdenius (1970), Zeitlin (2001), Nagy (2002), Sluiter (2005).

[94] So also Solmsen (1982) 1; the argument of West (1966) 47, that Homer became more popular than Hesiod because of the 'propaganda of the Homeridae' overshadowing Hesiod, who 'had no corresponding body to look after his interests', is not based on any positive evidence.

hints, not amounting to proof but carrying some cumulative weight, that the Greeks regarded Hesiod as the same sort of *Ur*-rhapsode as Homer, and that they believed his poems were composed and handed down in the same way.[95] First of all, there is the telling observation that of all Greek poets only Hesiod and Homer are said to 'stitch' or 'rhapsodize',[96] which sets the experience of their poems quite apart from that of other poets. Secondly, Hesiod and Homer are sometimes together pictured in rhapsode-like fashion; this happens as early as Plato.[97] And third, some may have believed that the poems of Hesiod were subjected to the notorious Peisistratean redaction,[98] just like those of Homer.[99] I

[95] See Graziosi (2002) 18–50 for a lucid discussion of the terms bard (ἀοιδός), rhapsode (ῥαψῳδός), and poet (ποιητής). See also Dowden (2004) 195 'the works ascribed to Hesiod (. . .) are arguably designed for the same sort of performance environment as the epic'.

[96] Graziosi (2002) 33; according to a certain Nicocles or Nicocrates (date unknown) Hesiod was even 'the first to rhapsodize' (Σ Pi. *Nem.* 2.1 = FGH 376 F 8). Dowden (2004) 194 suggests that Hesiod perhaps presents himself as a rhapsode since his sceptre (*Th.* 30) may be the staff 'of a non-singing performer'; this was already suggested by Cadoux (1929) 260 (cf. Kirby 1992 41 arguing that the staff turns Hesiod into a rhetor rather than a singer, who would receive a lyre, like Archilochus did). I am much tempted to connect this to the curious story related by Pausanias (10.7.3) that Hesiod was not allowed to compete in the Pythian competition 'because he had not learned to acompany his own singing on the harp' (ἅτε οὐ κιθαρίζειν ὁμοῦ τῇ ᾠδῇ δεδιδαγμένον, cf. Nagy 2009 300); see also 9.30.3, where Pausanias comments on a Heliconian statue of Hesiod, sitting holding a harp upon his knees, 'a thing not at all appropriate for Hesiod to carry, for his own verses make it clear that he sang holding a laurel wand' (οὐδέν τι οἰκεῖον Ἡσιόδῳ φόρημα· δῆλα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπῶν ὅτι ἐπὶ ῥάβδου δάφνης ᾖδε).

[97] Pl. *R.* 600d, which speaks of the poets as 'roaming about rhapsodizing' (ῥαψῳδεῖν περιόντας); see also Paus. 1.2.3.

[98] It is still a question of hot debate whether or not there actually was a Peisistratean redaction of the poems of Homer; see the discussions by e.g. Merkelbach (1952), Davison (1955a), Goold (1960), Jensen (1980), Nagy (1992a) and, most recently, Slings (2000) and Nagy (2002). See for overviews of the vast literature on this subject Janko (1992) 29–32 and Haslam (1997) 82–84. Slings (2000) approaches the question from a historian's perspective and rightly concludes that 'the literary activities ascribed to Peisistratus are anachronistic and the witnesses untrustworthy' (77). Nagy (2002) 15 explains the emergence of the recension-story as a 'coherent aetiology for the evolving institution of rhapsodic performances'.

[99] Plutarch (*Thes.* 20.2) says that according to the third-century BC Megarian historian Hereas, Peisistratus tinkered with the text of Homer and deleted a Hesiodic line that was damaging to the reputation of Theseus (Hesiod supposedly wrote that Theseus left Ariadne on Naxos because 'dreadful indeed was his passion for Aigle child of Panopeus', MW 298; there is mention of interpolation in Hesiod by Paus. 2.26.7). Even though some might find it 'fishy' that this is 'the only time that Peisistratus' editorial intervention in Hesiod is mentioned' (Slings 2000 74–75), and say there is no reason why the Peisistratean recension should have included Hesiod (see Solmsen 1982 1 and West 1966 50 n.1), there is no reason for assuming that Hesiod was not edited by Peisistratus either (the famous

therefore suggest, on the basis of the little evidence that we *do* have, that the Greeks imagined Hesiod as an ancient proto-rhapsode—a somewhat blurry picture, probably given shape on the basis of two things: 1) a thorough experience with contemporary rhapsodes, and 2) assimilation with Homer, whose association with rhapsodes was more firmly rooted.

As to the performance of the Hesiodic poems, there is proof for recitals of Hesiod in the classical age, since Plato mentions a rhapsodic performance of 'the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* or something of the Hesiodic poems' (Ἰλιάδα καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἤ τι τῶν Ἡσιοδείων, *Laws* 658d).[100] He compares such recitals to puppet shows, comedies or tragedies, which indicates they must have occurred regularly. Unfortunately, neither this passage nor the one from *Ion* (531a–532a) can prove that rhapsodes were experts in either the Homeric or the Hesiodic poems, or were able to perform both—I suspect that both exclusive specialists (focusing on Homer, such as Ion himself) and more inclusive performers existed, depending on their own preference and training.[101] Explicit references to the performance of Hesiod's poems are very rare: apart from those mentioned above, I have found one for the fourth century BC and one for the second AD.[102] It is not unlikely that Hesiod continued to be performed throughout antiquity, but we do not really know. Curiously enough, there is one source that mentions an actor 'playing' (ὑποκρίνασθαι) the poems of Hesiod in the great theater at Alexandria.[103]

---

passage from Lycurgus' *In Leocr.* (102) merely states that the only poems to be *recited* at the Great Panathenaea were Homer's). Moreover, strictly speaking the historicity of a redaction of Hesiod's poems is irrelevant to my case.

[100] Yamagata (2010) 72 detects a 'hint of condescension' in this reference, but I fail to see why.

[101] So also Lamberton (1988) 23–24. Perhaps in time the distinction faded: according to an unknown historian Aristocles (Athen. 14.620b) 'Homerist' was just another name for 'rhapsode' (an example of the *species*-name becoming used to denote the *genus*, like the jeep). Schmid-Stählin (1929) 251 claim, on the basis of *Th.* 100, that Hesiod *himself* on his 'Vortragsreisen' sang 'nicht nur eigene, sondern auch homerische' poetry.

[102] According to Athenaeus (14.620c), the fourth-century peripatetic Chamaeleon claimed not only the poems of Homer were 'sung' (μελῳδηθῆναι), 'but also those of Hesiod and Archilochus, and even those of Mimnermus and Phocylides'. In Lucian *Icar.* 27.13 Menippus visits Olympus and tells us that 'during dinner Apollo played the lute, Silenus danced the can-can and the Muses got up and sang us something from Hesiod's *Theogony* and the first song in the Hymns of Pindar'. Perhaps this joke could only have worked if the *Th.* was regularly recited in Lucian's time.

[103] Athen. 14.620d, which mentions a similar 'acting' of the Homeric poems as well; we are probably dealing with some curiosity here.

There is evidence for Hesiod being sung during symposia, even though his poetry might *a priori* seem somewhat out of place in such contexts.[104] The connection of Hesiod with sympotic poetry is as old as the earliest lyric poets, who referred to his poems just as much as they did to Homer's, in most cases without distinguishing between them. Moreover, the riddles and poetry-games that make up the greatest part of the contest in the *Certamen* in all likelihood find their origin in drinking-parties; all this suggests that Hesiod's poetry, just like Homer's, formed an inextricable part of the sympotic experience from the earliest times onwards. There are reasons to believe his poetry was both performed by professionals and sung by the symposiasts in later times as well. Philodemus, for instance, argues against the practice of ἰδιῶται, 'normal people' who during symposia listen only to music—it would be far better, according to the philosopher, to listen to 'Homer and Hesiod and the other poets who have composed verses and melodies' (τὸν Ὅμηρον καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποητὰς τῶν μέτρων καὶ μελῶν) as the beneficial effect of such performances is not so much in the actual sound but in the poetic text that the music accompanies.[105] We may compare a sympotic epigram mentioning Hesiod, where Posidippus describes a drinking bowl that is filled by pouring in lovers and poets: first Nanno, Lyde, Mimnermus, Antimachus, Posidippus himself and 'everyone who ever chanced to love' go in; they are followed by Hesiod, Homer, the Muses and Mnemosyne.[106] The image is a colourful expression of what, according to Posidippus, matters most during the symposium: love and poetry, which also includes Hesiodic poetry.[107]

Hesiodic poetry was certainly on the curriculum at schools and other institutions or places of education. It seems that Heraclitus was hardly speaking metaphorically when he called Hesiod the διδάσκαλος

---

[104] In hellenistic times, Hesiod was associated with water-drinking; see ch. 9, pp. 333–341.

[105] Phld. *De musica* IV p. 83 (Kemke). Philodemus argues against the view of the Stoics, especially Diogenes of Babylon, who did believe that music alone could be beneficial to the soul and help to improve one's life; see Neubecker (1986) 157–158.

[106] *AP* 12.168; Nanno and Lyde are the lovers of Mimnermus and Antimachus, respectively. There may be a climax in the enumeration.

[107] See also Lucian *Symp*. 17.6, where a symposiast is 'reciting verse, combining the lines of Pindar and Hesiod and Anacreon in such a way as to make out of them a single poem and a very funny one' (ἐρραψῴδει … καὶ συνέφερεν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ τὰ Πινδάρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ἀνακρέοντος, ὡς ἐξ ἁπάντων μίαν ᾠδὴν παγγέλοιον ἀποτελεῖσθαι). The curious thing, however, is that the two lines cited from this interesting poem are both from the *Iliad*.

πλείστων ('teacher of most'), and Plato says that the stories of Hesiod and Homer were especially damaging to the young.[108] Listening to poetry constituted the first stage of a proper Greek education, but Hesiod remained an object of study at later stages as well. Isocrates, for instance, tells us how the sophists of his age explain Hesiod and Homer to their students; Menander says that one must have memorized the poems of Homer and Hesiod in order to be able to improvise, and Plutarch gives us examples of how the two poets are sometimes quoted at the wrong moment, which can cause embarrassing scenes.[109] These are all indications of the firm place of Hesiod in Greek *paideia*. Plutarch explicitly informs us that the texts of both Hesiod and Homer were meticulously studied in his day and very often criticized for details;[110] the Hesiod presented by Lucian in similar fashion complains to be the victim of ferocious nitpicking—it is interesting that this Hesiod, defending his poetry, complains that his 'fellow-craftsman' (ὁμότεχνος) Homer suffers from the same treatment.[111] Cribiore, who studied Egyptian papyri of the hellenistic and Roman period, confirms Hesiod's canonical status in education: 'The large number of papyri that preserve his work are an excellent index of a popularity that must have originated in the schools'.[112] A final indication is the number of exegetical works devoted to him by ancient writers, ranging from Heraclides Ponticus to Proclus.[113]

---

[108] Heraclitus DK 22 B 57; Plato *R*. 377c; see also Aeschin. *In Ctes*. 135, Lib. *Or*. 16.46.

[109] Isoc. *Panath*. 18 and 33, Men.Rh. 3.393 (Spengel), Plu. *Mor*. 373C.

[110] Plu. *Mor*. 28B.

[111] Lucian *Hes*. 5.

[112] Cribiore (2001) 197. Cribiore suspects that Hesiod was especially studied at 'high educational levels', because students seem to have turned to Hesiod mainly to compose genealogies of gods and heroes and other mythographic work, which seems a fairly advanced task. Ford (2010), however, argues that 'the typical schoolbook (. . .) was more likely to contain extracts from Hesiod's gnomic poetry than his *Theogony*' (148).

[113] I found the following ancient works on Hesiod: Aristotle, one book of *Hesiodic Problems* (fr. 16.143 Rose); Heraclides Ponticus (4th cent. BC), *On the Age of Homer and Hesiod* (D.L. 5.87, two books), and *On Hesiod and Homer* (D.L. 5.92, unknown size, possibly the same as those mentioned in 5.87); Chamaeleon (4th cent. BC), a treatise on Hesiod and Homer (D.L. 5.92); Hecataeus of Abdera (4th cent. BC), *On the Poetry of Homer and Hesiod* (Suda 2.213); Antidorus of Cymae (third cent. BC), a treatise about Homer and Hesiod (Σ Dion. Thrax 448.6); the grammarian Demetrius Ixion (2nd cent. BC), an exegesis of Hesiod (Suda 2.41); Zenodotus of Alexandria (2nd or 1st cent. BC), *On Hesiod's Theogony* (Suda 2.506); Aristonicus (late 1st cent. BC), *On the critical signs in Hesiod's* Theogony *and in the* Iliad *and* Odyssey (Suda 1.356); an undateable Demosthenes Thrax, a paraphrase of the *Th*. (Suda 2.47); an undateable Dionysius of Corinth, a commentary on Hesiod (Suda 2.110); an otherwise unknown Cleomenes, *On Hesiod* (Clem.Al. *Strom*. 1.14.61.2). Aristophanes, Aristarchus, Praxiphanes, Crates, Didymus and Seleucus wrote scholia on (parts of) the Hesiodic corpus. Zenodotus of Ephesus

We should conclude, therefore, that Hesiodic poetry was studied in schools, sung during symposia and performed at festivals, just like the poems of Homer (though on a smaller scale). In fact, it is exactly the combination with Homer that seems to be the main thread in the sources on the presence and performance of Hesiod: most of the sources discussed above mention Homer too, which contrasts sharply with the many passages that speak of the study and performance of Homer without any reference to Hesiod. This is due, of course, to the greater popularity of the Homeric poems, but also leads one to suspect that Hesiod was believed to be complementary to Homer in a way. For instance, it seems to have been uncommon for ancient grammarians, rhetoricians and scholars to focus solely on Hesiod,[114] while there are many works devoted to Homer alone. At the schools, Hesiodic poetry may have been studied at the higher levels, which means that pupils dropping out earlier had mostly been in contact with Homer. Furthermore, I doubt that rhapsodes from classical times and later were exclusive experts on Hesiod, and it seems very unlikely that large-scale poetic festivals could fill a two- or three-day program with the poems of Hesiod alone. All things considered, I think it is fair to conclude that the ancients were often confronted with Hesiodic poetry in a wider context, largely determined by the poems of Homer. The combination of Hesiod with Homer must have been natural to them.[115]

---

produced a critical edition of Hesiod; Plutarch wrote a *Life of Hesiod* and a commentary on the *WD*. In late antiquity, a certain Procleius (4th cent. AD) wrote a commentary on the Pandora-myth in Hesiod (Suda 4.210), and Proclus wrote a commentary on the *WD* (Suda 4.210)—this, incidentally, together with Plutarch's commentary, is the only piece of writing on Hesiod of which significant parts still remain. Von Arnim believed that Zeno the Stoic's comments on the *Th*. derived from a book, *On Hesiod's Theogony* (SVF 1 p. 71), but this is unlikely, see the doubts of Algra (2001) 578–580 and Montanari (2009) 327, calling it a 'pure invention by H. von Arnim'. (Most (2006) T128–150 presents a nearly exhaustive list of the testimony on the literary scholarship on Hesiod, to which only Demosthenes Thrax should be added; see now also Cingano 2009, esp. pp. 101–109, and Montanari 2009.)

[114] Of the treatises mentioned in the previous note, five deal with Homer as well; *all* of the remaining authors mentioned had written separately on Homer as well.

[115] See also Paus. 5.26.2, who mentions statues of Homer and Hesiod standing together north of the temple of Zeus in Olympia. The statues were placed there around 460 BC, and it is revealing that 'the earliest attested statue of Homer' (Zanker 1995 19) stands close to one of Hesiod.

Appendix: The Hesiod-Homer Sequence

Some have speculated on what the sequence in which Hesiod and Homer are mentioned may tell us about the way their (temporal) relationship was perceived in antiquity. As far as I know, the matter has not yet been examined systematically and has so far led to misunderstanding. In this appendix, I will focus on three manifestations of the sequence: 1) the simplest combination, i.e. 'Hesiod and Homer' (or the other way around), 2) the combination of Hesiod and Homer with Orpheus and Musaeus, and 3) a somewhat more loose combination occurring in contexts in which both poets are referred to.[116]

First, we will look at the closest combination, 'Hesiod and Homer' (or vice versa), i.e. instances where the two poets are connected by a conjunction and no others are mentioned. It has been claimed that Hesiod in such combinations regularly precedes Homer, a supposedly remarkable observation: does it mean that some thought Hesiod was earlier, or more important perhaps? Renehan suggests Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ὅμηρος 'may have sounded more mellifluous (...) than the reverse',[117] but Graziosi dismisses this option[118] and believes that the front position of Hesiod was natural for Greeks knowing the tradition of the *Certamen*, where Hesiod is the first to speak and in the end wins the contest.[119]

Speculation of this sort is somewhat cut short by simple quantification: of the 34 combinations in question that I have been able to find, Homer goes first 25 times, and Hesiod only 10. The favorite conjunction is καί (21 times), followed by τε καί (9 times).[120] Closer investigation suggests

---

[116] See ch. 4 (p. 115) for the sequence 'Hesiod and Homer and others', be they poets or not.

[117] Renehan (1980) 341.

[118] She claims that Ὅμηρος θ' Ἡσίοδος τε at the end of a hexameter line is 'better' than Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ὅμηρος at the beginning, because the first is attested once (Xenoph. DK B 11) and the second never (Graziosi 2002 106 n.46)—but it is impossible to speculate on the basis of such numbers.

[119] Graziosi (2002) 106–107. Graziosi puts much emphasis on the contest: she even suggests that *if* the combination Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ὅμηρος had occurred in a hexameter, it would 'probably' have been in a poem connected to the contest (107 n.46)—but there is nothing to substantiate this.

[120] It must be said though that for the classical time, on which Graziosi focuses, the numbers are less marked (6:4). Incidentally, the combination occurs most in Plato (6 times), Dio Chrysostom (3), Plutarch (4), Lucian (7) and Pausanias (3); there is only one occurrence in Latin (Ovid *Ars Am*. 2.4: *Ascraeo Maeonioque seni*; I am not counting Philo *Prov*. 2.40).

that the front position of Hesiod is often context-determined: in at least 7 out of the 10 passages a certain logic can be detected behind Hesiod's first place. In *Republic* 363a, for instance, Plato perhaps speaks of the nasty tales of ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδος τε καὶ Ὅμηρος because he will first attack Hesiod's story of Uranus' castration and then proceed to Homer. When Herodotus in *Histories* 2.53 comes to speak of the 'theogony' of the Greeks, it is natural to think of Hesiod first;[121] and when he later in the same paragraph restates his claim, Hesiod is of course put in front again.[122] It appears, then, that naming Homer first is the default option. He is usually put in front, not for the sake of euphony or out of chronological speculation, but because one would normally first think of him.

The matter of chronological priority is often connected to another combination: that of Hesiod and Homer together with Orpheus and Musaeus. It must have been common in antiquity to take these poets together, since I have been able to find 12 occurrences of the foursome, which are listed in the table below:

Table 4: Ancient references to the foursome Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer

Passage	Sequence
Hippias DK 86 B 6	Orpheus-Musaeus—Hesiod—Homer
Aristophanes *Ran.* 1032–1036	Orpheus-Musaeus—Hesiod—Homer
Plato *Ap.* 41a	Orpheus-Musaeus—Hesiod—Homer
Plato *R.* 364d	Hesiod—Homer—Musaeus—Orpheus
Hermesianax (ap. Athen. 13.597B–599B)	Orpheus—Musaeus—Hesiod—Homer—Mimnermus—Antimachus—Alcaeus—Anacreon—Sophocles—Euripides—Philoxenus—Philitas
Chrysippus (Cic. *ND* 1.15.41)	Orpheus-Musaeus—Hesiod—Homer
Philodemus *Piet.* 13	Orpheus-Musaeus—Homer—Hesiod—Euripides

[121] But see Ford (2010) 136 explaining the precedence of Hesiod in Ong's term of the 'topical poetic': Hesiod can go first because his *Th.* narrated events that took place before those sung in the *Il.* and *Od.*

[122] Pl. *R.* 612b, Lucian *Sat.* 5.22, *Anach.* 21, and Paus. 1.2.3 can be explained along similar lines; the title of Heraclides Ponticus' book *On Hesiod and Homer*, Plu. *Mor.* 396D–E and Paus. 9.30.3 are harder to explain.

Passage	Sequence
Cicero *Tusc.* 1.41.98	Orpheus-Musaeus—Homer—Hesiod
Pliny *NH* 25.12	Homer—Orpheus—Musaeus—Hesiod
Pausanias 10.3.7	Chrysothemis—Philammon—Thamyris-Orpheus—Musaeus—Hesiod—Homer
Clemens *Strom.* 5.4.24.1	Orpheus—Linus—Musaeus—Homer—Hesiod
Philostratus *Her.* 25.7–8	Homer—Hesiod—Orpheus—Musaeus—Pamphos

The group is obviously a tight one, for seven of the passages are exclusive; in only five cases other poets are added to the foursome. It is also striking that the sequence is often the same: Orpheus—Musaeus—Hesiod—Homer (6 times); this is the main reason for assuming[123] that the order is chronological and thus indicates an ancient belief in Hesiod's priority. This is not improbable, at least not for the classical period, because most deviations from the 'basic pattern' (different sequence, persons added)[124] occur in post-classical times; the prominence of Homer in the later lists may testify to his ever-growing importance. Still, one could argue that the evidence is far from conclusive and leaves open other explanations: perhaps the sequence forms a climax, with the greatest poet at the end; or there could be some thematic association.[125] The data do not seem to allow anything better than speculation.

For the third and final combination I have examined all the passages in which Hesiod and Homer are mentioned or referred to in the same context, explicitly named or not, together or opposed, closely combined or somewhat more apart. The total numbers, divided per century, lead to the following figure:

[123] See e.g. West (1966) 40 n.1, Athanassakis (1983) 1, Graziosi (2002) 107 n.51. The argument of West is tendentious because he refers only to Hippias, Aristophanes and Pl. *Ap.* 41a, and leaves out the counter-evidence; the other passages he mentions have only Hesiod before Homer, but without Orpheus and Musaeus.

[124] In one case, Pl. *R.* 363b–c, Orpheus is missing; in Maximus of Tyre, Musaeus is absent three times (*Or.* 4.3, 17.3, 37.4). See also Hdt. *Hist.* 2.53 (discussed in ch. 2, pp. 63–72), who implies that Orpheus and Musaes came *after* Hesiod and Homer.

[125] The first three poets deal with cosmology and mysticism; perhaps Homer was originally added because the Greeks felt he could not be left out because of his age and importance; in later times, however, Homer was equated with the *theologoi* (see Lamberton 1986 28–30) and the sequence became less fixed.




Fig. 3: Priority of either Homer or Hesiod in ancient references

In this figure, the light left beam represents the number of instances where Hesiod and Homer are mentioned in the same context and Homer goes first; the dark beam on the right represents those instances where Hesiod is the first one mentioned. It is clear at once that Hesiod is not nearly the 'minor' he is usually supposed to be. The total scores for these ten centuries are 153 to 89 in favour of Homer, a proportion of roughly 3 to 2. It is interesting to compare this with modern times: of the 26 books and articles published from 1900 onwards with both Hesiod and Homer in the title, 24 name Homer first and only 2 Hesiod! The figure suggests that, generally speaking, the Greeks were not particularly bent on mentioning either Hesiod or Homer first; they are in fact regularly alternated—such variation also normally occurs within the *corpora* of individual authors.

This general impression can be slightly qualified. First, the preference for the front position of Homer seems to be stronger in the later centuries, although the small numbers in the first centuries make comparison difficult. And second, it seems to matter whether Hesiod and Homer are presented as a couple in a specific context, or played out against each other. In the first case (as a 'team'), the ratio is 132 to 71, Homer thus in most cases taking the lead; in the second case, however, the difference is remarkably smaller: 21 to 18. One might say that when named together, Hesiod becomes somewhat of Homer's associate; and when opposed, Hesiod is more of an equal. These are of course statements based on nothing more than the sequence of their names—as the following chapters make clear, however, they prove a valuable indication of their relationship.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BOUNDLESS AUTHORITY OF HESIOD AND HOMER

0. *Introduction*

It was the main aim of chapter 1 to demonstrate that it was common and natural for the ancient Greeks to lump Hesiod and Homer together and regard them as a duo. The poets were generally believed to be (at least) roughly contemporary, and visualized as comparable proto-rhapsodes engaged in the same business. In daily life, the Greeks often encountered Hesiod and Homer in combination: as young children, they were taught their stories; the grammarians explained Hesiod with the aid of Homer and vice versa; their verses were cited and recycled during symposia; and their poems were recited at the same (religious) festivals, presumably alongside each other, and by similar or even identical performers. With such a prominent place for the combination of Hesiod and Homer in Greek education and recreation, it is easy to see how the Greeks came to view them as naturally belonging together. It is now time to proceed beyond such preliminary observations and examine the *thematic* association between Hesiod and Homer. In this chapter, we will investigate the combined appearance of the poets in contexts dealing with morality, education and the closely-related subject of religion.

It is a truism to state that throughout antiquity both Homer and Hesiod were regarded as great authorities and revered specialists in these fields; it is especially the status of Homer as educator of the Greeks that has often been investigated—in section 1, a short overview of the scholarship is presented. My investigation, however, will focus on those passages in which Hesiod and Homer *together* are credited (either implicitly or explicitly) with a certain normative or prescriptive value, i.e. where the poets are turned into moral guides, teachers of ethics, and authorities on life and how to lead it. This focus, which is necessary to test the main hypothesis of this book (i.e. that the reception of Hesiod is thoroughly affected by his relation to Homer), might at first seem a bit peculiar; but contrary to what one may expect, the moral and religious authority of

Hesiod *and* Homer does indeed differ from that of either of them alone. Section 2, a case study taken from Herodotus' *Histories*, will demonstrate that the focus on Hesiod and Homer *together* can at times lead to interesting interpretations and insights that would be missed by a too one-sided or Homerocentric approach.

The ground is then sufficiently cleared for section 3, which will investigate the question of how the Greeks in general pictured the moral authority of Hesiod and Homer. Two characteristics of their combination in this respect are particularly marked. First of all, the poets together seem to be unique in being often compared to lawgivers, while their poems are described as laws—a sure indication of the great importance ascribed to them. Secondly, the combination of the poets considerably narrows the range of subjects they are supposedly authoritative about: the encyclopaedic Homer and the polymath Hesiod together know only about the gods and the underworld. These two characteristics added up to create a vast problem that was intensely felt from the archaic period onwards: the supposedly prescriptive poets presented gods who were engaged in all kinds of immoral and in fact unlawful behaviour, and provided a morally unsettling picture of life after death.

How the Greeks dealt with the tension arising from panhellenic educators telling immoral tales is the subject of section 4. In this discussion of the several strategies of attacking and defending Hesiod and Homer we will see that the terminology derived from cultural memory studies is especially useful. In perfect agreement with the model described by Assmann,[1] the enshrinement of the poets calls to life a caste of specialist interpreters to keep the archaic poems up to date and secure their value in an ever-changing society. In contrast to what Assmann described, however, these specialists too seem to be caught up in a perpetual war of memory, not only with other experts but also with ordinary people.

1. *The Authority of Homer*

Much has been written on the omnipresence of Homer in the Greek world. He was by far the best-read, best-studied, most-quoted and most-discussed author of antiquity. He held a prime position in all levels of

[1] See Introduction, p. 4.

Greek education, and was recited at public festivals and private gatherings. His poems were of seminal importance to the development of all Greek literature, not only according to modern scholars but to the Greeks as well.[2] It is well known, however, that the dominance and ubiquity of Homer went far beyond the artistic realm: Homer's voice carried weight on all kinds of affairs, and even if the well-known story about the Athenians referring to Homer in order to get the naval command in the battle of Salamis is a fiction, it is still indicative of the poet's universal authority.[3]

Obviously, Homer's influence on Greek ethical and social thought was enormous. As Zeitlin states, 'it seems fair to say that if there is one figure who might be said to dominate the field of Greek values and identity, it is Homer and the legacy of his epics'.[4] It is perhaps not possible for us to fully understand the magnitude and pervasiveness of Homer's cultural power, as the modern Western world seems to have nothing that is really comparable. Scholars sometimes resort to figurative speech: Hegel for instance called Homer 'das Element, in dem die griechische Welt lebt wie der Mensch in der Luft'—and this is hardly an exaggeration.[5] Homer has also often been compared to the bible, but, as Mehmel says, the Greeks cited, alluded and referred to Homer with a zeal that 'wir mit unseren Goethe- und Bibelzitaten nichts Entsprechendes an die Seite zu stellen haben'.[6]

---

[2] See Hunter (2004), who not only discusses the influence of Homer on Greek literature but also stresses the fact that the Greeks were very aware of his importance in this respect; another valuable discussion is that of Goldhill (1986) 138–167; for the influence of Homer in the Second Sophistic see Kindstrand (1973) and Zeitlin (2001), who focuses on the place of Homer in visual culture.

[3] Hdt. 7.161. See also Arist. *Rh.* 1375b28–30 for the similar case (also referred to by Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.40) of the Athenians claiming (and getting) possession of Salamis on the basis of two lines in Homer (*Il.* 2.557–558).

[4] Zeitlin (2001) 202. See also Verdenius (1970) 7 arguing that Homer was studied at school not so much for 'literary education but [for] the formation of character' and Robb (1994) 166 'to convey an oral paideia was the fundamental cultural purpose of Homeric speech'.

[5] Hegel (1923) 529. Compare, for instance, Heraclitus' *Homeric Problems* 1.5–7 (cited in Hunter 2004 235): 'From the very earliest infancy young children are nursed in their learning by Homer, and swaddled in his verses we water our souls with them as though they were nourishing milk. He stands beside each of us as we start out and gradually grow into men, he blossoms as we do, and until old age we never grow tired of him, for as soon as we set him aside we thirst for him again; it may be said that the same limit is set to both Homer and life'. See for a somewhat similar description D.Chrys. 18.8. Remarks on Homer's cultural hegemony abound; see e.g. Pl. *R.* 598d-e and 606e, Plu. *Mor.* 667F, *Caes.* 41.

[6] Mehmel (1954) 17, cf. Verdenius (1970) 6 'the Homeric epic even surpassed the bible in point of cultural power by its central position in the system of education'; see

Despite the importance of Homer for Greek thought it has taken relatively long for modern scholars to pass from very general remarks to the detailed and systematic study of Homeric reception.[7] The article of Verdenius (1970) presents a very useful collection of some of the most relevant sources, but the best studies dealing with Homer in the Greek imagination are still somewhat later: Kindstrand (1973), Lamberton (1986), and especially Lamberton and Keaney (1992) and Graziosi (2002).

What emerges most clearly from studies like these is that from the earliest times onwards the Greeks were very conscious of Homer's position in their own system of values and ethics. Because the poet was so early and so often attacked for his morally reprehensible tales, those who wished to defend the canonical status of Homer were forced to explain why his poems earned their prime position in (moral) education. It seems that there are basically two defence strategies adopted by the Greeks: one that remains on the surface level of the poems and one that seeks to explain Homer by postulating all kinds of meaning below the surface.

The second of these strategies involves allegory,[8] for which the early Greeks used the term ὑπόνοια ('undersense'). In the case of Homer, this practice has been well studied.[9] Though the origins of allegory are very

---

also 14. Modern scholars often compare the influence of the Homeric poems to that of the bible; see e.g. Long (1992) 44, who compares the texts because they are both 'the foundation of (...) cultural identity'. The comparison is very illuminating in many respects but should not be pushed too far: there were, for instance, no actual wars being fought over the correct interpretation of Homer.

[7] In 1954 Mehmel could still honestly say there were no studies focusing on the relationship between Homer and the Greeks (18). No-one has as yet undertaken a detailed study of the ancient reception of Homer as a whole.

[8] It is customary, after Long (1992), to speak of two kinds of allegory: strong allegory ('the author composes a text with the intention of being interpreted allegorically') and weak allegory ('the allegory is not something we know to be present in the text as originally constructed'). This distinction resembles that of Tate (1934), who speaks of '(pseudo-)historical interpretation' and 'intrinsic interpretation'. Long cogently argues that the Stoics were weak allegorists (and thus sought deeper truths in the texts of Hesiod and Homer without believing these were intentional), whereas those before them practised the stronger variant.

[9] See the ground-breaking articles of Tate (1927, 1929 and 1934), who discusses all the important sources, and further Richardson (1975), Lamberton (1986) and Lamberton and Keaney (1992); Steinmetz (1986) and Most (1989) are useful surveys of Stoic allegoresis.

unclear, and it is uncertain when,[10] how,[11] or with what purpose[12] allegory got started, it is fairly certain that the earliest allegorical interpretations of the Homeric poems neutralized morally offending passages by offering a 'deeper' reading. Some examples are provided by Pherecydes of Syros, who supposedly interpreted Zeus' binding of Hera (*Iliad* 15.18–22) as god ordering the matter of the universe, and Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who explained Homer's heroes as parts of the universe, and his gods as parts of the body.[13] Morally problematic passages from Homer are thus defused. It is unclear exactly when Homer's myths were allegorically explained to actively promote certain values and virtues, but this was certainly being done in the age of the sophists. From then on, the practice flourished throughout antiquity, culminating in such exegetes as Porphyry and Proclus, who offered grand-scale interpretations of the

[10] Theagenes of Rhegium (a grammarian from the 6th century BC) is traditionally held to be the first allegorist of Homer (DK 8 A 2), but modern scholars agree that 'the probability is', to speak with Tate (1927) 215, that allegorical interpretation did not 'suddenly spring from his brain'. Small (1949) very sensibly points out that there are some obvious allegories (in the strong sense) present in both Hesiod (examples are the Erides, the myth of Pandora, and the marriage of Zeus and Themis) and Homer (the personifications of Phobos and Eris and the like, the story of the two *pithoi*)—these passages may have invited or stimulated allegoresis. Most (1993) goes a step further in saying that Patroclus was the first 'Allegoriker'. Svenbro (1976) 119–121 connects the birth of allegoresis to the rise of the polis, since that enabled Homer to be regarded as a 'citoyen' with 'arrière-pensées'.

[11] Given the nature of the allegories (often connected to cosmology and physics, especially in earliest times) it seems likely that a great interest in natural philosophy (on which Homer does not say much) may have sparked allegory; see Tate (1929) 142: 'Allegorical interpretation of the ancient Greek myths began not with the grammarians, but with the philosophers', and Tate (1927) 215 'The early philosophers who expressed their doctrines in mythical language, which is to be taken as symbolical and allegorical, may well have been the first to interpret the poetic traditions as though they were conscious allegories.'

[12] As to the *why*: scholars are divided with regard to the the question of whether allegory originated either to defend Homer against attacks (what Tate calls 'negative or defensive allegory') or 'to make fully explicit the wealth of doctrine which *ex hypothesi* the myths contained' ('positive or exegetical allegory', Tate 1929 142). The fact that early allegory focuses on offensive passages seems to be in favour of the first view (see e.g. Sikes 1931 16 'the use of allegory was the only defence against the charge of immorality', and Long 1992 44), but scholars tend to think that positive allegory was earlier: see e.g. Tate (1929), who even says that the defensive function of allegory was 'unimportant' (144), Tate (1934), Lamberton (1986), stating that 'the desire to tap Homer's prestige probably came earlier than the desire to defend him' (15), and Sluiter (1996) 167. Some argue that the distinction should be given up since ''defensive' and 'positive' allegory worked hand in hand from the outset' (Coulter 1976 26); see esp. Struck (2004) 14–16.

[13] Pherecydes DK 7 B 5; Metrodorus DK 61 A 4.

Iliad and *Odyssey* as stories on the descent of souls into this world (caused by the beauty of this universe, represented by Helen) and the difficult return of one of those souls, respectively.[14]

As for the first of the strategies: the scholarly attention for the allegorical interpretation of Homer should not make us lose sight of the fact that the surface meaning of the Homeric poems was believed to contain positive values as well. For most people, allegory was not necessary to appreciate Homer. According to Aristophanes' Aeschylus, Homer had received 'honour' and 'glory' (τιμή and κλέος) 'because he taught valuable things, tactics, virtues and weaponry of men.'[15] One of those present at Xenophon's symposium says his father forced him to memorize all of Homer, 'so that I would become a good man.'[16] It is very well possible that the famous dictum of Anaxagoras, that Homer's poetry is 'about virtue and justice' (περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ δικαιοσύνης), is not allegorical at all, as it is usually believed to be.[17] And there are many more sources that (either explicitly or implicitly) mention Homer as an educator inspiring all the virtues necessary for living a good life,[18] especially the martial, liberal and generally 'manly' virtues.[19] Even Plato sometimes refers approvingly to the views and values contained in Homer's poems,[20] and in the *Apology* compares his own hero Socrates to the greatest hero of the Trojan War, Achilles.[21] It is in fact especially Homer's heroes, brought on stage by the rhapsodes, commented upon by the sophists, reincarnated in tragedy's protagonists—in short, endlessly shaped and reshaped by artists, orators and philosophers from all times—that provided the ethical paradigms for a Greek's everyday life. The ethics contained in the epic were re-lived

---

[14] Lamberton and Keaney (1986) xx, speaking of 'readers such as Porphyry (…) and Proclus'.

[15] Ar. *Ra.* 1035–1036: ὅτι χρήστ' ἐδίδαξεν, τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ὁπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν.

[16] X. *Smp.* 3.5: ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενοίμην.

[17] DK 59 A 1; see also Richardson (1975) 69–70.

[18] 'In general, it may be said that the constructive elements of Greek ethics have developed from the Homeric poems', so Verdenius (1970) 13; so similarly Hunter (2004) 249: 'Homeric values had been subsumed into, rather than erased by, the values of the polis.' Cf. e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 1.8.5 advising young people to read Homer and Virgil because they are 'morally improving' (*honesta*).

[19] This is exemplified by Dio Chrysostom's *Second Discourse on Kingship*, an elaborate speech on the 'noble, lofty and kingly' (γενναίαν καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ βασιλικήν, 2.6) poetry of Homer.

[20] E.g. *Phd.* 94d–95a, *Tht.* 194c, *Sph.* 216a, *Prt.* 348c, *R.* 389e, *R.* 441b–c, *R.* 468b–c, *Grg.* 525d.

[21] *Ap.* 28c–d. See for an elaborate discussion of this comparison Hobbs (2000) 178–186, who also discusses Socrates' likeness to Odysseus (193–198); cf. also Sluiter (2009).

everywhere—without the need for any 'undersense'. The Greeks wore the surface meaning of Homer on their very skins. We may conclude, then, that Homer could more than anyone else claim the title of 'Educator of the Greeks', bestowed upon him by Verdenius.[22]

It appears, however, that this view should be somewhat qualified. For if Verdenius is right, why then does Heraclitus call Hesiod and not Homer the διδάσκαλος πλείστων, 'teacher of most'? And if Homer is indeed the chief moral guide and authority of the Greeks, why then do new educators like Xenophanes and Plato criticize traditional *paideia* by attacking both Homer *and* Hesiod? It seems that Hesiod is a figure that deserves attention as well, but all too often scholars have ignored his presence in contexts that nonetheless mention both Hesiod and Homer. This Homerocentric approach to the question of epic's influence on Greek ethics can be highly misleading; this will now be illustrated by a discussion of perhaps the best-known passage on the influence of the poets on Greek thought: Herodotus' *Histories* 2.53.

2. *Herodotus on Greek Theology*

There are many reasons why Herodotus' famous statement on the origins of Greek religion should be given a prominent place in this chapter. For one, it is one of the earliest places where Hesiod and Homer are mentioned together at all; furthermore, it has become the *locus classicus* for the influence of epic on Greek religious thought in particular and their education and morality in general. Most interesting to us, however, is that the passage from the *Histories*, though much commented on, has (in my view) never been fully understood, and that the main defect of interpretations so far has been that too little attention has been paid to the fact that Hesiod and Homer are mentioned *together*—this I will demonstrate in a brief discussion of other views below. And finally, my own reading of the passage is meant to show the depth of the poets' authority in the mind of Herodotus; there are indications that he thinks of their poems in terms of laws, and it is that particular notion that we will explore during the remainder of the chapter.

[22] Verdenius named his 1970 article on the poet's influence 'Homer, Educator of the Greeks'; perhaps he took his cue from Jaeger (1945), whose chapter on the same subject is called 'Homer the Educator'.

Herodotus *Histories* 2.53 runs thus:

> ὅθεν δὲ ἐγένοντο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν εἴτε ἀεὶ ἦσαν πάντες ὁκοῖοί τέ τινες τὰ εἴδεα, οὐκ ἠπιστέατο μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθές, ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μευ πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι καὶ οὐ πλέοσι. οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες. οἱ δὲ πρότερον ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι ὕστερον, ἔμοιγε δοκέειν, ἐγένοντο. τούτων τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἱ Δωδωνίδες ἱέρειαι λέγουσι, τὰ δὲ ὕστερα τὰ ἐς Ἡσίοδον τε καὶ Ὅμηρον ἔχοντα ἐγὼ λέγω.
>
> 'But whence each of the gods came into being, whether they had all for ever existed, and what outward forms they had, the Greeks knew not till yesterday or the day before, so to speak; for I think that the time of Hesiod and Homer was four hundred years before my own, and not more; and it is they who created a theogony for the Greeks, and gave to the gods their several epithets, and divided their honours and arts, and declared their outward forms. But those poets who are said to be older than Hesiod and Homer were, to my thinking, of later birth. The earlier part of all this is what the priestesses of Dodona tell; the later, that which concerns Hesiod and Homer, is what I myself say.'

Generally speaking, modern interpretations of this passage suffer from three defects. The first one is concerned with focus. It is obvious, as many scholars have noticed, that Herodotus is very anxious to present his own opinion (δοκέω, 'I think', ἔμοιγε δοκέειν, 'to my thinking', ἐγὼ λέγω, 'I myself say').[23] But what is his own opinion *about*? It is the *communis opinio* that Herodotus here claims 'what is very definitely his own view about the role of Homer and Hesiod in the development of the Twelve Gods'.[24] But this is a misinterpretation, caused by the fact that this passage is so often cited out of context. *Histories* Book 2 is the book on the history and culture of Egypt; a correct interpretation of 2.53 must

[23] See e.g. Burkert (1985) 124–125, and Thomas (2000) 216–227 and 235–248, who links the emphatic first person statements to the style of display performance.

[24] In the words of Thomas (2000) 216, who expresses the universally accepted view. Scholars differ, however, on how Herodotus pictures this 'role'. According to Cartledge (1993), for instance, Herodotus did not mean that Hesiod and Homer invented 'the gods out of whole cloth, but that they so to speak reinvented them for the Greeks, describing and defining them in terms the Greeks could and did comprehend and worship' (172). Boardman (2002) 185 thinks the purport is that they 'codified much of what was current in a rich oral tradition, and filled the gaps'. Hartog (1980) 358 believes that it is Herodotus' point that Hesiod and Homer are known as the creators of the Greek pantheon because they had made an inventory of gods; by implication, he says, Herodotus portrays himself as a type of *aoidos* as well, creating the known world because he too makes an inventory of its elements.

include the Egyptian context.[25] In fact, the statement on Greek religion is embedded in a larger discussion of Egyptian religion,[26] and 2.53 is meant to illustrate what is one of the most defining characteristics of Egyptian religion and Egyptian culture in general: its awe-inspiring age. It has long been recognized that Herodotus to a significant degree presents peoples according to an oppositional schema,[27] and it is only when compared to its Egyptian counterpart that Greek religion appears extremely young. Herodotus claims that Greek religion started 'not till yesterday or the day before'[28] to make clear how old Egyptian religion really is—and *that* is Herodotus' point.

We can see how Herodotus is pulling the beginning of Greek religion towards his own time in two successive moves: first Hesiod and Homer ('four hundred years before my own time, and not more') are reeled in, and then the poets generally believed to be older than these two (presumably Orpheus and Musaeus) are said to be younger. It is these two moves that are accompanied by the emphatic personal pronouns, and *this* is the view that Herodotus wants to connect with his own name.[29] The historian is thus not primarily concerned with propagating the idea that Hesiod and Homer were important to the development of Greek religion; he subscribes to it, but he does not claim it as his own. Most likely, it is a view already well-known.

---

[25] Cf. Cartledge and Greenwood (2002) 354.

[26] From 2.37 onwards Herodotus discusses the religion of the Egyptians, the most pious of all men. Just as the Egyptians are the most ancient people on earth, and their cities the oldest still in existence, so their religion is of tremendous age and dates back many thousands of years. No wonder, Herodotus argues, that the Greeks took over many of their gods' names (οὐνόματα) and rites from the Egyptians, as we are told in the paragraphs leading up to our passage (2.50–52). What Hesiod and Homer did, was turn a collection of foreign names into a fully-fledged anthropomorphic pantheon (2.53). After demonstrating that divination as the Greeks know it was also an originally Egyptian art (2.54–58), Herodotus returns to his description of Egyptian cultural peculiarities.

[27] Herodotus' ethnology is heavily influenced by polar thinking, with qualifications opposed on geological dividing-lines; see the ground-breaking study of Hartog (1980), esp. chapter 1. The south, for instance (Hartog in fact takes Egypt as a testcase), is old, civilized and warm, while the north (the example is Scythia) is young, savage and cold.

[28] There is an interesting and very close parallel for this expression in Josephus (*Ap*. 1.7). Wishing to detract from the authority of Greek historians, he states that in comparison to *really* old civilizations like those of the Egyptians and Chaldaeans, 'everything in the Greek world will be found to be modern, and dating, so to speak, from yesterday or the day before' (τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἅπαντα νέα καὶ χθὲς καὶ πρῴην, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, εὕροι γεγονότα).

[29] τούτων τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, 'the earlier part of all this', refers to *Hist*. 2.52, where Herodotus tells us how the Pelasgians (Herodotus' proto-Greeks) came by the names for their gods ('this I know, for I was told at Dodona', ὡς ἐγὼ ἐν Δωδώνῃ οἶδα ἀκούσας).

The second defect is involved with Homerocentrism. Most interpretations of this passage feature in larger-scale discussions on (the influence of) Homer. That Hesiod is mentioned alongside (and even before) Homer in this passage is in such cases often completely ignored. This practice is to some degree understandable but nonetheless likely to lead to misinterpretation. Graziosi, for instance, focusing on the ancient conception of Homer, explains the relatively early date of Homer by claiming that Herodotus wants to distance the poet from the Trojan War: by thus disqualifying the *Iliad* as a ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις, Herodotus 'implicitly defines his relationship to his subject matter as different from the relationship Homer has with his'.[30] This is a very ingenious hypothesis, which moreover is in perfect accordance with other references to Homer in the *Histories*,[31] but it does not account for Hesiod's presence. There are many other examples of such Homerocentrism in the scholarship on this passage.[32] The text, however, does not offer any reason for ignoring or marginalizing the figure of Hesiod.

The third defect can be discerned in interpretations which *do* take Hesiod into account, but fail to see that the poets are presented as a combination—hence, Hesiod and Homer are regarded as separate. This defect is perhaps encouraged by the word θεογονίη ('theogony'), that according to some contains an allusion to Hesiod. Not, of course, because

---

[30] Graziosi (2002) 113. Graziosi's argument is largely based on the fact that Herodotus places the Trojan War 800 years before his own time (*Hist.* 2.145), thus putting Homer as far from the Trojan War as he himself is from Homer. But we can object to her argument that a) Herodotus puts the Trojan War rather at a distance of 850 than 800 years in *Hist.* 2.145, b) it is not very likely that the ancient audience when hearing 2.145 would in retrospect interpret 2.53 as a negative comment on Homer, and, perhaps more fundamentally, c) the fact that 400 is the exact half of 800 actually neither favours her argument nor undermines it.

[31] See *Hist.* 2.23 and 2.216, where Herodotus contrasts the poetry of Homer to his own work as a historiographer as well.

[32] See, for instance, the commentary of Lloyd (1976) 247, who says of this passage that it is 'the only pronouncement by an important writer of antiquity on the date of Hom.'—why not the date of Hesiod? Verdenius (1970) claims that the Greek tradition of regarding *Homer* as θεῖος 'forms the background of Herodotus' assertion that Homer and Hesiod gave shape to Greek religion' (6 n.2). Lamberton (1986) 23 says that *Hist.* 2.53 presents a 'peculiar conception of Homer as a source, a creator, (…) rather than a transmitter of information'—apart from the fact that this is a debatable statement, there is no sign of Hesiod in his discussion (incidentally, Lamberton translates 'Homer and Hesiod', reversing the sequence of the original). Banks (1876) is so eager to maintain Homer's priority that he suggests that 'perhaps it may be assumed that Herodotus is speaking of Homer generally as representing the beginning, and Hesiod as the close, of a period; and that (…) he notes down the proximate date of the former as standing for both' (v–vi).

one of his poems actually bore this title,[33] but because a great part of his work is concerned with the descent of the gods, whereas 'theogony is not an important trait of Hom.'s writings though examples do occur'.[34] It is easy to see how such an alleged allusion could lead to the view that Herodotus distinguished between the poets and believed that the gods' ἐπωνυμίαι, τιμαί, τέχναι and εἴδεα ('epithets, honours, arts and outward forms') were mostly Homer's specialty. Such a simplistic dichotomy goes back to 19th-century scholarship and is still maintained by Lloyd.[35] The twofold division, however, must be rejected as unauthentic for at least three reasons: 1) it evidently conflicts with the very emphatic plural in the Greek (οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην, 'it is they who created a theogony'), 2) there is no reason whatsoever to regard θεογονίη as anything else than a common denomination of a genre (instead of a title),[36] and, most importantly, 3) it is *a priori* unlikely that Herodotus meant for his fifth-century listening audience to be concerned with the question to which poet the terms τιμαί etc. would be most applicable[37]— it is clear, therefore, that the dichotomous view ascribed to Herodotus is an anachronistic projection by modern scholars.

Histories 2.53 thus provides a good example of how our own views of Hesiod and Homer can sometimes get in the way of interpreting those of the ancients. In this case, they may prevent us from seeing that Hesiod and Homer are here *together* credited with having 'created a theogony for the Greeks, and given to the gods their several epithets, and divided

---

[33] The actual title Θεογονία cannot be found earlier than Chrysippus (SVF 2.256); it was perhaps coined by the Alexandrians (see West 1966 150). In Herodotus' time, it is still unusual to refer to poems or other writings by giving a title (see also Davison 1955b).

[34] Lloyd (1976) 250; Paley (1883) however makes a stand for Homer and argues that Herodotus 'must have referred to the 'Cypria' in saying that Homer 'made a Theogony'; for we know that the origin and pedigrees of the gods were narrated in that work' (xv).

[35] Lloyd (1976) 250–251; cf. the discussion of scholarship by Wiedemann (1890) 239–240. Wiedemann himself does not believe Herodotus distinguishes between them, but nonetheless *should* have done so: 'Um genau zu sein, hätte Herodot auch zwischen Hesiod, der systematisch und didaktisch die Götterwelt darstellte, und Homer, der naiv und poetisch einzelne Ereignisse der Göttersage berichtete, einen Unterscheid machen müssen' (239).

[36] In 1.132 Herodotus mentions a common Persian sacrifice during which a Magian sings a θεογονίη, and there are examples in the *Histories* of poets 'creating' (ποιεῖν) all sorts of poems, be it a dithyramb (1.23), an epic poem (4.13), a hymn (4.35) or a play (6.21).

[37] And even if they would, they would probably pick Hesiod as the expert on divine τιμαί, cf. e.g. *Th.* 74, 112, 418, 426, 462, 491, 882, 885, 892, 904 (see on the importance of Zeus as a distributor of τιμαί Nelson 1998 102–107, and further Clay 2003 28–29). Homer by contrast speaks mainly of the honours among mortals.

their honours and arts, and declared their outward forms'. The poets are presented as a unity, a team, so to speak: there is no distinction made in terms of hierarchy, importance, or individual contribution. It is likely, as I argued above, that this is a common representation, since Herodotus is only claiming the statement on the *age* of Hesiod and Homer, and not on their combined importance to Greek religion, as his own.

What remains now is to investigate what the statement of Herodotus can tell us about the way the authority of Hesiod and Homer was perceived. Three observations suggest that the historian emphasizes their quality as universal teachers and at the same time compares their status to that of lawgivers. This comparison, which the next section will show to be common throughout antiquity, can thus be seen as early as the middle of the fifth century BC.

The first of the observations concerns Herodotus' claim that Hesiod and Homer 'made a theogony for the Greeks' (ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι). Athough the verb ποιέω can be used for 'shaping' older material,[38] we must assume that the poets thought up everything by themselves, since it is explicitly stated that there were no poets (i.e. 'authors') before their time: this emphasizes their power and prominence as educators. And even though we are dealing with a somewhat idiosyncratic view meant to make the Egyptian religion look even more ancient, Herodotus apparently believes Hesiod and Homer make credible creators *ex nihilo*. Of greater interest, however, is the qualification 'for the Greeks'. Nowhere else in the *Histories* does a poet 'create' anything for 'the Greeks' (or any other people) in general. Poems are usually fit for a specific occasion and a specific audience,[39] but the theogony of Hesiod and Homer is created without such restrictions in time and place.[40] It is obvious that Herodotus is here participating in the process of the 'enshrinement' of the poets, since they are presented as distant and unchangeable, and of timeless importance and universal appeal.[41] Moreover, it is clear that Hesiod and

[38] See, for instance, *Hist*. 2.116 and 4.16.

[39] Phrynichus, for instance, created a play for the Athenians (6.21), Olen created hymns to be sung at Delos (4.35), and Alcaeus created a song for his friend Melanippus (5.95).

[40] In contrast to the other poets in the *Histories*, Hesiod and Homer are not paid or otherwise rewarded either.

[41] Graziosi (2002) 58–61 speaks of the 'universality' of Homeric audiences; his poems are meant for all the Greeks (cf. e.g. *AP* 9.97, 16.295, 16.296). It is likely that this goes for the *combination* of Hesiod and Homer as well; see further below, esp. pp. 72–81.

Homer are represented here as contributing to the national (i.e. supra city-state) identity of the Greeks, who are in the *Histories* always indicated with their collective name of the Ἕλληνες when they are compared to other people.

The second observation involves the expressions τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες ('they divided their honours and arts') and εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες ('they declared their outward forms'). Both verbs are in the *Histories* often used for powerful authorities with greater capabilities than a normal human being. Διαιρέω ('to divide') is a verb connected to establishing law and custom: Egypt is 'divided' into provinces (2.164), the land of the King is 'divided', and in 3.89—the closest parallel to our passage—we hear how King Darius 'divided' his 'governments' (ἀρχὰς … διεῖλε). Σημαίνω ('to declare') is used not only for the statements of authority figures, but also for giving voice to divine signs;[42] there might even be a hint here that Hesiod and Homer are (nearly) as divine—where authority is concerned—as their subjects.[43] It is at least clear that the use of the two verbs make the poets resemble both prophets and rulers. That these functions are naturally connected can be seen in Herodotus' picture of Melampus, an ancient hero, quasi-historical like Hesiod and Homer, who was both a seer and a king[44]—he is also the only other example in the *Histories* of a person teaching 'the Greeks'.[45]

Third and finally: the 'lawgiving' or normative quality of the poets comes out clearly in the expression ἐπωνυμίας δόντες ('they gave epithets').Ἐπωνυμίη, literally 'eponymy', indicates a 'named-after relation'[46] between two words, establishing a connection between an original 'name' (ὄνομα) and another entity named after it: for instance, the Blackcloaks have their eponymy from the fact that they wear black clothes, and the

[42] Priests, divine signs and those reporting divine signs can σημαίνειν, see e.g. *Hist*. 1.34, 1.43, 1.78, 1.89, 1.108, 4.179, 7.192, 8.41 (cf. Heraclitus DK B 93); it is also done by the commander Themistocles (*Hist*. 8.62 and 8.111). Furthermore, the verb is often used in statements of Herodotus himself (e.g. *Hist*. 1.5, 1.75, 2.20, 4.99, 5.54, 7.77, 7.213), who is perhaps the highest authority in the *Histories* (see for Herodotus' control of his narrative by means of first person statements and *prolepseis* through oracles, dreams and divine signs De Jong 1999, esp. 227–228 and 230–241).

[43] Their distribution of τιμαί, moreover, strongly resembles Zeus dividing the divine τιμαί anew after his hostile takeover (see *Th*. 74, 426–428, 885, 904).

[44] *Hist*. 2.49 and 9.34; the second passage moreover tells us how he divided the kingship over Argos in three parts.

[45] He supposedly introduced the cult of Dionysus into Greece (*Hist*. 2.49).

[46] The 'named-after relation' is a term of Levin (1997) 50. See also her note 1 on the difference between etymology and eponymy.

Persians have this ἐπωνυμίη from the ancient hero Perses.[47] There is thus always an historical perspective, in that eponymy provides an explanation of how a name has come to be: 'Herodot verwendet eponumiè, wenn die Herkunft des Namens im Blick ist.'[48] Moreover, and this is especially relevant to our case, the historical or traditional aspect makes that eponymy defines the identity of the 'named after' group or person, and thus informs the audience of their place in the structure of the world.[49] Whoever knows the eponymy of the Persians, for instance, at once knows the Persians and how to distinguish them from other groups.

It takes an authority figure to create an eponymy and thus to define a person; this is usually done by fathers naming their children, such as Polymnestus the Therean naming his son Battus ('Stammerer') because of his speech impediment, or Hippocrates the Athenian calling his son Peisistratus after Nestor's son to indicate his descent from the house of Pylos.[50] There are none in the *Histories* so powerful as to be able to create eponymies and impose them upon an entire people, but there is one interesting exception to this rule; apparently, lawgivers *can* invent ἐπωνυμίαι. In *Hist*. 5.66 we are told how the great reformer Cleisthenes, who divided the Athenians into ten tribes instead of four, does away with the old tribal ἐπωνυμίαι and finds out (ἐξευρών) for his new groups the ἐπωνυμίαι of ten other Athenian heroes instead. Such a remarkable feat can

---

[47] *Hist*. 4.107 and 7.61. See further Levin (1996 and 1997) for a good collection of eponymies in the literary tradition up to and including Euripides. In both articles she distinguishes between four types of eponymy but in (1996) 200 concedes there is no real 'system': individuals, groups, natural inanimate entities and places or parcels of land can be both the primary and recipient entities.

[48] Burkert (1985) 130 n.25. Oddly enough, Burkert distinguishes between eponymies like that of the Blackcloaks and Persians on the one hand, and the ἐπωνυμίαι of the gods, which he calls 'Beinamen', on the other; Levin does not include *Hist*. 2.53 in her list of eponymies either (she does not say why not). I would say, however, that the ἐπωνυμίαι of the gods are excellent examples of the 'named-after relation', pointing at, e.g. the functions ('high-thunderer'), appearance ('grey-eyed'), or mythological feats ('Argus-slayer') of the gods. Seen in this light, ἐπωνυμίας δόντες sits perfectly well with τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες.

[49] It is interesting therefore that the word ἐπωνυμίη shows up quite often in connection with the earlier-mentioned 'divisions' that were once made in the past but still continue into the present. In the discussion on the names of the three continents, Herodotus says he cannot find out 'the names of those who divided (διουρισάντων) the world, or whence they got the ἐπωνυμίαι which they gave' (4.45). In 1.94 the king of the Lydians divided (διέλοντα) his people into two; one part stayed and the other part left their native soil; they were henceforth called Tyrrhenians after their leader Tyrrhenus, ἐπὶ τούτου τὴν ἐπωνυμίην ποιευμένους. In 2.17 Egypt is said to be divided (διαιρέεσθαι) into two parts, carrying the ἐπωνυμίαι of Libya and Asia.

[50] *Hist*. 4.155 and 5.65.

apparently only be performed by a lawgiver or a man with law-giving faculties, as is confirmed by a story told in 5.68, where Cleisthenes' grandfather, tyrant of Sicyon, changed (μετατιθείς) the ἐπωνυμίαι from the Dorian tribes from the old into new and ridiculous ones (such as 'Assites' and 'Porkites') to annoy them. Such an act destroys the historical connection, distorts tradition, and unsettles collective identity; and Herodotus knows this. His comment on the re-naming of the Athenian tribes is of great interest:

> Ταῦτα δέ, δοκέειν ἐμοί, ἐμιμέετο ὁ Κλεισθένης οὗτος τὸν ἑωυτοῦ μητροπάτορα Κλεισθένεα τὸν Σικυῶνος τύραννον. Κλεισθένης γὰρ Ἀργείοισι πολεμήσας τοῦτο μὲν ῥαψῳδοὺς ἔπαυσε ἐν Σικυῶνι ἀγωνίζεσθαι τῶν Ὁμηρείων ἐπέων εἵνεκα, ὅτι Ἀργεῖοί τε καὶ Ἄργος τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ὑμνέαται· τοῦτο δέ, ἡρώιον γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἔστι ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀγορῇ τῶν Σικυωνίων Ἀδρήστου τοῦ Ταλαοῦ, τοῦτον ἐπεθύμησε ὁ Κλεισθένης ἐόντα Ἀργεῖον ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρης.
>
> 'Now herein [renaming the Athenian tribes], this Cleisthenes was imitating his own mother's father, Cleisthenes the tyrant of Sicyon. For Cleisthenes, after going to war with the Argives, made an end to rhapsodists' contests at Sicyon by reason of the Homeric poems, because wellnigh everywhere in these it is Argives and Argos that are the theme of song; furthermore, he conceived the desire to cast out from the land the hero Adrastus son of Talaus because he was an Argive, even though his shrine stood then as now in the very market-place of Sicyon.'[51]

Herodotus compares the invention of new ἐπωνυμίαι for a people to cancelling the performance of the Homeric poems and the (attempted) banishment of a hero's cult, both activities bent on erasing the Argive element from Sicyonian history, tradition and identity.[52] Cleisthenes is a showcase example of a *damnator memoriae* trying to rewrite memory and thus create a new identity for his people. Creating eponymies is just as much part of this procedure as suppressing history (in the form of the *Iliad*) and eradicating traditional cult (by taking away Adrastus' θυσίας τε καὶ ὁρτάς, 'sacrifices and festivals').

It is obvious from Herodotus' words that only people with great power can impose ἐπωνυμίαι on others: Cleisthenes ('stronger by far than his political rivals', πολλῷ κατύπερθε τῶν ἀντιστασιωτέων, 5.69) for the

---

[51] *Hist*. 5.67; in 5.68 Herodotus recounts how Cleisthenes the tyrant changed the names of the Dorian tribes.

[52] A hero's shrine is a powerful site of memory which can greatly contribute to a feeling of common identity (see e.g. Alcock 2002, esp. chapters 3 and 4), as does the performance of the Homeric poems (see e.g. Nagy 1990 36–47, and *Hist*. 7.161 for another example from Herodotus).

Athenians, the tyrant Cleisthenes for the Sicyonians, and Hesiod and Homer for an even larger group, 'the Greeks'. The two poets are thus presented as a kind of *Ur*-lawgivers of tremendous power, shaping Greek religion and successfully imposing their entire theology on the Greeks, thus determining their traditions, memory and identity.

The notion of Hesiod and Homer as lawgivers, present already in Herodotus (though perhaps somewhat implicitly), finds expression throughout antiquity. In the next section I will investigate in what ways the two poets are equated to lawgivers, and examine whether there is a specific subject in regard to which the poems are regarded as normative.

3. *Hesiod and Homer as Lawgivers*

Herodotus is one of the earliest sources for the lawlike authority of Hesiod and Homer in antiquity, but he was not the first. Before we investigate the numerous ways in which the Greeks presented Hesiod and Homer as lawgivers of some kind, it is important to note that the poets *themselves* already promoted such a view. In *Odyssey* 3.267–271, for instance, Nestor tells Telemachus how Agamemnon left an anonymous *aoidos* to keep an eye on his wife while he went to war; and Hesiod is far more explicit still when he compares the rhetorical capabilities of the king to those of the poets (*Theogony* 79–103).[53] Even when we keep in mind that it can only be expected of poets to present poets as venerable and trustworthy, it is obvious that such descriptions influenced later views.[54] To these we will now turn.

---

[53] The other singers in Homer, Demodocus and Phemius, are also held in great esteem (although they are not associated with lawgiving); see e.g. Svenbro (1976) 19–21. See on Hesiod's comparison of kings and poets e.g. Solmsen (1954), Combellack (1974), Roth (1976), Martin (1984), Gagarin (1992), and Kirby (1992). Scholars nowadays agree that at least one of the functions of the comparison is to elevate the status of the poet, who becomes somewhat of a king and lawgiver himself.

[54] See the scholia on *Od.* 3.267 which (completely unaware of the 'propaganda for Homer's own profession', as Stanford 1959 puts it) say that in ancient times singers were like philosophers who guarded the ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀρετάς ('virtues of men and women'). See for the passage from the *Th.* the scholia (esp. 93 and 99b, where the singer and king are closely associated), and the comments by Cornutus (*Epidr.* 14) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 746D). Interestingly enough, the ancients noticed that Hesiod and Homer agreed on the likeness between poets and statesmen (Σ *Il.* 1.175c (T), 17.251a (A) and Plu. *Mor.* 801E).

There are several ways in which a certain legislative quality can be attributed to the poems of Hesiod and Homer. In the most obvious cases, their poetry is quite directly said to be understood as law, as in Lucian's *De Luctu*, where the author ridicules people for their methods of mourning and beliefs about death:

> Ὁ μὲν δὴ πολὺς ὅμιλος, οὓς ἰδιώτας οἱ σοφοὶ καλοῦσιν, Ὁμήρῳ τε καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μυθοποιοῖς περὶ τούτων πειθόμενοι καὶ νόμον θέμενοι τὴν ποίησιν αὐτῶν, τόπον τινα ὑπὸ τῇ γῇ βαθὺν Ἅιδην ὑπειλήφασιν …
>
> 'The general herd, whom philosophers call the laity, trust Homer and Hesiod and the other mythmakers in these matters, and take their poetry for a law unto themselves. So they suppose there is a place deep under the earth called Hades …'[55]

It is because the people believe the poets' picture of Hades as a dreadful place that they engage in all the ridiculous rituals of mourning that the rest of Lucian's treatise is concerned with mocking. The poetry of Hesiod and Homer is here clearly said to be turned into *nomoi* by the many, who live their lives in accordance with them. Such straightforward cases, however, are both rather rare and late.[56]

Secondly, Hesiod and Homer seem to be associated with reputable lawgivers and archetypes of justice. Perhaps the first indication for this particular association can be found in Plato's *Apology* (40e–41b), where the poets (together with Orpheus and Musaeus) are mentioned in a list

---

[55] Lucian *Luct.* 2.

[56] There is a close parallel in S.E. *M.* 9.15, where 'those who first led mankind' are said to have 'invented both the fancy about the gods and the belief in the mythical events in Hades', and 'purposing to check the wrongdoers they laid down laws (νόμους ἔθεντο) (…) and after this they also invented gods as watchers of all the sinful and righteous acts of men, so that none should dare to do wrong even in secret, believing that the gods 'cloaked in garments of mist all over the earth go roaming, watching the violent doings of men and their lawful behaviour' (ἠέρα ἑσσάμενοι πάντῃ φοιτῶσιν ἐπ' αἶαν, / ἀνθρώπων ὕβρεις τε καὶ εὐνομίας ἐφορῶντες)'. The quotation is a combination of *WD* 255 and *Od.* 17.487, which makes it likely that Hesiod and Homer are primarily on Sextus' mind (together with Orpheus, who was quoted somewhat earlier). One may compare Lucian *Nec.* 3, Plu. *Mor.* 28B and Athen. 12.546c. Lycurgus (*In Leocr.* 102) is the first to explicitly compare νόμοι with ποιηταί, but he does so in a rather general way and gives only Homer as an example (cf. Pl. *R.* 599e and *Lg.* 858e which deal with the question whether Homer can be called a νομοθέτης). Incidentally, there are also several scholia that ascribe a certain nomothetical quality to Homeric verses. When Nestor in *Il.* 23.644–645 says he is too old to compete in Patroclus' funeral games, the scholiast remarks that Homer νομοθετεῖ καθ' ἡλικίαν ἀεὶ ποιεῖν ('prescribes by law that one should always act according to one's age'). See further Σ *Il.* 3.16b (bT), 4.413–417 (b and T), 14.309 (bT), 15.349–351 (bT).

of famous people Socrates would like to meet in the underworld; they occupy the middle position after a group of righteous half-divinities (Minos, Rhadamantys, Aeacus, Triptolemus)[57] and before a few heroes who met their death through an unfair trial (Palamedes, Ajax, Telamon)—obviously, they are included as experts on justice here. The link with lawgiving is more apparent in *Symposium* 209c–e, where Socrates' teacher Diotima is measuring the superiority of spiritual love over physical love by the superiority of spiritual offspring over physical children. Her examples are the children of 'Homer, Hesiod and the other good poets (Ὅμηρον … καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς τοὺς ἀγαθούς)' that 'make them forever honoured and remembered (ἐκείνοις ἀθάνατον κλέος καὶ μνήμην παρέχεται)', and the laws of Lycurgus and Solon that in similar fashion provided them with great esteem. Hesiod and Homer, again linked to wisdom and justice, are here compared to the most famous lawgivers of Greece. Solon, who was both a poet and a lawgiver, seems to be a key figure here as he is elsewhere associated with both Hesiod and Homer as well.[58]

Third, there is the Greek habit of appealing to the poets as 'witnesses' (μάρτυρες) or 'proofs' (μαρτύρια), both terms with obviously legal overtones. This was a well-established practice in the classical age, and provides another indication of the poets' sayings being credited with a lasting validity. It must be granted that Hesiod and Homer were not the only poets thus appealed to, but their appearances as witnesses are nonetheless most frequent.[59]

That Hesiod and Homer can be called to witness is closely connected to their quality as lawgivers; I will briefly illustrate this with one example, taken from Plato. In *Republic* 364c–d, Plato is concerned about citizens

[57] Minos, Rhadamantys, and Aeacus were kings, lawgivers and (after their death) judges in the underworld; they were famous for their virtue, justice, and piety.

[58] Solon was said to have given shape to the public recitations of Homer in Athens (see D.L. 1.57, perhaps a democratically-inspired correction for the story of the Peisistratean recension), which, incidentally, Lycurgus supposedly did for the Spartans. Plato and Aristotle too couple Solon and Homer in a legal context (*Lg.* 858e, *Rh.* 1375b28–35). Aelius Aristides compares Hesiod and Solon (*Or.* 23.23–24). For more on the connection between Solon and Hesiod, already noted in antiquity, see ch. 5, pp. 172–175.

[59] In the works of Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle there are only four poets called μάρτυρες or μαρτύρια: Homer (10 times) and Hesiod (4), and the thoroughly gnomic poets Theognis (2) and Solon (1). The standard examples for the rhetorical trick of 'calling the ancients (παλαιοί) to witness' come from Hesiod and Homer (see Aristotle *Rh.* 1375b28–31 and Aphthonius I 66 Walz). See also Dem. *Fals. Leg.* 243 and Aristid. *Or.* 34.42.

who use poetic sayings to justify morally objectionable notions and actions. Some people, he says, entertain revolting ideas: they claim, for instance, that acting unjustly is pleasant and easy, and pays better than acting in accordance with justice, or that it is not wrong to harm the just and injust alike—

> Τούτοις δὲ πᾶσιν τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι, εὐπετείας διδόντες, ὡς 'τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι / ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει· / τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν,' καί τινα ὁδὸν μακράν τε καὶ τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀνάντη. οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὅμηρον μαρτύρονται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν 'λιστοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί, / καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγαναῖσιν / λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι / λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κεν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.'
>
> 'And the poets are brought forward as witnesses to all these ideas. Some harp on the ease of vice, as follows: 'Vice in abundance is easy to get; / The road is smooth and begins beside you, / But the gods have put sweat between us and virtue,' and a road that is long, rough, and steep. Others quote Homer to bear witness that the gods can be influenced by humans, since he said: 'The gods themselves can be swayed by prayer, / and with sacrifices and soothing promises, / Incense and libations, human beings turn them from their purpose / When someone has transgressed and sinned."[60]

This passage illustrates not only how easily poetic passages are stripped of context and adapted, but also how people justify their obvious ἀδικήματα by appealing—as to witnesses—to the authority of the poets.

It is of course this lawlike authority that Plato wishes to contend with, and it is in this light noteworthy that the passage from the *Republic* is preceded by the remark of Adimantus that there is 'another sort of *logoi* about justice and injustice employed both by private individuals and by poets'.[61] Private individuals are here put on a par with the poets: they employ the same *logoi* because the one group interprets passages from the other in order to support their amoral behaviour. The word ἰδίᾳ is aptly chosen for at least two reasons: an ἴδιος is both someone without skill or τέχνη,[62] so that the poets (in keeping with statements made by Socrates in *Ion* and elsewhere) are implicitly said to have no τέχνη, *and*

---

[60] I have slightly altered the translation in Cooper (1997). The quotes are *WD* 287–290 and *Il.* 9.497–501, both with minor alterations of our text.

[61] Pl. *R.* 363e: ἄλλο εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν.

[62] See Rubinstein (1998) 140.

the exact opposite of a magistrate or lawgiver.[63] By thus equating the λεγόμενον of poets and those not in office, the former are implicitly called unauthorized to be involved in the business of governing and lawmaking[64]—exactly the fields where they, much to Plato's dismay, are market leaders. As Robb puts it: 'Epical incidents, and epical narrative of established customs, along with the thousands of maxims and sayings embedded in the narrative, were used to settle daily disputes of all sorts in all periods'.[65]

Fourth and finally, it appears that laws and legal documents are in some respects treated in the same way as poetry, especially that of Hesiod and Homer. In juridical speeches from the fourth century BC, citations from poetry were alternated by readings of legal passages; in one extant speech, the orator even turns to the clerk and has the Homeric passages in question read aloud, as it was done with the laws;[66] as Perlman says, 'quotations from poetry [were] a substitute for proof from laws and for evidence by witnesses'.[67] According to Aristotle, in juridical speeches it is very common for an orator to bring in poets as witnesses,[68] and he even calls them the most trustworthy (πιστότατοι) of witnesses since they cannot be corrupted (ἀδιάφθοροι γάρ).[69] Among the relatively few references to poetry present in the extant speeches, Hesiod and Homer figure prominently.[70] Furthermore, it has often been pointed out that the study

---

[63] See LSJ s.v. I.1; Arist. *EN* 1113b21–23 contrasts individuals 'in their private capacity' (ἰδίᾳ) and 'the legislators themselves' (αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν).

[64] Cf. Pl. *R.* 366e, where ἴδιοι λόγοι ('private conversations') and ποίησις ('poetry') are again equated with regard to the concept of justice.

[65] Robb (1994) 78. Robb shows that analogical thinking, with characters of an age gone by serving as exempla for present behaviour, is already present in the Homeric poems themselves; Phoenix, for instance, refers to the story of Meleager laying aside his wrath to help his dear ones in order to convince Achilles that he should listen to his friends as well.

[66] Aeschin. *In Tim.* 148–150. See also Lyc. *In Leocr.* 110, where Lycurgus' 'résumé and application of the [Homeric] quotations to Leocrates clearly show that they are regarded as legal evidence on which the condemnation of Leocrates may be based' (Perlman 1965 168).

[67] Perlman (1965) 168.

[68] Arist. *Metaph.* 995a7–8. See also Aristotle's discussion of witnesses in *Rh.* 1375b26–1376a17.

[69] Arist. *Rh.* 1376a16–17. As the passage from the *Republic* shows, the practice of 'calling the ancients to witness' was not above corruption: quotations from Hesiod and Homer (and the other poets as well) are often incorrect, incomplete or out of context, so as to better fit the rhetorical purposes of the person quoting. See for this practice also ch. 4, pp. 144–149.

[70] Perlman (1965) lists all references; out of 25 quotations, five are from Homer and five from Hesiod (they are quoted close together once, Aeschin. *In Tim.* 129)—the other numbers are Euripides 5, anonymous epigrams 5, Sophocles 1, Tyrtaeus 1, Solon 1,

of poetry formed an integral part of an orator's training in eloquence and diction; but, as Ford has shown, it was also of great practical value since it developed two highly relevant skills: interpreting difficult texts (ancient epic or old laws), and the recycling of traditions 'to speak to present social and political arrangements'.[71] To these two I would like to add a third one: selecting from a vast corpus the passage most pertinent to the context and the rhetorical ends of the speaker. Selection, interpretation and re-application are the three basic approaches to Hesiod and Homer that we encounter throughout antiquity;[72] it is also exactly what lawyers and orators do with the corpus of laws, rules and regulations.

We have seen, then, that the prescriptive value of Hesiod and Homer, in their capacity as educators and guides for life, is rated so highly that their poetry can be compared to law. Although the Greeks to a certain extent regarded all poets as educators, Hesiod and Homer held a special position in this respect. So far, however, we have not yet examined the actual *content* of their 'laws'. In her pioneering study on the reception of Homer, Graziosi rightly claims that 'when Homer and Hesiod do not compete'—i.e. are combined or 'lumped'—'they (...) are represented as religious experts'.[73] But it appears that this general observation can be more narrowly specified when we investigate more closely whether there are any particular subjects on which the Greeks believed that the two poets were especially authoritative.

It must be said beforehand that the subjects Hesiod and Homer are said to talk about are not always described in detail. There are some broad and rather casual definitions of the content of their poetry, such as that of Lucian in the *Anacharsis*, a treatise on Athenian law and education; somewhere in this dialogue Solon explains that young Athenians are educated with the aid of 'Hesiod and Homer', whose poetry consists of the 'sayings of wise men, deeds of olden times, and helpful tales' (σοφῶν

unknown poets 3. Perlman attributes the scarcity of references to 'very deep-rooted antagonism towards experts and, what is even more important, a growing tendency to develop a prosaic-oratorical style, independent of poetry' (161). According to Ford (1999) 236 n.15 'poetic quotation was most impressive when it seemed to be the 'spontaneous' impulse of a well-bred and educated citizen', and he therefore assumes it was more common in oral than written eloquence—unfortunately, there is no way of knowing this.

[71] Ford (1999) 236; Ford's approach is unduly Homerocentric.

[72] On this see further section 4.2, pp. 86–101.

[73] Graziosi (2002) 181. Her observation may seem obvious at first but she is the first (to my knowledge) to have focused on this particular question.

ἀνδρῶν γνώμας καὶ ἔργα παλαιὰ καὶ λόγους ὠφελίμους), and stories of 'certain feats of arms and famous exploits' (ἀριστείας τινὰς καὶ πράξεις ἀοιδίμους).[74] Such broad, practically all-inclusive definitions are quite rare, presumably because they are so obvious—the poetry of Hesiod and Homer would not be at the heart of Greek education if people generally believed otherwise. This also accounts for the generally positive tone of such descriptions.

When the content of their poetry is more narrowly defined, however, this picture changes in two respects: 1) the tone becomes decidedly negative, and 2) the number of subjects commented on in detail turns out be rather limited, since the more specific descriptions of the poetry of Hesiod and Homer are almost always concerned with their presentation a) of the gods and b) of the underworld—roughly speaking, the material found where the two poetic corpora intersect.[75]

As to subject a): even though Herodotus credits the poets with inventing the 'epithets, honours, arts and outward forms' of the gods, it is in fact the *behaviour* of the epic gods, so remarkably out of tune with the laws of human beings, that the recipients in antiquity focus on. Xenophanes, who provides the first of our extant texts that mention Hesiod and Homer together, complains about the κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν ('theft, adultery and mutual deceit') among the gods; in similar fashion, Plato opens his attack on the poets in the *Republic* with heavy criticism against the Hesiodic and Homeric stories of gods mistreating each other in numerous ways.[76] We should guard here against Homerocentric interpretations such as that of Robb, who says that during Plato's attack on Homer and poetry, Hesiod 'is suddenly thrown in for good measure and similarly deprecated'.[77] This is to underestimate

[74] Lucian *Anach.* 21 (transl. adapted). See for a similar description Pl. *Ion* 531c–d (cf. Graziosi 2002 182–184).

[75] The description of Tartarus is the first example in the list of Walcot (1966) 127–129 of elements common to both epic *corpora*. Walcot suggests that it is such common elements that are less influenced by tales from the Near East and may point to a Greek tradition 'before epic poetry was divided into two streams' (127).

[76] Xenophanes DK B 11 (on which see further ch. 4.1); Pl. *R.* 377c–378d. In the passage from the *R.* cited above, the gods (as presented by Hesiod and Homer) are again mentioned, but this time it is not their behaviour towards each other but towards mortals that is critized: they are either discouraging mortals to choose virtue instead of vice or are too easily coaxed into forgiving them for their mistakes.

[77] Robb (1994) 231 on Pl. *R.* 600c–d. He seems to find an ally in Aristides (*Or.* 4.45) saying that Plato attacked Homer (too) viciously and considered Hesiod as an 'addition' (παρενθήκη).

the ancient tradition of criticizing the gods of both Hesiod and Homer, running from Xenophanes to Philo, who mentions objections to Homer and Hesiod 'who did not abstain from any kind of impiety and blasphemy against the gods' (*nihil omittens eorum quae spectant ad impietatem ac blasphemiam daemonum*)[78] or Lucian, whose alter ego Menippus says he read in Hesiod and Homer about 'wars and quarrels, not only of the demigods but of the gods themselves, and besides about their amours and assaults and abductions and lawsuits and banishing fathers and marrying sisters.'[79] We should note that the passages focused on are always the same: Zeus fettering Hera, Cronus castrating Uranus, Cronus devouring his children, and the theomachy of *Iliad* 21.[80] This limited repertoire of divine immoralities points to a tradition of criticism.

The poets' depiction of the underworld (subject b) is similarly denounced by critics. There are some value-neutral references connecting Hesiod and Homer to Hades and the afterlife,[81] but their description of the underworld is mostly censured. Pythagoras, for instance, attacked their poetic view on the afterlife, and Lucian in *De Luctu* takes nine paragraphs to deride the mythical underworld pictured by 'Homer, Hesiod and the other mythmakers';[82] moreover, when the very same Menippus who was mentioned above descends into the underworld, he satirically describes it in exactly the way the poets do—this is primarily meant as a gibe at the

---

[78] Ph. *De Prov*. 2.34–37.

[79] Lucian *Nec*. 3: πολέμους καὶ στάσεις οὐ μόνον τῶν ἡμιθέων, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν ἤδη τῶν θεῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ μοιχείας αὐτῶν καὶ βίας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ πατέρων ἐξελάσεις καὶ ἀδελφῶν γάμους.

[80] See further on the impious presentations of the divine by Hesiod and Homer together D.Chr. 14.21; S.E. *P*. 3.210–211; Clem.Al. *Protr*. 2.26.6; Jul. *Ep*. 423b; Suda 1.44.30–31 (including Orpheus). Perhaps there is a reference to Homer and Hesiod in Isocrates' allusive list of poetic blasphemers in *Busiris* 38: it is obvious that he refers to Homer, and it could very well be that the poet φεύγων τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοῖς οἰκειοτάτοις πολεμῶν ('who spent all his life in exile from his fatherland and in warring with his kinsmen') is not Alcaeus (nor Archilochus) but Hesiod, whose father left his city Cymae 'fleeing evil poverty' (φεύγων … κακὴν πενίην, *WD* 637–638) and who quarreled with his brother. Livingstone (2001) ad loc. provides the fullest discussion of the passage in question, though he does not mention Hesiod.

[81] See e.g. Socrates' remark that he will meet the poets in Hades (Pl. *Ap*. 40e–41b), Plutarch's attempt to harmonize Hesiod's and Homer's account of demons (the souls of the deceased, Plu. *Mor*. 361b), and Socrates' inclusion of 'the phenomena of the heavens and occurrences in the underworld' (περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων παθημάτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου) in the list of subjects treated by Hesiod and Homer (Pl. *Ion* 531c).

[82] Pyth. fr. 42 Wehrli (= D.L. 8.21); Lucian *Luct*. 2–10.

philosophical speculations concerning the afterlife, but of course in the end it is disclosed that the underworld of the poets is not to be believed in either.[83] Incidentally, the poets are also attacked separately for their presentation of Hades.[84]

At the end of this section we may conclude two things. First of all: the Greek evaluation of the normative status of Hesiod and Homer is highly ambiguous. It has been shown that their verses are explicitly and implicitly regarded as laws and hence deemed worthy of observance. In some contexts, this attitude is applauded: general descriptions of their poetry as containing 'wise sayings' and 'famous deeds of reverend ancestors' are in perfect accord with an undoubtedly wide-spread appreciation of the poems as educational or morally prescriptive material. In other contexts, zooming in on specific and notorious passages (at the intersection of both corpora) reveals problems that threaten the respectability of their poetry as a whole: the presentations of unlawful behaviour of gods, and a questionable picture of the afterlife.[85]

This first conclusion seems to roughly correspond with the findings of some recent studies on Hesiod's reception: the ancients generally praise the *Works and Days* (for its gnomic content) but criticize the *Theogony* (as a 'paradigm of mythological fiction'):[86] this doubleness even caused several scholars to speak of 'two Hesiods'.[87] Such a picture, however, even though it is a generalization, should be seriously qualified: as we will see later, there is ample praise for (parts of) the *Theogony* and occasional critique for the *Works and Days*; furthermore, recipients regularly present Hesiod both implicitly and explicitly as the author of both poems, trying to unify their contents. The most serious objection to this generalized

[83] *Nec*. 21. Menippus' journey to the underworld is parallelled by his trip to heaven in the *Icaromenippus*; here Lucian ridicules the philosophers again by presenting a picture of heaven that conforms exactly to that of the poets (cf. *Sacr*. 8.3).

[84] See e.g. D.Chr. 53.2; it is also relevant that Pherecydes, one of the first allegorical readers of Homer, wrote on his view of the underworld (cf. Tate 1927 214–215). Hesiod was the author of a catabasis of Peirithous and Theseus (fr. 280 MW), and it could very well be that the Cercops that Aristotle mentions as a critic of Hesiod (fr. 75 Rose) attacked him on that particular subject, seeing that he was a student of Pythagoras who moreover wrote a Κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου as well (Clem.Al. *Strom*. 1.21.131.5).

[85] We should note that the subjects on which the poets are most authoritative are those on which rational thought and investigation cannot ever provide real certainty.

[86] Rosati (2009) 351.

[87] Rosati (2009) 348–352; Ford (2010) named his article 'Plato's two Hesiods'.

picture of two Hesiods, however, is that it leaves out the role of Homer completely: it is especially when Hesiod and Homer are together that Hesiod becomes the butt of (theo)logical critique, while the educational programme ascribed to both poets is lauded by all the Greeks. This ambiguous position of Hesiod and Homer is felt as seriously problematic throughout antiquity; in the next section, we will discuss the various ways the Greeks dealt with it.

Secondly, it should be observed that this deeply ambivalent response to poetry is not limited to that of Hesiod and Homer alone; see, for instance, how Plutarch, speaking of poets in general, warns us for their 'delusion and ignorance regarding the gods' (ἀπάτην περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἄγνοιαν) as well as 'the monstrous tales of visits to the shades, and the descriptions, which in awful language create spectres and pictures of blazing rivers and hideous places and grim punishments'[88]—he voices the exact same objections that are levelled against the poems of Hesiod and Homer. This generally ambiguous attitude to poetry, however, should not lead us to conclude that Hesiod and Homer are arbitrary representatives of the larger group of poets, equal to, say, Sophocles or Alcman—instead, they are the *archetypes*. Not only do Hesiod and Homer 'stand for epic at large', as Graziosi puts it,[89] but they rather stand for (Greek) poetry at large.[90] This observation makes it all the more interesting to examine further how the Greeks approached this poetic authority.

---

[88] αἱ περὶ τὰς νεκυίας τερατουργίαι καὶ διαθέσεις ὀνόμασι φοβεροῖς ἐνδημιουργοῦσαι φάσματα καὶ εἴδωλα ποταμῶν φλεγομένων καὶ τόπων ἀγρίων καὶ κολασμάτων σκυθρωπῶν (Plu. *Mor.* 17B).

[89] Graziosi (2002) 184.

[90] This special archetypical status is suggested by the fact that, as was already mentioned above, the comparison of Hesiod and Homer to lawgivers is rather unique; there are no other poets whose verses are so explicitly or frequently equated with laws. This is relevant because it is exactly the friction between the lawlike authority of the poets and their picture of unlawful gods that is at the heart of the ambiguous view of poetry—and if Hesiod and Homer are the only poets with obviously nomothetical connotations, their offending passages are especially problematic and likely to be archetypical. Moreover, the oft-heard expression 'Homer and Hesiod (or vice versa) and the other poets' is virtually without parallel: there are no instances of 'Pindar and Euripides and the other poets', or the like. This also suggests that Hesiod and Homer, though epic poets, were thought to represent the whole field of poetry (see for a fuller discussion of this expression and its variations ch. 3, p. 115).

4. *Dealing with Poetic Authority: Reactions and Counter-Reactions*

In this section we will investigate how the Greeks tried to negotiate the fact that the poetry of Hesiod and Homer was of great educational value but at the same time contained passages that set a decidedly bad example. The first subsection will set the tone with two very early (and comparable) reactions against Hesiodic and Homeric poetry, i.e. those of Xenophanes and Pythagoras. Together they exemplify the Greek intellectual apprehension of the unlawful and socially dangerous quality of their poetry, and of the most elementary response to the problem: banishment from the educational program. The second subsection deals with the most important strategies designed to save the two poets: selection, (allegorical) interpretation and the concept of poetic licence. Section 4.3 will argue that these strategies, efficient though they are, create a new problem since they shift the authority from the poets themselves to their interpreters—and who can guarantee *their* integrity? In the final subsection, we can see how in hellenistic and later times a seemingly definitive solution presents itself, as critics try to harmonize the poetic accounts with other texts that have become canonical: mostly ethical philosophies, notably that of Plato.

4.1. *A Frontal Attack on Fellows*

The theologian, philosopher and hexameter poet Xenophanes, 'the first Greek author drawing a parallel between [Homer and Hesiod]',[91] criticized the epic poets harshly. His famous statement runs thus:

> πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδος τε,
> ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,
> κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.
>
> 'Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all
> sorts of things which are matters of reproach and censure among men:
> theft, adultery, and mutual deceit.'[92]

[91] Sihvola (1989) 7. It should be borne in mind that this claim has the same status as the one making Theagenes the first allegorist (see n.10 above); in all likelihood, the comparison did not 'suddenly spring from Xenophanes' brain', either. The first Greeks 'drawing parallels', just like the first Greeks applying allegory, were of course the poets themselves.

[92] DK B 11, translation Lesher (1992), slightly altered.

The main point of this much-discussed fragment is clear: Hesiod and Homer represent the gods as displaying behaviour that is unacceptable among men.[93] Stealing, committing adultery and deceiving each other are unlawful acts that disrupt the organized society of the polis; hence, the gods of epic set a bad example, and Hesiod and Homer are responsible.[94]

Even though we do not know how this fragment related to the poem of which it was part, we should notice (as modern commentators seem not to do) how the three lines are specially arranged to drive the point home: the first line contains a statement that seems positive and is *per se* wholly unremarkable,[95] but in fact it is the setup preparing for the twist of the second line, where the πάντα turn out to be morally reprehensible things, further elaborated on in the third line.[96] This strategy, common in archaic poetry,[97] reminds one of the sympotic game of ἀμφίβολοι γνῶμαι, in which the first speaker composes a hexameter verse containing a problem, which the next speaker has to resolve in a second verse,[98] except it is the other way around: the problem is

[93] Babut (1974) rightly stresses that Xenophanes chose crimes that damage the very 'fondements de la société' (91)—he applies a politico-social criterion rather than an ethico-religious one. But the distinction is not adamant, so that I think it is too strained to argue that the fragment is wholly unrelated to Xenophanes' rejection of anthropomorphism, as Babut does. The interpretation of Lesher (1992) 83–84, who argues that the poets are attacked not because of their anthropomorphic representation of the gods but because of their deviation from Xenophanes' own doctrine of divine perfection, is equally strained.

[94] We should beware of Homerocentrism or the wish to separate Hesiod and Homer. Babut claims that 'theft, adultery and mutual deceit' are allusions to *Homer* only (87), but this is both incorrect (as there is plenty of thieving, adultery and deceiving among the gods in the *Th.*) and beside the point (we are dealing with Xenophanes' presentation of Hesiod and Homer, and he presents Hesiod and Homer as comparable); there is something similar in Detienne (1981) 65 pointing to Homer as the 'real culprit'. Babut runs into further difficulties because of his belief that Hesiod is more of a theologian than Homer, so that he is forced to claim that Xenophanes criticizes Hesiod and Homer not as theologians but as poets, the representatives of 'la culture grecque' (115). This is strained and unnecessary.

[95] In fact, it accords perfectly well with the (presumably) common view voiced by Hdt. *Hist.* 2.53 (see above, esp. p. 65), i.e. that (the poems of) Hesiod and Homer were of crucial importance in the development of the Greek view of their gods.

[96] Lesher (1992) 84 points to the 'touch of sarcasm' in ἀνέθηκαν ('most men honour the gods by 'offering' or 'dedicating' (ἀνατίθημι), but Homer and Hesiod pay tribute to the gods by 'attributing' all sorts of things that are matters of shame and reproach'), which adds to the sudden twist.

[97] Cf. Griffith (1990) 197 on the 'adding-on' style of the hexameter, making it 'especially well suited to sudden reroutings and inversions'.

[98] This type of riddle is part of the poetical contest in the *Certamen*, cf. ch. 7 p. 250.

raised in the second line, almost as if Xenophanes wanted to suggest that there are no poetic solutions, only problems.

Although it is impossible to determine with certainty the argument of the poem to which this fragment belonged, it is not unlikely that it was designed to disqualify the poets as educators; we can compare fragment 10 ('Since from the beginning all have learned according to Homer …'),[99] which hints at a similar rejection of traditional *paideia*. It is obvious that Xenophanes the wandering poet regarded Hesiod and Homer, who were in the same business, as competitors—hence the promotion of his new theology goes hand in hand with the attack on the old one. Xenophanes cannot educate, because epic poetry was there first: he has to *re*-educate, first eradicating the old views.[100]

It is interesting to compare Xenophanes' critique with that of Pythagoras, who—as a leader of a religious community in southern Italy—was a theologian and a lawgiver himself. He too seems to have condemned Hesiod and Homer because of their immoral picture of the gods:

> φησὶ δ' Ἱερώνυμος κατελθόντα αὐτὸν εἰς Ἅιδου τὴν μὲν Ἡσιόδου ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν πρὸς κίονι χαλκῷ δεδεμένην καὶ τρίζουσαν, τὴν δ' Ὁμήρου κρεμαμένην ἀπὸ δένδρου καὶ ὄφεις περὶ αὐτὴν ἀνθ' ὧν εἶπον περὶ θεῶν, κολαζομένους δὲ καὶ τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας συνεῖναι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γυναιξί· καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τιμηθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Κρότωνι.
>
> 'Hieronymus [of Rhodes] says that he [Pythagoras], when he descended into Hades, saw the soul of Hesiod there, bound against a bronze column and squeeking, and that of Homer too, hung from a tree, with snakes all around it, as a punishment for what they have said about the gods; and he also saw being punished the men who did not want to have sex with their own wives. And that is why, according to Hieronymus, he was honoured by the inhabitants of Croton.'[101]

---

[99] ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες, transl. Lesher. It is incorrect to take this fragment to mean that Xenophanes regarded Homer as the worse of the two poets, as Detienne (1981) 126–127 does. This is unduly Homerocentric, because a) there is no way of knowing how this fragment continued (it may have mentioned Hesiod as well), b) there is also a reference to Hesiod without Homer in the fragments of Xenophanes (see next note), and c) the fragment denouncing the poets explicitly (11) mentions both Homer and Hesiod (which is the most important and principal point).

[100] Cf. DK B 1, where Xenophanes argues that the πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων ('fictions of the poets before us', 22), i.e. the 'songs of battles between Titans and Giants' (21), should be replaced with εὐφήμοις μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις ('reverent words and pure speech', 14). He is obviously hinting at Hesiod here (cf. also the wordplay on προμηθείην in 24).

[101] Fr. 42 Wehrli (= D.L. 8.21).

This story of Pythagoras' descent into the underworld is old, although we can never be sure whether Pythagoras himself or one of his followers came up with it.[102] However that may be, it contains an attitude toward Hesiod and Homer that is very similar to that of Xenophanes: in return for 'what they have said about the gods', the poets are presented as suffering punishment in hell, which I take to be an imaginative way of criticizing both the ungodly behaviour and lack of perfection of the epic gods.[103] It appears that it is especially the destructive influence of such representations on society that Pythagoras is concerned with, since the other sinners in the underworld committed adultery, a crime associated with the poets by Xenophanes too.[104] The link is not explicit, though it is not unlikely that this is what connects the two types of sinners: one group of adulterers, and the two poets for presenting the gods as such.

But there is more to be gained from the fragment. The punishment of the poets, which no-one seems to have commented on before, is described in decidedly mythical terms. Hesiod himself informs us that bronze is the main building material of Tartarus, and according to Homer 'squeeking' (τρίζω) is what dead souls do.[105] Moreover, in the *Theogony* Prometheus is 'bound' to a 'column' by Zeus.[106] It appears, then, that

---

[102] White (2004) 203 suggests that the story was contained in Hieronymus' work *On Citharodes*, the fifth book of *On Poets* (3rd century BC); it may go back several centuries earlier. White also points to the verse narrative entitled *Descent into Hades* which presumably dealt with Pythagoras' adventure and may have included his seeing the poets. The *Descent* was in antiquity ascribed to several Pythagoreans; one of them was Cercops, who according to Aristotle (fr. 75 Rose) was a critic of Hesiod.

[103] Cf. Iamb. *VP* 218: '[Pythagoras] proved that the gods are not responsible for evil: diseases and other bodily afflictions are the offspring of bad conduct. He refuted the mistakes of storytellers and poets' (περί τε τῶν κακῶς λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς μύθοις διήλεγξε τοὺς λογοποιούς τε καὶ ποιητάς, transl. Clark 1989).

[104] Adultery was perceived as a particularly heinous crime by Pythagoras, cf. Iamb. *VP* 48, 50 and 132. See also Kahn (2001) 9–10, who suggests that 'the protected and even egalitarian position of women and the emphasis on strictly conjugal sex (…) seem to reflect a family policy designed to enhance the prospects of the community for physical survival'.

[105] According to the *Th.* there is a bronze fence around Tartarus (726), and a bronze gate around the prison of the Titans (733); Day and Night are said to cross a bronze threshold (749–750). For the squeeking of souls see *Il.* 23.100 and *Od.* 24.5 and 7. Plato also objects to Homer representing souls as squeeking (citing both passages from Homer in *R.* 387a).

[106] *Th.* 521–522; the words δέω and κίων are used. Incidentally, this punishment is by the scholiast ad *Th.* 522 interpreted as a description of the soul being bound to the body.

Hesiod—or his soul at least—is getting a taste of his own medicine. The fate of Homer in similar fashion resembles that of the mythical musician Marsyas, who was also hung from a tree.[107]

This repayment in kind serves a purpose, for it is obviously a powerful stroke of satire to make the souls of Hesiod and Homer pay for their 'sins' in a way that they could have described themselves. On the other hand, however, the fact that the souls are punished after their bodies die is not in itself discordant with what we know of Pythagorean eschatology. Despite the great scholarly discord on particulars, it is commonly accepted that Pythagoras, the expert 'in matters concerning the afterlife',[108] was a firm believer in the immortality of the soul and reincarnation, and could very well have propagated some form of purification after death.[109] So even though the fragment contains an explicit attack on the poets, it still allows for the language of myth, when properly interpreted, to point to the truth—there is thus no need to abandon poetry altogether. It is this observation, which transfers the obligation of propriety from the author to the interpreter, that is of great importance for the defence of the two poets. To this we will now turn.

4.2. *Strategies of Defence*

The Greek defence of poetry against reproaches of impiety and injustice is a subject thoroughly studied, both as a whole and from more limited perspectives.[110] What follows in this subsection is such a small-scale approach, which focuses on Hesiod and Homer together and is limited to the ways in which the Greeks tried to negotiate the difficult status of epic as educational poetry containing distinctly unedifying passages. From early periods onwards, at least five such defensive strategies developed:

---

[107] The story is not in Homer but already referred to by Herodotus (*Hist*. 7.26); many versions attribute the punishment to his defiance of Apollo. The implication is that Homer displayed a comparable lack of respect for the gods.

[108] Kahn (2001) 11, referring to such early sources as Herodotus and Ion of Chios, among others (11–13).

[109] See Von Fritz (1963) 187–191 for early parallels for the evidence for such a Pythagorean purification; he omits the most obvious parallel to our passage, i.e. Pl. *R*. 615e–616a, where Er, the traveller from beyond, recounts how he saw the souls of great wrongdoers (in this case, tyrants) being bound, flayed and lacerated.

[110] See e.g. the excellent study of Stoic ways of defending poetry by Nussbaum (1993) 131–145, who singles out four weapons from the 'Stoic rationalizing arsenal' (131) used to render poetry harmless: censorship, the writing of new poetry, allegorical interpretation, and critical spectatorship.

selection, altering the surface, in-depth or allegorical reading, applying the concept of poetic licence, and harmonization. These will now be briefly discussed.

4.2.1. Selection

The easiest way around the problem of poetic authority—and not, strictly speaking, a strategy of *defence*—is to leave aside the morally doubtful passages in Hesiod and Homer, and focus on the beneficial ones instead. This practice is both very common and very obvious, but it deserves attention because it helps us to remember the peculiar way the Greeks made use of their poetic texts. In everyday situations, the recipient author or speaker would quote (or refer to) lines or small passages that fit a certain *ad hoc* goal in his own discourse. He focuses on one specific part at a time, and so the general notion of Homeric and Hesiodic impiety does not at all prevent him from quoting and praising particular verses. And so the well-known objections are generally ignored and the poets appear as wise and pious as they could be. This process of 'fragmentation' of the poets was extremely common[111] and the ability to 'select' was one of the hallmarks of an educated person;[112] this suggests that the existence of some objectionable passages may therefore have been less of a problem to the average Greek.

To give just one example: although the fragment discussed above strongly suggests that the Pythagoreans were critical of the poems of Hesiod and Homer, there are nonetheless several reports that their poetry formed part of Pythagorean training. Iamblichus, for instance, mentions their part in the curriculum twice, saying that the Pythagoreans 'used selected passages of Homer and Hesiod to 'correct' the soul (πρὸς

[111] The process should be connected to the curious fact that there are no *Gesamtinterpretationen* of any of the epic poems extant extant from antiquity, though small passages, single lines or individual words are heavily commented upon. Incidentally, the practice of fragmentary appreciation is sometimes made explicit; the most interesting passage is perhaps Pl. *R.* 468d, when Socrates in the midst of his attack on the epic poets still indicates that there are also praiseworthy passages in Homer and Hesiod, so that when Homer speaks fittingly of a reward for a hero it is said that 'we will follow Homer *in these matters at least*' (πεισόμεθα (…) ταῦτά γε Ὁμήρῳ).

[112] The ability was undoubtedly trained during symposia and elsewhere; its importance is shown by the fact that the contest between Hesiod and Homer in the *Certamen* is ultimately decided when the poets are asked to perform 'the most beautiful' part of their poems (see further ch. 7).

ἐπανόρθωσιν ψυχῆς)'.[113] Detienne, who collected a good many proofs of the Pythagorean interest in the pedagogical use of Homer and Hesiod,[114] rightly stressed that the keyword here is 'selected' (the λέξεις are called ἐξειλεγμέναι or διειλεγμέναι): the use of certain epic passages, interpreted—of course—within the right Pythagorean framework, resulted in 'une certaine conformité de leur pensée avec les oeuvres poétiques'.[115]

In this case, the recipients did not simply ignore the objectionable passages in Hesiod and Homer, but there is even evidence that they positively condemned them—nonetheless, they still found an educational or purificational use for particular passages. This practice of partial rejection is in no way unique in antiquity and perhaps connected to a theory often attested in later antiquity, i.e. that Hesiod and Homer were not so much creative mythmakers as rather preservers of ancient wisdom. According to this theory, especially en vogue in Stoicism, originally true stories stemming from an age so pure that language still reflected reality became almost hopelessly corrupted by an endless process of poetic reworking, so that the end products visible today are perverted and unintelligible. Hesiod and Homer occupy a special place in this chain of degeneration because they are so ancient that there are still some traces of the original wisdom left in their works.[116] This approach makes it unnecessary to defend or save Hesiod and Homer as they are regarded as untrustworthy vessels of ancient truths. The morally challenging passages can simply be rejected.

---

[113] Iamb. *VP* 111 and 164.

[114] Detienne (1962), esp. chapter 2 ('Les poèmes Homériques et Hésiodiques dans la secte Pythagoricienne'). See on the reputed connection between Pythagoras and Hesiod also Struck (2004) 103–104.

[115] Detienne (1962) 31. At the same time, Detienne argues, poetic training ensured that all Pythagoreans went through a form of *paideia* comparable to that of their master, who had reportedly been a student of the Homeridae of Samos (31–32).

[116] On the Stoic view of Hesiod and Homer as vehicles instead of allegorists see Most (1989, esp. 2018–2023) and Long (1992). Cornutus states explicitly that of Hesiod's *Theogony* 'some parts, as I think, were borrowed from more ancient sources, while other parts were in a more mythical fashion put forward by himself; and in this way the greatest part of the ancient theology became corrupted' (τὰ μέν τινα, ὡς οἶμαι, παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων αὐτοῦ παρειληφότος, τὰ δὲ μυθικώτερον ἀφ' αὑτοῦ προσθέντος, ᾧ τρόπῳ καὶ πλεῖστα τῆς παλαιᾶς θεολογίας διεφθάρη, *Epidr.* 17). There is a clear link between this theory and one attributing the true and valuable part of epic poetry to flashes of inspiration; as these flashes became ever more rare, Hesiod and Homer could still occasionally benefit from them, while later poets were utterly bereft of the Muse and forced to make everything up. See further ch. 9, pp. 360–362.

4.2.2. Altering the Surface

Passages that were thought offensive did not always need clever allegory to save them; sometimes clever re-interpretation was enough. I count as 'altering the surface' all cases in which a critic takes the sting out of a certain passage by offering an alternative surface reading, for instance by redefining the meaning of some key-term; more radical solutions are suggesting an emendation or even deleting a line or passage. This strategy does not take recourse to any 'deeper' or allegorical truth; the apparent flaws are shown to be the result of misunderstanding the (original) text of Hesiod and Homer.

The practice must have been extremely common, especially in hellenistic times and beyond. As far as redefinition is concerned: Plutarch in his treatise on how to understand the poets in fact exhorts students to 'adapt the usage of words to fit the matter in hand, as the grammarians teach us to do, taking a word for one signification at one time, and at another time for another'.[117] Needless to say, the defensive power of this procedure is immense. For instance, Hesiod's potentially elitist remark that 'virtue goes along with wealth' (πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετή ὀπηδεῖ) is easily neutralized by explaining that with ἀρετή he meant 'repute, or influence, or good fortune, or the like'.[118] Plutarch's remark that this interpretive manoeuvre was taught at schools seems to be borne out by the fact that there are many traces of it in the scholia;[119] the same goes for emendation and deletion.[120]

But 'altering the surface' was also practised in classical times. Perhaps the finest example of this strategy is found in Xenophon's version of the trial of Socrates. According to Xenophon, 'the accuser alleged that [Socrates] selected from the most famous poets the most immoral passages, and used them as testimony in teaching his companions to be tyrants and malefactors'[121]—the examples given are *Works and Days*

---

[117] Plu. *Mor*. 22F: τὴν χρείαν τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων συνοικειοῦν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν, ὡς οἱ γραμματικοὶ διδάσκουσιν, ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλα δύναμιν λαμβανόντων.

[118] Plu. *Mor*. 24E: ἀντὶ δόξης ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ εὐτυχίας ἤ τινος ὁμοίου (referring to *WD* 313). See for a comparably convenient re-interpretation of a Hesiodic passage 23E–F.

[119] See e.g. Σ *WD* 42a, 302–303, 311, 315–316, 324–326.

[120] See e.g. Σ *WD* 30, 160–161, 287–290, 353–354; see also Plutarch deleting *WD* 267–273 (where Hesiod wishes not to be just if Zeus will not reward the just) 'because they are unworthy of Hesiod's opinion concerning justice and injustice' (ὡς ἀναξίους τῆς Ἡσιόδου περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων κρίσεως, Σ *WD* 270–273).

[121] X. *Mem*. 1.2.56: ἔφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλε-

311,[122] which Socrates supposedly 'interpreted as the poet's advice to refrain from no work, dishonest or disgraceful, but to do anything for gain', and *Iliad* 2.188–191 and 198–202,[123] which Socrates supposedly 'explained to mean that the poet approved of chastising common and poor folk'. Socrates is thus accused of selecting the morally worst passages in Hesiod and Homer (i.e. passages better left 'unselected'), and interpreting them in a way that is destructive to (democratic) society. Xenophon, however, defends Socrates by arguing that he in fact interpreted them differently. As to *Works and Days* 311: since Socrates himself understands ἔργον as 'good work' (ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν), and ἀεργίη as 'any occupation that is immoral and leads to loss' (τι πονηρὸν καὶ ἐπιζήμιον ποιεῖν), he could not possibly have taken Hesiod's line to mean anything bad, but rather as an injunction to do good work. And as for the passage from the *Iliad*: Socrates merely cited it to show that 'those who render no service either by word or deed, who cannot help army or city or the people itself in time of need, ought to be stopped'—be they rich or poor, noble or base.

At the end of Xenophon's defence, Socrates through this re-interpretation turns out to have done the exact opposite of the things he is accused of: he promotes doing good work instead of inciting people to be κακοῦργοι, and is not tyrannical but instead 'one of the people and a friend of mankind' (δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος). But we should also notice that not only Socrates himself but the poets are cleared as well. This is especially obvious in the case of the Hesiodic passage, where two observations suggest that this line of defence was originally meant for Hesiod: a) the fact that this explanation of *Works and Days* 311 was common and thus not invented by Socrates (or Xenophon),[124] and b) the fact that Xenophon concludes his re-interpretation with the exonerative remark that 'when thus interpreted, there is nothing amiss with the line'.[125]

γόμενον τὰ πονηρότατα καὶ τούτοις μαρτυρίοις χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακούργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικούς.

[122] *WD* 311 runs ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος ('work is no disgrace [or, as it was obviously interpreted in this context, 'no work is a disgrace'], but idleness is a disgrace)'. When understood wrongly, this verse could incite people to become κακοῦργοι.

[123] In this passage Odysseus prepares the Greek army for a meeting; he restrains the noblemen with gentle words but insults the common people; such behaviour could inspire men to become τυραννικοί. This passage was perhaps notorious for its possibly anti-democratic purport, cf. Iambl. *VP* 259.

[124] Cf. Pl. *Chrm.* 163b and perhaps Democritus DK 68 B 218; see also D.Chrys. 7.110–111.

[125] ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι, *Mem.* 1.2.57; cf. Graziosi (2010) 121.

The examples show how 'altering the surface' could radically change the moral purport of a poetic passage, without taking recourse to allegorical reading. The poetry of Hesiod and Homer, being so fundamental and at the same time so problematic, was rather susceptible to this form of defence.

4.2.3. Allegorical Reading

Allegorical reading was a very early response to epic poetry; as stated above, it sought for meaning of poetic texts in a 'sense' hidden 'under' the surface content—hence the term ὑπόνοια.[126] Allegory, loosely defined by Richardson as 'any interpretation which disregarded the obvious literal sense of a passage in favour of a more subtle way of taking the words', is a fairly straightforward concept, though some nuances are called for. Apart from the valuable distinction between weak and strong allegory made by Long,[127] we should recognize that some allegorical readings are 'easier' than others. Understanding Hesiod's Eros as a cosmic principle is a form of allegory, but it takes considerably less interpretive effort than seeing Zeus' threat to hang all the world by a golden chain from Olympus as a statement on the universe's dependence on the circular motion of the heavenly bodies.[128] It is perhaps not unlikely (although there is no direct evidence for it) that allegory of Hesiod was slightly earlier than that of Homer, given the great similarities between (the first part of the) *Theogony* and the cosmogonical accounts of the natural philosophers,[129] and the cosmological interests of the first allegorists in general.[130] The allegorical interpretation of Homer, on the other hand, was definitely more popular: the Homeric poems allowed for more

[126] The term was much en vogue in Plato's time but, as Struck (2004) 39 has shown, the original term for hidden meaning was αἴνιγμα (cf. Ford 1999b 38–42 discussing αἶνος and αἰνίττομαι as the central terms of allegorical reading, Nünlist 2009 225–237 commenting on the wide application of αἰνίττομαι, and Coulter 1976 57 citing Proclus *In R.* 1.85 who states that allegory is prompted by the 'grim, monstruous, and unnatural character of poetic fictions' which causes the reader to look beyond—or rather beneath—the literal meaning). The term ἀλληγορία is of later, probably Stoic, origin.

[127] See above, p. 60 n.8.

[128] Plato mentions this allegorical reading of *Il.* 8.18–27 in *Tht.* 153d.

[129] On which see further ch. 6, pp. 190–200.

[130] On the other hand, it is certainly true that 'Homer seemed to cooperate with his allegorically minded readers', as Clarke (1981) 63 puts it, discussing the allegorical interpretation of Homer in the 15th to 18th century. The judgement of Paris, however, the passage described as 'blatantly allegorical' by Clarke (*ibid.*), does not feature in the Homeric poems. It is interesting, in this light, that Homer's clearest 'cosmology' (the

spectacular interpretations and thus provided interpreters a better occasion for surprising their audience and showing off their knowledge and learning.[131]

Despite such modern observations, however, the Greeks themselves seem to have regarded the allegorical reading of both the Hesiodic and the Homeric poems as roughly comparable. First of all, the corpora most often searched for *hyponoiai* are the poems of Hesiod and Homer.[132] In Plato, for instance, Hesiod and Homer are almost the only poets allegorically interpreted; in the Stoic corpus they are still pre-eminent.[133] Secondly, allegorical readings of either poet were used indiscriminately to strenghten one's own argument, as the numerous ('weak') allegories by for instance the Stoics show.[134] And thirdly, there is ample evidence

---

representation of the world on the shield of Achilles, *Il.* 18.478–608) resembles Hesiod's account of the birth of the universe; see Clay (1992) 132–137.

[131] See also ch. 1, pp. 46 and 51. There might be a trace of the classical preoccupation with Homeric (instead of Hesiodic) allegory in Plato *R.* 377e–378e. Socrates, beginning the attack on poetry, gives an example of the lies Hesiod and Homer have spread: 'There is, first of all, the greatest lie about the things of greatest concern (τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων), which was no pretty invention of him who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did to Cronus, and how Cronus in turn took his revenge, and then there are the doings and sufferings of Cronus at the hands of his son. Even if they were true (εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ) I should not think that they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons …' (377e–378a). When switching to some of the horrors Homer has been telling about, Socrates says: 'But Hera's fetterings by her son and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and the battles of the gods in Homer's verse are things that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegory or without allegory (οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν). For the young are not able to distinguish what is and what is not allegory …' (378d). We should note the parallelism of both passages: first Socrates gives some examples of the dreadful lies of the poet in question, and then imagines how these would affect the young. It is therefore remarkable that in the case of Hesiod Socrates suggests the stories are either untrue or true (and in either case the young should never hear of them), but that in Homer's case the stories are either literal or allegorical (and here too in either case the young should never hear of them). This difference is perhaps an indication that allegorical reading of Homer was more popular than that of Hesiod.

[132] See Lamberton and Keaney (1992).

[133] Plato mentions allegorical interpretation of Hesiod at least 7 times (*Cra.* 397e, 402b; *Tht.* 155d; *Ly.* 215c; *Prt.* 316d; *R.* 468e, 546e), that of Homer at least 10 times (*Cra.* 402a, 407a; *Tht.* 153d, 160d, 179e, 194c, *Smp.* 179b, *Phdr.* 252b, *Prt.* 316d, *R.* 378d)—I found no such interpretations of the other poets Plato often refers to (Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides). Among the Stoic interpreters, Euripides is the only one coming close to the status of Hesiod and Homer (cf. SVF 1.539 = Phld. *Piet.* 13).

[134] Incidentally, during the post-classical age we find more 'spectacular' allegories of Hesiod as well; see for instance Zeno's interpretation of the Cyclopes as the circular motions of heaven (SVF 1.118), and Chrysippus' reading of Athena's birth from the head of Zeus (SVF 2.208–209).

for the notion that allegory was a very legitimate way of acquitting the two poets of whatever was deemed unfitting in the surface text. For instance: in the passage from Philo's *De Providentia* mentioned above, the philosopher claims that objectional passages in Hesiod and Homer in fact 'do not include blasphemy about the gods, but are a sign of the presence of a physical theory' (*neque … blasphemiam includit de Diis, sed est indicium inclusae physiologiae*), and that it is childish not to admit 'the rules of allegory and its interpretations' (*regulas allegoriae aut sententiarum*).[135]

Since allegorical interpretation was used and recognized as a defence of poetry, and Hesiod and Homer were the authors most often allegorically interpreted, we may conclude that their poetry was generally believed to be most worthy of (and most in need of) allegorical defence.

4.2.4. The Freedom of Poets

So far, we have seen three attempts to come to terms with what I have called the problem of poetic authority: one can 1) simply ignore the morally inexcusable passages and focus on fitting ones instead; 2) argue for a positive re-reading of the surface meaning; or 3) accept the 'bad' surface and argue that there is a 'good' meaning hidden underneath. To these old strategies, applied especially to the poems of Hesiod and Homer, another is added at a later time: it is the claim, first explicitly stated by Aristotle, that poetry is a special type of discourse allowed to defy the normal demands of truth, propriety, and possibility.[136] The poets thus became 'free'.

Most discussions on poetic freedom in antiquity take the socio-political perspective and focus on the poet's right to speak out as an independent and unrestrained voice.[137] The freedom I am concerned with, however, is freedom in a much narrower sense: poetic ἐξουσία ('licence').[138]

---

[135] Ph. *De Prov*. 2.40–41; see also n.126 above.

[136] See the elaborate treatment in Arist. *Po*. 1460b6–1461b26. Of special interest is 1460b35–1461a1, where 'the tales about gods' (τὰ περὶ θεῶν) with which Xenophanes found fault, are excused on the basis of the principle that poets may represent things 1) as they are (οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν); 2) as they ought to be (οἷα εἶναι δεῖ) or 3) (which applies in this case) as they are said to be (οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, see 1460b10–11).

[137] See, for instance, Sluiter and Rosen (2004), esp. the contributions of Raaflaub (41–61) and Braund (409–428). As far as I know, there are no articles or monographs on the subject of poetic licence in its more narrow sense; the most exhaustive treatment is that of Meijering (1987) 62–67.

[138] According to Grube (1965) 131 the technical term used by the Alexandrians was

Some critics believed that the aim of poetry was to please and enchant the audience, and in order to do this, poets were allowed to create their own universe with its own laws.[139] Consequently, the poets could freely bend or break rules that were expected from ordinary discourse, both with regard to form (displaying deviations in morphology, syntax, diction, and metre) and, which is of greater interest to the present discussion, to content (allowing for plots lacking in consistency or plausibility).

It appears that Hesiod and Homer were the poets most often associated with this form of poetic licence. For instance: Strabo, who often feels the need to defend Homer against charges of historical or geographical falsehoods, points out several times that Homer is a poet; and poets sometimes 'weave in myths intentionally, not through ignorance of the facts, but through an intentional invention of the impossible, to gratify the taste for the marvellous and the entertaining'[140]—and in this respect, he is compared first and foremost to Hesiod.[141] Plutarch complains that critics are often too involved with small problems in poetic texts and thus fail to see the bigger picture; he gives Hesiod and Homer as examples.[142] It is Hesiod himself, however, who offers the best example for the poet's claim to ἐξουσία as a defence against overly enthousiastic nitpicking. When Lucian in his *Dialogue with Hesiod* accuses him of not making good on his promise to tell the future, Hesiod replies that he was inspired and thus cannot be held accountable for what he said. But then he turns to another line of defence:

> οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, χρὴ παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐς τὸ λεπτότατον ἀκριβολογουμένους ἀπαιτεῖν κατὰ συλλαβὴν ἑκάστην ἐντελῆ πάντως τὰ εἰρημένα, κἂν εἴ τι ἐν τῷ τῆς ποιήσεως δρόμῳ παραρρυὲν λάθῃ, πικρῶς τοῦτο ἐξετάζειν, ἀλλ' εἰδέναι ὅτι πολλὰ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῶν μέτρων ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς εὐφωνίας ἐπεμβάλλομεν· τὰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔπος αὐτὸ πολλάκις λεῖα ὄντα οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως παρέδεξατο. σὺ δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ὧν ἔχομεν ἀγαθῶν ἀφαιρῇ ἡμᾶς—λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ τὰ

(ποιητικὴ) ἀρεσκεία, but the example he gives (Σ *Il.* 2.45a A) is the only time ἀρεσκεία occurs in this sense in the Homeric scholia.

[139] 'Impossibilities (…) are correct, if they serve the end of poetry itself' (ἀδύνατα … ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς, Arist. *Po.* 1460b23–24); Lucian says of poetry that 'liberty is absolute and there is one law—the will of the poet' (ἄκρατος ἡ ἐλευθερία καὶ νόμος εἷς—τὸ δόξαν τῷ ποιητῇ, *Hist.Conscr.* 8); cf. Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.28–30.

[140] μύθους παραπλέκουσιν ἑκόντες, οὐκ ἀγνοίᾳ τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ πλάσει τῶν ἀδυνάτων τερατείας καὶ τέρψεως χάριν, 1.2.35. See also 1.2.17 for a definition of ἐξουσία, said to consist of ἱστορία ('history', aiming at truth), διάθεσις ('composition', aiming at vividness) and μύθος ('myth', aiming at pleasure and amazement).

[141] Cf. Str. 1.2.14 and 1.2.35. See further ch. 1.3 above, pp. 40–51.

[142] Plu. *Mor.* 28B.

> μὲν ἄλλα οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅσα τῆς ποιήσεως καλά, σκινδαλάμους δὲ καὶ ἀκάνθας τινὰς ἐκλέγεις καὶ λαβὰς τῇ συκοφαντίᾳ ζητεῖς. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μόνος ταῦτα σὺ οὐδὲ κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ μόνου, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι τὰ τοῦ ὁμοτέχνου τοῦ ἐμοῦ Ὁμήρου κατακνίζουσι λεπτὰ οὕτω κομιδῇ καὶ μάλιστα μικρὰ ἄττα διεξιόντες.
>
> 'It is not, I think, proper to examine poetry in minute detail, nor to demand complete perfection down to every syllable of what is said, nor again to criticise bitterly any unconscious oversight in the flow of composition. No, you must realise that we include much for the sake of both metre and euphony, and often the verse itself has somehow let in some things, they fit so smoothly. But you are robbing us of our greatest possession—I mean freedom and poetic licence. You are blind to the other beauties of poetry, and pick out a few splinters and thorns and seek out handles for captious criticism. You are not alone in this, nor am I the only victim. Many others pick the poetry of my fellow-craftsman Homer utterly to pieces, pointing out similar niggling details, the merest trifles.'[143]

This passage is taken from a larger 'defence of poetry' (ποιητικὴ ἀπολογία, *Hes*. 5) that carries juridical overtones: although Lucian's alter ego Lycinus does not formally 'charge' Hesiod, the poet reacts as if he is on trial.[144] More directly relevant to us, however, are three points: 1) the fact that Hesiod defends himself by appealing to poetic licence, 2) the fact that he mentions Homer as his ὁμότεχνος or 'fellow-craftsman', entitled to the same freedom, and 3) the fact that Lycinus, as the rest of the dialogue shows, does not accept ἐξουσία as a valid line of defence. These three observations indicate that Hesiod's tirade is a caricature of the misunderstood artist, whose recourse to poetic freedom is subsequently rejected. To provoke such criticism by Lucian, the practice of defending especially Hesiod and Homer through ἐξουσία must have been frequent.

The examples from Strabo, Plutarch and Lucian imply that the 'strategy' of poetic licence was primarily used to account for historically or

---

[143] Lucian *Hes*. 5.

[144] Hesiod's reply is couched in the language of law: he speaks several times about 'defending' himself, calls Lycinus a 'sycophant' and describes Lycinus' reproach as a 'charge'. But it is also the structure of Hesiod's reply that reminds us of legal discourse: his plea as a whole (*Hes*. 4–6) seems to be informed by the legal-rhetorical theory of στάσεις or *status*, which is concerned with finding the right position to be taken up by the defence. Hesiod shifting his lines of defence ('it was not I making promises but the Muses'—'there should be some freedom for poets'—'Homer did it too'—'Lycinus does not know what poetry is about and so should not judge me') resembles the accused party in a trial considering which status to choose for the defence. See Sluiter (2005) for a lucid exposition of status theory.

physically impossible tales that strike the audience as incredible or fantastic (the so-called ἀπίθανον). This is borne out by the scholia, which often acquit the poets of such 'mistakes' by pointing to their right to exaggerate, distort or simply invent stories as they see fit.[145] It is in fact only on rare occasions that poetic licence is employed to explain away *morally* challenging passages, although the scholiast's remark on the Homeric description of Ares being bound by the giants Otus and Ephialtes sounds like a general rule: 'Aristarchus believes that we should understand what the poet says as part of a myth, in agreement with poetic licence, and that we should not trouble ourselves with explanations beyond what the poet says'.[146] In reaction to other, allegorical interpretations, Aristarchus thus explains the passage through poetic licence: the shocking episode is simply part of myth. There are other examples, though not many.[147]

4.2.5. Harmonization

The Greeks thus developed an impressive range of strategies to defend the poets' central position in education: selection, altering the surface, allegorical reading, and the concept of poetic licence. Such interpretive tools, however, also at the same time shift the meaning and authority from the poems to their interpreters. This shift is unavoidable and universal: whenever texts are canonized or 'enshrined', an ever-growing gap arises between the moment of fixation and the subsequent re-readings that keep moving away from that moment, and a continuous exegetical effort is needed to keep the canon relevant.[148] Usually, a special caste of interpreters takes care of this: in the case of Greece, these are the schoolmasters and rhapsodes, but also the sophists and philosophers. Paradoxically, the tools that are supposed to keep Hesiod and Homer close

[145] See Meijering (1987) 62–67 and Nünlist (2009) 174–184, both dealing only with poetic freedom with regard to realism and consistency.

[146] Σ *Il.* 5.385 (D): Ἀρίσταρχος ἀξιοῖ τὰ φραζόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ μυθικώτερον ἐκδέχεσθαι, κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐξουσίαν, μηδὲν ἔξω τῶν φραζομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ περιεργαζομένους.

[147] Σ *Il.* 8.428–429 (AbT), 14.176 (bT). I have not been able to find Hesiod connected to such licence; perhaps on his own he was too ethically sound to need it. The statement of Richardson (2006) 185, that the scholia 'defend poetic freedom to 'follow the myths' however shocking or odd these may seem later' thus seems slightly inaccurate, as ἐξουσία far more often explains the odd than the shocking.

[148] Cf. Assmann (2000) 56–59.

to later generations also indicate an ever-growing distance. The poems speak less and less for themselves, and they must be understood through others.

It is another well-known paradox that the fixation of the text is followed by a proliferation of meanings: the interpreters all have their own agenda. This is not necessarily a problem, for the source text thus becomes richer and more interesting. The scholia, for instance, show us that Hesiodic or Homeric verses can often be interpreted in different but nonetheless non-exclusive ways; in general, the scholiast does not prefer or disqualify certain readings but demonstrates his knowledge by enumerating all the exegetical possibilities.[149] From another perspective, however, this polyinterpretability of the poems, together with an apparent absence of clear rules for interpretation, could also be a dangerous thing, especially where ethics are concerned: it provides a *carte blanche* for the interpreter in question, since it is nearly impossible to determine what the 'right' interpretation is.

This problem seems to have been considerable in the case of Hesiod and Homer, whose poems were felt to belong to everybody. At least two factors contributed to this feeling: first, the poets' fundamental position in Greek education, which provided all citizens with (at least) a rudimentary knowledge of their poems; and second, the scale of the appropriation of their poems by professionals, which made the 'laymen' aware of many different and perhaps contradictory interpretations. Richardson speaks of 'a climate of opinion in which less enlightened figures might pursue their own theories about Homer's 'true meanings'',[150] and his Homerocentric remark undoubtedly goes for Hesiod as well. The sophists in fact thrived on the poems' status as cultural common property,[151] which seems to go hand in hand with a democratization of Hesiod and Homer in legal contexts.[152] In Plato too we find a particular concern for the

[149] Alternatives being separated by the (neutral) term ἄλλως (cf. Dickey 2007 108–109).

[150] Richardson (1975) 69.

[151] See Morgan (2000) 89–94. There is an interesting passage from Isocrates' *Panathenaicus*, that seems to oppose two ways of teaching: Isocrates' ideal, i.e. one schoolmaster organizing a single coherent system of education without any room for the poets, or the sophistical practice of sharing and repeating interpretations about 'the poets, especially the poetry of Hesiod and Homer' (περί τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου ποιήσεως, *Panath.* 18).

[152] Cf. Ford (1999).

fact that everybody could harness the authority of the poets for his own cause.[153] Interpreting Hesiod and Homer could thus become a very individual, almost personal affair.[154]

Apart from this unsettling polyinterpretability, the problem of poetic authority was further increased by the rise of another authority on ethics, i.e. philosophy. So far, we have seen how thinkers found fault with the nomothetical status of Hesiod and Homer because their poems contained passages that advocated behaviour incompatible with the *laws*. But after the foundation of the Academy, the Lyceum, and the schools of Epicurus and the Stoa, the Greeks were faced with no less than three different prescriptive bodies: laws, poets, and philosophical doctrine. This potentially confusing situation is problematized in the Second Sophistic. In Lucian's *Necyomantia*, for instance, the protagonist Menippus descends into Hades to ask Tiresias how one should live, because it is exactly the contradictory instructions by the poets, laws and philosophers that have made him utterly confused. As a boy, Menippus listened to the poets talk about quarrels, adultery and theft—but these things, as he found out later, were forbidden by the laws, which gave rise to a great 'ambivalence' (ἀμφιβολία, 3) in him. He tried to solve his ἀπορία by going to the philosophers, but this only made things worse:[155] in the

[153] Of all the times Hesiod and Homer are mentioned together in the *Republic*, they are quoted only twice, and in both instances in support of a moral abomination: in 364c–e (quoted above, see p. 75), to demonstrate that injustice pays better than justice, and in 363a–c, where the poets—according to their interpreters—praise the benefits of a reputation of justice rather than of justice itself. Plato deliberately quotes the passages from Hesiod and Homer out of context and ascribes a meaning to them never intended by the poets themselves; in fact, the circumstance that all citations are far more naturally explained as exhortations to justice, excellence and godliness adds considerably to the irony of the *Republic*-passages (see further Koning 2010). Other than in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, no interpretative correction is offered: the reading of the nameless 'they' is allowed to run completely off the rail, as a clear demonstration of yet another dangerous aspect of poetry: the fact that its interpretations cannot be checked. See also *Euthphr*. 5e–6a, where Euthyphro defends his prosecution of his father with Hesiod's tale of Zeus castrating Cronus; such a 'Platonic reductio ad absurdum of contemporary moral and legal debate' (Robb 1994 83) is comparable to the absurd interpretation of Homer by some of Aristophanes' characters (on which see Verdenius 1970 11–12).

[154] See the discussion of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* in 4.2.2 above: it is because of Socrates' idea of ἔργον as 'good work' that Hesiod's line passes the test, and because of Socrates' supposedly democratic persuasion that he did not use Homer to promote aristocratic values.

[155] He went 'out of the smoke into the fire', as he himself puts it, εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ ἐκ τοῦ καπνοῦ (4).

end, Menippus felt 'like a drowsy man, nodding now this way and now that.'[156] Eventually, he gives up and ends up following the simple life of the cynic.

This, however, was not the only possible response. Some critics recognized that the philosophers, especially those whose thoughts had become part of the canon too, could offer the criterion by which interpretations of poetry could be measured. Such 'harmonization' of the poetical and philosophical canon could greatly benefit the Greek ethical or educational system by making ethical prescriptions 1) more powerful (for they could lean on the authority of both poets and philosophers), 2) unified and unequivocal, and 3) thoroughly Greek. These advantages were particularly appealing to the intelligentsia of the Second Sophistic, who were eager to present themselves as the latest heirs of an unbroken line of Greek tradition. Hence they often tried their hand at the merging of canons.[157]

One of the clearest examples of this practice of harmonization comes from Plutarch's treatise on how to understand the poets, designed to enable young readers to recognize (ethically) good passages in poetry. After going through the several steps[158] necessary for the development of the readers' power of judgement, we come to the final and crucial test, in which the thoughts of the poets are compared to those of philosophers. In 36A–B, Plutarch demonstrates that the purport of Zeus' words to Aphrodite in *Iliad* 5.428–429 ('not to you, my child, are given works of war; but attend to the lovely works of marriage') corresponds exactly

---

[156] *Nec*. 4: ἔπασχον τοῖς νυστάζουσι τούτοις ὅμοιον, ἄρτι μὲν ἐπινεύων, ἄρτι δὲ ἀνανεύων ἔμπαλιν. This perplexity is brought on especially by the philosophers, who each expressed 'the most contradictory opinions' (περὶ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν λέγων); but it is obvious (both from the earlier-mentioned 'ambivalence' and the fact that the philosophers in paragraph 4 cite Hesiod to add further to the confusion) that Menippus' uncertainty is also due to the three authorities disagreeing with each other.

[157] Such harmonization is a relatively common practice, see e.g. Varro (who is borrowing from Greek sources) distinguishing three types of theological discourse (the mythical, physical, and political, fr. 6 and 7) and demonstrating how they are in fact three separate expressions of the same truth.

[158] The five steps (Heirman 1972 8) are the following: 1) we have to come to a realization of the nature of poetry and its relation to the truth; 2) we must look at examples of evaluation in the text; 3) we must try to acquire a deeper understanding of the nature of poetry; 4) we must engage in exercises such as trying to improve upon the words of the poet, or giving them a wider application; 5) if the poem is beautiful enough, we ought to find the corresponding words of the philosophers. A good example of the second step is provided by Plutarch himself in the *Comp. Arist. Cat*. 3.3.2, where Odysseus' pronounced dislike of work in *Od*.14.222–225 is by Plutarch believed to agree with the praise of labour in *WD* 498–501, since Odysseus is playing the role of a villain.

to that of the famous maxim 'Know yourself', just as *Works and Days* lines 40 ('fools, they do not know how much more the half is than the whole') and 266 ('an evil plan is most evil for the planner') 'are identical with the doctrines of Plato in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* upon the principle that 'to do wrong is worse than to be wronged' and 'to do evil is more injurious than to suffer evil'.[159] According to Plutarch, poetic passages are good and valuable when they can be harmonized with the statements of sages and philosophers.[160] At the same time, the alignment of the voices of the Greek champions of education, i.e. Plato, the well-known Delphic inscriptions *and* of Hesiod and Homer, brings on an almost irresistible authority: the ethical advice cannot but be true.

More evidence for the practice of harmonization can easily be gained from the scholia on Hesiod and Homer. Apparently Plato, despite his own persistent attacks on the poets, was felt to be a particularly suitable philosopher to harmonize with Hesiod and Homer. For instance: Hesiod and Plato are said to agree on demons overseeing human affairs, on the essential role of one's education for leading a good life, on the fact that leading a life in agreement with ἀρετή is both the best and sweetest, and on the importance of *kairos*.[161] At the same time, the scholiasts point to similarities in Homer and Plato: both say that the soul of a living person is bound up with his bones, that plenty of food and drink fill a person with the right attitude, and that it is essential to honour one's parents;

[159] Plu. *Mor*. 36A–B. The *Gorgias*-passages referred to are 473a and 474c, and examples from the *Republic* may be found in 354a and 334d. See Hunter (2008) 161–162 for another example of such alignment by Plutarch.

[160] See also *Mor*. 35F, where Plutarch advises his students in poetry to 'shatter the authority of worthless and harmful poems (φαῦλα καὶ βλαβερὰ ποιήματα) by pitting against them the remarks and views of well-known political thinkers (λόγους καὶ γνώμας ἀντιτάττοντες ἐνδόξων καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν). But, by the same token, whenever we come upon something noble and gracious we ought to foster it and give it more importance by using proofs and testimonies (ἀποδείξεσι καὶ μαρτυρίαις) from the works of philosophers (…). Our confidence in the poets gains strength and dignity whenever the doctrines of a Pythagoras or Plato are in agreement with what is spoken on the stage or sung to the lyre or studied at school' (transl. Heirman 1972). In *Mor*. 763E Plutarch claims that poets, legislators and philosophers agree that Love is a god, and refers to Hesiod, Solon and Plato.

[161] Σ *WD* 122a (and 124a), 130a, 290–292, 689–694. See also the scholia on *WD* 15, 111, 113–115, 130–131, 200–201, 266a, 274–280, 286, 423–427, 448–452, 695–698, 706, 709 and 759a. Most of these harmonizing interpretations are made by the neoplatonist Proclus, though some go back to Plutarch or are anonymous.

there are even some, the scholiast says, who believe that Plato derived the tripartition of the soul from Homer.[162] Attempts at harmonization can also be found in other sources.[163]

The evidence points out that the poets most often interpreted to fit the philosophers are Hesiod and Homer. Even though Plutarch in the passage mentioned above shows that the expressions of other poets can be brought into harmony with the thoughts of the philosophers as well, he thinks first of Hesiod and Homer. Similarly, Maximus of Tyre in his fourth oration, specifically designed to demonstrate that poetry and philosophy 'are two names for what is, in reality, a single thing',[164] points first to the philosophical quality of Hesiod and Homer.[165] Furthermore, the scholia on the other popular poets—Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides—do not show comparable attempts at harmonization, at least not to the same degree.[166] Harmonizing the 'Big Three'—law, poetry, and philosophy—was the dream of any educator: it instilled in the pupil an unequivocal, unshakeable, and thoroughly Greek ethical ideal with the tremendous force of the three authorities combined: laws, poets, and philosophers—and it is clear that Hesiod and Homer were the poets' foremost representatives.

---

[162] Σ *Il.* 12.386d (T), 19.167 (bT), 24.371 (T), 18.113b (A). The scholia also pay attention to the Plato's critique on Homer, see for instance Σ *Il.* 14.176b (bT), 14.342–351 (bT), 18.22–35a (A), 24.527–528b (bT).

[163] The Stoics are perhaps the most obvious harmonizers, cf. SVF 1.539 (= Phld. *Piet.* 13). See further e.g. Aelius Aristides, who makes Plato agree with Hesiod (2.438), while Dio Chrysostom in his 55th oration elaborately compares Socrates with Homer, claiming the philosopher was the poet's pupil. Clemens of Alexandria often tries to harmonize Christian thought with sayings of the poets (see e.g. *Strom.* 5.14.100.3, 107.2, 112.3, 129.5–6); see also Lib. *Or.* 16.46–47 (calling both Hesiod and Homer and Plato and Pythagoras educators providing essential moral instruction) and Philo *De Aeternitate Mundi* 17.

[164] *Or.* 4.1: χρῆμα διττὸν μὲν κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα, ἁπλοῦν δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν (transl. Trapp 1997).

[165] *Or.* 4.3. See also Lucian *Anach.* 21, where Solon presents an idealized form of Greek education and pictures the young Athenians as studying the laws and discussing with philosophers—before this, however, they are to listen to and remember the poetry of Hesiod and Homer.

[166] The scholia on Pindar mention Plato only five times, and in four of those instances 'harmonization' takes place. The numbers for the scholia on the three tragedians are even more revealing: Aeschylus 5 (0), Sophocles 2 (0), Euripides 1 (1). Even when one takes into account that there are considerably less scholia on these four poets than on Hesiod and Homer, the contrast remains striking.

5. *Conclusion*

This chapter began with a short description of Homer's central position in Greek education and ethics, and has demonstrated that scholars both ancient and modern are often quick to raise his status as guide and teacher to monopolistic proportions (section 1). It is the conclusion of this chapter, however, that such a picture is too simplistic and inaccurate, at least for the archaic and early classical period. Instead of taking the (oft-discussed) position of Homer as the starting-point for an investigation into the authority of Hesiod and Homer combined, we should probably turn things around, and accept that a great prescriptive value was originally ascribed equally to both poets, or to their combination.

A number of considerations favour such a view. First of all: we have seen that from earliest times onwards the poems' morals and maxims were believed to be so pertinent that they were comparable to the laws of a community. Such a comparison is already implicitly present in Herodotus' statement on Greek theology (one of the first texts mentioning Hesiod and Homer together, see section 2), and is frequently seen throughout antiquity: the poets are sometimes explicitly said to be engaged in νομοθετεῖν, they are compared to lawgivers, they are invoked as 'witnesses' or 'proofs', and their poems are in some respects treated as laws (see section 3). Apart from these indications, there is the ancient sense of the poems' universal appeal (they are composed 'for the Greeks') and of their essential contribution to a collective identity.

The positive evidence for the nomothetical status of Hesiod and Homer is affirmed by negative approaches from critics. It is significant that the earliest attacks on poetry that we have, by thinkers like Xenophanes, Pythagoras and Plato,[167] are aimed at Hesiod and Homer *together*. The critics recognized that their poetry was filled with passages that could inspire immoral behaviour; it was especially their descriptions of the underworld and of the conduct of the gods that were thought to be damaging to society. As a general rule that holds in classical as well as later times, attacks on Hesiod and Homer together are usually aimed at the Homeric poems in combination with the *Theogony* (concentrating on the brutal behaviour of the gods), while praise is reserved for Homer's

[167] To the list of early critics can perhaps be added the lyric poet Stesichorus (c. 632–556), who wrote two palinodes, one rejecting a Homeric story, and the other a Hesiodic tale (fr. 193 PMG, on which see Bowie 1993 23–28). It is impossible to determine, however, whether or not his criticism was ethical/moralistic.

poetry combined with the *Works and Days* (focusing on 'great deeds and wise sayings'). It seems inaccurate to say, on the basis of the evidence presented in sections 3 and 4.1, that Homer is generally linked to either the *Theogony* or the *Works and Days*[168]—the connection depends on the context.

It is highly illustrative of the importance of Hesiod and Homer that they were not, on account of 'what they said about the gods', punished, ejected from education or banished altogether—whatever some critics may have suggested. Instead, in order to keep the poets, a refined and elaborate system of defensive strategies emerged to evade or neutralize problematic passages, or to positively turn them around: selection, altering the surface, allegorical reading, poetic licence and harmonization (see section 4). Such exegetical weaponry was not used exclusively on the poems of Hesiod and Homer, but their poetry was definitely the main target.

In sum, this chapter has first and foremost shown that in the Greek imagination the combination of Hesiod and Homer in the field of ethics and education was extremely strong. Together, their poems are both forcefully defended and attacked as the most powerful prescriptive texts of society. In the course of time, Homer becomes the most prominent figure—but throughout antiquity we find traces of an original unity of Hesiod and Homer together as the greatest 'educators of the Greeks'.

[168] Which is argued by Kassies (1989) 27 and Graziosi (2002) 184, respectively.

CHAPTER THREE

HESIOD AND HOMER: THE STOREKEEPERS OF KNOWLEDGE

0. *Introduction*

In chapter 2, we have seen that Hesiod and Homer were strongly bound together in the Greek imagination where ethics, morality and education are concerned. The two poets, whose authority in this field amounted to laws, were often presented together. As a team, they were believed to have invented Greek religion and to have established the moral code according to which one should interact with other people and the gods. As a unity, they were severely attacked by Plato and others for promoting ethically questionable behaviour that could disrupt society, while countless teachers defended the canonical status of Hesiod and Homer through an extremely elaborate apparatus of exegetical strategies that was developed and passed on through the centuries. Eventually, the poets were aligned with other true 'educators of Greece', such as Plato, Pythagoras, and the Seven Sages.

The present chapter will shift from the poets' authority in the field of ethics to a different area of competence: that of natural philosophy, science, and (factual) knowledge. In the first section, we will examine if and to what extent Hesiod and Homer together are associated with particular scientific and natural-philosophical notions. Contrary to what one may expect, we will find that the unity of the poets is extremely weak in this respect. Despite the fact that both Hesiod and Homer are often connected with particular philosophical theories and views when they appear apart from each other,[1] they hardly even count as philosophers when they are combined. This is a curious fact in need of explanation.

On the other hand, the poems of Hesiod and Homer *were* often searched for purely factual information, especially in the fields of history,

[1] See on Hesiod's philosophical qualities ch. 6, and on their incompatibility with the qualities ascribed to Homer ch. 9, pp. 304–310.

geography, anthropology and (human and animal) physiology; section 2 will concentrate on the poets' role as storekeepers of knowledge. It is not the main concern of this section to examine what sort of information the epic poems were thought to contain (this subject is briefly discussed in 2.1), but rather how this information was evaluated. Some critics believed that all poets wrote fiction and were more concerned with enchanting the audience than with providing factual information; as could be expected, Homer was their example *par excellence*. But others disagreed, and it is especially interesting for us that Hesiod played an important part in their argumentation. We will see in this chapter that our sources suggest that the combination of Hesiod and Homer could somehow be regarded as a class of its own, a special category of just two poets that could (to some degree) escape the accusations of fiction and fantasy. We will gain insight into the workings of this mechanism if we investigate how this 'special category' was given shape by the sophists (2.1), and how it related to other categories, such as that of the tragic poets (2.2) and the historians (2.3). These sections will make clear that the combination of Hesiod and Homer has a different conceptual value than that of the poets treated separately, since it is used in a decidedly different way.

1. *Hesiod and Homer as Philosophers*

When speaking of the Greek view of Hesiod and Homer as philosophers, it is fundamental to distinguish between two types of references: 1) general references to their philosophical insights and wisdom, and 2) specific references to their propagation of particular doctrines.

The first type is common, and understandably so: the philosophical status of both Hesiod and Homer was acknowledged throughout all periods of antiquity. There is ample evidence, for instance, that the earliest recipients of epic, the natural philosophers from Milete, regarded the poets as their own predecessors; they borrowed freely from and reacted seriously against the physiological views either explicit or implicit in the poems of Hesiod and Homer.[2] A similar debt can be seen in the

[2] See e.g. Cornford (1952) 187–201, Stokes (1962 and 1963), and Ferrari (1984) 202 dismissing the statement of Havelock (1983) 80 that 'philosophy proper arose as a commentary upon and correction of the cosmic imagery of Homer and the cosmic architecture of Hesiod' as 'disappointingly uncontroversial'; see further ch. 6, pp. 190–

works of Parmenides and Empedocles.[3] It was common procedure to select what one needed from the poetic tradition as a whole, and thus use Hesiodic material for some purposes, and Homeric for others. This approach continues in the classical and later periods. In the fragments that remain from the sophists, and in the works of Plato and Aristotle, we often see references made to either Hesiod or Homer: they can be hailed as the 'first founder' of a particular theory, and quotations from their work are employed to illustrate a certain notion, be it in the field of epistemology, natural philosophy or linguistics.[4] This eclectic use of the poets allows for them to be occasionally mentioned *together* as philosophers.[5] This observation fits well with one of the conclusions of the previous chapter, i.e. that the two poets were often aligned with the best-known philosophers and sages and thus achieved a certain philosophical quality.

The second type of reference, however, is extremely rare. None of the early philosophers refers to Hesiod and Homer *together*, and nowhere do we find the two poets *together* as either the creative source or even the illustrative material for a specific philosophical doctrine. This observation is confirmed by Stoic references to Hesiod and Homer: their poems are the Stoics' favorite texts for philosophical exegesis, but they do not provide the same philosophical insights.[6] And a similar picture emerges

---

200. It was especially the cosmogonical and cosmological passages in the poems the Milesians were interested in, but other passages of a more physiological nature must have appealed to them as well (we can think, for instance, of Hesiod's 'physical' explanation of mist, clouds and rain in *WD* 548–553).

[3] For Hesiodic influence on the works of Parmenides and Empedocles see ch. 6, pp. 210–217. For Homeric influence on Parmenides cf. e.g. Vos (1963) and Meijer (1984).

[4] See further ch. 6 and 9.

[5] Thus Hesiod and Homer are for instance said to 'philosophize' by Clemens (*Strom.* 5.4.24.1). According to Maximus of Tyre (*Or.* 4.3), the human soul was less complicated in archaic times, and Hesiod and Homer provided a 'gentle and artistic kind of philosophy which would guide it and control it by the use of myths' (φιλοσοφίας μουσικῆς τινος καὶ πραοτέρας, ἣ διὰ μύθων δημαγωγήσει αὐτὴν καὶ μεταχειριεῖται, cf. *Or.* 26.2). See also Arist. *Metaph.* 982b7–983b20 (on which see Schmitter 1991 58) and the epilogue of Cornutus' *Epidrome* saying that 'the ancients' (οἱ παλαιοί), by which he primarily means Hesiod and Homer, were 'both able to understand the nature of the universe and inclined to philosophize about it through symbols and riddles' (καὶ πρὸς τὸ διὰ συμβόλων καὶ αἰνιγμάτων φιλοσοφῆσαι περὶ αὐτῆς εὐεπίφοροι, *Epidr.* 35).

[6] It is striking that the Stoics themselves do not refer to the combination of Hesiod and Homer, but of course do refer to the poets very often separately. Only in the mouths of others (cf. Plu. *Mor.* 948E–F = SVF 2.430), especially their opponents (cf. Galen 5.300 Kühn = SVF 2.906, Cic. N.D. 1.41, Phld. *Piet.* 13 = SVF 1.539), do we hear that the Stoics make use of the poems of 'Hesiod and Homer'.

from the scholia: Hesiod and Homer appear as the most 'philosophical' of poets,[7] but the specific tenets ascribed to them are not the same. Generally speaking, then, the poets are both regarded as philosophers, and hence comparable, but they are not seen as a combination where the particular content of their respective philosophies is concerned.

Exceptions to this general rule are hard to find. The only explicit example I could find for the classical period is a passage from Plato's *Cratylus*, where Socrates ascribes the Heraclitean notion of flux to both poets. After a brief summary of Heraclitus' beliefs,[8] Socrates conjectures that such thinking is more ancient since 'Homer speaks of 'Ocean, origin of the gods, and their mother Tethys', and I think Hesiod does so too . . .'[9] The connection of the poets to a specific doctrine seems fairly straightforward here: the literary depiction of a river as the origin of all things is put on a par with the theory of flux. But even in this one explicit case the combination is rather weak, since Hesiod is added with a certain hesitation (οἶμαι)—and rightly so—[10] and the theory of flux is elsewhere in Plato only associated with Homer.[11] Besides this passage from *Cratylus*, other philosophical equations of Hesiod and Homer *qua* content are much later and not very strong either.[12]

We must conclude, then, that Hesiod and Homer were generally regarded as philosophers, but that their combination was not attached to

---

[7] In the scholia, Hesiod and Homer are explicitly called philosophers or said to philosophize far more often than other poets; compare the number of instances for Hesiod (4 times) and Homer (9), for instance, with those for Pindar (1), Aeschylus (0), Sophocles (2; in one of those, Σ *El.* 86, the philosophical thought is said to go back to Hesiod) and Euripides (1; although his characters are called philosophical three times).

[8] Pl. *Cra.* 402a: 'Heraclitus says somewhere that 'everything gives way and nothing stands fast', and, likening the things that are to the flowing of a river, he says that 'you cannot step into the same river twice'' (Λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι 'πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει', καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς 'δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης').

[9] Pl. *Cra.* 402b: Ὅμηρος Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσίν' φησιν 'καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν'· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος . . . (transl. slightly altered).

[10] The cited verse on Ocean occurs twice in Homer (*Il.* 14.201 and 302) but nowhere in Hesiod. Perhaps Plato means that Hesiod says something comparable ('I think Hesiod says much the same', in Reeve's unaltered translation); maybe he is thinking of *Th.* 337 ('Tethys bore to Ocean eddying rivers', the introductory sentence to the catalogue of rivers), as Patzer (1986) 52 suggests. There can be little doubt that Plato mentions Hesiod in the first place because he derives his material from Hippias' *Synagoge* (see pp. 112–115).

[11] Cf. *Tht.* 153a, 153d, 160d, 179e (and see further ch. 9.1, pp. 304–310).

[12] See Plu. *Mor.* 1088D (the reference to Hesiod is obvious here, see e.g. Adam (1974) and Einarson-De Lacy (1967) ad loc. contra Zacher 1982 103) and fr. 178.79–91 Sandbach; S.E. *M.* 9.7.

any particular doctrine. This is a remarkable conclusion since it clearly contrasts with the findings of the previous chapter, where we have seen that the two poets were both regarded as moral authorities and were often credited with the same ethical notions, be it either approvingly (the 'wise sayings' and 'famous deeds worthy of imitation') or disapprovingly (the objectionable picture of the gods and the underworld).

Part of the explanation for this discrepancy lies in the fact that Hesiod and Homer have always played a central part in Greek education, and thus *had* to be seen as comparable in this respect. Their combination in the field of ethics both carried the weight of tradition and was proven of educational value each day. Philosophy, however, was a later and more intellectual endeavour, which makes it *a priori* more suitable for differentiation.[13] As we will see in chapters 6 and 9, Hesiod and Homer were in fact, from the classical period onwards, credited with very distinct and often completely opposite notions on especially epistemology and ontology. With such a contradictory view on the poets rather firmly in place, it was unlikely for the Greeks to present them as a philosophical combination, except in a most general way.

Such a combination, on the other hand, *was* possible in cases where Hesiod and Homer were regarded as age-old authorities recording and handing down factual knowledge. This is a matter to which we will now turn.

2. *Old Knowers: An Exclusive Category*

The poems of Homer, for a Greek, contained more than moral advice and stories of gods and heroes; as Havelock pointed out, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* constituted a kind of 'encyclopaedia' filled with all sorts of factual knowledge relevant to the audience, be it historical, technical, or geographical.[14] The breadth of such knowledge attributed to the poet seems to have been virtually endless, from instruction on the proper way to conduct a sacrifice to the rules of successful seamanship—anyone listening to the adventures of Odysseus would in the meantime learn how

[13] Such differentiation is perhaps sharpened by the Greeks' conscious search for the πρῶτος εὑρετής ('first founder') of particular views or inventions, which allows only one 'discoverer' at a time.

[14] See Havelock 1963, who also pays much attention to religious and ethical instruction. Although he focuses on Homer, Havelock grants this encyclopaedic function to Hesiod as well (61–64, and further 97–114).

to build a raft or address a stranger. And although Havelock stressed the importance of epic's encyclopaedic function in an essentially oral society, Homer's immense scope of learning seems to have remained a commonplace throughout antiquity, as the famous libellum *De Vita et Poesi Homeri II* demonstrates.[15]

Scholars have been remarkably less eager to point to the comparable position held by Hesiod, who seems to have been a similarly encyclopaedic figure to the Greeks: he was considered an expert in such fields as the (early) history of Greece, geography, astronomy, ethnology, animals and monsters, and specific crafts like household economy and of course agriculture.[16] It need not surprise us, therefore, that the poets are often mentioned together as the authorities on numerous matters. Herodotus, for instance, names both Hesiod and Homer as sources for one of the world's most obscure peoples, the Hyperboreans,[17] and Stesichorus is said to have written two poems to correct stories told by Hesiod and Homer.[18] Apart from such early cases there are many other references to the two poets as knowers: according to Ephorus, Hesiod and Homer agreed on the justice of the Scythian people, and Strabo too mentions the two poets as authorities familiar with Scythians, Arabians and Pelasgians, as well as with certain geographical data.[19] Plutarch says that Hesiod and Homer showed us the right way of praying, and rightly dis-

---

[15] Cf. Max.Tyr. *Or*. 26.1 and 4 presenting a long list of Homer's areas of expertise; cf. Seneca *Ep*. 88.5 mocking all philosophical schools for their appropriation of Homer.

[16] Examples of the expertise attributed to Hesiod: early history and genealogy Hecat. FGH 19, Str. 7.7.2, Σ *Il*. 2.523a (b), 2.604 (test.), 12.292–293 (T), *Od*. 10.2, 10.139, 12.69, J. *Ap*. 11.6 and *AJ* 1.108, Theon 2.93 Spengel, Paus. 2.6.5, Men.Rhet. 3.338 Spengel; geography Str. 8.3.11, 8.6.8, 9.5.22, 14.5.17, Σ *Il*. 2.523a (b), *Od*. 1.85; astronomy [Pl.] *Epin*. 990a, Plin. *NH* 18.213, Plu. *Mor*. 402E; ethnology Str. 7.7.2; animals and monsters Arist. *HA* 591a4, Nic. *Ther*. 10–12, Str. 9.1.9, Σ *Il*. 6.181b (bT), 8.367–368 (AbT), Plu. *Mor*. 978F; the household Pl. *Lg*. 677e, Arist. *Oec*. 1343a18–21, Σ *Il*. 1.250b (AbT), Plu. *Mor*. 157F, 753A, 940C; agriculture Varro *RR* 1.1.9, Virgil *Georg*. 2.176, Prop. 2.34.77–78, Ovid *Fasti* 6.13–14, Plin. *NH* 14.3, 15.3, 18.201 and 25.12. Heraclitus called Hesiod a much-knower (DK B 40). The scholia on *Th*. and *WD* abound with references to Hesiod's factual knowledge.

[17] Hdt. *Hist*. 4.32. It is clear that Herodotus, who after this passage tells us what he knows of this half-mythical people, was at first hesitant to accept their existence; a reasonable doubt, considering that their close neighbours the Scythians, who speak even of one-eyed men, do not mention them at all. It is the authority of Hesiod and Homer that encourages him to carry on his investigation.

[18] Stesichorus fr. 193 PMG. One poem of Stesichorus was directed against Homer and argued that his account of the abduction of Helen was false; the other poem was directed against Hesiod, but it is unknown what story he found fault with.

[19] FGH 42; Str. 7.3.7, 1.2.34, 7.7.10, 9.2.34, 9.3.16.

tinguish between sorts of seers, and Lucian (ironically) calls them both astronomers.[20] The scholia provide us with ample evidence on the coupling of Hesiod and Homer in the field of knowledge: for instance, they agree on the name of Achilles' daughter, the place where Oedipus died, the origin of man, the existence of a race of heroes, the name of the town Hyria, the hiding-place of Typhoeus, the wind-appeasing capabilities of the Sirens, and the right way to grind grain.[21]

Obviously, Hesiod and Homer were not the only poets credited with factual knowledge of many different subjects; to a certain extent the Greeks considered their poets and prose-writers in general as storekeepers of knowledge. Nonetheless, there are several indications that Hesiod and Homer in this respect belonged to a category of their own. Their special status finds expression in at least two ways: 1) they were often taken together in a way that excluded all other Greek authors, and 2) more credence was attached to their words than to those of others, especially when those others were poets. I will now illustrate these two ways by examining how the Greeks distinguished Hesiod and Homer from other groups of alleged knowers, i.e. the tragedians (2.2) and the historians (2.3). Whereas Homer was often regarded as a tragic poet, we will see that such a qualification was impossible for Hesiod; as a result, their combination set them apart from the tragic poets, who are generally described as later but less truthful and less accurate. The veracity and reliability of the poets are also at stake in the ancient debate concerning the relationship of Hesiod and Homer with the historians; I hope to show that in this debate, it is especially the combination of the two that plays a vital role.

First, however, by way of introduction, I will briefly discuss the sophists' categorization of Hesiod and Homer (2.1). Some of them attempted to appropriate the poets' authority by turning them into proto-sophists, and in so doing, they were the first to explicitly group them together as a separate category.

2.1. *Making Groups: The Sophists*

Scholars have often pointed out that the sophists' approach to Hesiod and Homer was widely different from that of the (early) philoso-

[20] Plu. *Mor.* 169B, 593D; Lucian *Astr.* 22. Cf. Aristid. *Or.* 27.18 coupling the poets as experts in ancient lore.

[21] Σ *Il.* 16.175a (T), 23.679 (T), *Od.* 24.13, *WD* 159a, *Il.* 2.496a (A), *Th.* 304, *Od.* 12.168, 7.104.

phers. Whereas the latter tended to find fault with the poets because they regarded them as competition, the sophists deliberately appropriated 'the cultural tradition of which mythological poetry was so important a part',[22] and tried to assimilate the poets as proto-sophists. In an excellent study of the sophists' treatment of Hesiod and Homer, Morgan demonstrated the many advantages that such an approach could have. Apart from the fact that the sophists could manipulate myth and harness the authority of the poets,[23] there were considerable practical benefits. The sophists were itinerant teachers, and the epic poems fulfilled their need for a Hellenic *lingua franca*. At the same time, the very fact that mythological poetry was so well-known allowed the sophists to impress the audience with new and stunning insights into old and familiar texts. Moreover, by aligning themselves with traditional education, the sophists intended to trade their image of radical innovation for one of reassuring continuity.[24]

Hesiod and Homer were not the sophists' only area of interest; in fact, the sophists aimed to present themselves as incorporating *all* possible wisdom and learning. In this great collection of knowledge, however, some *did* reserve a special place for the two poets. Consider, for instance, the proem of Hippias' *Synagoge*:

> τούτων ἴσως εἴρηται τὰ μὲν Ὀρφεῖ, τὰ δὲ Μουσαίῳ κατὰ βραχὺ ἄλλῳ ἀλλαχοῦ, τὰ δὲ Ἡσιόδῳ τὰ δὲ Ὁμήρῳ, τὰ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν ποιητῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐν συγγραφαῖς τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκ πάντων τούτων τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὁμόφυλα συνθεὶς τοῦτον καινὸν καὶ πολυειδῆ τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι.
>
> 'Of these things some may perhaps have been said by Orpheus, some briefly here and there by Musaeus, some by Hesiod, some by Homer, some by others among the poets, some in prose-writing whether by Greeks or by barbarians. But I will put together the most important and inter-related passages from all these sources, and will thus make this present piece both new and varied in kind.'[25]

---

[22] Morgan (2000) 90.

[23] This goal is not restricted to the appropriation of the poets by the sophists alone, but similarly holds for the historians' use of Hesiod and (especially) Homer as well. As such, it is part of a strategy to establish the credentials of new prose genres like historiography and philosophy, that had to engage with poetry in their quest for authority (see e.g. Goldhill 2002 1–9).

[24] See Morgan (2000), chapter 4. Morgan rightly stresses that this is indeed only a matter of image. The sophists' treatment of traditional stories in their speeches is morally conservative on the surface but at the same time contains hints of innovation and subversiveness meant to attract the attention of the smart (and wealthy).

[25] DK 86 B 6 (transl. Kerferd 1981, slightly adapted).

Hippias' *Synagoge* ('*Collection*') was a compilation of quotations from all kinds of sources, ordered around particular themes or 'philosophical' views, such as the primacy of Eros or the theory of flux; the result was a 'collection of quotes (...) extended (...) into the philosophical realm', an 'umfassender Überblick über die Lehrmeinungen und Ansichten', maybe even 'a beginning of the writing of the history of philosophy'.[26] Of greatest interest to us is Hippias' obvious attempt to organize and categorize sources of knowledge; he is the first, for instance, to distinguish between poetry and prose. Amid his subdivisions, Hesiod and Homer occupy a special place: between Orpheus and Musaeus (separated from them spatially by the phrase κατὰ βραχὺ ἄλλῳ ἀλλαχοῦ)[27] and the rest of the poets (distinguishing them by calling them 'other' and leaving them anonymous). Even though Hippias uses some formal criteria (such as the division between poetry and prose, and that between Greek and barbarian), this way of setting Hesiod and Homer apart suggests that the combination of their names is enough to indicate a specific category. According to this reading, Hippias visualizes five sources of knowledge: the sayings of Orpheus and Musaeus, the poetry of Hesiod and Homer, the other (presumably Greek) poets, Greek prose, and non-Greek prose. The category of Hesiod and Homer is thus presented as unique and exclusive.[28]

Hippias' list calls to mind a similar division made by Protagoras, or at least the Protagoras presented to us by Plato. When Socrates meets him, the sophist mentions the dangers of being a traveling professor: sometimes one meets with hostility and resentment. He then continues:

> ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἷον

[26] Morgan (2000) 95–96, Patzer (1986) 32, Kerferd (1981) 49. As such, the program of the *Synagoge* fitted very well with one of Hippias' most fundamental beliefs, i.e. that all men are comparable and share the same basic set of rules and ideas: perhaps his work 'both new and varied in kind' was meant to demonstrate exactly that. The *Synagoge*, far more than a mere display of learning, would then become a sort of atlas of human culture.

[27] Obviously, the repeated use of δέ suggests that all the four named poets are more or less separate entities, but the structure of the sentence divides them into two groups.

[28] I disagree wholeheartedly with Patzer (1986) 18, who distinguishes between *six* 'Einzelglieder' (Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, Homer, the poets, the prose-writers) and so heaps together the prose-writers who are obviously subdivided in Greek and non-Greek specimens. I also reject his claim (20) that Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer are opposed to all other, non-epic poets; in my view, the four poets are subdivided in two groups of two (suggested by word-order), and there is nothing to suggest that Hippias regarded Orpheus and Musaeus as epic poets.

> Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμῳδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίους δέ τινας ᾔσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικήν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἥττων σοφιστὴς Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς· μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὢν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο.
>
> 'Now, I maintain that the sophist's art is an ancient one, but that the men who practiced it in ancient times, fearing the odium attached to it, disguised it, masking it sometimes as poetry, as Homer and Hesiod and Simonides did, or as mystery religions and prophecy, witness Orpheus and Musaeus, and occasionally, I've noticed, even as athletics, as with Iccus of Tarentum and, in your own time, Herodicus of Selymbria (originally of Megara), as great a sophist as any. Your own Agathocles, a great sophist, used music as a front, as did Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others. All of them, as I say, used these various arts as screens out of fear of ill will.'[29]

Just as in Hippias' proem, the art of the sophist is presented as one of a most comprehensive and varied nature.[30] The sophist recognizes several types of education—poetry, religion, physical training, music—and claims that they are all to be regarded as part of an all-inclusive sophistic discipline. As in the *Synagoge*, the famous predecessors are mentioned as a way to introduce oneself,[31] and, most importantly, Hesiod and Homer are again named as one particular category of educators (a category more clearly demarcated from that of Orpheus and Musaeus than in Hippias' list), and no less exclusive.[32]

---

[29] Pl. *Prt*. 316d–e.

[30] The question of the authenticity of Protagoras' words remains inconclusive. Even though it can be argued that the similarity to the *Synagoge*'s proem makes Protagoras' speech more sophist-like, this could also be a clever picture by Plato (who certainly knew the *Synagoge*, as was established by Snell 1944 (esp. 178), who is followed by e.g. Patzer 1986 33–37 and Kerferd 1981 48–49).

[31] The passage from *Protagoras* is taken from the beginning of the dialogue, when Protagoras is introducing himself to Socrates. He goes on to claim that he is more straightforward than his predecessors since he freely admits to being a sophist, and so does not use any πρόσχημα ('front'). But of course the very fact that he is ascribing such screens to others is his own screen: in this way he can appropriate the authority of Hesiod and Homer (and other acclaimed Greek educators).

[32] The name of Simonides being added to those of the great poets does not invalidate my argument because he is only there for narrative economy; in *Prt*. 339a–347a one of his poems is discussed at length (cf. Yamagata 2010 73 suggesting the list reflects the structure of the dialogue). This may also explain why the possibly chronological sequence in Protagoras' list is destroyed, and Orpheus and Musaeus are mentioned as the second group. Cf. *Prt*. 338e–339a, where Plato makes Protagoras say that 'the greatest part of a

Whether Hippias was really the first to distinguish between genres in a systematic way or not, and whether Protagoras' words are actually Plato's or not, we can see that early divisions of educators and knowers result in Hesiod and Homer constituting a separate and exclusive category, distinct from other authors. This *status aparte* remains visible throughout antiquity. Let us examine, for instance, the phrase 'Hesiod and Homer and the other poets', i.e. instances where Hesiod and Homer are presented as a couple and then combined with a group of nameless other poets.[33] This phrase occurs, as far as I have been able to establish, 15 times (Homer going first in 8 of those instances). In five cases, the group of other poets are further defined. These are simply characterized as the 'good' poets in Plato's *Symposium*, but in later times a genre-distinction seems to play a role since Strabo calls them 'the tragic poets', Seneca 'the lyric poets', and Lucian 'the other mythmakers' and elsewhere 'the best poets and especially the tragedians'.[34] Another type of phrase, in which Hesiod and Homer are coupled and then connected to named others (poets or not), also indicates their separate status, since of all 36 cases I could find, there are only 8 where they are not mentioned right next to each other.[35]

With the 'separateness' of Hesiod and Homer well established, we will now investigate how the combination of the two poets related to other groups or genres, more specifically the tragedians and the historians.

---

man's education is to be in command of poetry, by which I mean the ability to understand the words of the poets, to know when a poem is correctly composed and when not, and to know how to analyse a poem and to respond to questions about it' (ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι).

[33] See for a other types of phrases containing the names of Hesiod and Homer the appendix to ch. 1.

[34] Pl. *Smp*. 209d, Str. 11.6.3, Seneca *Ep*. 27.6 (so also Men.Rhet. 3.393 Spengel), Lucian *Luct*. 2 and *Salt*. 61. See also D.Chr. 14.21, who compares Hesiod and Homer to nameless 'wise men' (σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν). See for the fourth century AD and later e.g. Lib. *Ep*. 181.4 ('Hesiod and Homer and the rest of the poets'), Suda 2.348 ('Homer and Hesiod and the Attic writers'), and Planudes 5.448 (defining 'poetry' as 'the things by Homer and Hesiod and the others').

[35] The names occurring most in these lists are Pindar (10 times), Stesichorus (8), Archilochus (7) and Euripides (7)—all poets that were (with the exception of Euripides) considered old.

2.2. *Hesiod and Homer versus the Tragedians*

The combination of Hesiod and Homer is often set against the collective tragic poets. This might seem rather remarkable, since Homer—without Hesiod—is usually closely affiliated with tragedy. Plato, for instance, called him the 'leader' (ἡγεμών) of tragedy,[36] and Aristotle similarly regarded his poetry as both the source of drama and its greatest example.[37] The most important of reasons for this exceptional position was the extensive *mimesis* present in Homer's poems, manifest in the many speeches. Both Plato and Aristotle comment on the fact that the Homeric poems contain much direct speech, which makes them tragic to a considerable degree.[38] It must also be borne in mind that rhapsodes were no mere reciters but *acted out* the speeches, imitating the speaker in question. The distinction between Homerist and tragedian must thus occasionally have been blurry, and the scholia testify to this fine line: they say, for instance, that Homer was the first to introduce *in tragedy* (εἰς τὴν τραγῳδίαν) the *peripeteia*, silent characters, and children as characters; the scholia also refer to the bards depicted in Homer as tragedians.[39]

Hesiod is very different from Homer in this respect. Of the two literary critics mentioned above, Plato does not associate him with tragedy, and Aristotle does not refer to him at all in his *Poetics*. This is most likely due to the lack of *mimesis* in the Hesiodic poems,[40] a fact commented on by

---

[36] Pl. *R.* 598d; cf. *Tht.* 152e, *R.* 595b and *R.* 607a: χρὴ … συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν ('you should agree that Homer is the most poetic of tragedians and the first among them').

[37] See e.g. Arist. *Po.* 1448b34–38, 1451a24–29, 1454b11–14, 1454b25–30, and 1460a5–11. Else (1986) speaks of the 'admiration, not to say worship of Homer' in the *Poetics* (67), and concludes that for both Plato and Aristotle 'the storm center of the debate over tragedy is not the tragedians but Homer' (85). Cf. Hogan (1973) 96 stating Aristotle regarded Homer 'as the predecessor of all drama'.

[38] Pl. *R.* 393a–394c makes the famous distinction between imitative poetry (tragedy and comedy), narrative poetry (e.g. dithyrambs) and the third, mixed type (of which Homer provides the example). A strikingly similar distinction can be found in Arist. *Po.* 1448a19–25.

[39] Σ *Il.* 2.156 (bT), 1.332b (AbT), 6.466 (bT); Σ *Od.* 1.152, 3.267, 8.74, 8.499, 8.542, *Il.* 13.637a (T). See also Σ *Il.* 2.478–479a (AbT) for the notion that Homeric poetry contains all genres (history, tragedy, comedy) within itself.

[40] The *Iliad* contains 45 percent direct speech, the *Odyssey* no less than 67 (see e.g. De Jong 1991 409); compare the *Th.*'s 3 and *WD*'s near-2 percent (my own calculations, based on the lists of direct and indirect speech in the *Th.* and *WD* by Leclerc 1993 83–84). On the 'character-text' in the *Th.* see Stoddard (2004) 98–125. Rengakos (2009) 203 even goes so far as to state that 'Hesiod's poems have no plot'.

Proclus in his commentary on the *Works and Days*. After he has introduced the traditional distinction between the narrative (διηγηματικόν), dramatic (δραματικόν) and mixed (μικτόν) modes, he explains:

> καὶ διηγηματικὸν μέν ἐστιν ἐν ᾧ ὁ ποιητὴς μόνος φαίνεται φθεγγόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα ὁ ποιητὴς Ἡσίοδος μόνος ἐν παντὶ τῷ συγγράμματι φαίνεται διαλεγόμενος· δραματικὸν δὲ ἐν ᾧ οὐδαμοῦ ὁ ποιητὴς φθέγγεται, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ταῖς τραγῳδίαις γενόμενον· μικτὸν δὲ, ἐν ᾧ ὅ τε ποιητὴς διαλέγεται, καὶ πρόσωπα εἰσῆκται διαλεγόμενα, οἷον ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι ἐμφαίνεται.
>
> 'And the narrative mode is that in which the poet appears as the only one speaking, just as the poet Hesiod here appears as the only speaker in the entire book; the dramatic mode however is that in which the poet nowhere speaks, just as we see in the comedies, and what happens in the tragedies; and the mixed mode is that in which the poet both speaks and has put on characters that are speaking, as is exemplified in the *Iliad*.'[41]

Proclus seems to voice the *communis opinio* in antiquity here;[42] and since Hesiod, generally speaking, was thought to possess no obviously mimetic or tragic quality, he could not easily be associated with the tragedians.

Hesiod's decidedly a-tragic quality has a great impact on the position of the combination of Hesiod and Homer vis-à-vis the tragedians. The epic poets together are mostly viewed as distinct from the tragedians, and although some critics note that the tragic poets use a different language than Hesiod and Homer,[43] the main criterion to distinguish between them is that of factual information: the tragedians tell the stories differently. It also appears that in those cases, the account of Hesiod and Homer is generally believed to be more true.[44]

There are some examples of this belief in greater veracity in the scholia, for instance when the scholiast notes that Hesiod and Homer say that Oedipus died in Thebes, in contrast to the tragedians.[45] Most

---

[41] Prol. Procl. Gaisford (1823) 5, own transl.

[42] There are nonetheless two scholia that explicitly state that Hesiod belongs to the mixed category and thus contains switches from narrative to dramatic (Σ *Th*. 75 and *Il*. 2.484–877 (b), where Erbse's conjecture μικτήν for μιμητικήν is surely correct); see also Σ *WD* Prol. B on the creation of the πρόσωπον Perses.

[43] See Σ *Il*. 16.336a (A), 21.430b (A), *Th*. 691, *WD* 3.

[44] Griffith (1990) 197 rightly argues against the notion that the Homeric or Hesiodic version of a story should be regarded as more true than later ones; but he does not discuss the Greek view on this matter. Nünlist (2009) 178–179 touches on this subject, but seems to overstress the liberal attitude of Greek critics.

[45] Σ *Il*. 23.679b (T). The scholia quite often contrast the epic account with the tragic, see also Σ *Il*. 1.7 (D), 2.199b (AT), 9.145 (D), 9.448 (A), 9.481a2 (T), 14.114b (T), *Od*. 11.260, 11.271, 11.563, *WD* 48f.

interestingly, the Socratic dialogue called *Minos* very explicitly says that the tragic depiction of Minos as an evil tyrant conflicts with that of Hesiod and Homer, who present him as a just king—and although Socrates' friend is convinced of the Attic account, Socrates calls the epic poets 'more trustworthy than all the tragedians put together' (πιθανώτεροι ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί).[46] On the very same subject, Plutarch remarks that 'it seems to be a grievous thing for a man to be at enmity with a city which has a language and a literature' (Ἔοικε γὰρ ὄντως χαλεπὸν εἶναι φωνὴν ἐχούσῃ πόλει καὶ μοῦσαν ἀπεχθάνεσθαι); despite the praise for Minos by Hesiod and Homer, the 'tragic poets prevailed, and from platform and stage showered obloquy down upon him, as a man of cruelty and violence.'[47] It is clearly implied that Hesiod and Homer provide the more accurate picture as they composed their verse *sine ira et studio*, 'for the Greeks' (in Herodotus' words), and not for some particular city-state. A similar impartiality and aloofness is attributed to Hesiod and Homer by Dio Chrysostom in his Borysthenitic oration. Here Dio claims that the two epic poets are more truthful than the tragedians because they are older and hence closer to divine truth, but also because the tragic poets are dependent on their audience; they write in order to be 'applauded by the multitude' (θαυμαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν).[48] The 'enshrinement' of the poets makes them impartial, incorruptible and eternally true: other versions than those of Hesiod and Homer are to be considered aberrations.[49]

That there is a basic incompatibility between Hesiod and Homer on the one hand and the tragedians on the other is confirmed by the scarcity of passages where they are explicitly associated with each other. I have found only two such passages:[50] one is Strabo 11.6.3, where Hesiod, Homer and the tragic poets are said to be more trustworthy than (some of)

[46] [Pl.] *Min.* 318e.

[47] Plu. *Thes.* 16.2–3: ἐπικρατήσαντες οἱ τραγικοὶ πολλὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λογείου καὶ τῆς σκηνῆς ἀδοξίαν αὐτοῦ κατεσκέδασαν ὡς χαλεποῦ καὶ βιαίου γενομένου.

[48] D.Chrys. 36.35; this passage is discussed more fully in ch. 9, pp. 361–362.

[49] See also Plu. *Mor.* 857F, where Herodotus, in 857A described as a φιλοβάρβαρος ('pro-barbarian'), is said to have given us a picture of Heracles that is at odds with that of the poets, Homer and Hesiod first.

[50] But see also Arist. *Mete.* 353a34–b3, where the two poets are not explicitly named. In this passage, Aristotle introduces his new topic of the sea: 'The ancients who concerned themselves with theology make it have sources, their purpose being to provide both land and sea with origins and roots. They perhaps supposed that this would give a more dramatic and grander air to their theories, according to which the earth was an important part of the universe' (οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαῖοι καὶ διατρίβοντες περὶ τὰς θεολογίας ποιοῦσιν αὐτῆς πηγάς, ἵν' αὐτοῖς ὦσιν ἀρχαὶ καὶ ῥίζαι γῆς καὶ θαλάττης· τραγικώτερον γὰρ

the historians; the other is a fragment from Agatharchides,[51] claiming that all poets (he names Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and Euripides) are unconcerned about historical reality. It is not a coincidence that these two cases introduce another party, i.e. the historians; we will now briefly turn to their relationship with the poets in general and Hesiod and Homer in particular.

2.3. *Hesiod and Homer as Historians*

Even though Herodotus issued an early warning that epic poetry and historiography were not the same thing,[52] the Greeks regarded much in the Homeric and Hesiodic poems as historically true. The Trojan War, the wanderings of the heroes, the genealogies of gods and men—it was generally believed that Hesiod and Homer had written them down in complete and detailed accordance with historical reality.[53] Some of the historians themselves, however, saw the poets as competition and departed from the subtlety of Herodotus to heavy attacks on the poets in general and Homer in particular, focusing on his ignorance, implausibility and desire for pleasure instead of truth. Much of the discussion among historians concerning the veracity of Homer is preserved in the works of the geographer Strabo, who nonetheless regarded Homer as the 'founder of the science of geography'[54] and was eager to defend the authority of the epic poet. The words of Strabo reveal that the combination of Hesiod and Homer played an important role in the debate.

οὕτω καὶ σεμνότερον ὑπέλαβον ἴσως εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς μέγα τι τοῦ παντὸς τοῦτο μόριον ὄν·). Most likely, Hesiod and Homer are meant here (cf. *Th.* 282 and 790–792).

[51] Fr. 8 Burstein; see on this fragment further below, n.56, and ch. 9, pp. 359–360.

[52] *Hist.* 2.23 and 2.116.

[53] Hesiod and Homer are often ranked among well-known historians such as Hecataeus, Hellanicus and Ephorus (see e.g. J. *Ap.* 1.16, 1.118, Athenaeus 13.557a), and early historians are sometimes pictured as continuing the poets' work (e.g. Str. 1.1.11, Clem.Al. *Strom.* 6.2.26.7); moreover, many fragments surviving from historians such as Hecataeus and Hellanicus suggest that they regarded Hesiod and Homer as historical sources to be taken seriously (see for Hecataeus FGH 1 14, 18a, 18b, 19; Hellanicus FGH 4 74, 88, 94, 95, 156); see also Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.3.1 mentioning Homer and Hesiod together and describing the latter's activity as ἱστορεῖν. Hermesianax (fr. 7.22 Powell) describes Hesiod as the 'keeper of all of history' (πάσης ἥρανον ἱστορίης); Thucydides appears to have little faith in Homer as a historian (cf. Th. 1.9.3 and 1.10.3).

[54] Str. 1.1.2: ἀρχηγέτην τῆς γεωγραφικῆς ἐμπειρίας. Strabo believes geography is a philosophical enterprise and attempts to prove this by saying that it was practised first by

Strabo seems to have taken up a middle position between historians like Agatharchides, Eratosthenes and Apollodorus on the one hand, who believed that Homer was only out for 'entertainment' (ψυχαγωγία) and thus could not be trusted in anything, and scholars like Crates of Mallus on the other, who claimed that Homer was perfectly trustworthy in all matters, including history and geography.[55] It is exactly in this debate on mythological ψυχαγωγία versus historical πίστις ('proof') that Agatharchides in the passage briefly mentioned above equated all poets—Hesiod, Homer and the tragedians—and claimed that 'every poet strives more to give pleasure than to tell the truth', πᾶς ποιητὴς ψυχαγωγίας μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθείας ἐστὶ στοχαστής.[56] This statement, perhaps an allusion to the historian Eratosthenes' saying that 'every poet is after entertainment, not instruction',[57] erases the distinction discussed in the previous section and instead opposes an indiscrimate heap of all the poets together (epic and tragic) to the group to which Agatharchides himself belongs, i.e. the historians. The criteria applied are allegiance to the truth and didactic intent. The poets are classified as story-tellers in historians' clothes.

Strabo, however, held a more nuanced view: according to him, a trained reader of Homer could occasionally penetrate the 'shell of myth' to find 'the facts of history', a method called 'historical exegesis' by Schenkeveld.[58] Even though he recognizes that entertainment (ψυχαγωγία) was an important objective, it is Strabo's belief that Homer wrote

---

Homer, who clearly was a philosopher (1.1.1; cf. 1.2.17, 'everybody agrees that the poetry of Homer is a philosophical production' (τὴν γὰρ ἐκείνου [= Homer] ποίησιν φιλοσόφημα πάντας νομίζειν).

[55] See Schenkeveld (1976).

[56] The whole passage (fr. 8 Burstein) reads '… then why do I not censure Homer for describing the quarrel of Zeus and Poseidon, a thing for which he can furnish no evidence (πίστιν) to anyone? Why do I not blame Hesiod for daring (τολμῶντι) to reveal the birth of the gods? Why do I not reproach Aeschylus for lying often (διεψευσμένον) and writing many things that cannot be allowed (ἀσυγχωρήτων)? Why do I not arraign Euripides for assigning the deeds of Temenus to Archelaus and bringing on stage Teiresias who had lived more than five generations? (…) I do not do so because every poet strives more to give pleasure than to tell the truth' (transl. Burstein 1989). It is likely that these are the words of Agatharchides himself, see Burstein (1989) 37 and 49 n.1.

[57] Eratosthenes fr. I A 20 Berger: ποιητὴς πᾶς στοχάζεται ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας. The similarity is striking, even though the notion was a commonplace (see Berger ad loc.).

[58] Schenkeveld (1976) 59. Strabo is understandably obscure about the actual procedure of this method. Schenkeveld's reconstruction, i.e. to speak of *historia* when Homer's words check out, and of *mythos* when they do not, does little to elucidate the method itself.

primarily in order to instruct (διδασκαλίας χάριν). He knew that his instruction would be more effective if it was wrapped in myth, but was also aware that making up everything would not be credible.[59] Thus, when Strabo in 11.6.3 equates Hesiod and Homer with the tragic poets, he does align himself with historians like Eratosthenes, who claim that historiography should be cleansed of all fiction. Strabo, however, has a different purpose: he wishes to oppose the poets in general to the phantasts who tell marvelous stories to please the audience, while they pretend to be historians (ἐν ἱστορίας σχήματι); the examples are Ctesias, Hellanicus and Herodotus.[60] They are the *real* story-tellers in historians' clothes, presumably the worst possible insult for a historian.[61] Their tribe is in fact far worse than that of the poets, who do not claim to tell the truth but nonetheless offer it to the reader with intelligence.[62]

Strabo's nuanced opinion of Homer as a truthful mythographer seems to have held for other poets as well, first and foremost for Hesiod. On the whole, Strabo seems to assume that Hesiod and Homer inhabited roughly the same world, so that their accounts are more or less in accord with each other. The poets, for instance, agree on the age-old connection between the Pelasgi and Dodona, and are the oldest sources on the Arabians.[63] A more telling indication for the agreement attributed to them can be

---

[59] Cf. e.g. 1.2.8–9, 1.2.19.

[60] Str. 11.6.3: 'For, seeing that those who were professedly writers of myth enjoyed repute (τοὺς φανερῶς μυθογράφους εὐδοκιμοῦντας), they [the fake historians] thought that they too would make their writings pleasing (ἥδεῖαν) if they told in the guise of history (ἐν ἱστορίας σχήματι) what they had never seen, nor even heard—or at least not from persons who knew the facts—with this object alone in view, to tell what afforded their hearers pleasure and amazement (ἥδεῖαν καὶ θαυμαστήν). One could more easily believe (ἄν … πιστεύσειεν) Hesiod and Homer in their stories of the heroes (ἡρωολογοῦσι), or the tragic poets, than Ctesias, Herodotus, Hellanicus, and other writers of this kind…'.

[61] Plutarch too accused Herodotus of μυθολογία, *Mor*. 857E; he corrects Herodotus' account of Heracles with the aid of the poets (this time Hesiod and Homer and the lyricists).

[62] See also Lucian's *Verae Historiae* for critique of the 'sensationalist and mendacious historians' (Georgiadou 1998 2), a critique that appears to date back several centuries. Strabo, for instance, makes mention of the fourth-century historian Ephorus, who wrote about the Scythians in a book called *Europe*; for information on this people he had to rely in part on the testimonies of Hesiod and Homer, since his colleagues focused only on the Scythians' negative qualities and had no eye for anything else: 'the other writers, he [Ephorus] says, tell only about their savagery, because they know that the terrible and the marvelous are startling (εἰδότες τὸ δεινόν τε καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐκπληκτικὸν ὄν, 7.3.9).'

[63] Str. 7.7.9, 1.2.34.

found in a passage from book nine, where Strabo criticizes Zenodotus, the Alexandrian scholar and first editor of Homer, for changing 'Arne' in *Iliad* 2.507 to 'Ascre':

> Ζηνόδοτος δέ, γράφων 'οἳ δὲ πολυστάφυλον Ἄσκρην ἔχον', οὐκ ἔοικεν ἐντυχόντι τοῖς ὑπὸ Ἡσιόδου περὶ τῆς πατρίδος λεχθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ὑπ' Εὐδόξου, πολὺ χείρω λέγοντος περὶ τῆς Ἄσκρης. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις πολυστάφυλον τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ λέγεσθαι πιστεύσειεν;
>
> 'Zenodotus, who writes 'and those who possessed Ascre rich in vineyards', seems not to have read the statements of Hesiod concerning his native land,[64] nor those of Eudoxus, who says much worse things concerning Ascre. For how could anyone believe that such a place was called 'rich in vineyards' by the poet?'[65]

Since Hesiod can fairly be trusted to have described his own country correctly, the argument goes, Homer could never have meant Ascre. It is natural for Strabo to regard both poets as harmonized; hence the critique on Zenodotus.

It is this view of the poets that allows Strabo to employ the combination of Hesiod and Homer as an argument against scholars harping on Homer's ignorance and the implausibility of his tales. Such charges against Homer, Strabo feels, could be averted by showing that they would not hold against Hesiod either. In one passage Strabo turns against the second-century BC historian Apollodorus, who believes that all the poets, Homer first of all, blend myth and history because they are ignorant of the facts; Strabo, however, believes they are not ignorant but rather tell their story in the guise of a myth (ἐν μύθου σχήματι):

> καθάπερ καὶ τῶν παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ προφέρει ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος οὐδ' ὃν τρόπον παρατίθησι τοῖς Ὁμήρου ταῦτα εἰδώς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ Ὁμήρου τὰ περὶ τὸν Πόντον καὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον παρατίθησιν ἄγνοιαν αἰτιώμενος, ὡς λέγειν μὲν τὰ ὄντα βουλομένου, μὴ λέγοντος δὲ τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα κατ' ἄγνοιαν. Ἡσιόδου δ' οὐκ ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο ἄγνοιαν, Ἡμίκυνας λέγοντος καὶ Μακροκεφάλους καὶ Πυγμαίους· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ Ὁμήρου τ⟨οι⟩αῦτα μυθεύοντος, ὧν εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι οἱ Πυγμαῖοι, οὐδ' Ἀλκμᾶνος Στεγανόποδας ἱστοροῦντος, οὐδ' Αἰσχύλου Κυνοκεφάλους καὶ Στερνοφθάλμους καὶ Μονομμάτους …

[64] Hesiod's description of his own country ('evil in winter, distressful in summer, not ever fine', *WD* 640) was famous in antiquity.

[65] Str. 9.2.35; 'the poet' is, as usually in Strabo, Homer. There are numerous attempts in the scholia to establish the Homeric text by adducing parallels from Hesiod, cf. e.g. Σ *Il.* 2.496a1 (A) (referring to Hes. fr. 181 MW).

> 'And the same is true of the stories that Apollodorus cites from Hesiod and the other poets without even realising in what way he is comparing them with the stories in Homer. For he compares them with what Homer says about the Pontus and Egypt and charges him with ignorance, on the ground that, though he wanted to tell the truth, he did not do so, but in his ignorance stated as true what was not true. Yet no one could charge Hesiod with ignorance when he speaks of 'Half-doggers', of 'Big-Heads' and of 'Pygmies'; no more should one charge Homer with ignorance when he tells such mythical stories of his, one of which is that of these very Pygmies; nor Alcman when he tells about 'Web-footers'; nor Aeschylus when he speaks of 'Dog-Headers' or of 'Breast-Eyers', or of 'One-Eyes' . . .'[66]

In this passage, probably referring to Apollodorus' critique of Homer's ignorance concerning the workings of the Nile,[67] Strabo makes the point that Hesiod, who is supposedly more knowledgeable about the world than Homer, still included pygmies and half-dog people and the like in his poems. Such fantastic elements, which represent the obviously untrue material making up the *mythos* of poetry, are put in *on purpose*, Strabo argues, to comply with the generic rules of poetry, and not out of ignorance. Similarly, the argument goes, Homer should not be called ignorant when his words do not always agree with (historical) reality; in such passages, we must assume that he is merely satisfying the mythographic demands of poetry. It is wrong to charge Homer with ignorance but let Hesiod off the hook when they both tell tales of pygmies, for the poets are the same in this respect. Apollodorus, then, does not understand the consequences of his own comparison: comparing Homer with Hesiod will result in acquitting them both of ignorance.

Apollodorus' strategy for undermining the credibility of Homer (making him less knowledgeable and more 'mythographic' than Hesiod and the other poets) resembles that of Eratosthenes, who also attempts to

---

[66] Str. 1.2.35 (transl. slightly altered); all the references, except the one to Homer (who speaks of Pygmies in *Il.* 3.6) are to now lost works (Hesiod fr. 153 MW; Alcman PMGF 148; Aeschylus TGF 3.431, 441, and 434a).

[67] Cf. Str. 7.3.6: 'But this ignorance [concerning the flooding of the Nile and comparable geographical particulars of Arabia and Ethiopia, attributed to Homer by Eratosthenes] in Homer's case is not amazing, for those who have lived later than he have been ignorant of many things and have invented marvellous tales (πολλὰ ἀγνοεῖν καὶ τερατολογεῖν): Hesiod, when he speaks of 'Half-doggers', of 'Big-Heads' and of 'Pygmies'; and Alcman, when he speaks of 'Web-footers' . . .'. Ancient historians were generally concerned about the limits of Homer's knowledge; so much so, in fact, that they wondered whether he knew about the things he did not write about (see Schenkeveld 1976 53–54).

bring down Homer by contrasting him with a (supposedly) more knowledgeable Hesiod. In one passage explaining Homer's occasionally indeterminate references to locations, Strabo says:

> … οὔτε γὰρ τὸν ποιητὴν ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα πυθέσθαι οὔθ' ἡμεῖς παρ' ἐκείνου ζητοῦμεν τὸ ἀκριβές· οὐ μὴν οὐδ' οὕτως ἔχομεν ὡς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ μηδὲν πεπυσμένον περὶ τῆς πλάνης, μήθ' ὅπου μήθ' ὅπως γεγένηται, ῥαψῳδεῖν. Ἐρατοσθένης δὲ Ἡσίοδον μὲν εἰκάζει πεπυσμένον περὶ τῆς Ὀδυσσέως πλάνης, ὅτι κατὰ Σικελίαν καὶ Ἰταλίαν γεγένηται, πιστεύσαντα τῇ δόξῃ ταύτῃ μὴ μόνον τῶν ὑφ' Ὁμήρου λεγομένων μεμνῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ Αἴτνης καὶ Ὀρτυγίας, τοῦ πρὸς Συρακούσαις νησίου, καὶ Τυρρηνῶν, Ὅμηρον δὲ μήτε εἰδέναι ταῦτα μήτε βούλεσθαι ἐν γνωρίμοις τόποις ποιεῖν τὴν πλάνην. πότερον οὖν Αἴτνη μὲν καὶ Τυρρηνία γνώριμα, Σκύλλαιον δὲ καὶ Χάρυβδις καὶ Κίρκαιον καὶ Σειρηνοῦσσαι οὐ πάνυ; καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ μὲν ἔπρεπε μὴ φλυαρεῖν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς κατεχούσαις δόξαις ἀκολουθεῖν, Ὁμήρῳ δὲ 'πᾶν, ὅ τι κὲν ἐπ' ἀκαιρίμαν γλῶσσαν ἴῃ, κελαδεῖν;'
>
> '… for we do not demand of the poet [Homer] that he should have inquired accurately into every detail, nor do we in our School[68] demand scientific accuracy in his statements; yet, even so, we surely are not entitled to assume that Homer composed the story of the wanderings without any inquiry at all, either as to where or as to how they occurred. But Eratosthenes conjectures that Hesiod learned by inquiry that the scene of the wanderings of Odysseus lay in the region of Sicily and Italy, and, adopting this belief, mentioned not only the places spoken of by Homer, but also Aetna, Ortygia (the little island next to Syracuse), and Tyrrhenia; but he [Eratosthenes] contends that Homer knew nothing about these places and had no intention of placing the wanderings in any known regions. Now, were Aetna and Tyrrhenia well-known places, but Scyllaeum, Charybdis, Circaeum, and the Sirenussae wholly unknown? Was it the proper thing for Hesiod not to talk nonsense and to follow prevailing opinions, but the proper thing for Homer to 'give utterance to every thought that comes to his inopportune tongue'?'[69]

Eratosthenes too apparently believed that Hesiod had a greater knowledge of geographical particulars than Homer.[70] Exactly why Eratosthenes thus preferred Hesiod over Homer is a matter of speculation,[71] but it is

[68] Strabo is talking of the Stoics.

[69] Str. 1.2.13–14.

[70] Cf. Str. 1.2.22: 'But, persisting in his false assumptions [about the winds being only two in total], Eratosthenes says that Homer does not even know that there are several mouths of the Nile, nor yet does he know the real name of the river, though Hesiod knows, for he mentions it.'

[71] He may have supposed Hesiod lived at a later date (cf. n.67 above), but it could

at least certain that he employed the alleged difference between them as a tool to attack Homer for his *mythologia*. Strabo tries to avert this attack by again pointing out how absurd it is to apply different standards to Hesiod on the one hand and to Homer on the other. In their geographical descriptions, just as in the rest of their poetry, they *both* mix fact with fantasy; it is ridiculous to assume that Hesiod never talks nonsense, but Homer is constantly lying.

It is fair to deduce from the evidence discussed above, however slight it may be, that separating Homer from Hesiod was part of the ancient historian's strategy to disqualify the former as a historian. Both Apollodorus and Eratosthenes recognize that Hesiod's geographical knowledge is more extensive than Homer's, and use it to demolish his aura of omniscience. Strabo responds to the attack on his hero by 'lumping' Hesiod and Homer back together: they inhabited and knew roughly the same world, and in wholly similar fashion blended myth and history together. Even though Strabo thinks that 'generally speaking, it is wrong to place the poetry of Homer on the same level with that of other poets',[72] he is willing to make an exception for Hesiod.

3. *Conclusion*

Throughout antiquity both Hesiod and Homer were regarded as great philosophers who were the first to speculate on nature and being. Despite their comparable status, however, they are never presented as sharing the same philosophical doctrines or propagating similar theories. This is a highly remarkable fact (especially so when seen against the poets' far-reaching unity in the field of ethics and education), but it agrees very well with the observation (made in chapters 6 and 9) that the Greeks attributed incompatible or even contradictory philosophical notions to Hesiod and Homer. Whereas it is practically impossible for the age-old system of *paideia* to differentiate between the traditional pillars of education, philosophy could: the philosophers adopted a more critical

---

also be that the Alexandrian poet and physiologist felt more inclined toward the 'natural philosopher' Hesiod (see further ch. 6, esp. pp. 190–200); perhaps he also wrote a poem on Hesiod (see Fraser 1972 902 n.200).

[72] Str. 1.2.20: τὸ δ' ὅλον οὐκ εὖ τὸ τὴν Ὁμήρου ποίησιν εἰς ἓν συνάγειν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν. Interestingly enough, the 'other poets' Strabo mentions are tragedians, i.e. Sophocles and Euripides.

and selective stance towards their sources, and often set Hesiod against Homer. Their combination in any but the most superficial way was hence problematic.

On the other hand, the connection between Hesiod and Homer as 'encyclopaedic figures' was very strong: the poets together are generally credited with a vast scope and great knowledge, and are furthermore believed to know roughly the same things. As such, they are often set against other sources of factual information and seem to form a separate and exclusive category of their own; this can be deduced from the classifying lists of Hippias and especially Protagoras, and the frequency of formulations like 'Homer and Hesiod and the other poets'.

It is obvious that with the exclusive category comes a *status aparte* where their knowledge is concerned. For instance, what is told by Hesiod and Homer is regarded as more respectable and trustworthy than the tales of other poets, especially the tragedians. Since it was easier to 'contextualize' the tragic poets than the enshrined poets of a hallowed age, the information in their poems was far more easily attacked as imperfect, deviant or partial. We have also seen that the special status of Hesiod and Homer extended beyond the poetic genre: they were sometimes ranked among historians, and even though the historians themselves tended to heap all poets together as unreliable mythographers, they were nonetheless particularly concerned with the authority of Hesiod and (especially) Homer. Strabo reinvigorated the age-old idea that Hesiod and Homer belong together in order to exonerate Homer from charges of ignorance and fantasy; in so doing, he turned both Hesiod and Homer into poets who combined historical accuracy with poetic embellishment.

PART TWO

THE 'REAL' HESIOD

CHAPTER FOUR

INTRODUCTION: SEARCHING FOR HESIOD

0. *Introduction*

In the first Part we have seen how the *locus* or *lieu* Hesiod was informed and defined by the combination with Homer: when presented together with the other poet, Hesiod appeared as a religious authority, an ancient lawgiver, an author belonging to a special category, and a reliable storekeeper of knowledge. It is the purpose of the second Part to demonstrate that these characteristics do indeed derive (at least to a considerable degree) from the combination itself; for Hesiod alone, i.e. without Homer in the immediate context as either friend or foil, is a different Hesiod. This can be seen in chapter 5, which deals with Hesiodic ethics, and especially chapter 6, which focuses on Hesiod's qualities as a philosopher. These chapters will show that Hesiod could be employed in texts as far more than Homer's sidekick. There was a Hesiod without Homer as well; and this chapter is concerned with the ways he was constructed.

The title of the second Part is *The 'Real' Hesiod*. The inverted commas are there for two reasons. The first and most obvious one is that I am not looking for *das Hesiodische in den Werken Hesiods*, trying to single out *das spezifisch Hesiodische*.[1] It is not Hesiod himself I am primarily interested in, but his reception by others. This relieves me from the virtually impossible task of finding criteria for determining what is specifically Hesiodic in the works of Hesiod, and allows me to adopt the fairly straightforward method of looking for Hesiod in texts where Homer is not mentioned, in order to find out what the ancients *believed* was specifically Hesiodic. But there is still one *caveat* here, and that is the second reason for the inverted commas: I am sure that in the end we must accept that even where the reception of Hesiod is concerned, there is no 'real' Hesiod, in the sense of an 'independent' Hesiod that is wholly Homer-free. For even when Homer is not mentioned explicitly,

[1] Von Fritz (1962).

he lurks in the background as a determining factor, claiming areas of expertise and monopolizing themes that thus cannot be associated with Hesiod. This is also why we will meet Homer from time to time in this Part; Hesiod, it seems, is never really alone.

Of course this 'Homeric' influence is only one of the factors determining the ancient construction of Hesiod. In this chapter I will investigate six of these 'mechanisms of memory', which I deduced from the many references to Hesiod in antiquity, in an attempt to address Confino's important question of *why* certain parts of the past are received and others rejected:[2] the practice of assimilation (2.1), the catchword-factor (2.2), the principle of snowballing (2.3), the principle of clustering (2.4), the Homeric factor (2.5), and the persona's paradox (2.6). We will begin our search, however, with a body of texts most directly tied to the construction of Hesiod: the biographical tradition. Understanding Hesiod's *vita* (as a construct) is essential for understanding the reception of his poems, since a writer's life and his work were in antiquity regarded as mutually informative, which entails that 'the figure of the author is (...) a means of circumscribing interpretive possibilities.'[3]

1. *The Biographical Tradition*

The biographical tradition concerning the Greek poets is a good place to start looking for the way they were imagined, as 'virtually all the material in all the lives is fiction'.[4] The fantastic nature of the lives is partly due to the scarcity of reliable information, which has caused ancient 'biographers' to scrutinize the poet's works for biographical clues and then speculate and extrapolate at will. This recourse to fancy, however, is somewhat uncalled for in the case of Hesiod, who is very explicit about some of the particulars of his life. That this is highly exceptional for a poet that old has been noted by many scholars,[5] but was also felt by the ancients themselves, who regarded the very tangibility of Hesiod as a Hesiodic quality: the clarity of Hesiod's background was often contrasted

[2] Confino (1997) 1390; see Introduction, pp. 6–7 and 9–13.

[3] Too (1998) 133.

[4] Lefkowitz (1981) viii (and the introduction in general). The chapter on Hesiod is a thorough collection of all the material concerning Hesiod's 'life'; I will discuss only the most relevant points here.

[5] See ch. 1 (pp. 31–32 and 38–39) for the scholarly appreciation of Hesiod's autobiographical remarks.

to the obscurity surrounding Homer, especially with respect to origins and whereabouts: Hesiod tells us where he was born, where he lived, where he travelled—but we know nothing like that of Homer.[6]

Apart from his origin and place of residence, Hesiod tells us more about himself in his poems. Two of these autobiographical remarks were taken very seriously and became inextricable parts of the Hesiodic *persona*:[7] his victory in the funeral games of Amphidamas (*WD* 646–662), which formed the basis of the well-known story of Hesiod having beaten Homer in a poetry contest; and his meeting with the Muses on Mount Helicon (*Theogony* 22–34), which started off the long and complicated tradition of Hesiod's inspiration.[8] It is especially the tale of how Hesiod became a singer—perhaps a conscious attempt of the poet (or the tradition of poets) to influence his own reputation[9]—that established his undying image of the ragged old shepherd turned venerable poet.[10] The archetype of the pitiful peasant delivered by the gods from ignorance and pettiness firmly rooted itself both in ancient reception and modern scholarship.[11] Nonetheless, to say that 'the persona of the shepherd poet, the peasant, so dominates the tradition's perception of the Hesiodic corpus that it is the *Works and Days* rather than the *Theogony* that has seemed the essential Hesiod' would be an exaggeration,[12] not least because the story of Hesiod's initiation is told in the proem of the latter poem, and not in the *Works and Days*. In my opinion, one should rather say that

[6] For the opposition e.g. *Cert.* 1–17 (Allen), Str. 13.3.6, Velleius Paterculus 1.7.1.

[7] The fifth important autobiographical datum, Hesiod's quarrel with his brother Perses, is the only clue not further pursued by the ancients (the only reference I could find is Plu. *Mor.* 480E)—perhaps because there were other, more powerful examples of (brotherly) strife to be gotten from mythology; or perhaps the ancients generally believed, much as modern scholars do today, that the quarrel with Perses was a fiction useful to Hesiod's purpose; see e.g. Σ *WD* 27a: 'The whole business with Perses must be understood either as historically true or as fictitious and hypothetical, because that would make his argument look better' (τα κατὰ τὸν Πέρσην, ἤτοι ἱστορικῶς ἐκληπτεὸν ἢ πλασματικῶς καὶ ὑποθετικῶς διὰ τὸ εὐπρόσωπον τοῦ λόγου).

[8] On which see ch. 9.2, pp. 319–332.

[9] Lang and Lang (1990) 319–326 describe the artist's own efforts as one of the four factors shaping his reputation; cf. Introduction, p. 6 n.17.

[10] See e.g. [Virgil] *Culex* 96; D.Chr. 2.8; Lucian *Hes.* 7, *Ind.* 3; there is an elaborate discussion of the *Dichterweihe* in ch. 9, esp. pp. 300–304. According to Wilamowitz (1916a) 472 the inspiration-scene is the 'Echteste des Echten' from the *Th.*'s otherwise heavily corrupted proem.

[11] See e.g. Snell (1982) 298, describing Hesiod 'as a true herdsman'; Hesiod is obviously the default interpretation of the statue of a peasant-poet for Zanker (1995). See for further qualifications of Hesiod as a peasant ch. 8, pp. 270–284.

[12] Lamberton (1988) 38.

the inspiration-scene in the *Theogony* has caused both ancient Greeks and modern scholars (either consciously or not) to believe a) that the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* were by the same poet;[13] and b) that the *Theogony* was earlier than the *Works and Days*.[14]

I submit that the obvious difference between Homer's obscure background and Hesiod's autobiographical candour is one of the main reasons behind the curious fact that the ancients generally regarded Homer as θεῖος but never understood Hesiod as such. Homer and his verses are called 'divine' from the times of Pindar to those of Philostratus, by fans as well as critics, and in both Greek and Roman writings;[15] and the mystery surrounding him only added to his status.[16] See, for instance, how Dio connects Homer's lack of self-reference to his divine nature: 'Homer by contrast [to authors mentioning themselves] was so liberal and magnanimous that nowhere in his poetry will he be found to refer to himself, but in fact, like the prophets of the gods, he speaks, as it were, from the invisible, from somewhere in the inmost sanctuary'.[17] Several laudatory epigrams suggest Homer's indeterminability points to a divine origin.[18]

---

[13] The fact that Hesiod features in one poem as a shepherd and as a farmer in the other has (to my knowledge) never upset anyone, either ancient Greek or modern scholar (Haubold 2010 15–19 is one of the very few scholars noting and discussing the difference); apparently, these professions are (taken to be) so alike that they rather seem to connect the two poems. The significance of the oft-mentioned remark by Pausanias (9.31.4) that the Boeotians living around Helicon believed only the *WD* was authentic should probably be downplayed since the *Th*. is referred to on the so-called Helicon-stèle (see Hurst 1996 62–63).

[14] See e.g. Σ on *WD* prol. B (and for an alternative sequence in antiquity P. Oxy. 3537 = Most T95). It is the modern *communis opinio*, although the arguments for this case are weak (see ch. 8, pp. 276–277).

[15] See e.g. Pi. *Isthm*. 3.55, Philostr. *Her*. 43.5, Hermesian. fr. 7.28 Powell (calling Homer the ἥδιστον πάντων δαίμονα μουσοπόλων, the 'sweetest divinity among all poets'), Pl. *Phd*. 95a, Fronto 2.67. The (short) inscription on Homer's grave in Ios also calls him θεῖος (see e.g. *Cert*. 338 Allen), and so, notably, does the inscription on the bronze tripod that Hesiod dedicated to the Muses to celebrate his victory over Homer (*Cert*. 214 Allen). See Skiadas (1965) 63–75 for more places where Homer is called 'divine' (esp. in Greek epigram). See Pinkwart (1965) 169–173 on the evidence for *Homerkult* and Clay (2004) 74–76 and 87–89 for 'Panhellenic' (75) cults of Homer, which sometimes resemble those of gods rather than those of heroes.

[16] Cf. Zeitlin (2001) 204.

[17] D.Chrys. *Or*. 53.10: ὁ δὲ οὕτως ἄρα ἐλευθέριος ἦν καὶ μεγαλόφρων ὥστε οὐδαμοῦ φανήσεται τῆς ποιήσεως αὐτοῦ μεμνημένος, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὥσπερ οἱ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν ἐξ ἀφανοῦς καὶ ἀδύτου ποθὲν φθεγγόμενος. Cf. Hesychius on the life of Homer (Suda 3.525.10–11).

[18] See *AP* 16.293 (cf. 9.455), 16.295, 16.296, 16.301. See on Homer's anonymity also D.Chrys. *Or*. 36.10–13.

Hesiod, on the other hand, was never called divine in classical times,[19] and the Greeks apparently remained reluctant to do so throughout antiquity.[20] One can easily think of several factors contributing to this glaring contrast with Homer: Hesiod's reputedly human descent,[21] his own very infrequent use of the term θεῖος, the history of the formation of the Hesiodic and Homeric *corpus*,[22] and the subject matter of their poems.[23] Still, I would suggest that it is mostly Hesiod's 'tangibility', which derives from his openness in referring to himself, that has made him—his divine inspiration and extraordinary knowledge notwithstanding—more 'human and close to us' (ἀνθρώπινον καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς).[24]

But this is not the whole story. For even though we should conclude that Hesiod was considered too human to be truly divine, he was surely more than a mere mortal. Despite the poet's own efforts to create his own persona, Hesiod's *vita* is only in part based on the supposedly autobiographical remarks in the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*. The legend of Hesiod depends for the other part on stories (related elsewhere)

---

[19] Graziosi (2002) 107 n.47.

[20] Plu. *Mor*. 431E is the only place I could find where Hesiod is called θεῖος (interestingly enough, Hesiod is here cited on demons, on which see ch. 5, pp. 165–172). See e.g. Galen 10.7 Kühn and Lucian *Salt*. 24 for passages where Hesiod comes close to divinity.

[21] Hesiod addressing his brother with δῖον γένος (*WD* 299) may have given rise to the belief (perhaps already present in Pl. *Ti*. 40e) that Hesiod descended from Zeus. Others conjectured at the same time that Hesiod's father was named Dius (see West 1978 ad loc.). Modern scholars generally take δῖον γένος as an indication of nobility (and an exhortation to Perses to live up to the demands of his lineage); according to Marsilio (2000) 27 the phrase is ironical and meant to remind Perses to live according to the rules of Zeus.

[22] According to Allen (1915) 86–87 tradition represented Homer and his work 'as one and indivisible', which contributes to its divinely perfect status, while 'the authorised view of Hesiod from the beginning was that the verses were not homogeneous' (87). Allen is surely exaggerating, since there was in fact great uncertainty about the authenticity of the Homeric poems, that lasted till well into the fourth century BC (cf. e.g. Notopoulos 1964 18–45 discussing Homer's role in the context of the cycle, Nagy 1992a36–37, Graziosi 2002 53). Nonetheless, the question was definitely settled around 350 BC ('the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* only'), whereas the debate on the limits of the Hesiodic corpus never ceased to continue (Pausanias for instance voices serious doubt even about his authorship of the *Th*., see 8.18.1, 9.27.2, 9.31.4–5, and 9.35.5). See on the ancient view of the Hesiodic corpus Cingano 2009 (esp. pp. 91–98); particularly relevant here is his remark that among the many archaic poems attributed to Hesiod and Homer only one is attributed to both (the *Kerameis*, Cingano p. 94).

[23] Clay (2003) 72 sums it up nicely when she says that Hesiod in the *WD* does not sing of things 'far beyond the normal ken of mortals'.

[24] Plu. *Mor*. 162C.

that deal with events beyond the 'life' in the strictest sense, i.e. his violent death and the fate of his body. These seem to have turned Hesiod into a superhuman or heroic figure.

The general outline of the story is the following:[25] when Hesiod was travelling through Locrian territory, he was murdered by his hosts when they found out he was sleeping with their sister. His body was cast into the sea, but brought back to the shore by dolphins.[26] The murderers were found (through the persistent barking of a dog, says Plutarch) and punished, by Zeus according to one version, by their fellow-citizens according to another. Hesiod was buried in Locris, but in order to ward off a plague his bones were transported by order of an oracle to Boeotian Orchomenus, where they were still on display in Pausanias' days.[27]

The story contains so much that suggests a heroic status that Brelich concluded that 'Hesiodos ha assunto quasi completamente la forma tradizionale dell'eroe.'[28] First, there is the violent death, which in itself could already be an indication of his status as a hero.[29] Moreover, Thucydides (3.95–96) tells us Hesiod's death was predicted by an oracle and thus divinely ordained. Second, there is the seduction of the hosts' sister. This supposedly 'sordid'[30] particular of Hesiod's life, which has always been problematic to modern scholars because of its incompatibility with Hesiod's otherwise blameless reputation,[31] is probably another sign of his

[25] See for the several versions and more details of this story Lefkowitz (1981) 4–7.

[26] Plutarch had trouble picturing this kind of transport and imagined that there were several groups of dolphins, each passing on the body of Hesiod to another group (*Mor.* 984D).

[27] Paus. 9.38.3–4; Lefkowitz (1981) 10.

[28] Brelich 1953 (321), cf. 322 'il poeta rientra perfettamente nella morfologia caratteristica dell'eroe'; he is followed by Nagy (1979) 296; see also Nagy (2009) 304–310 on Hesiod as a cult hero. Nilsson (1906) 383–384 suggests that the story may be an aetiological myth for the ritual in a Locrian Ariadne-festival.

[29] See Chroust (1973) 181 'a 'hero' or human benefactor is not supposed to die a natural or peaceful death'; cf. Burkert (1983) 39 'a slain man is easily made into a hero or even a god, precisely because of his horrible end'. It is usually the function of such a death to remove 'all possibility of envy, human or divine, incurred in life by the poet as the result of his superior knowledge' (Lefkowitz 1981 3). Graziosi (2002) 154 remarks that Homer 'resembles a god rather than a hero' because his biography focuses on his birth (like hymns and other tales about the gods) and not on his death, as is usual in the case of heroes.

[30] Scodel (1980) 304; see further ch. 7, pp. 254–256.

[31] The problem was felt in antiquity as well; in Eratosthenes' poem on Hesiod (see fr. 17–21 Powell) it was not the poet but his travel companion Demodes who seduced the girl, cf. Hiller (1872) 82 (= *Cert.* 240–247 Allen) and Paus. 9.31.6 ('some say that the deed was Hesiod's, and others that Hesiod was wrongly thought guilty of another's crime').

heroic status. According to Brelich, there is usually something 'mostruoso' about heroes, which manifests itself in physical appearance (e.g. theriomorphism, gigantism) but also in 'caratteri moralmente 'indegni' di un 'ideale'.'[32] Heroes often suffer from an abnormally great sexual appetite, which causes them to transcend limits and enter 'contatti illeciti'.[33] I thus submit that the origins of the seduction-story should be sought in a heroic context rather than in folklore or in the *Works and Days* itself.[34]

Third and finally, there is perhaps the most strongly 'heroic' trait of Hesiod's *vita*: the transportation of his body by dolphins, providing the combination of divine support with events of violence that is typical for the life of the hero as well. The Greeks told several stories about people riding dolphins, and they all enjoyed heroic status.[35] The closest parallel is the tale of Melicertes, who is the only other person carried by dolphins while already dead.[36] In all these cases, the curious behaviour of the animals is a sure sign of divine intervention; in the case of Hesiod in particular, the gods feel offended by the death of their servant and take steps to reward the poet and punish the wrongdoers.[37]

I am sure Hesiod's posthumous dolphin-ride can help to explain another intriguing aspect of the 'life' that has always riddled scholars

---

[32] Brelich (1953) 232. See his pages 233–248 for examples of physical aberration of heroes, and 248–268 for anomalous character traits. Brelich sees another monstruous aspect of Hesiod in the story (related by Ephorus fr. 169 FHG) that his father had to flee his native country because he had killed a relative (321).

[33] Brelich (1953) 253.

[34] So Hess (1960) 47 claiming that the 'Interesse am Skandalösen' is typical for 'volkstümliche Legenden'; the connection suggested by Lefkowitz (1981) 4 to *WD* 270–274 is very tenuous.

[35] See Bowra (1963), who mentions Telemachus, Coeranus of Paros, Enalus of Lesbos, Melicertes of Corinth and Taras of Tarentum. Bowra suggests that the heroes are 'in some sense substitutes' (132) for Poseidon. See also Burkert (1983) 203–204 connecting Hesiod's death to Poseidon.

[36] After the dolphins carried him to the Isthmus, he was buried by the ruler of Corinth, who afterwards celebrated the first Isthmian Games. Melicertes received heroic honours and became the marine deity Palaemon (cf. Phld. *Epigr.* 34 Sider (= *AP* 6.349) addressing Melicertes as a δαῖμον ἀλεξίκακε).

[37] Compare the gods' anger at the death of the hero Archilochus (see e.g. Plu. *Mor.* 560E, D.Chrys. *Or.* 3.11–12, Suda 1.376, and most notably Plu. *Num.* 4.6.3 comparing Archilochus and Hesiod because they were both honoured after death by 'the demon', ἀπέδωκε δέ τινα τιμὴν καὶ Ἀρχιλόχῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ διὰ τὰς Μούσας τὸ δαιμόνιον) and the cranes pointing at the murderers of the poet Ibycus (see *AP* 7.745, Suda 1.80). Hess (1960) 47–48 rightly remarks that we should not take the gods' protection as a sign of the poet's innocence.

and is not yet fully understood: the ancient belief that Hesiod flourished twice. An epigram attributed to Pindar[38] greets Hesiod with the words χαῖρε δὶς ἡβήσας καὶ δὶς τάφου ἀντιβολήσας ('hail, you who were young twice, and twice received a tomb'). Several explanations have in the past been put forward, but none very convincing: perhaps someone feigned that Hesiod had lived twice, or it may refer to Hesiod siring the poets Mnaseas when he was young and Stesichorus when he was (very) old; maybe it meant that Hesiod had undergone a spiritual rejuvenation by the Muses, or that the second life refers to his poetic fame.[39] Scodel improved greatly upon these unsatisfactory theories by arguing convincingly that there existed a tradition of Hesiod having made a shaman-like return from the dead, comparing him to similarly catabatic figures like Orpheus, Pythagoras and Empedocles. It also explains the epigram praising Hesiod's wisdom in particular, for 'nothing is greater proof of wisdom or a more impressive sign of power than a successful catabasis or remembered metempsychosis'.[40]

Scodel is probably right here because Hesiod was certainly thought of as a person with knowledge from the world beyond.[41] The only problem with her argument is that it is largely circumstantial; there are no stories of Hesiod actually descending into the underworld. But perhaps the dolphins can come to the rescue here as well. In myth and ritual, a plunge into the water, the so-called *katapontismos*, usually constitutes 'le moment d'un passage, d'une transformation vers une personnalité plus divine'[42] and could also signify the cathartic movement from life to after-life.[43] I suggest that the story of Hesiod's plunge and subsequent transportation by dolphins is a mythical expression of his death and

[38] *EG* 428. Wilamowitz (1916) 407 n.2 believed it was Pindar's, and Evelyn-White (1920) thought it could be; there is serious doubt in McKay (1959) and scepticism in Scodel (1980).

[39] These suggestions were made by Marckscheffel (1840) 28–29, Evelyn-White (1920) following Wilamowitz, McKay (1959), and Scodel (1980), who offers her poetic-fame hypothesis only to replace it later in the same article by her shaman-theory. I long believed that perhaps 'Pindar' meant to say nothing more than that Hesiod produced two very fine poems.

[40] Scodel (1980) 317. She also points out that Hesiod was the author of a *Catabasis* of Theseus and Peirithous (fr. 280 MW). West (1966) 15–16 shows that theogony was generally associated with seers and wonder-workers.

[41] See for more on Hesiod's wisdom in general ch. 5, pp. 161–164, and on Hesiodic eschatology and demonology in particular pp. 165–172.

[42] Beaulieu (2004) 107; cf. Gallini (1963) 67–68 and Rank (1990) 64.

[43] See Wallace (1999) 196 and 204.

rebirth. Like the dolphin-carried hero Melicertes (on whom see note 35 and 36), Hesiod after this transformative event lived a second life as a hero of great power and especially wisdom.[44]

I believe that the information contained in the anecdotes surrounding Hesiod's death are sufficient proof for his ancient status as a hero. Other indications, such as Hesiod's description of himself as a Μουσάων θεράπων,[45] the inclusion of his statue among those of other heroes on Mount Helicon,[46] the fact that only heroes are said to have 'been young twice',[47] and the care for Hesiod's body described in *AP* 7.55,[48] only further confirm this.[49] It must be said, however, that despite all the evidence for heroization there is no definite (archaeological or literary) proof for a cult for Hesiod.[50] Optimistic claims to the contrary by scholars like Notopoulos, Calame, and others[51] should be mitigated: a cult is very likely, but (so far) not definitely proven.

---

[44] It strikes me as odd that Beaulieu (2004) 114–115 does not remark on the possible connection between Hesiod's plunge and second youth, and in fact explicitly denies (in the face of all Scodel's evidence) that his second youth is somehow tied to knowledge of the other side, preferring the explanation of McKay (1959).

[45] Nagy (1979) 292–293 and (1990) 48 argued that θεράπων originally meant 'ritual substitute' and thus points to a cult hero (cf. the hero Archilochus, who was generally known as a 'θεράπων of the Muses' and received cult worship, cf. Clay 2004 9–38). There was an annual festival of the Muses (*Musaea*) at Helicon, with which Hesiod was probably connected: see further below.

[46] Esp. Thamyris, Arion, and Orpheus (cf. Paus. 9.30.2–4); Homer is conspicuously absent (cf. Hunter 2006 18).

[47] Scodel (1980) 307–308 names Jason, Aeson, Pelops, and Iolaus.

[48] Beaulieu (2004) 116 remarks that the mention of 'goatherds pouring libations of milk mixed with golden honey' (*AP* 7.55.3–4) may refer to the μελίκρατον-offerings made to heroes and chthonian deities.

[49] It may be significant that the asphodel, associated with Hesiod because of *WD* 41, was called the 'hero's plant' (heroion), cf. Plin. *NH* 22.67.

[50] The famous inscription on a Thespian boundary-stone (ὅρος τᾶς γᾶς τᾶς ἱαρᾶς τῶν συνθυτάων τᾶμ / Μωσάων τῶν Εἰσιοδείων) offers nothing conclusive. The inscription should probably be translated 'this is the boundary-stone of the terrain sacred to the Hesiodians who sacrifice together to the Muses' (see e.g. Roesch 1982 162–166), but even if Εἰσιοδείων should go with Μουσάων ('the Hesiodic Muses', so e.g. Hurst 1996 64) there is no mention of a cult for Hesiod.

[51] Notopoulos (1964) 43 suggests (though without direct evidence) that there may have been 'a cult center in Boeotia devoted to the propagation of Hesiodic poetry'; Calame (1996) and others are probably too quick to take the lead tablet inscribed with the *WD* shown to Pausanias (9.31.4) as proof for a cult (see Beaulieu 2004 112). Calame's basic hypothesis that Hesiod's biography 'n'est que la trace langagière du culte rendu au poète héroïsé' (1996 48) is somewhat too simplistic and leads to the assumption of (at least) two different cults (one in Orchomenus, and one on Mt. Helicon, 50–51).

All things considered, it is rather difficult to fully agree with Lefkowitz' concluding remarks on the life of Hesiod as a whole—according to her, 'the events of Hesiod's 'life' are related to his poetry only in distant and general ways'.[52] We have seen, however, that many of Hesiod's autobiographical remarks from both the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* were taken very seriously and thus helped to shape the Hesiodic persona. Besides, the more general picture of Hesiod as a poor shepherd or farmer could generate more specific biographical information, such as when he is turned into the inventor of the obscure *alimon-* or 'no-hunger'-drug, a magical medicine that keeps hunger away.[53] Moreover, and this is most interesting, Hesiod's superhuman qualities proven by his death, burial and possible rebirth are in perfect agreement with a well-attested tradition of the poet as the expert on demons, spirits and the afterlife. Hesiod obviously owes this reputation to his description of the underworld, and especially to his often-quoted words on the afterlife of the men of the Golden Race, who have transformed into demons guarding those alive today.[54] But I hope to have shown that the great authority on demons is himself a hero with similar powers: he has gone to the other side and came back, like the guardian-δαίμονες still 'watches over judgements and cruel deeds' (cf. *WD* 124); and tradition has bestowed a beneficial power to the bones of the very poet who sang that the Men of Gold after their demise are taking care of mortals.

The biographical tradition of Hesiod, then, pictures him as something more human than a god (a description used for Homer) and more godlike than a man (such as a shepherd or farmer). He was regarded as a hero, on account of his special connection to the Muses and his extraordinary wisdom. He was in some way seen as πρὸς ἡμᾶς ('close to us'), a benign spirit who could ward off disaster and advise mankind against evil deeds. It is obvious that much of this heroic image is based on his own work: it can hardly be a coincidence that the relics of the poet typically warning against injustice are the only remedy against a pestilence in Orchomenus, the sort of calamity that Hesiod himself says is a divine punishment for 'evil outrageousness and cruel deeds' (ὕβρις … κακὴ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα, *WD* 238). Nonetheless, it remains impossible to trace the exact development of the relationship between the poems and the *vita*.

---

[52] Lefkowitz (1981) 11.

[53] See Pl. *Lg.* 677e and Plu. *Mor.* 157E–158B.

[54] *WD* 121–126. This tradition is well attested for the age of Plato and probably goes back even further. See ch. 5, pp. 165–172.

2. *The Mechanisms of Memory*

We have seen so far that the biographical tradition, which obviously plays a significant role in the ancient construction of Hesiod, is based to a significant degree on the poems themselves: most autobiographical remarks are taken seriously and are further elaborated, while other passages (like those on the demons and the plague) contribute to the 'life' in a less direct but nonetheless visible way. At the same time, however, some parts of the autobiography (such as the quarrel with Perses) are mostly ignored, and the largest part of Hesiod's poetry is not or only loosely tied to the *vita*. It is thus clear that the 'life' of Hesiod is just as much the product of the mechanisms of cultural memory as the rest of his ancient image.

The second part of this chapter is concerned with a close investigation of these mechanisms, and aims to find an answer to the question of why some passages from the Hesiodic corpus are favoured over others, and why some lines are quoted over and over again while others are wholly forgotten. In other words, I will attempt to specify the mechanisms that cause the 'sacred mountains' and 'profane valleys' of the Hesiodic commemograms printed in the introductory chapter.[55] I have distinguished six of these factors; four of them account for the mountains, i.e. the fact that quotes and references tend to group around certain verses. These have been labeled the practice of assimilation, the catchword-factor, and the principles of snowballing and clustering. The fifth and sixth are factors explaining the valleys, i.e. the fact that whole groups of Hesiodic lines are not or not frequently referred to. These are called the Homeric factor and the persona's paradox.

2.1. *The Practice of Assimilation*

What later authors find (and focus on) in Hesiod is often determined by what they are looking for. Surely, this is an obvious observation, but nonetheless crucial to the understanding of Hesiod's reception (or in fact that of any cultural icon). Later authors tend to reshape Hesiod in their own image. Natural philosophers, for example, are of course mostly interested in Hesiod's theogony, and especially the passages that can be interpreted as referring to cosmic forces and elements; *Theogony* 116–

[55] See Introduction, pp. 20–21.

120 on the birth of Chaos, Earth and Eros is thus very popular with them. Similarly, but more generally, Heraclitus has to turn Hesiod into a philosopher—albeit a failed one—or there would be no point in attacking him.[56] Since the image of Hesiod apparently depends in part on the particular outlook of the recipient, I call this the principle of assimilation: there has to be some common ground between source and recipient, which allows them to become one to some degree.

The practice of assimilation can also explain less clear-cut cases. In order to demonstrate this, I will for the remainder of this subsection focus on the remarkable 'mountains' constituted by the references to the *Works and Days* in the archaic period, and try to find an explanation for them.

The concentrated peaks in question are often connected to Hesiod's misogynist comments on the deceptive and generally harmful nature of women (*Works and Days* 700–705), verses that are referred to by Archilochus (fr. 196a West), Semonides (fr. 6 and 7.110–111 West), Alcaeus (fr. 347 L-P), Theognis (1.851–852 and 965–966) and Phocylides (fr. 2 D). Together, these references make up about a third of all 7th- and 6th-century references to Hesiod. The archaic poets' narrow focus, and the fact that Hesiod's misogynist verses become markedly less popular in later periods, suggest that these references are bound by some common factor; I suggest that we can find it in the archaic poems' performance context and generic affinity.

Before we can look at the recipient poems themselves, however, there are two fundamental objections to my suggestion which I have to address. The first is that the five poets mentioned do not appear to be related by genre: Theognis and Phocylides wrote elegiac poetry, but the works of Archilochus and Semonides are usually categorized as iambic, whereas Alcaeus was a lyric poet. But this conventional separation, I submit, should not deter us from grouping them together. 'Metre alone was not decisive in determining archaic genres', as Fowler says,[57] and it appears that subject matter was not, either.[58] Occasion, however, *was* of great importance, and Bowie argued rather convincingly that most of the

[56] Or perhaps it is better to say that the very fact that Heraclitus attacks Hesiod turns the latter into a philosopher. See ch. 6 on Hesiod's reception by the natural philosophers (pp. 190–200) and Heraclitus (pp. 206–210).

[57] Fowler (1987) 89.

[58] See Fowler (1987) chapter 3 ('Elegy and the Genres of Archaic Greece', 86–103), West (1974) 14–18 on the wide range of elegy's subject matter and Bowie (1986) 13–15 on generic distinctions in the archaic period.

poetry of the poets mentioned could be roughly called sympotic.[59] I follow his argument[60] and situate the references to Hesiod's misogynist remarks in a sympotic context.

The second objection is a pertinent warning by Fowler (and others)[61] against an overly enthusiastic *Quellenforschung* that detects epic reminiscences everywhere in archaic poetry: the use of traditional epic verses, he points out, does not necessarily entail references to Hesiod (or Homer), and certain ideas are more often than not merely commonplaces instead of allusions. Single words cannot be meant to recall whole epic passages, and 'adaptations' of epic phrases belong to a 'Virgilian technique' that is 'inappropriate' for early Greek lyric.[62] Fowler's wise words notwithstanding, I believe the references under discussion can still count as such because 1) it is never just a single word that triggers the reference; 2) the passages recalled are relatively small, i.e. the focus is rather narrow; 3) the references were meant to be recognized as such since quoting from Homer and Hesiod was a popular game at symposia;[63] and 4) the way the reminiscences are adapted to their new context (see further below) makes it very plausible to take Hesiod as a subtext.

With these two crucial objections met, I will now discuss a few of the references to Hesiod's misogyny to explain the 'mountain' around *Works and Days* 700–705. It is convenient to turn to Theognis first, for even though he does not refer to these verses in particular, his reference to Hesiod's misogyny serves as a good example of my approach. One of the recurrent themes in the first book of Theognis' elegies is that of loyalty among friends and the difficulty of finding out if people are

[59] Bowie (1986); he concludes (contra West 1974) that elegiac poetry (which includes Archilochus, Semonides and Alcaeus) 'in its shorter form was so closely associated with the symposium that no clear evidence remains to attest any other context of performance' (34).

[60] Bowie (1986) distinguishes between the shorter poems, meant for performance at symposia, and the longer ones that were performed at public festivals. Of our five poets only Semonides wrote such a long one, a story on the foundation and early history of Samos, and it is very unlikely that fr. 7.110 was part of that poem.

[61] So already Davison (1955b) 139–140.

[62] Fowler (1987) 8–9. This is why he disqualifies the fragments of Archilochus and Semonides as references (30–31); it is unclear to me, however, why then the Alcaeus-fragment is 'undoubtedly an imitation' (37). He does not mention the other references, maybe because he believes that 'by the time we reach Anacreon and Simonides, the lyric genres have come into their own and their debt to epic is virtually non-existent' (50).

[63] See DuPont (1999) 'a symposium (. . .) particularly welcomed citations' (35, cf. 84–85).

really to be trusted or not.[64] In 1.965–966 he says that 'many indeed have a false, thievish character / and keep it hidden, taking on an attitude appropriate to the day' (πολλοί τοι κίβδηλον **ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος** ἔχοντες / κρύπτουσ', **ἐνθέμενοι** θυμὸν ἐφημέριον). This, in my view, is a clear reference to *Works and Days* 67, where Hesiod tells how Hermes was ordered 'to give [Pandora] a doggish mind and a thievish character' (**ἐν δὲ θέμεν** κύνεόν τε νόον καὶ **ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος**). There are several words here, not just one, triggering the reference; moreover, the passage referred to is both well-known and recalled in a general way, so there is no question of a 'Virgilian' alertness supposed in the audience. And lastly, the relevance of the Hesiodic line to the new context is so pertinent that a conscious adaptation is obvious: it makes excellent sense to compare the pleasant exterior and deceptive interior of people with the prime example of outward beauty covering inner evil, Pandora. Incidentally, there is another passage in Theognis equating the deception of friends with the behaviour typical of womankind, which also refers to Hesiod.[65]

I will turn now to *Works and Days* 700–705, which the archaic poets understood as a comment not on woman's deceitful nature but on her lustfulness. In the Hesiodic passage, Perses is advised to be careful in choosing a bride, 'lest your marriage cause your neighbors merriment' (μὴ **γείτοσι χάρματα** γήμῃς); there is nothing better than a good wife, but a bad one 'singes her husband without a torch' (ἄνδρα … εὖει ἄτερ δαλοῖο). Semonides (who also refers to *Works and Days* 702–703 in fr. 6) picks up the warning of the laughing neighbours in fr. 7.108–111: 'I tell you, the woman who seems most respectable, she's the very one who commits the greatest outrage. For while her husband stands open-mouthed, the neighbours delight in seeing how he too is mistaken' (ἥτις δέ τοι μάλιστα σωφρονεῖν δοκεῖ, / αὕτη μέγιστα τυγχάνει λωβωμένη· / κεχηνότος γὰρ ἀνδρός οἱ δὲ **γείτονες** / **χαίρουσ'** ὁρῶντες καὶ τόν, ὡς ἁμαρτάνει). The worst of women is apparently she who cannot σωφρο-

[64] See e.g. 1.77–78, 119–124, 299–300, 599–600.

[65] Compare Thgn. 1.851–852, 'May Olympian Zeus utterly destroy the man who is willing to deceive his comrade with gentle blandishments' (Ζεὺς ἄνδ' ἐξολέσειεν Ὀλύμπιος, ὅς τὸν ἑταῖρον / μαλθακὰ **κωτίλλων ἐξαπατᾶν** ἐθέλει) with *WD* 373–374, 'Do not let an arse-fancy woman deceive your mind by guilefully cajoling you while she pokes into your granary' (μὴ δὲ γυνή σε νόον πυγοστόλος **ἐξαπατάτω** / αἰμύλα **κωτίλλουσα**, τεὴν διφῶσα καλιήν). The recurrence of (a participle form of) the rare κωτίλλω is a dead give-away (cf. Anacreon fr. 154 Bergk). See for the idea of woman as a *kakon* sent by Zeus also Semonides fr. 7.

νεῖν, a word probably meant in its sexual sense as Semonides may have interpreted Hesiod's words on 'the singing of a husband without a torch' sexually.[66] This is less than the far stretch it might first appear, for it is exactly the 'sex-mad woman' (μαινόλις γύνη) that Archilochus will avoid for fear of being laughed at by his neighbours (**γείτοσι χάρμ**' ἔσομαι, fr. 196a). Alcaeus fr. 347, which contains an obvious reference to Hesiod's comment on the increased sexual appetite of women during summertime (*WD* 582–587), is a confirmation of the archaic poets' concern with women's lusty behaviour—a concern they saw foreshadowed in Hesiod.[67]

It is not difficult to see why sympotic poetry deals with the supposed destructiveness of women. The symposium (as Greek commensality as a whole) was an all-male occasion.[68] Cautionary reflections on the other sex are a natural topic in such a context, especially since the institution of the symposium was meant to be of educational value for the boys present.[69] Hesiod, for the archaic poets, was clearly the expert on misogyny *par excellence*: his Pandora-myth and pertinent warnings concerning women did not go unnoticed.[70] Because of their own focus and interest, the sympotic poets found in Hesiod what they were looking for.[71] Incidentally, it should be noted that Homer, in this period, is not at all associated with that particular topic.[72]

We should conclude, therefore, that the picture of Hesiod is to a considerable degree formed through 'assimilation' by his recipients. What

---

[66] *Pace* Rademaker (2005) 97 n.45.

[67] See also Phocylides fr. 2.

[68] See Murray (1983) and his introduction to the collection of articles *Sympotica* (1990).

[69] Bremmer (1990). Incidentally, West (1966) 45–46 rather fancifully takes Hesiod's 'earnestness' concerning marriage as an indication that he was about 30 when singing the *Th*.

[70] According to Servius (*in Verg. Buc.* 6.42, Thilo-Hagen 3.72), Sappho too treated the Pandora-myth.

[71] This principle is at work in modern scholarship as well. To stay with the topic: feminist readers tend to focus on and so blow up Hesiod's misogyny; see e.g. Hathaway (2001) 59 introducing Hesiod in a non-specialist book on mythology as 'a dour man and a misogynist'. An extreme example is provided by DuBois, who ends her 1992 article on Hesiod's misogyny supposedly permeating the entire corpus with a personal touch, admitting she 'so much dislikes the author in question' (113), whose very name 'summons up dread in me' (114). See Van Noorden (2007) 170 on Hesiod's misogyny as a modern construct; Kirk (1970) 229 believes Hesiod in his description of women in the *Th*. is actually 'moderating' the traditionally misogynistic myth of Pandora.

[72] See the overview of lyric imitations of (Hesiodic and) Homeric poetry in Fowler (1987) 20–52. In later times, Homer is also believed to have known about the destructive nature of women (see *AP* 9.165).

they are searching for and what passages of Hesiod's works they select, is in part dictated by their own genre and outlook. The short digression on the archaic poets made it clear that this principle is valid even in less-than-obvious cases.[73] Theoretically, the practice of assimilation would make the development of the Hesiodic persona dependent on the development of genres in subsequent periods: what will not be looked for, will never be found. But there are other factors as well.

2.2. *The Catchword-Factor*

One of those other factors is concerned more with the work itself, perhaps, than with its recipients. One could argue that some of Hesiod's verses were bound to receive a rich afterlife because of their own quote-worthy nature; I call this the catchword-factor. In order for a line to develop into a slogan, it should ideally possess a number of qualities. First of all, it should address a subject of considerable interest to the Greeks; second, there should be something new and original to it, either with regard to form or to content (and preferably to both). These two qualities will allow the verse in question to be noticed and stick in one's memory. The third requirement is a broad scope, so that the verse can be adapted and made to apply to many different contexts.

It is not a coincidence that all three qualities are present in the Hesiodic passage quoted most often in antiquity: *Works and Days* 287–292, on the easy road leading to vice and the steep road to virtue.[74] It is convenient to quote them in full:

τὴν μέν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι
ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·
τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,
ῥηϊδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἐοῦσα.

'Misery is there to be grabbed in abundance,
easily, for smooth is the road, and she lives very nearby;
but in front of Excellence the immortal gods have set sweat,

[73] We should note, incidentally, that this limitation in genre sometimes entails a limitation in time as well: sympotic poetry, for instance, had its heyday in the archaic period; interest in themes fluctuates over time.

[74] I have found 26 references to the passage in later texts, the biggest number by far; see also the peak in the commemogram on p. 21.

290 and the path to her is long and steep,
and rough at first—yet when one arrives at the top,
then it becomes easy, difficult though it still is.'

That ἀρετή and the way to achieve it are of of central interest to Greek thinking is obvious, and that Hesiod's road image was original is beyond doubt.[75] But it is especially the third requirement, that of a broad scope, that these verses fulfill in such an extraordinary way. A short (and non-exhaustive) overview of how this passage was used in new contexts will demonstrate this wide applicability.

First of all, it should be noted that the applicability of the passage in question derives for a large part from the interpretive scope offered by the terms κακότης and ἀρετή. What Hesiod may have 'meant' originally is not something I would venture to discuss, but according to most scholars the terms deal with the concrete and material rather than with abstract concepts of ethical import—but this was a very easy step,[76] taken as early as Theognis.[77] We can compare the extensive elaboration of Hesiod's road image by Prodicus, who transformed κακότης and ἀρετή into two women giving the young Heracles advice on which way to take in his life.[78] It appears that this moral reading became the standard interpretation, which lasted throughout antiquity. Plutarch, for instance, is far from thinking of mundane matters like wealth and status when he says *Works and Days* 287–292 is one of those poetic sayings that 'one should immediately believe to relate to the best and godliest estate to which we can attain, which we think of as correctness of reasoning, the height of good sense, and a disposition of soul in full agreement with it.'[79]

---

[75] Panofsky (1930) 45–47, Becker (1937) 56–60, Hommel (1950). It is also telling that West (1978) ad loc. cites a Sumerian proverb and a Norse saying as the closest parallels.

[76] These verses are an excellent illustration of how ancient reception can influence modern interpretation; scholars used to interpret κακότης and ἀρετή in moral terms until West (1978 ad loc.) argued that they 'are not 'vice' and 'virtue' but inferior and superior standing in society, determined principally by material prosperity' (see also Verdenius 1985 ad loc). Compare also Most's 2006 Loeb translation above with that of Evelyn-White (1914), who renders 'Badness' and 'Goodness' (note the capitals).

[77] Thgn. 1.1027–1028.

[78] Prodicus DK 84 B 2.

[79] Plu. *Mor.* 24E: εὐθὺς οἰέσθω λέγεσθαι περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης καὶ θειοτάτης ἕξεως ἐν ἡμῖν, ἣν ὀρθότητα λόγου καὶ ἀκρότητα λογικῆς φύσεως καὶ διάθεσιν ὁμολογουμένην ψυχῆς νοοῦμεν.

As could be expected, the Hesiodic lines are often cited in the context of education,[80] especially philosophy. Not only is the passage believed to contain philosophical value by itself,[81] but some also take it as a *meta*-comment on the very quest that is philosophy. Philo, for instance, claims the road to virtue is steep and hard for those who are ἄφρων, and Plutarch compares the illumination brought on by philosophy with reaching the top after a tough climb.[82] Furthermore, several remarks in Lucian strongly suggest that the Stoics used the verses to illustrate the difficult path of the *proficiens* (although the Hesiodic passage is not present in any of the extant Stoic fragments).[83] It is perhaps relevant here that rhetoric, philosophy's age-old enemy, is sometimes associated with the 'easy road' to quick success.[84]

It should be stressed again that the general acclaim for Hesiod's words of wisdom is greatly facilitated by their vagueness: strictly speaking, Hesiod does not define ἀρετή, but merely comments on its accessibility, and thus allows all readers to understand the notion itself in their own way. Nonetheless, some of those readers apparently engaged with the Hesiodic passage in order to discuss the concept of ἀρετή. This is not a late practice; see, for instance, the end of a particularly martial fragment by Tyrtaeus: 'Let everyone strive now with all his heart to reach *this* top of virtue, with no slackening in war' (ταύτης νῦν τις ἀνὴρ **ἀρετῆς** εἰς **ἄκρον ἱκέσθαι** / πειράσθω θυμῷ μὴ μεθιεὶς πολέμου).[85] We can compare a fragment of Simonides: 'There is a tale that Virtue dwells on unclimbable rocks and (close to the gods?) tends a holy place; she may not be seen by the eyes of all mortals, but only by him on whom distressing sweat comes from within, the one who reaches the peak of manliness' (ἐστί τις λόγος / τὰν **Ἀρετὰν** ναίειν δυσαμβάτοισ' ἐπὶ πέτραις, / †νῦν δέ μιν θοαν† χῶρον ἁγνὸν ἀμφέπειν· / οὐδὲ πάντων βλεφάροισι θνατῶν / ἔσοπτος, ᾧ μὴ δακέθυμος **ἱδρὼς** / ἔνδοθεν μόλῃ, / **ἵκῃ τ' ἐς ἄκρον** ἀνδρείας).[86] It is obvious that these recipients *do* assume that Hesiod has defined ἀρετή,

[80] Cf. Cic. *ad Fam*. 6.18.5, and Galen 5.89 Kühn in the context of medical training.

[81] As is shown by the above-mentioned reference in Plutarch; see also an approving quotation by Socrates (X. *Mem*. 2.1.20).

[82] Ph. *De Ebr*. 150; Plu. *Mor*. 77D; see also Σ Eur. *Med*. 296. Maximus of Tyre responds to this use of Hesiod's lines by giving them a place in a plea for the *vita activa* (*Or*. 15.7). The earliest echo may be Pi. *Ol*. 9.107–108 saying 'the ways of wisdom are steep' (σοφίαι μὲν αἰπειναί).

[83] Lucian *Bis Acc*. 21, *Nec*. 4, and *Herm*. 2.

[84] Pl. *Phdr*. 272b, and Lucian *Rh.Pr*. 3 and 7.

[85] Fr. 12.43–44 West.

[86] Fr. 579 Page.

and they wish to respond:[87] instead of trying to excel in the rather servile occupation of farming, they propose a more 'manly' type of virtue.[88]

The main reason for the scope of *Works and Days* 287–292, then, is the convenient vagueness of its principal terms. But the passage is also popular because its supposed content can vary greatly depending on the lines selected for quotation. When quoted *as a whole*, the verses seem to urge the audience to strive for ἀρετή: although it is easier to reach κακότης, 'virtue' is not an impossible goal; moreover, once it is achieved, it is fairly easy to keep. But in most cases, the passage is not quoted in full, which (drastically) alters its meaning. Simonides, for instance, in the passage quoted above does not refer to lines 287–288 and 292 (on 'vice' and the easiness of 'virtue' once it is achieved) because his focus is on the difficulty of reaching ἀρετή (whatever he means by it) and the heroism of those who nonetheless did so. Plutarch in his treatise on how to reach virtue concentrates on line 292 because he wants the students of philosophy to know they will in the end be rewarded for their efforts.[89] Plato, on the other hand, leaves out 292 on purpose: he wants to picture Hesiod as actually encouraging vice for the reason that it is simply too hard to achieve excellence.[90]

It is important to note that the eclectic attitude of recipients, here demonstrated with the aid of *Works and Days* 287–292, is a widespread phenomenon for the entire corpus of Hesiod (and perhaps even all of Greek poetry). Taking lines out of context, sometimes even altering them a little to make them fit the new context better,[91] belongs to

---

[87] Simonides is hinting at his literary debt by introducing his image by ἐστί τις λόγος; Munding (1984) has demonstrated how Tyrtaeus alerts his audience to the reference.

[88] Tyrtaeus' addition not to leave off war may be a 'correction' to Hesiod's oft-repeated advice never to stop working (perhaps his θυμῷ also helps to identify the subtext as Hesiod often warns his brother to store his advice in his θυμός, see *WD* 27, 297, 491, 797). There could be an aristocratic ring to Simonides' fragment since the 'sweat from within' may have to do with inborn qualities. See for aristocratic interpretations of the road-image also Pi. *Nem*. 6.23 and fr. 108a Maehler.

[89] Plu. *Mor*. 77D.

[90] Pl. *R*. 364c. Lucian in his many references to the passage (see e.g. n.83 above) consistently leaves out line 292, either to make the passage more 'Stoic' or because the Stoics used to quote it without 292 in the first place.

[91] I will give just one example of such practice, coming from the work of Plato. Plato quotes Hesiod's words on the demise of the Golden Race twice, *WD* 121–123 in *Cra*. 397e and *WD* 122–123 in *R*. 468e. His quote in the *Cratylus*-passage runs as follows: αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρ' ἐκάλυψεν, / οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι καλέονται (*R*.: τελέθουσιν) / ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν (*R*.: μερόπων) ἀνθρώπων. There are considerable differences with our text of Hesiod (I will focus on two, marked in bold): αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψεν, / τοὶ

the standard repertoire of quoting authors. Differences between ancient citations and the reading of our critical texts can of course be due to the forgetfulness or sloppiness of ancient authors, but are just as often the result of willful manipulation and adaptation.[92] Such manipulation naturally occurs most often with verses that possess the 'catchword-factor', because it is most useful to appropriate a poet's most popular lines.[93]

The example of Hesiod's most often-quoted lines shows what happens when all three catchword qualities—pertinence, originality and applicability—are so generously present in one and the same passage; such verses are bound to be noted, imitated and adapted. There are also some less extreme examples of lines that for the same reasons seem to invite treatment by successors, such as *Works and Days* 25 (on envy and friendship), 40 (on the dangers of greed), 372 (on trust and distrust), and 763–764 (on the power of Rumour).[94] Nonetheless, there are still many

---

μὲν δαίμονες **εἰσι Διός μεγάλου διὰ βουλὰς** / ἐσθλοί, **ἐπιχθόνιοι**, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων. These differences are not due to inadvertence or forgetfulness on Plato's part (so e.g. West 1978 ad loc., claiming that Plato was 'quoting from memory' and therefore 'went wrong'), but conscious alterations (cf. Labarbe 1949 devoting pp. 257–383 to demonstrating 'comment Platon, par occasion, violentait des vers homériques et les adaptait à sa phrase' (257), Benardete 1963 demonstrating that 'some of these misquotations could be deliberate' (173)). Plato wants to get rid of 'the will of great Zeus' in line 122 because he interprets the demons as the spirits of the citizens that were most valuable to the polis; after they die, they are rewarded because of their goodness and not because of the will of a god. Plato subsequently writes ἀλεξίκακοι, 'averters of ills', instead of ἐπιχθόνιοι, 'dwellers on the earth' in *WD* 123, in order to avoid the contradiction with ὑποχθόνιοι, 'dwellers below the earth', in the line above (and perhaps ἀλεξίκακος was a normal adjective for a demon, cf. Phld. *Epigr.* 34 n.36 above). Furthermore, Plato leaves out line 121 in the *Republic* because the demonification he speaks of is a continuing process and not a singular (quasi-)historical moment. (Incidentally, I suspect that the different ending of line 122—*Cra.* καλέονται, *R.* τελέθουσιν—is not a mistake or a coincidence either: after all, the *Cratylus* focuses on how things are named, while in the passage from the *Republic* the focus is on the death and subsequent honour of the guardians.) See on this passage also El Murr (2010) 280–282.

[92] A third explanation, of course, is the absence of authorized editions, which allows for the side-by-side existence of different versions. The impact of this factor, however, is difficult to assess.

[93] It is hazardous, because of the manipulative nature of ancient citation, to use quotes for textual criticism. Jacoby (1926) 169–170 used citations by Aristotle to conclude that in *Th.*-passage 115–122 only lines 116, 117 and 120 were authentic; but the citations prove only that Aristotle found them most interesting. Cf. Pl. *Smp.* 178b, who quotes only those three lines because he needs only those three in that particular context.

[94] Generally speaking, the *WD* is a more 'quotable' work than the *Th.* (cf. Ford 2010 134), which partly explains the fact that the *WD* was quoted twice as often as the *Th.* (cf. Introduction, p. 19).

quoteworthy verses that are (so far as we know) devoid of any afterlife, while some verses that lack the qualities described above do receive attention by later authors. As an explanation for the mountains and valleys, the catchword-factor is not enough by itself.

2.3. *The Principle of Snowballing*

Sometimes, quotes evoke quotes, and a reference to (or a particular use of) Hesiod can be seen to trigger further reference(s) to the poet. I call this the principle of snowballing, and this is how it works: author A employs a Hesiodic reference in his own text and is later followed by author B who quotes the same passage. In such a case, author B does not (only) refer to Hesiod, but also to author A's use of him. What is interesting about snowballing is that the second reference is not primarily occasioned by the author's own interest in Hesiod or the pertinence of Hesiod's text, but caused by the way the verse was used—and interpreted—by the earlier recipient. It is a reference to a Hesiodic reference. The principle of snowballing applies to the use and re-use of individual lines, which thus gain a considerable extra load of meaning through time, much like a snowball running down a hill.

A very straightforward example of this principle is provided by Aeschines' and Demosthenes' use of *Works and Days* 763–764, 'no talk is ever entirely gotten rid of, once many people talk it up: it too is some god' (Φήμη δ' οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα πολλοὶ λαοὶ φημίξωσι· θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή). Aeschines quotes these verses in his *Against Timarchus* (346 BC), a speech designed to prove that Athenian law forbade Timarchus to hold office. Part of the character assassination in this speech was based on rumours about Timarchus' private vices that supposedly made him unfit to be a public servant. The quote from Hesiod is used to show that persistent rumours are always true:[95] in the goddess Φήμη, Timarchus thus finds a 'deathless accuser', κατήγορον ἀθάνατον (*Tim.* 129).

Demosthenes defended the case of his political ally Timarchus at the time, and lost. Three years later, however, when charging Aeschines for high treason, he returns to the matter. In his speech *On the False Embassy* (343 BC) he accuses Aeschines of having used the state embassy to king Philip of Macedon for personal gain, a claim backed up by countless

[95] The passage was usually taken to mean something along the lines of our 'where there is smoke there is fire' (cf. e.g. Arist. *EN* 1153b27–28).

rumours. It is at this point in the speech, of course, that Hesiod's lines on Φήμη are quoted, and Demosthenes vilely adds 'that for the veracity, and even the divinity, of rumour, and for the wisdom of the poet who composed these verses, we have your own assurance.'[96] It is obvious that Demosthenes is not quoting the Hesiodic lines for their own sake:[97] the relevance of the citation (and—in this case, more importantly—its rhetorical power) does not primarily derive from the Hesiodic passage itself, as in the speech of Aeschines,[98] but from the fact that Aeschines used them already.

Aeschines did not give in and obviously wanted the last say, since he referred to the question of Φήμη again in his response,[99] but the basic idea is clear: the example provides a clear-cut case of a Hesiodic reference evoking not so much Hesiod's text itself but rather the earlier reference, a link that should be recognized in order to fully understand it. Behind this process of snowballing, we can see a particular tradition of Hesiod's reception given shape in a relatively conscious manner. It is not, of course, always this evident. Aeschines quotes Hesiod fully, and so does Demosthenes, who moreover explicitly says he is referring to Aeschines—it goes without saying that snowballing is often more hidden than this. It is usually more difficult to prove there is really a *chain* of references; one example is the reception of *Theogony* 27–28, on the Muses' capacity to either tell the truth or speak untruths that resemble the truth (further discussed in chapter 6). At other times, it is impossible to see where the snowball begins; this is the case with the reception of *Works and Days* 311, which claims that 'work is no disgrace' (see also chapter 6).

---

[96] Dem. *Fals.Leg.* 243–244: ὅτι πιστὴν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ 'θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή', καὶ ὅτι σοφὸς ἦν ὁ ποιητὴς ὁ ταῦτα ποιήσας, σὺ διώρισας αὐτός.

[97] Demosthenes disliked referring to the ancients. Apart from this citation there are no explicit references to either Hesiod or Homer in his speeches.

[98] Aeschines quotes Hesiod twice more. In both cases he refers to Hesiod's verses on how a corrupt civil servant can bring about the destruction of the polis (*WD* 240–247), applying them once to Demosthenes (*Fals.Leg.* 158) and once to Ctesiphon (*Ctes.* 135–136).

[99] Aeschin. *Fals.Leg.* 144. He distinguishes between rumour, when through divine intervention a whole group of people suddenly all say the same thing, and mere slander, when malicious individuals like Demosthenes insinuate accusations in the minds of the masses. See on this distinction further ch. 6, p. 227 n.150, and on the Φήμη-passage as a whole Graziosi (2010) 114–119.

2.4. *The Principle of Clustering*

Another way of accounting for 'sacred mountains' is clustering, a process that most often takes place *inside* the corpus of a recipient author. Clustering occurs when an author connects Hesiod to a certain theme or view, and associates several Hesiodic verses (which are ususally scattered through the works of the recipient author) with that particular theme. It is a more or less conscious way of creating a consistent-looking Hesiod by bringing previously unconnected lines together under one common denominator.

The principle is applied by Plato, for instance, who in several passages in his work credits Hesiod with knowledge about elements, or the smallest constituents of reality.[100] In this section, however, I will focus on another example, provided by Aristotle. Aristotle seems to have believed that Hesiod was responsible for the initial impetus to philosophical speculation, but should nonetheless not be considered a philosopher or scientist. Instead, he ranks among the early 'theologians' (θεολογήσαντες) and, as a 'thinker in mythical terms' (μυθικῶς σοφιζόμενος) belongs to a non-philosophical genre.[101] Moreover, his more practical contributions to Greek thought, represented by the many pieces of advice in the *Works and Days*, are dismissed as mere popular wisdom.

Aristotle's view of Hesiod as a basic and incipient thinker is reflected in the way he is employed in his treatises. As could be expected, the *Theogony*'s lines on the beginning of the cosmos are often quoted as the beginning of cosmogonical *thinking*—see, for instance, the start of *Physics* book 4, when Aristotle begins to discuss 'place' (τόπος), a concept aligned with Hesiod's Χάος.[102] This almost 'iconic' use of Hesiod at the beginning of the treatise is, interestingly enough, extrapolated to other issues. At the start of the *Oeconomica*, *Works and Days* 405 is quoted ('a house first of all, a woman, and an ox for ploughing', οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα) as a short introduction to the basic components of the household; the same verse is cited at the beginning of the *Politica*, to illustrate the first and most rudimentary form of man's associations.[103] Similarly, *Works and Days* 25 is

[100] The argument is somewhat too complex to be summarized here; see for a full discussion ch. 6, pp. 223–233.
[101] *Metaph*. 983b27–32, 1000a18–19. See also ch. 9, pp. 364–365.
[102] *Ph*. 208b27–33. See also *Metap*. 984b23–31, *Xen*. 975a7–14 and 976b14–18.
[103] *Oec*. 1343a21, *Pol*. 1252b11–12.

quoted at the beginning of book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in the same work verse 715 is mentioned when Aristotle starts to address the question of whether or not one should make as many friends as possible.[104]

The most telling example, however, comes from the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a whole, where the very question of how an enquiry or treatise should begin is addressed. Aristotle suggests that the 'starting-points' (ἀρχαι) are the facts themselves (τὸ ὅτι), and that any well-educated man either knows them already or can get them easily. He continues: 'And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod: 'Far best is he who knows all things himself; / Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right; / But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart / Another's wisdom, is a useless wight'.'[105] Hesiod is quoted in a passage where 'starting' itself is problematized; when we add this reference to those we mentioned already, we may surmise that there is an Aristotelian connection between Hesiod and beginnings. As Hesiod's thinking represents, in Aristotle's eyes, the starting-point of philosophy, his logical place is at the start of a philosophical account. When we are alert to the principle of clustering, we can see the logic behind the references.

Some final comments should be made with regard to clustering. First, it is relatively infrequent. As it is generally impossible (and undesirable) for a recipient author to subsume *all* his references to Hesiod under one unifying theme, a rather large and diverse corpus with a considerable amount of references to Hesiod is necessary in order to detect the principle; hence the examples from Plato and Aristotle (who refer to Hesiod 39 times and 28 times, respectively). Many authors do not refer to Hesiod that often, or have left us smaller *corpora*, or both. Second, clustering is not per se a strictly 'synchronic' process (occurring only within the corpus of one author), but appears to develop through time as well. Even though all authors have their own view of Hesiod and the themes that are connected to him, it is clear from the examples of Plato and Aristotle that Hesiodic themes can be passed on. For instance, there is a strong resemblance between Plato's Hesiod (with his arcane knowledge of elements)

---

[104] *EN* 1155b15 and 1170b21–22; *WD* 25 is also quoted at the start of book 7 of the *EE* (1235a18).

[105] ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου· οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσει, / ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ καὶ κεῖνος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται· / ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων / ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὁ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ (*EN* 1095b8–13, *WD* 293 and 295–297).

and Aristotle's Hesiod (with his ancient wisdom of basic starting-points). That is the power of tradition, which is also clearly visible in the Homeric factor.

2.5. *The Homeric Factor*

So far, we have been concerned with mechanisms of memory accounting for the mountains in the commemogram, i.e. the reasons why some passages or verses from the Hesiodic corpus are referred to in later times. In this paragraph, however, we will try to reveal why some passages are rejected instead of received. As was noted above, it is not enough to simply negate the reasons for remembering certain verses and claim that all others are forgotten because they are not assimilated, do not qualify as 'catchy', are not selected for snowballing and are not involved in clustering. There are also mechanisms that positively rule out certain Hesiodic lines or passages for remembrance. The most important one is the so-called Homeric factor.

It goes without saying that in the ancient imagination Homer too, just like Hesiod, was associated with certain themes, especially that of war. Such themes are then already 'spoken for'[106] and subsequently help to erase comparable Hesiodic verses and passages from memory. This explains why it was stated earlier that Hesiod is never really alone. This principle of 'claiming' themes is made explicit by a scholiast:

> Μετὰ τὴν ἡρωϊκὴν γενεαλογίαν καὶ τοὺς καταλόγους ἐπεζήτησε καινουργῆσαι πάλιν ἑτέραν ὑπόθεσιν· καὶ δὴ καταχρησθέντων τῶν εἰς πολέμους καὶ μάχας, καὶ τῆς γεωργίας διδασκαλίαν εἰσφέρει καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὴν κρᾶσιν …
>
> 'After the genealogy of the heroes and the catalogues Hesiod sought to begin yet another, new subject (for poetry); and since the themes connected with wars and battles had of course been fully worked out, he introduced the instruction on agriculture and the combination of the days …'[107]

Note that the poet himself is here pictured as making the conscious choice to stay away from war poetry and choose a subject that was not already extensively covered, while it is of course to a large degree

[106] I do not mean that such a division of themes was chronologically determined; Homer did not have 'first pick'.

[107] Σ Prol. *WD* B.

the collective forgetting of heroic and martial passages in Hesiod that has turned him into the peace-loving farmer poet.

I will illustrate this process with a fairly straightforward example. There is a remarkable valley in the *Works and Days* where Hesiod speaks of the fourth Race, that of the heroes who fought in Thebes and Troy (*WD* 156–173). Both the Golden (first) and Iron (fifth and last) Race are often referred to, and later imitations of the passage name all the metals—but the heroes are almost completely left out.[108] It is somewhat of a commonplace among modern scholars that the insertion of the Heroic Race into an originally metallic scheme was a truly Hesiodic touch,[109] but this was clearly not how he was remembered in antiquity. I suggest that since warfare among heroes was such an obviously Homeric theme, no-one quotes Hesiod on the subject.

Someone might object that this argument is hardly convincing since Hesiod's twenty verses-passage on heroes is rather insignificant anyway. That is true, but Hesiod has written considerably more about the heroes and their exploits (notably of Heracles) in the *Catalogue* and elsewhere. Moreover, Hesiod *does* speak often of war and conflict, especially in the *Theogony*: the struggle of Zeus, his peers and the Hundred-handers versus the Titans (617–720), and the duel between Zeus and Typhoeus (820–880) are unmistakably epic battle-scenes.[110] Nonetheless we find valleys here, too. Apparently, the war-theme in general is so inextricably linked to Homer that martial scenes among the gods are usually believed to be Homeric as well.[111] Homer's mountains, then, explain Hesiod's valleys.

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the Homeric factor is active in modern scholarship as well: we too are usually blind to martial scenes in Hesiod and thus turn him into a non-heroic poet of peace, simply because we are taught by tradition to think he is one. I will give just one example, that deals with the Titanomachy, one of the few war narratives in the

---

[108] There are some exceptions, however, notably Catullus 64.382–408 and Virgil *Ecl.* 4 (I thank Helen van Noorden for bringing these passages to my attention).

[109] E.g. Griffiths (1956) 109 and 118, Von Fritz (1962) 33–34, Fontenrose (1974) 3–4.

[110] In the *Theogony*, I counted 119 lines (12 %) dealing with war, and another 218 (21 %) with other acts of violence and conflict, together making up 33 per cent of the poem. It thus seems incorrect to state with Wade-Gery (1949) 91, voicing a very common view, that 'Hesiod practically never mentions war.'

[111] See e.g. Pl. *R.* 377d. The denial of martial themes to Hesiod was so strict that it was sometimes played with, see e.g. Manilius describing Hesiod's main subject as 'man's warfare with the soil' (*militiam soli*, *Astr.* 2.20). See for more on the war-peace distinction between Homer and Hesiod ch. 8.

Theogony (617–720). It has often bothered scholars that the all-powerful Zeus needs the Hundred-handers to defeat the Titans, a fact that seems to run counter to the general trend in Hesiod to idealize Zeus and his regency.[112] In an intriguing article on the Titanomachy as a whole, Mondi attempts to solve this (supposed) incongruence by suggesting Hesiod 'recast[s] the Titanomachy, and especially Zeus' role in it, in the mold of heroic epic'[113]—hence all the Homeric elements he detects in what we can only describe as an *aristeia* of Zeus, designed to overshadow the crucial role played by the Hundred-handers. Although his argument is cogent, and the parallels from the *Iliad* are striking, it is of course only after we have tacitly assumed that Hesiod is only a poet of genealogies and agriculture that we can say he switches to *another* tradition, i.e. true epic, for the description of Zeus' exploits. In so doing, we—just like the ancients—keep our own traditional view of Hesiod alive.[114]

2.6. *The Persona's Paradox*

When we take another look at the *Works and Days*-commemogram, especially for the archaic and classical period, we can discern other curious valleys. For instance, there is a large gap between lines 456 and 582 (a valley of 125 verses), which becomes even greater (456–654, coming to 197 verses) if we leave out the peak connected to the passage on lustful women (582–587, cf. p. 143 above). Furthermore, there are no references to verses after line 764. These two valleys are so remarkable because they roughly cover the sections on the *Works* and the *Days*, respectively, i.e. those passages that are believed to have been so typical of the poem that they brought forth its name.[115] See the commemogram below:

---

[112] See Blaise and Rousseau (1996) 214–218 for a short overview.

[113] Mondi (1986) 32.

[114] See also Clay (2003) 165 saying that the rejection of Hesiodic authorship for the *Catalogue* derives from the 'unspoken premise' that 'if Hesiod's poetry constitues an implicit polemic against heroic epic, then we should not assign to Hesiod a composition dealing with the heroic tradition.'

[115] It is unknown when the title came into existence. Stanford (1968) 163 says Aristophanes, describing Hesiod's poetry as dealing with γῆς ἐργασίας and ὥρας in *Ran*. 1034 'paraphrases' the title (incidentally, Stanford might have mentioned Prodicus' Hesiod-like book Ὥρας as well, cf. O'Sullivan 1992 76–77); but the description is no proof that the title as such actually existed. West (1978) thinks it likely to be in use by the time of Callimachus; he believes the sections on the works and days were 'picked out [for the title], perhaps by sellers, as representing what was of most practical value in the poem' (136). I think this is highly unlikely, especially since the practical use of the *WD* is quite limited (see ch. 8 n.16); but I cannot offer an alternative explanation.




Fig. 4: References to the *Works and Days*, archaic and classical period (peak in 582–587 left out)

A hypothetical explanation is what I call the persona's paradox: the passages are so well-known that they are not mentioned, and so obviously Hesiodic that they are not connected to him explicitly. According to this hypothesis, the Greeks were so thoroughly familiar with (the existence of) both passages that the sections on the *Works* and the *Days* did contribute to the Hesiodic persona (turning him into the traditional farmer-poet with good advice), but were only rarely referred to explicitly. Furthermore, we should bear in mind that Hesiod's treatment of farming and the calendar is almost unique in Greek literature: we have only very few later texts that could naturally present Hesiod as a source on these particular subjects—as if the poet was generally believed to have dealt with the theme in a definitive way.[116] I suggest that these two hypotheses account for the small number of references to either the *Works* or *Days*.

We should beware, however, of relying too much on numbers and figures, and jumping to conclusions. It should be remembered that only word-by-word citations or references that are substantiated by identical words are incorporated into the commemogram, which means that more general references to Hesiodic passages or ideas do not show in the figure. Heraclitus, for instance, refers to Hesiod's section on the days as a whole when he jeers at the poet for claiming there are good and bad days; Herodotus too presumably thinks of Hesiod when he says that the Egyptian system of connecting days to certain gods and fates

[116] See Osborne (1987) 16–21 on 'the concealment of agriculture' in Greek literature; he further suggests that the countryside in general may have been taken for granted 'because it was so universally important' (16).

was taken up by 'Greeks who deal in poetry' (τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ ἐν ποιήσι γενόμενοι).[117] Nonetheless it appears that, apart from these two, there are no more general references to the *Days* in the 7th to 4th century BC, and there are no such references to the section on the *Works*.

The hypothesis of the persona's paradox is admittedly weak since it argues *e silentio* and cannot prove that unmentioned passages were thought to be very Hesiodic;[118] furthermore, its corollary that the passages that *are* referred to are not or not wholly regarded as Hesiodic, is obviously untrue. Still, there is some circumstantial evidence for the hypothesis, which is provided by the Romans. When Hesiod is mentioned in Latin literature, we *do* often find references to the *Works* and his advice on agricultural matters. The Romans generally describe him and his work in very similar (and stereotypical) ways: according to Cicero, he is the *doctus* who 'wrote on agriculture', Virgil says his *Georgics* are an *Ascraeum carmen*, the *Culex* speaks of a 'shepherd vying with the bard of Ascra' (*aemulus Ascraeo pastor … poetae*), Propertius calls Virgil's *Georgics* 'the precepts of the old bard of Ascra' (*Ascraei veteris praecepta poetae*), Ovid describes Hesiod as 'the teacher of ploughing' (*praeceptor arandi*) and the 'old farmer' (*senex agricola*), and Pliny the Elder names Hesiod several times as the first to have put forth *praecepta* on agriculture.[119] The Romans obviously make the 'typical' Hesiod, i.e. the wise farmer-poet, far more explicit than the Greeks (of the classical period), perhaps because they are not so much affected by the persona's paradox: they are considerably less familiar with the *Works and Days*, and agriculture to them is much less a strictly Hesiodic subject; this is also shown by the fact that (in contrast to what we find in Greece) there are quite a few Roman treatises on the subject.

---

[117] Heraclitus DK B 106, Hdt. *Hist*. 2.82.

[118] Such proof is very rare anyway. One example is Hesiod's catalogue of Nereids (*Th*. 240–264); it is never referred to, but Zenodotus deleted Homer's catalogue of Nereids (*Il*. 18.39–49) for being too Hesiodic (see schol. ad loc).

[119] Cic. *Cato* 15.54, Verg. *Georg*. 2.176, [Verg.] *Culex* 96, Prop. 2.34.77, Ovid *Fasti* 6.13 and *Pont*. 4.14.32, Plin. e.g. *NH* 14.3 and 18.201. It seems that in late(r) antiquity such stereotypical descriptions of Hesiod occur in Greek literature as well (cf. e.g. D.Chrys. 2.8, Lucian *Sat*. 5.22, and Nonnus *D*. 13.76.)

3. *Conclusion*

This chapter was concerned with investigating the ways in which the ancient Greeks constructed Hesiod; its main question was why certain parts of him are remembered while others are forgotten. It has been clearly shown by the first section, dealing with the biographical tradition, that this question depends on several 'agents'. First of all, Hesiod's *vita* and persona are informed by autobiographical remarks, i.e. 'constructive' elements suggested by the source text itself. These remarks can be regarded as the artist's way of influencing his own reputation, and in fact most of them are used by later authors. Second, there is the recipients' creative use of other (that is, non-autobiographical) material in the poems; and this factor can be just as influential. I have tried to argue, for instance, that the story of Hesiod's double burial and posthumous protection is an imaginative reworking of his own statements on demons and their powers. Third and last, there is an agent I will call tradition, which determines the possibilities of Hesiod's construction, for instance by setting him off against (the construction of) Homer. These three agents naturally work together and have resulted in the picture of Hesiod as a hero, a superhuman figure with less-than-divine powers, who stays close and gives aid to us mere mortals.

The second section, on the mechanisms of memory, provides further proof against monocausality. The six mechanisms (assimilation, the catchword-factor, snowballing, clustering, the Homeric factor and the persona's paradox), that were discussed separately only for convenience's sake, can in reality be seen to work together. For instance: Hesiod's tale of divine inspiration is copied by Empedocles, not only because he wishes to 'assimilate' Hesiod to some degree, but also because he wishes to refer to other thinkers who copied it;[120] here, the principles of assimilation and snowballing are both present. Similarly, Hesiod's words on demons, or on justice in the polis, are referred to not only because they are memorable, but also because there is not much on this in Homer;[121] here the catchword- and Homeric factor are combined.

The six mechanisms are combined so easily because they all function from different perspectives. The Homeric factor, for instance, involves the tradition of epic reception as a whole, whereas the catchword-factor works only when the author has provided his audience with sufficiently

[120] See further ch. 6, pp. 214–217.
[121] See further ch. 5, pp. 165–177.

'catchy' lines. The principle of clustering, on the other hand, depends mostly on the recipient, who bundles together lines in accordance with his own individual view of Hesiod. Interestingly enough, the six mechanisms of memory can be aligned rather well with the three agents that made up the biographical tradition (as described above): the source text, the recipient's efforts, and tradition. See the illustration below:




Fig. 5: Agents and mechanisms making up the memory of Hesiod

Obviously, a schematic view like this does not do full justice to the complexity of the dynamics behind Hesiod's reception (especially since I do not wish to claim that the list of mechanisms is exhaustive).[122] It is rather meant to illustrate that any construction of Hesiod (or any author) is always caused by a combination of factors ultimately deriving from three different constructive 'agents': 1) the source text (and/or the author presented by it), 2) the recipient author (and his particular aims and views), and 3) the framework provided by the tradition as a whole. The precise interplay between the different mechanisms varies in each particular context. Hesiod can be remembered and forgotten for different reasons.

[122] One could also argue about the exact place of the different mechanisms along the sides of the triangle.

CHAPTER FIVE

ETHICS AND POLITICS: THE COMMON AND THE ARCANE

0. *Introduction: Hesiod the Wise*

This chapter is the thematic sequel to chapter 2 and thus deals with reception in the sphere of ethics and politics; but whereas chapter 2 is concerned with Hesiod's reception when presented together with Homer, the present chapter focuses on the ethico-political image (or construction) of Hesiod *without* the other poet. It is the chief purpose of this chapter to compare findings, so I will briefly recapitulate the three main conclusions of the earlier chapter. First of all, we have seen that there is a very strong prescriptive or normative quality attributed to the poets when they appear together; they are often put on a par with lawgivers and philosophers, the other two guidelines for life. Second, the most typical subjects of the poets' teachings are the gods and the afterlife (obviously things it is impossible to gain sure knowledge of). And third, the evaluation of the poets' influence is often very negative—it is especially their detrimental effect on the polis and the behaviour of its inhabitants that is commented upon.

This chapter is also connected to the previous one (4), a link which becomes clear when we consider what ethico-political themes are particularly associated with Hesiod when he is alone. Judging from the number of references, there are four themes—drawn, as could be expected, more or less exclusively from the *Works and Days*—that seem most specifically Hesiodic: demonology and the afterlife, political justice, human interaction in the city, and moderation. These themes are obviously connected to the persona of Hesiod as found in the *vita*, i.e. a superhuman or 'demonic' power warning against wrongdoing and injustice (see chapter 4.1).

The Hesiodic themes will be discussed in four sections below. An analysis of the sources will show not only how these Hesiodic themes are employed, but also how Hesiod's solitary image relates to that of chapter 2. As it turns out, Hesiod's knowledge on gods and the underworld is further specified as arcane wisdom concerning demons, mortality and

the afterlife. Furthermore, his destructive influence on life in the city, which is at the center of attention when he is mentioned together with Homer, changes radically into much-appreciated advice on political justice and valuable comments on the ideal form of human interaction (a change in attitude which of course annuls any problem with his nomothetical status).

It should be noted beforehand that throughout this chapter we will find that Hesiod is rather consistently depicted as 'wise', σοφός. This may strike one as less than remarkable since the chapter will focus only on subjects on which Hesiod was already considered to be some sort of expert in the first place. It appears, however, that Hesiod's connection to σοφία or 'wisdom' far exceeds the contexts discussed here, and should rather be seen as part of a general and widespread notion in antiquity: stating the case with some exaggeration, Hesiod is typically 'wise' almost to the degree that σοφός is his *epitheton ornans*.

Naturally, Hesiod's status as a wise man derives for a considerable part from the pose he assumes in the *Works and Days*, where he contrasts himself to the 'great fool' Perses[1] and constantly deals out advice that one should 'store up in one's heart';[2] it is obvious that Hesiod himself should be regarded as 'the man who thinks of everything by himself, considering what will be better, later and in the end—this man is the best of all.'[3] Hesiod's self-representation as a σοφός caught on so well that in antiquity 'wisdom poetry of various sorts was considered Hesiodic.'[4] Consequently, Hesiod is called 'wise' and associated with 'wisdom' from Pindar's times to the Roman age.[5]

Hesiod, of course, is not the only poet called σοφός; the epithet is also regularly applied to Homer.[6] Moreover, there are plenty of references

---

[1] Cf. *WD* 131, 397, 456.

[2] Cf. *WD* 27, 491.

[3] *WD* 293–294: οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτῷ πάντα νοήσει, / φρασσάμενος τά κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ᾖσιν ἀμείνω. Cf. e.g. Jensen (1966) 23–25 on Hesiod posing as the πανάριστος towards the 'fool' Perses.

[4] Lamberton (1988) 135.

[5] See e.g. Pi. *Paean* 7b.11–20 (on which see pp. 315–316 below); Pl. *Prt.* 341a, *Cra.* 396c (perhaps ironically) and *R.* 466c; Dem. *Fals.Leg.* 243, D.Chrys. 7.110 and 12.23; Plu. *Mor.* 562A, 969E, fr. 178.88 Sandbach, Jul. *Ep.* 387d, Nicolaus 1.332 Walz. Aulus Gellius calls Hesiod the 'wisest of poets' (*poetarum prudentissimus*, *NA* 1.15), the term *prudens* pointing to his practical wisdom and thinking ahead.

[6] See Verdenius (1970) 9 for some of the most interesting references; these do not prove, however, that Homer 'was regarded as the wise poet *par excellence*.'

to Hesiod and Homer together as 'wise'.[7] Still, it appears that the use of σοφός for Hesiod is remarkably frequent, which makes one suspect that Hesiod in particular was regarded as such. Two other considerations further strengthen this suspicion. One is the epigrammatic evidence.[8] Tradition has preserved two epitaphs for Hesiod, one of which runs thus:

> Ἄσκρα μὲν πατρὶς πολυλήιος, ἀλλὰ θανόντος
> ὀστέα πληξίππων γῆ Μινυῶν κατέχει
> Ἡσιόδου, τοῦ πλεῖστον ἐν Ἑλλάδι κῦδος ὀρεῖται
> ἀνδρῶν κρινόμενων ἐν βασάνῳ σοφίης.
>
> 'Ascra rich in corn was his fatherland, but now that he is dead,
> the land of the horse-striking Minyans holds the bones
> of Hesiod, whose fame will be greatest in Greece
> when men are judged by the touchstone of wisdom.'[9]

This is an intriguing epigram, the second part of which is of greatest interest here.[10] We should note that a) Hesiod's fame is celebrated in universal terms (ἐν Ἑλλάδι);[11] b) the poet is obviously reckoned among *men* (ἀνδρῶν),[12] in contrast, perhaps, to the godly nature attributed to Homer in his epitaph; and c) the quality he is praised for—and this is most relevant here—is his 'wisdom' (σοφίη), emphasized by its position. It is highly remarkable that the same elements are present also in the other version of his epitaph: 'Hail, you who were young twice, and twice received a tomb, Hesiod, who among men holds the measure of wisdom' (Χαῖρε δὶς ἡβήσας καὶ δὶς τάφου ἀντιβολήσας, / Ἡσίοδ', ἀνθρώποις

---

[7] See e.g. Pl. *R.* 600d (where the common notion is denied), D.Chrys. 14.21, Clem.Al. *Strom.* 5.4.24. Of course σοφός was also used for other poets than Hesiod and Homer.

[8] See on the epigrams mentioned here and their connection to Hesiod's σοφία also Skiadas (1965) 41–44.

[9] Own translation. The inscription is mentioned by Pausanias (9.38.4), who says the Boeotians ascribe it to the Orchomenian poet Chersias (who is unknown but for a brief appearance in Plutarch's *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men*, *Mor.* 156F); in the *AP* (reading κλέος ἐστὶν instead of κῦδος ὀρεῖται) the inscription is ascribed to Mnasalces (7.54). The epigram is also transmitted in *Cert.* 250–253 and Tz. *Vita Hes.* (Wilamowitz 1916b, p. 51.4–7), with small differences.

[10] See for the first two lines ch. 8, p. 282 n.63.

[11] Most (2006) 235 rightly translates ἐν Ἑλλάδι 'among human beings'; cf. Hdt. *Hist.* 2.53 (cf. ch. 2, pp. 63–72).

[12] The curious expression ἀνδρῶν κρινόμενων may seek to vindicate Hesiod's own suffering at the hands of unjust judges; the βάσανος ('touchstone') is already used metaphorically by Pindar (*Pyth.* 10.67).

μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης).[13] Here again we find a universal scope, human status, and an emphatic position for his wisdom, which appears as his defining characteristic.[14]

The second consideration confirming Hesiod's special connection to wisdom is the fact that authors not only call him wise (and thus add to his reputation of wisdom), but actually refer to the reputation itself. Aristotle, for instance, says that Hesiod belongs to 'those who are looked upon as wise men' (τῶν δοξάντων … σοφῶν τινες) because of his cosmogonical speculations, whereas according to Dio it was because of his inspiration that 'Hesiod came to be regarded as a wise man among the Greeks' (ἐνομίσθη σοφὸς ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν Ἡσίοδος);[15] Plutarch makes the rather general claim that Hesiod is famous for his ancient wisdom.[16] Admittedly, this consideration is not very significant in itself, but added to the remarkable use of the adjective σοφός for Hesiod, and the emphasis on the poet's σοφία in his epitaphs it provides considerable evidence for Hesiod being regarded as typically 'wise'.[17]

---

[13] *EG* 428; see for this version ch. 4, pp. 135–136.

[14] See for the central position of Hesiod's wisdom (not explicitly mentioned) on the Helicon-stèlè Hurst (1996). Heldmann (1982) 66–70 discusses Hesiod's reputation as a wise man; oddly enough, he cites the heavily ironic D.Chrys. 77.1 as one of the passages proving his point (68–69). He believes Hesiod's alleged wisdom is one of the two main reasons that Hesiod wins the contest with Homer, the other being that Homer was supposedly much younger at the time of their meeting (cf. ch. 7, p. 247 n.31).

[15] Arist. *Xen*. 975a10, D.Chrys. 7.1 (cf. Them. *Or*. 30.348c).

[16] Plu. *Thes*. 3.2: 'Now the wisdom of that [= ancient] day had some such form and force as that for which Hesiod was famous, especially in the sententious maxims of his *Works and Days*' (ἦν δὲ τῆς σοφίας ἐκείνης τοιαύτη τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἰδέα καὶ δύναμις, οἷᾳ χρησάμενος Ἡσίοδος εὐδοκίμει μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς Ἔργοις γνωμολογίας).

[17] His reputation as a wise man is further confirmed, I believe, by reactions that try to downplay his wisdom. There is a certain tendency in Aristotle to qualify Hesiod's knowledge as popular wisdom instead of philosophical insight (see e.g. *EN* 1155a32–b8 and *Metaph*. 989a8–12; cf. [Pl.] *Epin*. 990a). See also Plutarch's tell-tale defence of Hesiod's (admittedly) somewhat obvious advice 'to invite a friend to dinner, and not a foe' (*WD* 342); he needs to go through some lengths to explain why 'the advice of Hesiod is not absurd or silly, as some assert, but wise' (οὐ γελοῖον οὖν, ὥς φασί τινες, ουδὲ ἀβέλτερον, ἀλλὰ σοφόν, *Mor*. 530D). Perhaps Hesiod's connection to the αἶνος or fable (on which see e.g. Plu. *Mor*. 158B, Theon 2.74 (Spengel), Hermogenes *Prog*. 1.10 Walz, and further ch. 9, pp. 347–349) contributed to this counter-trend, for fables 'often attract the mind, particularly that of uneducated rustics, who listen to fiction in a simpler spirit' (*ducere animos solent praecipue rusticorum et imperitorum, qui et simplicius quae ficta sunt audiunt*, Quint. *Inst*. 5.11.19, who also calls Hesiod the 'first author' of the fable). Dio, planning to attack Hesiod's concept of envy (*WD* 25) first describes him in obviously ironic fashion as a broad-sweeping author who 'speaks to those who read his poems as to intelligent persons' (ὡς πρὸς συνιέντας λέγει τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς ποιήμασιν,

This being said, we should turn to the several areas of expertise to which Hesiod's reputed wisdom was most specifically related: demonology (section 1), justice in the polis (2), social interaction (3), and moderation (4).

1. *Hesiod's Demons*

As we have seen, there appears to be a particularly demonic quality to both Hesiod and his poetry. In this section, I will demonstrate how Hesiod's relatively few words on δαίμονες turned him into an expert on spirits of all kinds. We will first try to establish how and when Hesiod's reputation as a demonologist became fixed, and then attempt to briefly follow its development throughout antiquity. A comparison with Homer forms the end of this section.

Modern scholars have often commented on Hesiod's peculiar use of the term δαίμων. In the Homeric poems, it is generally agreed that the plural δαίμονες is used in much the same way as θεοί ('gods'), and despite an ongoing debate, there appears to be no very significant difference in the use of the singular either.[18] In Hesiod, however, the δαίμονες are clearly defined and set apart from the gods; according to Hesiod's tale of the Five Races, the men of the First or Golden Race are covered by the earth, and

> τοὶ μὲν δαίμονές εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλάς
> ἐσθλοί, ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.
>
> '… by the plans of great Zeus they are fine demons
> upon the earth, guardians of mortal human beings.'[19]

Obviously, these lines are nowadays often understood as a definition of demons as the earth-dwelling spirits of the departed;[20] but this clear

---

77.5). Hesiod's proud boast when introducing his fable, to speak to 'kings who themselves too have understanding' (βασιλεῦσιν φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς, 202), is thus poked fun at almost a millennium later. See on fables further pp. 347–349 below.

[18] 'The demon acts very much like a god, except that it tends to be unidentifiable and evil', Brenk (1986) 2074. See also Chantraine (1954) 51–53, Vrugt-Lentz (1974), Neue Pauly s.v. 'Dämonologie' (3.265–268), and De Jong—Van der Ben (1984). According to Laín Entralgo (1970) 34–35 the belief in demons is a more typically post-Homeric phenomenon.

[19] *WD* 122–123 (transl. slightly altered). This is the reading of the mss.; for significant variations in antiquity see West (1978) ad loc.

[20] Although the Myth of the Races was not 'invented' by Hesiod, he is generally

statement has encouraged scholars to find other hints of demonology in Hesiod as well, for instance on the demon as an avenging spirit.[21] We will focus, however, on the concept of the demon as a guardian spirit from the other world, and see how the Greeks connected that concept to Hesiod.

Although Hesiod does not explicitly say that the Golden Race dies (his only comment is that 'the earth covered them'),[22] this interpretive step was taken very early, perhaps as early as Pythagoras. Detienne argued forcibly for such a Pythagorean interpretation (and for a more general connection of Hesiodic and Pythagorean thought), claiming that Hesiod's description of demons and the Golden Age was of great eschatological value for the early Pythagoreans' belief in the immortality of the soul.[23] Although Detienne's argument is not always persuasive,[24] the book is interesting and suggestive, and certainly hits the mark where the early link between Hesiod and demonology is concerned.

That this link existed as early as the fifth century, is obvious from the *Purifications* of Empedocles, a mystical poem in which Empedocles describes himself as a δαίμων condemned to mortality;[25] he has been banished by the gods and must pass through a long series of incarnations in order to return to his earlier state of divinity. It has long been recognized that this eschatological comment on the pitiful *condition humaine*

---

credited with some refinements of his own, such as the insertion of the Race of Heroes into the metallic sequence (cf. e.g. ch. 4, p. 154), and the different types of afterlife for the races (Solmsen 1962 183–184).

[21] The primary source for the demon as the prototype for the avenging spirits called ἀλάστωρ and ἐρινύς (popular in tragedy, see Vrugt-Lentz 1974 607) is *WD* 252–255, dealing with the 'thrice ten thousand immortal guardians of Zeus' who roam the earth and keep watch on mortal humans; and even though there is no explicit mention of the word δαίμων (except for one reading), the beings described strongly resemble those mentioned in *WD* 122–123. Vrugt-Lentz (1974) 604 sees so-called 'Schadensgeister' in the many personifications of mainly evil forces in both the *WD* and *Th.* (although Hesiod would never call them δαίμονες).

[22] *WD* 121. The removal of the entire Golden Race by Zeus is quite different from normal death; see the sensible discussion of the myth of the Five Races by e.g. Fontenrose (1974). In the only comparable passage in Hesiod, *Th.* 991, Phaethon too becomes a demon but there is no explicit mention of death either.

[23] Detienne (1963a), esp. pp. 93–117. See also Detienne (1963b) 35–36 for the connection between Pythagorean and Hesiodic thought.

[24] Detienne is quick to call a source Pythagorean, and relies too heavily on material that is both late and scanty (one passage from Plato and one from Plutarch form the core of his argument, see Detienne 1963a 93–117). Moreover, he does not consider the possibility of both Hesiod and Pythagoras going back to an even earlier source. See for more detailed critique the reviews by Kerferd (1965) and Burkert (1964), and the scepticism expressed by Ter Vrugt-Lentz (1974) 613 and Brenk (1986) 2097–2098.

[25] This is the common (and most obvious) interpretation; see e.g. Detienne (1959).

(presumably all men are such fallen δαίμονες) and the true nature of religion is 'heavily indebted' to Hesiod;[26] according to Zuntz 'the word through which this myth could be perceived and conveyed was Hesiod's'.[27] To give just some examples: the denizens of Empedocles' underworld are creatures very reminiscent of Hesiod's personifications; the primal state of bliss resembles Hesiod's portrayal of the Golden Age; and the instructions on ritual (the actual 'purifications') have an esoteric flavour comparable to Hesiod's rules of proper conduct.[28]

The strongest Hesiodic influence, however, is to be found in DK B 115, the fragment on the actual banishment of the demon Empedocles: he has broken his oath never to shed blood, and must now wander apart from the blessed for 'thrice ten thousand years' (τρὶς μυρίας ὥρας). During this time he will pass through many incarnations and can never rest, being tossed hither and thither by the elements—and so he is punished for putting his trust in raving Strife (Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ). There is obvious borrowing from Hesiod here, since he in *Theogony* 775–806 speaks of a special rule among the immortals: if any god breaks the oath he took to desist from 'quarrel and strife' (ἔρις καὶ νεῖκος, 782), he must suffer years of absence from the gods' company as a penalty, until he is at last allowed again to join their assemblies and feasts. Empedocles' dependence on Hesiod is confirmed by many verbal similarities,[29] the most remarkable of which is B 115.4, 'who by his error made false the oath he swore' (ὅς κεν τὴν ἐπίορκον ἁμαρήσας ἐπομόσσῃ), which strongly resembles *Theogony* 793, 'who after pouring a libation made false the oath he swore' (ὅς κεν τὴν ἐπίορκον ἀπολλείψας ἐπομόσσῃ).[30]

Another probable reminiscence of Hesiod, to my knowledge not commented on before, is the pinball-like state of the exile, who is thrown around by the elements in B 115.8–12. His fate reminds one of the

---

[26] So Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983) 283; see also Hershbell (1970) and Zuntz (1971), esp. pp. 266–269.

[27] Zuntz (1971) 266. Zuntz goes very far in speaking of 'the younger and the elder prophet' (266), and 'the master and the disciple' (267–268). Cf. Most (2007) 289 describing Empedocles' philosophy in some features as a 'profoundly original interpretation and further elaboration of Hesiod's cosmology.'

[28] DK 31 B 118/122 and e.g. *Th.* 228–232; B 129–130 and *WD* 109–120; B 140/141 and *WD* 724–764.

[29] See Hershbell (1970) for an (almost) exhaustive list.

[30] See on this passage also Most (2007) 284–293. Perhaps the 'thrice ten thousand' years of banishment go back to Hesiod's 'thrice ten thousand' immortals watching over mankind. The expression is unique for Hesiod; Empedocles is the first to use it after him (cf. West 1966 ad loc.).

unfortunate person ending up inside the 'great chasm' in *Theogony* 736–744. The influence of the Hesiodic model is clearest when the texts are quoted in full:

Hesiod *Theogony* 736–744	Empedocles DK 31 B 115.8–12
ἔνθα δὲ **γῆς** δνοφερῆς καὶ Ταρτάρου ἠερόεντος **πόντου** τ' ἀτρυγέτοιο καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος ἑξείης πάντων πηγαὶ καὶ πείρατ' ἔασιν, **ἀργαλέ'** εὐρώεντα, τά τε **στυγέουσι** θεοί περ· χάσμα μέγ', οὐδέ κε πάντα τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν **οὖδας** ἵκοιτ', εἰ πρῶτα πυλέων ἔντοσθε γένοιτο, ἀλλά κεν ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα φέροι πρὸ θύελλα θυέλλης **ἀργαλέη**· δεινὸν δὲ καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι τοῦτο τέρας·	**ἀργαλέας** βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους. αἰθέριον μὲν γάρ σφε μένος **πόντον**δε διώκει, **πόντος** δ' ἐς χθονὸς **οὖδας** ἀπέπτυσε, **γαῖα** δ' ἐς αὐγάς ἠελίου φαέθοντος, ὁ δ' αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίνῃς· ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, **στυγέουσι** δὲ πάντες.
'That is where the sources and limits of the dark earth are, and of murky Tartarus, of the barren sea, and of the starry sky, of everything, one after another, distressful, dank, things which even the gods hate: a great chasm, whose bottom one would not reach in a whole long year, once one was inside the gates, but one would be borne hither and thither by one distressful blast after another—it is terrible even for the immortal gods, this monstrosity.'	[The demon goes through many incarnations …] 'interchanging the distressful paths of life. For the strength of aither pursues him into the sea, and the sea spits [him] onto the surface of the earth and earth into the beams of the blazing sun, and it throws him into the eddies of the air; and one after another receives [him], but they all hate [him].'[31]

Admittedly, the exact verbal similarities are less than impressive; but on a more abstract level the influence is clear. Hesiod tells of a prison-like

[31] Transl. Inwood (2001), slightly adapted. Most (2007) 286–289 discusses Hesiod's influence on Empedocles on the basis of these two passages, but misses this one.

place hated by the gods, close to the four main elements of the cosmos (earth, Tartarus, sea and heaven), where an unlucky person could be endlessly tossed hither and thither by stormwinds—Empedocles then transforms this tale into his picture of the punishment of the fallen god, imprisoned in human bodies for a sheer endless period of time, and pushed around again and again by the elementary forces of nature. And although Hesiod does not say so explicitly, his text certainly allows for the idea that the person locked up in the chasm is a god (743–744), and that he wound up there because he broke an oath.[32]

For his tale of the godlike state of man, his fall from grace, the long way of redemption and the world beyond, Empedocles looked to Hesiod's description of Tartarus, the secret rule of the gods, and the fate of the Golden Men.[33] Perhaps Hesiod's attractiveness as a model was increased by his demon-like status (as a hero who came back with knowledge from beyond),[34] although we cannot be sure of its precise influence on Empedocles' own self-description as a demon who has been on the other side. That Hesiod was not Empedocles' sole example is beyond doubt,[35] but it is obvious that in the first half of the fifth century Hesiod's words on demons could be taken to mean much more than was explicit: in fact, they turned him into an authority on eschatology and, more specifically, δαίμονες.

Hesiod's reputation as an expert on demons is firmly established by Plato (to whom later sources on Hesiodic demonology are often indebted). When discussing the meaning of the word δαίμων in the

---

[32] It is not unlikely that Empedocles combined the Hesiodic notions of the 'chasm' and the nine-year long banishment of an oath-breaking god (*Th.* 793–804), and thus located the punishment for perjury in a chasm-like maelstrom of elementary forces. This connection could be encouraged by Hesiod's statement that the gods 'hate' (στυγέουσι, 739, also 810) the chasm, just as they 'hate' Styx (στυγερή, 775—obviously, the Styx is often 'hateful' or 'hated' for reasons of etymology), the goddess of the oath. Could Empedocles' στυγέουσι be a sign of this connection? Such allusions are not impossible: see Most (2007) 288, who rather brilliantly noted that Empedocles is referring to his debt to Hesiod with the expression ἄλλος δ' ἐκ ἄλλου δέχεται ('and one after another receives', 115.12), which is not only a quote from Hesiod (*Th.* 800) but also points to Empedocles 'receiving' from Hesiod.

[33] The highest possible incarnations according to Empedocles, 'prophets, bards, doctors, and princes' (DK B 146/147), are probably selected because of their healing, balancing, or more generally 'phylactic' quality—in Hesiod, both bards and princes avert evil and cure (mental) suffering; see also Østerud (1976) 24–29.

[34] Cf. Philodemus describing the dead-and-reborn hero Melicertes as a δαίμων (see ch. 4, p. 135 n.36).

[35] Much of Empedocles' thought is Pythagorean; see e.g. Zuntz (1971) 264–265 and Inwood (2001) *passim*.

Cratylus, Socrates mentions Hesiod and quotes *Works and Days* 122–123; the Golden Men are interpreted metaphorically as the good and noble people among us, who because of their wisdom become demons both in life and death.[36] In the *Republic* (468e), the particularly brave φύλακες ('guardians') of the Ideal State become demons in death (and thus remain φύλακες); here too, Hesiod is quoted. The demons are also φύλακες of individual souls in *Republic* 620d, and the 'kings and magistrates' (βασιλέας τε καὶ ἄρχοντας) of men in *Laws* 713c–e, appointed by Cronus in the Golden Age.[37] In Plato, more obviously so than in Empedocles, the demons are 'phylactic', though of course in a strictly Platonic sense: intellectually superior, and thus fit to rule. Moreover, Plato's tone is decidedly less mystical than that of Empedocles: he tells his audience he understands the Hesiodic passage allegorically, and uses the myth as an illustration to his philosophy.[38] This difference is partly due to genre, but may also point to an increase in the familiarity with Hesiod as a demonologist.[39]

It is uncertain what happens to Hesiod the demonologist during the hellenistic age, although there are some clues that at least the Neopythagoreans and Stoics continued to associate the poet with demons.[40] In Roman times, there is much evidence for the belief in his expertise,[41] mainly provided by Plutarch (who seems to have been particularly interested in the subject). In his *On the Obsolescence of Oracles*, for instance, it is said that 'Hesiod was the first to set forth clearly and distinctly four classes of rational beings, gods, demons, heroes and, last of all, men, who are apparently presented as the start of the transformation, from the Golden Race to many good demons and from the selected demigods

[36] Pl. *Cra*. 397e–398c; the name 'daemon' itself is there said to derive from δαήμων, 'knowledgeable'.

[37] Hesiod is not explicitly mentioned here. See also *Phd*. 107d, where the demons guide the soul to the afterlife. The most famous (and influential) Platonic treatment of the δαίμων-concept is its picture of an intermediate figure between men and gods (*Smp*. 202d–203a; see Zintzen 1974); this idea is not explicit in Hesiod, either.

[38] Plato thus demystifies Hesiod, turning him into a philosopher. His 'mystical' image as the keeper of arcane knowledge, however, turns up again at *Ti*. 40e, where Socrates implies that Hesiod's knowledge on the origin of gods is beyond proof but should be believed anyway (cf. Arist. *Metaph*. 1000a9–15).

[39] See also Soury (1942) 23 for Hesiod as 'une autorité en la matière'.

[40] See Brenk (1986) 2094–2098 on the Neopythagoreans; the Stoic Strabo also refers to Hesiod's authority on demons (10.3.19).

[41] Cf. Clemens targeting Hesiod in particular as propagating the pagan belief in demons (*Protr*. 2.41.1–2).

into heroes …'.[42] Furthermore, according to Plutarch Hesiod supposedly 'hinted at' (αἰνιττόμενος) the lifetime of demons, knows about the different functions of demons, tells us how they appear on earth, defines them as departed souls, is quoted as part of a tradition of demonology, and defines them as bodiless and free souls.[43] Plutarch also makes various speakers comment variously on Hesiod's demons, which implies that Hesiod was central to discussions on demonology; furthermore, he seems to seek confirmation in Hesiod for his own ideas.[44]

There is ample evidence for Hesiod's demonology in the scholia on the *Works and Days*. For instance, the scholiast on 122 tells us that 'those who are released from life, and who are guardians of human life, he calls demons … while the divine is unmixed with us, the demons oversee the human affairs, as Plato says too.'[45] The Neoplatonist Proclus, who wrote a commentary on the *Works and Days*, also understands Hesiod's demonology in Platonic fashion. According to his reading, Hesiod's tale of the Five Races actually means that all men partake of all metals at the same time; this explains why earthly evil is ultimately indestructible. Anyone leading a golden (i.e. intellectual) life will become younger instead of older by letting go of the body, and will eventually be turned into a demon by the gods, a guardian spirit that will help the mortals relieve the pain caused by their bodies.[46]

That demonology is a distinctly Hesiodic theme seems to be confirmed by Homer's near-absence in discussions on the subject. This is probably largely due to the fact that Homer does not distinguish clearly between gods and demons, a thing noted not only by modern scholars but by the ancients as well: Plutarch explicitly contrasts Hesiod's clarity with the blurriness in the other poet: 'Homer appears to use both names

---

[42] Plu. *Mor*. 415B: Ἡσίοδος δὲ καθαρῶς καὶ διωρισμένως πρῶτος ἐξέθηκε τῶν λογικῶν τέσσαρα γένη, θεοὺς εἶτα δαίμονας εἶθ' ἥρωας τὸ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώπους, ἐξ ὧν ἔοικε ποιεῖν τὴν μεταβολήν, τοῦ μὲν χρυσοῦ γένους εἰς δαίμονας πολλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς, τῶν δ' ἡμιθέων εἰς ἥρωας ἀποκριθέντων.

[43] Plu. *Mor*. 415C–416B, 417B, 431B, 431E; 361B; 593D.

[44] Brenk (1986) 2117–2130, esp. 2129–2130. In Plutarch's time there was a debate on whether demons could be evil; whatever Plutarch may have thought of this, he seems eager to point out that the demons described by Hesiod are good ones, cf. *Mor*. 415B and 361B.

[45] Σ *WD* 122a: τοὺς μεθισταμένους τοῦ ζῆν, ὄντας δὲ φύλακας τοῦ βίου τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δαίμονας καλεῖ (…) τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἡμῖν ἀνεπίμικτον, δαίμονας δὲ τοὺς ἐφορῶντας τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων φησίν. Cf. Σ *WD* 123 and 124a.

[46] See the scholia on 109–110, 111, 113–115, 116–117, and 121–124 (all by Proclus).

in common and sometimes to speak of the gods as demons.'[47] Similar comments can be found in the scholion on *Works and Days* 122 and some of the Homeric scholia.[48] It is perhaps significant that Plato, when discussing the honour due to the good citizens of the Ideal State, cites Homer when illustrating the honour for those alive, and Hesiod for those who died.[49]

One final thing remains to be said on this topic. Some scholars have suggested that the belief in demons belonged to the 'low' culture of the uneducated many, which raises the interesting possibility that Hesiod's demonology links him to the lower classes (presumably in contrast to the 'higher' audience addressed by the anthropomorphic gods in Homer's epics).[50] But such a hypothesis can hardly stand, since 1) there are no clear indications that popular expressions of such a belief (e.g. in comedy) refer to Hesiod, and 2) clear references that we *do* have are mostly derived from high culture texts (e.g. philosophical treatises). If the link exists, it is 'in mist apparelled' like the demons themselves.

2. *Justice and the City*

The second of the Hesiodic themes to be discussed in this chapter is justice, which is generally regarded as one of Hesiod's central concerns by modern scholars as well.[51] It is the goal of this section to demonstrate

---

[47] Plu. *Mor.* 415A–B: Ὅμηρος μὲν ἔτι φαίνεται κοινῶς ἀμφοτέροις χρώμενος τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔστιν ὅτε δαίμονας προσαγορεύων. In the same treatise (*Def. Or.*), Homer is mentioned twice more in a slightly derogatory manner, as a poet with a mythical and thus a-philosophical outlook (423A and 426C–D). Brenk (1986) 2072 adduces no proof whatsoever to support his suggestion that demons are specially connected to Homer; there is certainly no truth in his statement that 'authors such as Plutarch began their discussions of the *daimones* with Homer' (*ibid.*).

[48] See Σ *Il.* 1.222 (D): 'he calls the gods demons like this … Hesiod however uses the name demons for those who are released from life' (οὕτως δὲ δαίμονας καλεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς … Ἡσίοδος δὲ δαίμονάς φησι τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μεταστάντας) and perhaps Σ *Il.* 17.98–99a–d (A and T, equating the Homeric demon with a θεός) and Σ *Od.* 10.323 ('Homer is used to calling a demon 'god' ').

[49] Pl. *R.* 468d–469a.

[50] See Chantraine (1954) 53, Ter Vrugt-Lentz (1974) 601, Brenk (1986) 2081.

[51] The scholarly discussion on the central theme or unity of the *WD* is long and complex; for an overview of the search for unity in the *WD* see Hamilton (1989) 47–52. There seems to be some agreement among scholars that the poem is primarily concerned with two central issues, justice and work; see e.g. Fontenrose (1974) and Clay (2003) 31–48 *et passim*. Detienne (1963b) was one of the first to argue that they are the same: 'Pour le paysan, la justice, c'est de travailler sa terre' (60).

that Hesiod's remarks on justice in the *Works and Days* were much appreciated in antiquity, as both wise and of great use for the city-state. Such a positive evaluation is in marked contrast with the negative influence on the polis ascribed to Hesiod when coupled with Homer (see chapter 2); we will see that this remarkable difference can be explained by the fact that Hesiod's advice on δίκη, originally meant for a small farming community, could be rather easily transferred to the new context of the polis. This process of transferral can be witnessed most clearly in Solon's adaptation of the Hesiodic theme, to which most attention will be paid in this section; some other examples from the classical period complement the picture.

Hesiodic influence runs deep in the poems of the Athenian lawgiver and poet Solon, whose fragment 13 has been called 'Solon's own comment on the *Works and Days*'.[52] Of greater interest to us, however, is fragment 4, in which Solon sings of the evil that unjust people can bring to the city, and the benefits bestowed by Eunomia ('Good government'); the idea that an entire city can suffer for the wrongs of few persons, the personification (and importance) of Δίκη and Εὐνομία, the misery deriving from σκολιαὶ δίκαι ('crooked judgements'), and the antithetical formulations to indicate the god's power (τραχέα λειαίνει, 'she makes the rough smooth' etc.),[53] have long been recognized as borrowing heavily from the first part of the *Works and Days*.[54]

Several scholars have commented on the relationship between Hesiod and Solon 4, and their focus has understandably been on the development of the concept of justice; consequently, much has been said on the extent and manner in which Solon has furthered the ideas he found in Hesiod.[55] This type of analysis, however, informed by the *a priori*

[52] Gagarin (1974a) 190; most of its ideas, however, are probably more generally Greek than specifically Hesiodic.

[53] Fr. 4 lines 17/27, 14/32, 36, 34–37 refer more or less specifically to *WD* 240–241, 220–221, 248–273, 5–8.

[54] See e.g. Solmsen (1949) 107–123 on what Solon did (justice, *eunomia*) and did not (original context, emphasis on hard work) take over from Hesiod; Havelock (1978) 256–258 discussing Hesiod as Solon's 'model', and Rousseau 1996, who concludes that Solons reworks the Hesiodic theme because 'les projets du poète et du sage seraient convergents sur le fond' (167). Lloyd-Jones (1983) 44–45 argues that Solon was also heavily influenced by the *Odyssey*.

[55] The central questions to this line of investigation, started by Jaeger (1960) 326–337, have been: 'What did Hesiod mean by δίκη? What did Solon mean by δίκη? What do those differences tell us about the way the idea of justice developed?' Almeida (2003) 70–118 gives an extended and up to date overview of the scholarly debate, and the relevant literature; see also Manuwald (1989) 1–9.

assumption that such a development must have taken place (because of the hundred years separating them),[56] tends to focus on the differences between Hesiod and Solon,[57] and presents Solon either implicitly or explicitly as a conscious innovator.[58] Such reasoning, I suggest, should be treated with caution—it was presumably not Solon's primary concern to think on how he should improve on his model. Obviously, he saw the Hesiodic paradigm as useful, and seems to have been especially interested by his ideas on the shared, polis-wide responsibility for justice (since it is also the polis as a whole that is punished for wrongdoing): the 'citizens themselves' (4.5–6) destroy the great city because of their 'foolishness' (ἀφραδίῃσιν, 5), the 'mind' of the leaders is 'unjust' (ἄδικος νόος, 7), their misbehaviour is coming upon the 'whole city' (πάσῃ πόλει, 17), there is 'civil strife' (στάσιν, 19), and the 'public evil comes home to each man' (δημόσιον κακὸν ἔρχεται οἴκαδ' ἑκάστῳ, 26)—only Eunomia can put an end to 'the anger of grievous strife' (ἀργαλέης ἔριδος χόλον, 38).[59] Solon found Hesiod's advice directly relevant, and did not, for instance, conceive of his Eunomia and Dysnomia as 'personifizierte menschliche Verhaltenweisen' to contrast them with Hesiod's 'Personen mit göttlicher Abstammung'.[60] The point is that, from the perspective of the present study, Solon's reworking of Hesiodic justice does not so much constitute a 'breakthrough in Greek thought', but rather updates Hesiodic thinking, makes him ready for use in the new polis which is (admittedly) so

[56] See Almeida (2003) 100–101 for the minority standpoint regarding Solon 'as a mere recycler of Hesiod'.

[57] Results vary from rather obvious remarks (such as those of L'Homme-Wery 1996 146–149 and Blaise 1995 35–36, who claim that Hesiod's framework is mythical or theological, but Solon's political) to interesting insights (such as that Hesiod conceives the punishment for the unjust city in terms of plague and infertility, whereas in the poem of Solon wrongdoing results automatically in dysnomia which *is* the punishment, cf. Manuwald 1989 7–8).

[58] See for similar critique Irwin (2005) 161–162.

[59] The ἀφραδίῃσιν probably refer to *WD* 134, where the people of the Silver Race are said to wrong each other through 'foolishness' and are punished accordingly by Zeus (*contra* Jaeger 1960 322 and Almeida 2003 73, who regard *Od*. 1.34 as the primary source); the ἄδικος νόος is present in *WD* 260 (nowhere in Homer); in *WD* 240–241 it is stated that 'often even a whole city suffers for a bad man who wrongs people and devises foolish things'; the evil Strife is discussed in *WD* 11–16. The focus of Solon's references is rather narrow, which has also been noted by Irwin (2005) 163 ('the overwhelming majority of Hesiodic resonances in Solon 4 are derived primarily from two sections of the *WD*: lines 213–326 and the Hymn to Zeus (1–10))'; according to her, this very fact 'suggests that Hesiod is already by the early sixth century a definitive authority on δίκη' (163 n.22).

[60] A difference as formulated by Manuwald (1989) 8.

different from Hesiod's farming community. Hesiod is not 'written off' (in an almost literal sense), but rather reborn as an authority on polis-bound justice.

The rest of this section will demonstrate, by means of examples from various genres, how strongly the concept of justice was tied to Hesiod, and how widely his authority was recognized. Thucydides, for instance, modelled his general description of στάσις or civil strife in a Greek city (3.82–83) on Hesiod's description of the unjust people of the Iron Race; Edmunds has shown how closely Thucydides' rhetoric of inversion, according to which all normal ethical conduct in the polis is turned upside down, sticks to Hesiod's verses 174–201.[61] Another example can be found in *Isthmian* 6, where Pindar praises a certain Lampon, the father of the victor in the boys' pancratium, and says that he, 'in devoting industry to his deeds, holds in particular honor that saying of Hesiod,[62] which he quotes and recommends to his sons, as he brings to his own city an adornment all share and is beloved for his acts of kindness to foreigners, pursuing due measure in judgment and holding fast to it; his tongue does not stray from his thoughts'.[63] Hesiod can apparently inspire behaviour in individuals that brings κόσμος to the city as a whole. This κόσμος ξυνός is of course primarily linked to the glory of the boy's victory, but also to Lampon's 'richtige Lebenshaltung'[64]—he is honest, fair, and treats foreigners well;[65] this is also an 'adornment all share'.[66]

---

[61] Edmunds (1975) 82–88.

[62] Presumably a reference to *WD* 412, μελέτη δέ τοι ἔργον ὀφέλλει ('industry advances work'). See on this quote also Ford (2010) 149.

[63] Pi. *Isthm.* 6.66–72: … μελέταν / ἔργοις ὀπάζων Ἡσιό- / δου μάλα τιμᾷ τοῦτ' ἔπος, / υἱοῖσί τε φράζων παραινεῖ, / ξυνὸν ἄστει κόσμον ἑῷ προσάγων / καὶ ξένων εὐεργασίαις ἀγαπᾶται, / μέτρα μὲν γνώμᾳ διώκων, μέτρα δὲ καὶ κατέχων· / γλῶσσα δ' οὐκ ἔξω φρενῶν.

[64] Thummer (1969) 110.

[65] These characteristics may refer back to the Hesiodic source as well; Bury (1965) 118 links Pindar's remark on 'due measure' to *WD* 639, and the kindness to foreigners perhaps echoes *WD* 225–227.

[66] See also Bacchylides 5.191–197, connecting a Hesiodic saying (fr. 344 MW) to truth and 'the path of justice' (κελεύθου … δίκας, following Jebb's conjecture). See further Thgn. 1.792–794, who also connects the theme of kindness to foreigners with δίκη: 'may I have noble thoughts in company with the noble, harming with hurtful deeds neither foreigner nor citizen, but living righteously' (μετὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιμι νόον, / μήτε τινὰ ξείνων δηλεύμενος ἔργμασι λυγροῖς / μήτε τιν' ἐνδήμων, ἀλλὰ δίκαιος ἐών). This passage, I believe, refers to Hesiod too: 'But they who give straight judgements to foreigners and to citizens, and go not aside from what is just, their city flourishes, and the people prosper in it' (οἳ δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι διδοῦσιν / ἰθείας καὶ μή τι

There are also more explicit references to Hesiod. When Aeschines was accused of treason by Demosthenes, for instance, he defended himself by turning the tables; according to Aeschines, it was better to throw Demosthenes out. 'Will you', he says to the jurors, 'harbour longer in your midst guilt that is so fraught with doom to itself—God grant it be not to the city!' And a citation of *Works and Days* 240–241 follows: 'often even a whole city suffers because of an evil man who sins and devises wicked deeds.'[67] Aeschines points to the danger Demosthenes poses to society again in *Against Ctesiphon*, arguing that the miserable state of Athens was caused by Demosthenes: 'Well does the poet Hesiod speak concerning such men; for he says somewhere, instructing the people and advising the cities not to take to themselves corrupt politicians'; and then *Works and Days* 240–243 and 246–247 are quoted.[68] Aeschines claims these verses are so appropriate that they seem 'to be not a poem by Hesiod, but an oracle directed against the politics of Demosthenes' (οὐ ποιήματα Ἡσιόδου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χρησμὸν εἰς τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν, 136).[69]

As for Homer, it appears that the subject of 'political justice' was not associated with his figure; I found only a few references that only remotely link him to the idea (although my grasp of the Homeric material is admit-

---

παρεκβαίνουσι δικαίου, / τοῖσι τέθηλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἀνθεῦσιν ἐν αὐτῇ, *WD* 225–227). This time, the beneficial effect of Hesiod's δίκη to the polis is transferred by Theognis to the individual citizen living in it.

[67] Aeschin. *Fals.Leg.* 158; these verses were also referred to by Solon, see note 69 below.

[68] Aeschin. *Ctes.* 134–135: εὖ γὰρ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Ἡσίοδος ὁ ποιητὴς ἀποφαίνεται. λέγει γὰρ που, παιδεύων τὰ πλήθη καὶ συμβουλεύων ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς πονηροὺς τῶν δημαγωγῶν μὴ προσδέχεσθαι. As always, it is interesting to see what is left out of the citation. Here it is Hesiod's remark that the punishment from above comes through the 'contriving of Olympian Zeus' (Ζηνὸς φραδμοσύνῃσιν Ὀλυμπίου).

[69] Apart from acknowledging Hesiod's authority on justice in the polis, these passages from Aeschines are interesting for at least two reasons. First of all, they throw an interesting light on the connection between Hesiodic and Solonic thoughts on justice (as discussed above), for Solon fr. 4 is actually preserved in Demosthenes' speech *On the False Embassy*, and is quoted by him to show how one man (Aeschines, in this case) can do damage to an entire city (Dem. *Fals.Leg.* 255–256). Aeschines returns the favour by quoting Hesiod on the same subject, which indicates that at least Aeschines thought that Solon and Hesiod were comparable—perhaps Aeschines wanted to outdo his opponent by going back to Solon's source. Second, Aeschines attributing oracular value to Hesiod's ποιήματα implies that he presents his verses as laws, for elsewhere in Aeschines, ancient (Solonic) laws are sometimes said to be so pertinent to a case that they seem to be like oracles; this seems to be a typical rhetorical strategy (see Ford 1999a, esp. 242 and 247–248). These considerations again indicate that Hesiod was of some nomothetical importance when it came to justice in the polis, which contrasts markedly with the critique on the supposedly polis-disruptive quality of Hesiod and Homer together (see ch. 2).

tely incomplete).[70] Perhaps this is because 'δίκη is an insignificant word in Homer',[71] or perhaps the Homeric poems were generally regarded as so full of violence and injustice that Hesiod could actually be opposed against 'what might gloriously be called the Iliadic temper'.[72] The idea that justice is a responsibility shared by all the citizens in the polis is an idea, it seems, regarded as specifically Hesiodic.

Finally, it remains to be said that the references to Hesiod's political justice are rather restricted in time: they appear only in the (pre-)classical age, but almost disappear in later periods. It is obvious to attribute this to the radical changes in the political situation of the Greeks themselves; when they became part of larger states governed by either Macedonians or the Romans, the idea of justice as a shared concern of all citizens lost most of its value. Apparently, there was no new Solon to update Hesiodic thought to fit an empire.

3. *People and their Dealings*

The third of the Hesiodic themes is the interaction between humans. Of course it is true that Hesiod and Homer together were generally regarded as authorities 'on how people deal with each other in society—good people and bad, ordinary folks and craftsmen';[73] but there are several indications that the image of Hesiod changes in this respect when he is alone. The concept of δίκη, which was rather firmly (and more or less exclusively) connected to Hesiod, plays an important role here as well as in the previous section: whereas Solon *cum suis* recreated Hesiodic justice as a reciprocal relationship between polis and individual citizen (as we have seen above), the Hesiodic idea of human interaction is also understood and explained in terms of balance and reciprocity.[74] Obviously, some interpretive and re-creative effort by the recipients was necessary here, too.

---

[70] Aristotle associates Homer with the idea of 'civic courage' (πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία) in *EN* 1116a15–26, *EE* 1230a16–21, and *MM* 1191a5–9, and attributes a notion of citizenship to him (*Pol.* 1253a1–9 and 1278a34–38), but this does not come anywhere near the Hesiodic involvement with the topic of political justice.

[71] Gagarin (1973) 87.

[72] Irwin (2005) 196 on Solon's appropriation of Hesiod's Eunomia.

[73] περὶ ὁμιλιῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ δημιουργῶν, in the words of Socrates (Pl. *Ion* 531c, see also ch. 7, p. 241).

[74] Cf. Segal (2001) 58 interpreting δίκη as 'path of retribution', making explicit the notion of balance that is inherent in the term.

The first indication for this particular concept of Hesiod's 'sociology' can be witnessed in the reception of his verses on the difference between beasts and men. In *Works and Days* 274–280, Hesiod tells us that Zeus allowed animals to devour each other (since there is no δίκη among them), but that he gave δίκη to men.[75] These verses are now generally believed to contain the moral of the fable (very popular in antiquity) of the hawk and the nightingale, related some 60 verses earlier, and are supposed to impress on us the idea that *only* in the animal kingdom might is right.[76] Archilochus was quick to use the idea in a fable of his own, in which a fox is wronged by an eagle and then appeals to Zeus, saying that 'you oversee men's deeds, wicked and lawful, and both the violence and the justice of beasts are your concern' (σὺ δ' ἔργ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ὁρᾷς / λεωργὰ καὶ θεμιστά, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων / ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει).[77] It is part of the joke, of course, that in the fable's world of anthropomorphic animals Hesiod's distinction does not apply anymore;[78] all the same, the reference does make clear that Hesiod's 'rule' is there to protect the weak against the strong. Similarly, in pseudo-Lysias' *Funeral Oration* the (ancestors of the) Athenians are continually praised for their willingness 'to do battle for the weaker on the side of right, rather than favour the powerful', and they too 'deemed that it was the way of wild beasts to be held subject to one another by force, but the duty of men to delimit justice by law'[79]—an attitude characterized as democratic, for obvious

[75] An idea hailed by Solmsen (1949) 96 as 'Hesiod's great contribution to (. . .) Greek humanism'.

[76] *WD* 202–212 (but see the cautionary words of Nelson 1998 78). Most modern scholars agree on the fable's function as an 'illustration of the ruthless exercise of might' (Daly 1961 50), but quarrel endlessly over who the hawk and the nightingale are meant to represent. The most obvious interpretation (hawk = kings, nightingale = Hesiod) is usually cast aside for more creative solutions, such as that of Ford 1965 (hawk = necessity, nightingale = human condition), Jensen 1966 (hawk = Zeus, nightingale = unthinking people), Tandy/Neale 1996 (hawk = kings, nightingale = Perses), and Steiner 2007 (hawk = Homeric epic, nightingale = Hesiodic poetry). According to Clay (2003) 40, the point of the tale is that 'if the poet can manage to ally himself with the demos, those who depend on the kings, the contest may even out'; Mordine (2006) connects the fable to the story of Zeus and Prometheus. See for the latest interpretation Zanker (2009), which involves the *Mahabharata*; he also provides a useful bibliography, but see for the most complete overview Van Dijk (1997) 127–134.

[77] Fr. 177 West.

[78] Irwin (1998) describes Archilochus' 'reformulation' of Hesiod as 'pointed, almost polemical' (181).

[79] [Lys.] 2.12: ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου διαμάχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς δυναμένοις χαριζόμενοι. [Lys.] 2.19: ἡγησάμενοι θηρίων μὲν ἔργον εἶναι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων βίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ προσήκειν νόμῳ μὲν ὁρίσαι τὸ δίκαιον.

reasons.[80] In this admittedly still somewhat faint and implicit manner, Hesiod is referred to as an authority on social balance, whose words provide a check on the overpowering greed of the mighty.

Another indication for Hesiod's authority on social behaviour is his apparent reputation as an expert on 'friendship' (φιλία), a term indicating an affective and mutually beneficial bond not only between friends, but also between parents and children, husbands and wives, and even among neighbours.[81] It appears that Hesiod was thought to have a say concerning all of those relationships. In Plato's *Lysis*, for instance, Socrates presents an anonymous source who believed that nothing was so hostile to like as like, and presents Hesiod's *Works and Days* 25–26 ('potter is angry with potter, and singer with singer, and beggar with beggar') as a witness (μάρτυς).[82] Plato's ironic treatment of this theory suggests it was commonly linked to Hesiod in his time, and this is in fact affirmed by a passage in Aristotle, who treats the Hesiodic saying as an anonymous proverb which is set against the more 'profound and scientific' (ἀνώτερον καὶ φυσικώτερον) explanations of named thinkers like Euripides, Heraclitus and Empedocles.[83]

Aristotle links Hesiod to the theme of φιλία again when he applies the poet's advice that one should be 'neither a man of many guests nor a man with none' to friendship, and agrees with Hesiod that marrying a young girl will be conducive to a relationship that is φιλικόν.[84] Plutarch connects Hesiod to φιλία several times,[85] but the connection goes back as far as Theognis, referring to Hesiod when he compares the fake friend (ἑταῖρος) to Pandora,[86] and again follows him in his warning against disrupting another φιλία-relationship, i.e. that between parents and children: there is little esteem, he says, for those 'who dishonour parents when they are growing old' (οἵ κ' ἀπογηράσκοντας ἀτιμάζωσι τοκῆας)[87]

---

[80] Cf. Plu. *Mor*. 1125A, where anti-social pleasure-seekers are compared to wild animals with no sense of justice; they too are to be prevented by law from devouring their neighbours.

[81] See Blundell (1989) 39–49 for this inclusive view of φιλία (that appears to represent the majority view of modern scholars); for a more restricted view, see e.g. Konstan (1996).

[82] *Ly*. 217c; see ch. 2, pp. 64–65 for the implications of this term.

[83] *EN* 1155a32–1155b8; *WD* 25 returns in *EE* 1235a18, this time without any comment on its lack of profundity.

[84] *EN* 1170b20–23 (*WD* 715), *Oec*. 1344a15–18 (*WD* 699).

[85] See *Mor*. 49F, 92A, 473A, and 491F.

[86] Theognis 1.851–852; see also 1.963–970 (and ch. 4, pp. 141–142).

[87] Theognis 1.821; there is another reference to Hesiod (*WD* 372) in Theognis' remarks on trust and distrust (1.831–832).

—a reference to the ethical inversion of the depraved Iron Age where men 'will dishonor their parents at once when they grow old,' αἶψα δὲ γηράσκοντας ἀτιμήσουσι τοκῆας (*WD* 185).[88] Similarly, Hesiod's *Works and Days* 342–351 proved the ancient *locus classicus* for advice on how to establish a friendly relationship with neighbours.[89]

It seems, then, that Hesiod is connected to a very particular type of human interaction: he stresses those values that promote a harmonious cohabitation in the polis,[90] values that we might call 'co-operative' or 'quiet' in Adkinsian terms.[91] It is useful, in this light, to remember that φιλία is a concept governed by the principle of reciprocity. According to Sahlins' convenient model, there are three degrees of reciprocity: 1) altruistic giving (giving with no obligation to return), 2) balanced reciprocity (giving and returning), and 3) negative reciprocity (taking without returning).[92] Type two, as could be expected, is the most common one and the one most conducive to valuable, long-term relationships between individuals and groups. Hesiod gives us several warnings against types one and three, and urges us to pursue type two; see, for instance, *Works and Days* 352–369, especially 354, 'give to him who gives, and do not give to him who does not give' (δόμεν, ὅς κεν δῷ, καὶ μὴ δόμεν, ὅς κεν μὴ δῷ,) and 356, 'Give is good, Grab is bad, a giver of death' (δὼς ἀγαθή, ἅρπαξ δὲ κακή, θανάτοιο δότειρα). Millett in a discussion on Hesiod's community concluded that 'reciprocity turns out to be one of the central institutions of the *Works and Days*'.[93]

Advice of this sort was originally meant in the context of a small farming community whose members (despite the ideal of complete autarky) depended on each other for survival;[94] its recipients however, living in the

---

[88] Interestingly enough, Hesiod himself presents the ungrateful attitude towards parents as one way of expressing the attitude of 'might-is-right' (*WD* 189).

[89] Especially *WD* 348 ('not even a cow would be lost, if the neighbor were not bad') seems to have risen to proverbial heights. See e.g. Arist. fr. 611.38 Rose (tracing the origin of the Hesiodic saying), D.Chrys. 77.5, Plu. *Mor*. 34B, Jul. *Ep*. 409b.

[90] Cf. Aristid. 24.13, who understands Hesiod's division of the two Strifes (*WD* 11–24) as promoting concord in the city, and later (15) says of Hesiod that 'there is no poet (…) who begins with any other point or honors anything more than friendship and trust in one another' (οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐ ποιητής, ὅστις ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἄρχεται, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι μᾶλλον πρεσβεύει τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίας καὶ πίστεως).

[91] See for the distinction between competitive values (which dominate the Homeric poems) and co-operative ones e.g. Adkins (1960) and (1972).

[92] This summary of Sahlins' theory comes from Donlan (1998) 51.

[93] Millett (1984) 100.

[94] Cf. e.g. Millett (1984) 93–103, Tandy/Neale (1996) 37, and esp. Edwards (2004) ch. 3.

new context of the full-fledged city, interpreted it as semi-philosophical speculation on correct behaviour among citizens. Like the Hesiodic concept of justice, his idea of φιλία was thus transformed and updated. On occasion, this could mean that Hesiod's wisdom was integrated into the age-old behavioral code of 'help your friends and harm your enemies'.[95] Most of the time, however, Hesiod is presented as promoting social balance and warning against the negative spiral of mutual enmity. This picture is consistent throughout antiquity. Hesiod's saying that one should listen to both sides of the story, for instance, is referred to by Aristophanes, occurs in pseudo-Plato's *Demodocus*, and is adapted by Zeno.[96] Cicero mentions *Works and Days* 350, on returning favours with interest, no less than three times, two of which concern the return of kindness or goodwill.[97] Perhaps the most interesting reference, however, comes from the beginning of the *Ethica Nicomachea*, where Aristotle discusses the theme of justice, and claims that some believe justice to be reciprocity (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός): 'people want even the justice of Rhadamanthys to mean this: 'Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would be done' (εἴ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἐπρέξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο)'.[98] Evidently, this Hesiodic phrase figured as a common guideline on social interaction, and even though Aristotle himself believed it too simple a picture, he does admit that 'in associations for exchange this sort of justice holds men together (...), for it is by proportionate requital that the city holds together.'[99]

The Hesiodic idea of social balance may also serve as a warning never to initiate any kind of wrongdoing. Alcaeus was inspired by *Works and Days* 721 ('if you speak evil, you will soon be worse spoken of', εἰ δὲ κακὸν εἴποις, τάχα κ' αὐτὸς μεῖζον ἀκούσαις) when he wrote that 'if you say what you want, you will hear what you do not want' (αἴ κ' εἴπῃς, τὰ θέλῃς, ⟨καί κεν⟩ ἀκούσαις, τά κ⟨εν⟩ οὐ θέλοις).[100] Callimachus seems

[95] See Archilochus, who in fragment 23.14 West says he knows how 'to love those who love him' (τὸν φιλέοντα φιλεῖν, copying *WD* 353) and then adds 'and how to hate my enemy' (τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν ἐχθαίρειν, cf. Phld. *Epigr.* 23, which probably refers to Archilochus); see also Thgn. 1.1090, who refers to Hesiod's advice to pay back double the man who hurts you (*WD* 710–711).

[96] MW 338; Ar. *V.* 725, [Pl.] *Demod.* 383b, Zeno SVF 1.78. The saying is perhaps not Hesiod's; it was also attributed to Phocylides and Democritus.

[97] Cic. *Att.* 13.12, *Brut.* 4.15, *Off.* 1.15.48.

[98] *EN* 1132b25–26 (fr. 286 MW); Detienne (1962) 23–24 believed that the 'people' mentioned by Aristotle refer to the Pythagoreans. See also Jul. *Caes.* 314a.

[99] Arist. *EN* 1132b31–34: ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον (...), τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις.

[100] Alc. fr. 341 L-P; Proclus already saw the reference (Σ *WD* 721).

to have regarded the notion that 'causing evil to another man causes evil to his own heart' (τεύχων ὡς ἑτέρῳ τις ἑῷ κακὸν ἦπατι τεύχει) as so central to Hesiod's message that he listed it right next to the birth of Chaos as one of the things the Muses taught him.[101] Callimachus' addition 'to the heart' (ἦπατι)[102] suggests that Hesiod's advice, originally prompted by strictly economic motivations, is in the meantime understood (or re-created) as an ethico-philosophical statement on keeping oneself pure and unpolluted by crime. This is certainly Plutarch's interpretation of this *Works and Days*-passage; he believed that Hesiod meant that any criminal damages his own soul, and so by committing a crime is *ipso facto* punished by it, since he will for the rest of his life be haunted by feelings of remorse. Hesiod, as the argument goes, is thus even stricter than Plato, who said that punishment *follows* (instead of being coeval with) crime.[103]

It is difficult to see how Homer related to the theme of social balance. His poems are mainly about heroes performing extraordinary feats outside a strictly 'political' framework, and scholars have noted that Homer does not describe and perhaps does not know the city.[104] And even though it is not true, as Adkins claimed, that only the competitive values are praised in his poems,[105] it can still be argued that Hesiod's embrace of the victim's perspective is 'refreshingly antithetical to Homer's'.[106] The question remains to what degree (if any) the Greeks were alive to this difference. Since a complete overview of all the Homeric material is impossible (or at least far beyond the scope of this section) we can only say that 'socio-political' references to Homer are relatively few.[107] In some of

[101] Call. fr. 2.5 Pf., referring to *WD* 265 (οἷ γ' αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων). Pfeiffer ad loc. already drew the logical conclusion that the Muses in this version taught both the *Th.* and *WD* to Hesiod near the Heliconian Hippocrene; but it is perhaps more remarkable that Callimachus chose verse 265 to represent the *WD*.

[102] The addition is presumably the work of Callimachus, see Pfeiffer ad loc.; it was copied in that form by Lucillius (*AP* 9.183).

[103] Plu. *Mor.* 553F–554A; the comparison with Plato is a sure sign that Plutarch believed Hesiod was speaking of the condition of the soul.

[104] See Morris (1986) 96–97, referring esp. to several publications of Finley. Cf. Goldhill (1991) 126, who demonstrates that excellence (ἀρετή) from the sixth century onwards is more and more 'sited within the context of the polis', and that there is progressively less honour (τιμή) for the individual heroics of Homer's protagonists. Hunter (2004) 249, however, rightly argues that Homeric values too 'had been subsumed into, rather than erased by, the values of the polis', thus warning us against a too dichotomous view.

[105] Adkins (1960); see the critique by e.g. Long (1970) and Rowe (1983b). Donlan (1998) demonstrated that all the degrees or kinds of reciprocity are present in Homer.

[106] Lamberton (1988) 66, calling it 'Hesiod's most characteristic perspective.'

[107] A notable exception being Homer's reputed expertise on ξενία ('the treatment of guests'), a theme of central importance in the *Odyssey*. Still, it should be noted that ξενία

the most important authors we have discussed here, such references are either absent (Theognis), less frequent than references to Hesiod (Aristotle),[108] or outweighed by references to 'competitive' values (Plato). If Hesiod is the nightingale, then Homer appears as the hawk.

4. *Moderation and Simplicity*

The fourth and final Hesiodic theme discussed here concerns moderation and simplicity, concepts obviously connected to the previous themes. Hesiod, it seems, was from early times onward connected to present poverty, resulting from the tragically lost days of bliss and comfort. Although this status occasionally made him the target of (mildly) ironic jests, especially in Roman times, it was far more often employed in a positive sense. So, Hesiod could become the champion of frugality, warning against the corruptive power of greed and money. In this case too, it is especially the polis as a whole that could benefit from his advice.

Theognis is the first to refer to poverty in Hesiodic terms: he deplores 'accursed poverty'[109] twice in contexts clearly reminiscent of Hesiod, and wishes for a wealthy and youthful life not dissimilar to that of the Golden Age. Poverty, as in Hesiod, is accepted as a godgiven fact of the human condition, and thus should not be held against the poor: 'never, pray, out of anger at a man throw heart-rending poverty and accursed indigence in his face'.[110] Wealth may be a highly desirable thing, but Theognis knew it did not always indicate a person's goodness, 'for some keep their baseness hidden by wealth and others their merit by accursed poverty' (οἱ μὲν γὰρ κακότητα κατακρύψαντες ἔχουσι / πλούτῳ, τοὶ δ' ἀρετὴν οὐλομένῃ πενίῃ); there is a reference here to Hesiod's gods who 'keep livelihood

---

is a social institution that primarily involves two (or more) individuals from different cities, and is less concerned with behaviour inside the polis.

[108] Aristotle (in *EN* and *EE*) couples Homer to the theme of friendship three times, but only once to friendship among equals (*EN* 1155a15); the other two cases refer to the φιλία of a father to his children, which is likened to that of a king to his subjects (*EN* 1160b24–27 and 1161a10–15).

[109] Thgn. 1.155–156 and 1062: οὐλομένη πενίη (*WD* 717).

[110] Thgn. 1.155–156: μήποτέ μοι πενίην θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρὶ χαλεφθεὶς / μηδ' ἀχρημοσύνην οὐλομένην πρόφερε. The passage continues with 'be assured that Zeus inclines the scales now on this side, now on that; now to be wealthy, now to have nothing'; cf. *WD* 717–718 'do not ever dare to reproach a man with baneful, spirit-destroying poverty, the gift of the blessed ones that always are' (μηδέ ποτ' οὐλομένην πενίην θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρὶ / τέτλαθ' ὀνειδίζειν, μακάρων δόσιν αἰὲν ἐόντων).

hidden' (κρύψαντες ἔχουσι βίον) from men so that they need to toil[111]—these are dreadful circumstances the immutability of which must simply be accepted.

It follows naturally that Hesiod's poverty appears favourably in contexts that regard little means as a sign of moral decency, and wealth as a source of corruption. Democritus criticizes the 'evil gain' of the *nouveau riche* in Hesiodic terms,[112] and comments on Hesiod's famous words that 'work is no disgrace' with his own maxim that 'wealth acquired by bad deeds makes the disgrace more apparent'.[113] In this type of discourse wealth can even, from a certain point of view, be regarded as a bad thing itself. Plutarch describes the Hesiodic idea on the evil effects of wealth in Hesiodic fashion when he says that 'wealth, overwhelming and overpowering you, like the woman in Hesiod 'singes without a brand and ages ere your time', bringing upon the mind like premature winkles and grey hairs the cares and distractions that come from avarice.'[114]

The worst thing about wealth is apparently that it inspires greed. Hesiod is often cited to warn against its pernicious effects; the powerfully paradoxical *Works and Days* 40, 'the half is more than the whole' (πλέον ἥμισυ παντός) became somewhat of a slogan in these contexts. It seems that the Suda's explanation of this verse ('that the little bit with justice has much more profit than the greater with injustice')[115] was the standard one in antiquity.[116] It is of interest that the greed Hesiod warned against

---

[111] Thgn. 1.1061–1062, *WD* 42; the parallel is not recorded by Young (1971) or West (1978).

[112] DK 68 B 220: κακὰ κέρδεα (cf. B 221), *WD* 352. See for the connection between poverty and work Desmond 27–103 (esp. 72–76 for the traditional work-ethic as exemplified by the *WD*).

[113] *WD* 311: ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, echoed by DK 68 B 218: πλοῦτος ἀπὸ κακῆς ἐργασίης περιγενόμενος ἐπιφανέστερον τὸ ὄνειδος κέκτηται. Many Democritean fragments remind one of Hesiod's ethical teachings, see e.g. DK 68 B 3 (*WD* 689–691), 204 (*WD* 291–292), 238 (*WD* 210–211), 252 (*WD* 11–26).

[114] Plu. *Mor.* 526F–527A: ὁ πλοῦτος περιχυθεὶς καὶ κρατήσας, ὥσπερ ἡ παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ γυνή 'εὖει ἄτερ δαλοῦ καὶ ὠμῷ γήραϊ δῶκεν', ὥσπερ ῥυτίδας ἀώρους ἢ πολιὰς ἐπαγαγὼν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰς φροντίδας ἐκ τῆς φιλαργυρίας καὶ τὰς ἀσχολίας, quoting *WD* 705.

[115] Suda 3.569: τὸ ὀλίγον μετὰ δικαιοσύνης τοῦ πολλοῦ μετὰ ἀδικίας πλείονα ἔχει τὴν ὄνησιν.

[116] See also West (1978) ad loc. It seems to be the standard interpretation of modern scholars as well, although there are some interesting alternative interpretations. According to Gagarin (1974b) 110–111, Hesiod is saying to Perses that 'a simple but adequate livelihood is preferable to the risk that dire poverty may follow from excessive greed', while Nettel (1976) and Rousseau (1996) focus on the mallow and asphodel mentioned as a 'great boon' in the next line (*WD* 41). Both note that these are plants that grow by

was thought to be particularly dangerous to society as a whole. This idea is brought forward quite clearly in Plato: when a guardian in Plato's State will use his power to appropriate everything in the city for himself, he will 'find out that Hesiod was indeed wise, who said that the half was in some way more than the whole.'[117] Similarly, in the *Laws*, the kings of Argos and Messene are said to have destroyed themselves and Greece by forgetting 'the solid truth of Hesiod's saying.'[118] Dio Chrysostom too stresses that despite Hesiod's warning kings or the people themselves have in the past 'attempted to transgress the principle of justice and grasp at the greater share,'[119] thus causing their own ruin. Dio also states that it was Hesiod who warned us that kings are particularly open to the seductive power of money, which 'drags generals of cities to the gates, so as to open them and act the traitor.'[120] In all these cases, greed is in Hesiodic fashion presented as something that upsets the balance of justice and disrupts the community as a whole.[121]

Hesiod figures more often in contexts that condemn (the trouble deriving from) wealth than in those actually praising poverty. I could find

---

themselves, without cultivation, a quality they associate with the αὐτόματος βίος of the Golden Age. Nettel takes the link to mean that in the Golden Age people were happy with mallow and asphodel, and so that half was enough for them. Rousseau, however, believes that the link functions as an ironic foil, and that people nowadays can only come close to a life resembling the Golden Age when they work hard and live in a good city; under kings that rule badly, people will have to be satisfied with mallow and asphodel, a 'non-bios', 'une alimentation qui n'en est justement pas une' (156). Miller (2001) 273–275 interestingly connects the saying with the conduct of Uranus and Cronus in the *Th.*; both were punished for trying to keep everything for themselves, while Zeus neatly distributes all honours among the gods. There seems to be less textual support for the interpretations of Verdenius (1972) ad loc. ('poor food is a boon compared with no food at all') or Tandy/Neale (1996) 56, who think that 'the half' refers to a toilsome life, while 'the whole' represents an 'utterly untroubled life such as gods enjoy, but which is fraught with danger for mortals', quoting Crotty (1982) 43.

[117] Pl. *R.* 466c: γνώσεται τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἦν σοφὸς λέγων πλέον εἶναι πως ἥμισυ παντός.

[118] Pl. *Lg.* 690e: ἀνοήσαντες τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὀρθότατα λέγοντα. The ruler's lack of moderation leading to evil is denounced in Hesiodic terms again in *Lg.* 713c–714a (on the present deviance from the age of Cronus).

[119] D.Chrys. 17.12: ἐπιχειρήσας ὑπερβῆναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τοῦ πλείονος ὀρεχθῆναι.

[120] D.Chrys. 80.12: σύρει δὲ πόλεων στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ πύλας, ὥστε ἀνοίγειν καὶ προδιδόναι.

[121] It is easy to see how the Hesiodic concept of the 'gift-eating kings' destroying society with their 'crooked judgements' (*WD* 220–221, 263–264) could have promoted this image, although there are no explicit links. See D.Chrys. 7.110–111 and Plu. *Mor.* 527B for a Hesiod-related rejection of luxury in the city, and Thgn. 1.923–924 warning Democles in Hesiodic terms to be thrifty and careful.

only one such passage, provided by Plutarch, arguably Hesiod's greatest fan in antiquity. In the *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men*, the poet is praised for advocating frugality and the benefits of simple foods;[122] he is also believed to have invented the no-hunger drug *alimon*, presumably of particular use to people who cannot afford food.[123] His modest outlook on life is further reflected in his knowledge of health and medicine, since he is said to know about 'the daily course of life, the mixing of wine, the value of water, the bathing of women, the right time for intercourse, and the way in which infants should sit'.[124] For the belief that Hesiod himself was poor, just like his original audience, see further chapter 9.

It is obvious that the Hesiodic theme of moderation is closely connected to that of justice and social balance. In this case too, the advice from the *Works and Days* is interpreted in a context it was not originally meant for, i.e. that of polis, and so again Hesiod is transformed and updated. The relation of Homer to this subject is a question too large to deal with here; suffice it to say, with Donlan, that only a developed community can produce critique on the excesses of typically epic-heroic values, such as 'arrogance, (...) luxury, (...) mere appearance'.[125] Hesiodic values thus seem to fit the polis better than Homeric ones, and there is reason to think the two poets were employed as icons of contrasting ideologies; this, however, will be further discussed in chapter 8.

5. *Conclusion*

In this chapter we have taken a look at the four ethical themes most associated with Hesiod in antiquity: 1) demonology, concerned with the care for one's soul and its fate in the afterlife; 2) justice in the polis, on the individual's responsibility for the well-being of the city as a whole; 3) human interaction, on the value of reciprocity; and 4) moderation and simplicity, dealing with the dangers of greed and the benefits of a

[122] Plu. *Mor*. 157F.

[123] Plu. *Mor*. 157F (where Hesiod's status as the inventor is doubted by an interlocutor), and *Mor*. 940C; see also Pl. *Lg*. 677e.

[124] Plu. *Mor*. 158A–B: περὶ διαίτης καὶ κράσεως οἴνου καὶ ἀρετῆς ὕδατος καὶ λουτροῦ γυναικῶν διαλεγόμενος καὶ συνουσίας καιροῦ καὶ βρεφῶν καθίσεως. The references are to *WD* 405–821, 744–745, 737–741, 753–755, 735–736 and 750–752, respectively. Hesiod seems to be connected to a rudimentary way of living again in Plu. fr. 157.124–129 Sandbach, but the context is unclear.

[125] Donlan (1973) 149; 'the focal point (...) is now the community not the individual' (*ibid*.).

simple life. Central to all four is the concept of balance or proportionate compensation: keep your soul clean, and become a good spirit; act justly, and live in a flourishing polis; give, and get something in return; overstretch, and punishment will follow.

Hesiod's message of balanced reciprocity was thought to be particularly appropriate for the community of people living together in the polis. Early sources, especially the elegiac poets Solon and Theognis, use Hesiod to comment on the relatively new phenomenon of the city and its proper social code. It is wrong to cast such reception in terms of linear development; rather, there exists a form of 'reciprocity' between the source and the recipient as well: Solon, for instance, appropriates Hesiod's authority, borrows ideas, and enjoys the safety of grounding his innovations (whether conscious or not) in a familiar framework—in return, Hesiod is rejuvenated and made ready for contexts that his poem was not originally designed for.[126] In later and more systematic treatments of social behaviour, such as Plato's *Lysis* and especially Aristotle's *Ethics*, we find sure traces of a widespread and popular notion of Hesiod as an authority on reciprocity (while the philosophers themselves out of professional rivalry sometimes emphasize Hesiod's lack of intellectual depth).[127] The interest in Hesiod as a 'political' writer is reflected in the distribution of references to the *Works and Days*: many to the first part, that deals with the polis, and few to the second part, which focuses more narrowly on the *oikos*.[128]

The creation of Hesiod as a political thinker shows us how easily the past is adjusted to fit the present. The original context of borrowing and lending in a small village of farmers is completely forgotten as Hesiod's

[126] As Svenbro (1976) 92 puts it, the songs of Homer and Hesiod are 'enracinés dans un monde avec lequel la Cité a dû rompre pour s'établir'. But even though this is probably true in its own right, Hesiod can survive because of his recreation 'in a Solonian image' (Irwin 2005 163).

[127] There thus seems to be little truth in the claim of Fakas (2001) 101 (and others like him) that Hesiod was rather regarded as a teacher on agriculture than that he was associated with an ethical message. The claim is based on the modern-day stereotype of Hesiod as a grumpy old farmer; Fakas refers to none of the material discussed in this chapter (moreover, of the 9 references to Hesiod's agricultural teaching he mentions, 5 are Roman).

[128] When we apply the caesura of Hamilton (1989) 58 at verse 286 (and leave out the immense mountain of lines 287–292), I count 55 references to the first part on the polis and 54 references to the second part on the *oikos* in archaic and classical times. Since the second part (543 lines) is almost twice the size of the first (285), the density of the references to the first part is almost twice as large as that to the second part. See also the commemograms on pp. 19–20.

advice turns out to be equally applicable to the new context of the nascent polis in its classical sense. When politics and just leadership become less of an issue in post-classical times, the theme of reciprocity is again transformed, this time into a more personal code on how to behave in order to be rewarded after death. Incidentally, this chapter (like chapter 4) further illustrates how easily the persona of the poet was equated to the content of his works: the teacher of simplicity and moderation can be pictured as poor and practical himself, just as the expert on demons became a beneficial presence after his death.

It is interesting to compare this picture of Hesiod with the evaluation of the ethics of Hesiod and Homer together. We have seen, in chapter 2, that Hesiod's teaching was either rejected or at least believed to sit uncomfortably with the precepts of philosophers and lawgivers. When Hesiod is alone, on the other hand, his verses meet with almost universal approval. I do no wish to claim that this radical change is unique for Hesiod; when he is alone, there is plenty of praise for Homer as well—as we have seen, Hesiod and Homer are often grouped in order to represent the potentially false or detrimental nature of *poetry as a whole*, and this notion of collectivity is absent when they are cited individually. It *is* remarkable, however, that Hesiod alone receives praise for his teaching on the exact same subjects he was attacked for when combined with Homer: proper behaviour in the polis, and stories about the afterlife.

This conclusion will also look ahead, for it is interesting to consider what we have *not* seen in this chapter. Take, for instance, the conventional picture of Hesiod, the old farmer, the people's prophet, the pacifist—this side of the Hesiodic persona did so far not come to the fore. Surely, the association with the theme of peace could be deduced from his warnings against arrogance, greed, and other transgressive behaviour, but it remains far from explicit. Similarly, there is a certain connection between Hesiod and the people, because of his popular wisdom and firm rejection of the aristocratic principle of 'might is right'; but it would be overly bold to describe Hesiodic thought as democratic. And finally, although we have seen some agricultural qualities of Hesiod in this chapter, his polis-related σοφία makes him more of a politically-minded citizen than a secluded farmer. I am not suggesting here that the traditional picture of Hesiod is not grounded in antiquity; it definitely *is*. But when Hesiod is alone, he is a different person, and we can see only a dim outline of the figure drawn in vivid colours when he is contrasted to Homer, which will be the subject of chapter 8.

CHAPTER SIX

PHILOSOPHY: GREAT AND SMALL

0. *Introduction*

This chapter is the last to focus on Hesiod without Homer, and will deal with the philosophical qualities ascribed to the poet. As in chapter 3, philosophy is to be understood here as covering thought and speculation on natural philosophy, the way to acquire knowledge, and the relation between language and truth (for the sake of convenience, ethics was treated separately in chapter 5). In chapter 3 we have seen that Hesiod and Homer together were generally not regarded as philosophers in this more limited sense. As a team, they are not appropriated by individual thinkers or specific schools of thought to propagate specific ideas.

When Hesiod is alone, things are very different. From its earliest reception onwards, the Greeks regarded the *Theogony* as a textbook of great philosophical import (comparable to the *Works and Days* in the field of ethics).[1] Its relevance to cosmology and physics was realized immediately, and early thinkers from Anaximander to Empedocles saw Hesiod as their predecessor on the path to the great theory of everything. But we should note beforehand that it was not just the bare fact *that* Hesiod had described the cosmos that made him so appealing to later philosophers; of considerably greater importance (at least to the history of Hesiod's reception) was the *way* he was believed to have done so: meticulously collecting as many data as possible, searching for the smallest building-blocks of the world, and explaining the total of reality through the sum of its constituent parts. Hesiod, as we will see, was thus credited not only with a world view that could be called philosophical, but with a genuinely philosophical method as well. It is one of the main theses of this chapter that this was the reason that Hesiod, when the interest in natural philosophy had waned somewhat, remained greatly relevant to thinkers in the classical period and beyond.

---

[1] See ch. 5, esp. pp. 172–186.

This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section will present an overview of Hesiod's reputation as a natural philosopher, given shape by thinkers from Anaximenes to the Stoics. Its main goal is to establish Hesiod's image as a philosopher combining a cosmic scope with a preoccupation with elements. Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of the reception of Hesiod's *Dichterweihe*, the introductory scene from the *Theogony* which many philosophers interpreted as a statement on epistemology, and an indication of the poet-philosopher's methodology. We will see how recipients adopted the topos of revelation to elucidate their own philosophical method, comparing and contrasting their method to those of previous thinkers. Finally, in the third section, we will see how Hesiod's reputation as a speaker of truth and a thinker in elements made him useful to certain philosophers exploring the correspondence between language and reality, and the capacity of language to convey truth.

1. *Natural Philosophy*

There is a trend, in both ancient and modern doxography, to rank Hesiod among the earliest philosophers. In modern scholarship, Snell claimed that Hesiod's *Götterwelt* testifies to serious philosophical speculation, Fränkel wrote that 'the history of Greek philosophy as literature begins not with Anaximander but with Hesiod', and Wade-Gery called Hesiod the first presocratic.[2] Such qualifications, even in some more extreme forms (in which Hesiod is turned into a culture hero ushering in mankind from the outdated world of *mythos* into the modern one of *logos*),[3] are by no means extraordinary. Hesiod is nowadays almost universally regarded as a formidable thinker sometimes tied to archaic modes of expression but otherwise way ahead of his time: he is defining, organizing, classifying, conceptualizing; systematic, rational, abstract,

[2] Snell (1955) 65–82 (esp. 78 'Vorläufer der Philosophen'), Fränkel (1975) 515 speaking of 'profound ontological speculations', Wade-Gery (1949) 81.

[3] See Kirk (1970) 226–251 discussing the modern concept of the 'Hesiodic Revolution' (247, and concluding that Hesiod was a great organizer of the mythical tradition, but not the first); cf. e.g. Burn (1936) 73 who describes Hesiod as 'a worthy member of the band of Greek thinkers (…), a true forerunner of those Ionians who almost in one stroke cut away from their lives the whole mass of the old irrational terrors of 'natural man."

intellectual, analytical, even scientific.[4] This particular view of the poet is in fact one of the very few constants in modern Hesiodic scholarship.

In antiquity, Hesiod is often called a philosopher, but rather implicitly than explicitly;[5] his classification as such is perhaps more obvious from his association with 'real' philosophers. Plato, for instance, compares him to Parmenides, and so does Aristotle, who also associates Hesiod with 'the first natural philosophers' (οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες);[6] both Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius put Hesiod next to Parmenides, Xenophanes and Empedocles.[7] Interestingly enough, Homer, despite his great reputation as a philosopher in antiquity, is often absent from ancient 'lists' of the *earliest* philosophers; there are, at any rate, *no* instances of Hesiod and Homer together being ranked among the presocratics—as a team, they can be wise men, authorities on ethics, sophists even, but not natural philosophers. This is perhaps a first indication that the subject of natural philosophy could be used to distinguish Hesiod from Homer.[8] Incidentally, this distinction from Homer can also be witnessed in modern scholarship.[9]

---

[4] Cf. e.g. Sellschop (1934) 99–101 (despite Hesiod's *Gebundenheit an die epische Formel* he is still on the way to *philosophische Begriffssprache*), 104 (Hesiod's *Intellektualismus* sets the tone for Greek philosophy); Diller 1946 (Hesiod rejects coincidence in favour of nature's *Gezetzmässigkeit*); Baldry (1952) 91 saying Hesiod was not only a farmer-poet, but a thinker as well; Angier (1964) 329 on Hesiod's 'organizing and classifying mind'; Sinclair (1966) xxvii stating Hesiod 'deserves to be considered as a poet and philosopher'; Philips (1973) on Hesiod's 'speculation' and 'abstract reasoning' (300) and his conflicting roles as philosopher and story-teller (302); Most (1991) 86 on Hesiod's 'selective, analytic approach'; Bowie 1993 (21) characterizing Hesiod's poetry as 'philosophical'; Clay (2003) 50 suggesting Hesiod is a presocratic because 'he too seems obsessed with the question of beginnings'. Rowe (1983a) presents a slightly different view since he qualifies Hesiod's thinking as 'unscientific' rather than 'pre-scientific' (135).

[5] Nowhere in antiquity, at least so far as I know, is Hesiod explicitly called a φιλόσοφος; he is said to have spoken 'most philosophically' (πάνυ φιλοσόφως) in the scholia (Σ *WD* 130–131 and 130a, and less directly 286, cf. Aphthonius 1.66 Walz; Nicolaus 1.281 Walz). Plutarch claims that Hesiod demonstrates 'a better understanding than some philosophers' (ἐνίων φιλοσόφων βέλτιον διανοηθείς, *Mor.* 433E), and Sextus Empiricus explicitly bans Hesiod from the field of φιλοσοφία (*P.* 3.123).

[6] Pl. *Smp.* 178b; Arist. *Metaph.* 984b23–31 and *Cael.* 298b25–29.

[7] Plu. *Mor.* 402E, 756F and 927E; D.L. 9.22.

[8] See Clay (1992) 138, who notes the same 'segregation' (though on the basis of little evidence). See also Lamberton (1986) 28 who suggests that Homer does not belong to Aristotle's class of 'Hesiod and his school and all the theologians' (*Metaph.* 1000a9).

[9] See e.g. Gigon (1945) 13–21, who opposes 'Hesiodic truth' to 'Homeric myth' and thus begins his book on the origins of Greek philosophy with Hesiod, and Jaeger (1947) 9–11, who calls Hesiod a precursor of philosophy and then explains why Homer cannot be classified as such. But perhaps this distinction is somewhat outdated: it seems that the importance of Homer as a precursor of natural philosophy is more and more recognized

This section deals with the ancient concept of Hesiod as a natural philosopher. I will first demonstrate how the earliest Greek thinkers on science and cosmogony created a Hesiod after their own image, by examining the passages they borrowed from their source text and the way they interpreted it. I will then proceed to investigate how this picture of Hesiodic physics influenced later conceptions of the poet as a natural philosopher (in fact, the post-classical views of Hesiod on this particular subject are remarkably similar to those of the earlier period). The subject of Hesiod's influence on later physiology is a vast subject on which much has been said and written. The overview presented here must therefore necessarily be selective and sketchy, highlighting only those characteristics of Hesiod-the-natural-philosopher that were useful to other areas of philosophy—the most interesting part of this chapter, described in sections 2 and 3.

The first recipients of Hesiodic cosmogony were the Milesians.[10] Anaximander postulated the Apeiron ('Infinite') as the ultimate origin, from which the hot and cold came to be, creating 'a kind of sphere of flame' around the air surrounding the earth; then, the flame 'was broken off' into circles of fire which made up the heavenly bodies. Anaximenes believed air to have produced earth through a process of condensation; from the earth then arose a rarefied form of air called fire, creating the 'sun and moon and remaining heavenly bodies'.[11] Cornford argued for a strong Hesiodic influence on the Milesian cosmogonies,[12] and pointed to several striking similarities in their proposed sequence of cosmogonical events: first there is primal unity, followed by separation, and this process enables the separated opposites to interact and generate more life. The opening of the primal gap also causes light to enter, and then pieces of the earth break off to form the stars. The sequence then ends with the separation of the dry land from the sea. Stokes further developed and somewhat modified Cornford's ideas in two influential articles.[13] He

(see for instance how Homer is included among 'the forerunners of mythical cosmogony' in Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983), right next to Hesiod, while Homer is absent from Diels-Kranz, who include Hesiod).

[10] I will only discuss Anaximander and Anaximenes because almost nothing is left of Thales' cosmogony. For the same reason, I leave out theogonists like Acusilaus, Orpheus and Pherecydes.

[11] DK 12 A 10 (Anaximander) and DK 13 A 6 (Anaximenes), following the interpretation of Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983).

[12] Cornford (1950) and (1952) 187–201.

[13] Stokes (1962) and (1963).

convincingly argued that Anaximenes, though later than Anaximander, actually follows Hesiod more closely.[14] More importantly, however, he complemented Cornford's findings with an investigation of the primary entities proposed by the three thinkers: Chaos, Apeiron and Air. Many of their characteristics were found to correspond: immense size, internal motion, divinity, and (probably) homogeneity. These similarities were often noted and further elaborated by later scholars.[15]

Three relevant points emerge. The first and rather obvious one is that it is indeed Hesiod rather than Homer to whom the earliest cosmologists turn,[16] and to the *Theogony* rather than to the *Works and Days*.[17] The second is that Anaximander and Anaximenes apparently thought of Hesiod as a natural philosopher, that is, as someone engaged in the same enterprise as they were: according to the principle of assimilation, they downplayed differences and focused on what (they believed that) they and Hesiod had in common. This is perhaps less obvious than it seems: it is worth emphasizing that the *Theogony* is actually about gods, and not about condensating elements, vortexes of water or circular bits of fire breaking off from the earth. Nevertheless, where Hesiod says Chaos, they see a first principle; where Hesiod says Gaea, they understand 'earth'. This is allegory in its strictest sense, i.e. reading something else than it actually says.[18] This almost escapes our notice since Hesiodic theogony is so remarkably close to Milesian cosmogony—the leaps of interpretation are relatively small and easy,[19] especially when compared

[14] In fact, Stokes in general makes a better case for the connection between Hesiod and Anaximenes (which he proves beyond any doubt, cf. Wöhrle 1993 14) than that between Hesiod and Anaximander.

[15] See e.g. Clay (1992), who discerns in both Hesiod and Anaximander a tendency to present the primeval state of the world in all its confusion as an inverted projection of the well-differentiated present state of affairs. See Wöhrle (1993) 11–19 on Anaximenes and Hesiod.

[16] Some of the Milesians' ideas, most notably the symmetrical shape of the cosmos, could be derived from Homer as well (cf. *Il.* 8.16). Moreover, Anaximander is called an expert on Homer by Xenophon (*Smp.* 3.6).

[17] Anaximander may have been inspired by the *WD*'s description of Hephaestus creating Pandora from earth and water when he claimed man originated from a combination of earth and water, heated to a certain temperature (DK 12 A 30, see Guthrie 1957 55 speaking of 'the 'Pandora' theory').

[18] In terms of Long, 'weak allegory' (see ch. 2, p. 60 n.8). It is impossible to know if Hesiod actually intended Chaos etc. to be taken allegorically ('strong allegory', so Sihvola 1989 95, saying Hesiod 'clearly and intentionally presented his myths as allegorical examples illustrating his main message, they were not intended as literal truths').

[19] Cf. Cornford (1950) 96 on *Th.* 116–132: 'the veil of mythological language is so thin as to be quite transparent.'

to the allegorization of Homer: Theagenes, for instance, explained the *Iliad*'s theomachy as the interaction of elements, Pherecydes perhaps interpreted Homer's Zeus and Hera as god and matter, and Metrodorus explained Homer's heroes as parts of the universe, and his gods as parts of the body.[20] It may very well be that the ease of physical allegorization of Hesiod facilitated that of Homer, which is more elaborate and more sophisticated; it may also be that the obviousness of Hesiod's supposedly 'real' message caused more interpretive effort to be spent on Homer.[21] The third point relevant to us is that the early cosmologists' interest in Hesiod focuses almost exclusively on three things: Chaos, Eros, and his (supposed) theory of elements—that is, presumably, what they believed to be most cosmological or physical about him.

These three points are so relevant because they return in later cosmological or more generally physical accounts influenced by Hesiod: these refer mainly to the *Theogony*, unabashedly understand this poem allegorically, and focus on Chaos (as a receptacle or the 'void'), Eros (as a unifying force binding principles often regarded as opposites), and the elements (as the constituents of the visible world).

The cosmological thinking of Parmenides and Empedocles serves as a good example. Parmenides' first principles are light and night (DK B 8.53–61), referring to the opposition between Erebus / Night and Aether / Day in *Theogony* 123–125.[22] The prominent position of Eros in Parmenides' cosmogony ('She [perhaps the goddess of necessity] created Eros first of all the gods', DK B 13) is the most obvious of all borrowings from Hesiod, and was already recognized as such in Plato's times (*Symposium* 178b).[23] Similarly, in the cosmology of Empedocles,

---

[20] Tate (1927) and (1929), Richardson (1975).

[21] Cf. Tate (1934) 105: 'The attempt of Hesiod to be more didactic than Homer merely encouraged the notion that Homer intended to be as didactic as he'.

[22] Parmenides may have had *Th.* 282 in mind ('the shining stars with which the heaven is garlanded') when he described the stars as 'garlands' or 'rings' of fire; see Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983) 258–259 on DK 28 A 37.

[23] See Dolin (1962), Schwabl (1963), Pellikaan-Engel (1974) and Most (2007) 280–284 for more elaborate comparisons between Hesiod and Parmenides with regard to content. See also Böhme (1986) 35–85 for an extended enumeration of poetic parallels in general (including Hesiod and Homer); his list, however impressive, suffers from serious flaws (cf. Heitsch 1988). Scholars disagree on whether the *Th.* or the *Od.* was Parmenides' primary source text. According to Jaeger (1947) 92 Parmenides' 'epic is by no means so closely akin to Homer as it is to Hesiod's *Theogony*', but Mourelatos (1970) concluded that 'the relation with Hesiod is strongest at the level of import and overall structure, but weakest at the level of verbal detail' (34). Some other scholars taking Homer as Parmenides' primary model are Havelock (1958), whose argument to take Parmenides' *kouros* as a copy of

which is 'in broad outlines still dominated by Hesiod',[24] the cosmic force of 'Love' (Φιλία) evidently recalls Hesiod's Eros, while its opposite, 'Strife' (Νεῖκος), has a constructive and destructive power perhaps partly derived from Eris' dual nature in the *Works and Days*.[25] Furthermore, the four basic elements governed by Empedocles' principles are conceived as 'roots' (ῥιζώματα) divine in nature,[26] just as the most important constituents of Hesiod's universe (earth, sea, heaven) are all gods and have their 'roots', too (ῥίζαι, *Theogony* 728).[27] We should perhaps also mention the positive evaluation of Strife in Heraclitus, who in fr. 80 says ἔρις is the same as δίκη. Similarly, there may be a Hesiodic justice of transgression and punishment underlying Anaximander's view of the interaction of the elements as well, as they 'pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time'.[28]

Of the three 'Hesiodic' concepts of cosmology (Chaos, Eros, and the elements), Chaos seems to have been the most interesting to the Greeks, and the most prominently Hesiodic; there is an immense mountain in the commemogram of the *Theogony*, centered around verse 116 ('In truth, first of all Chaos came to be'). I will focus, therefore, on the afterlife of Chaos, and then turn only very briefly to Eros and the elements.

The first thing that should be said about Chaos is that it was a widespread and very popular notion.[29] There are, for instance, two references to it in Old Comedy: Epicharmus has one of his characters doubt the primacy of Chaos as 'it would possess nothing from which or to which it

---

Odysseus is stretched too far to be credible, and Vos (1963). Deichgräber (1958) defended the extreme (and untenable) view that Hesiod was the only real *Vorbild* for Parmenides, who wished to oppose 'alles Homerische und Homerisierende' (652). Robbiano (2005) 35–66 takes up a most sensible middle position and takes both Hesiod and Homer *and* other predecessors (such as Xenophanes) as creating a context against which Parmenides' poem should be understood.

[24] Hershbell (1970) 157; cf. Schwabl (1957).

[25] *WD* 11–26; see Inwood (2001) 49 and 23 n.48. Empedocles, like Hesiod, believed that in his age the power of (bad) Strife was increasing (see DK 31 B 20, 22, and 30).

[26] DK 31 B 6 and Wright (1981) 22 on the divinity of Empedocles' roots; Inwood (2001) 34–42 raises the possibility that Love and Strife are more divine than the basic elements.

[27] Cf. Stokes (1962) 30–32 interpreting Hesiod's πηγαί in Tartarus in terms of cosmogony. See for more similarities between Hesiod and Empedocles Hershbell (1970) and Schwabl (1957), and ch. 5, pp. 166–169.

[28] DK 12 B 1: διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν (transl. Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983). Diller (1946) first saw the connection; see also Gagarin (1973) and (1974a).

[29] Cf. Plu. *Mor.* 678F (speaking of *Th.* 116): 'this line of Hesiod is amazingly popular' (εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ θαυμαστῶς καὶ Ἡσίοδος εἰπών).

might first come forth',[30] and Aristophanes makes the cosmogony of the birds begin with 'Chaos, Night, black Erebus and broad Tartarus'.[31] The concept is thus obviously mainstream enough to be parodied, in classical times and later; this is shown by Plutarch, who applies the ancient cosmic wisdom to something as trivial as a party: there too, it is necessary to have some 'room and place' (χώραν καὶ τόπον), for it is an insult to the guests to fill up the room in Anaxagorean fashion.[32] However mainstream, Chaos remained closely tied to Hesiod: Callimachus, referring to Hesiod at the beginning of the *Aetia*, speaks of the inspiration-scene and then immediately mentions the birth of Chaos—apparently something that strongly 'defines' Hesiod.[33]

That Chaos was a concept well-known, popular, truly Hesiodic, and generally taken to mean 'void' is all confirmed by Aristotle. See, for instance, this passage from the *Physics:*

> ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστί τι ὁ τόπος παρὰ τὰ σώματα, καὶ πᾶν σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἐν τόπῳ, διὰ τούτων ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι· δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ Ἡσίοδος ὀρθῶς λέγειν ποιήσας πρῶτον τὸ χάος. λέγει γοῦν 'πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος', ὡς δέον πρῶτον ὑπάρξαι χώραν τοῖς οὖσι, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, πάντα εἶναί που καὶ ἐν τόπῳ.
>
> 'These considerations [on the concept of direction, just mentioned] then would lead us to suppose that place is something distinct from bodies, and that every sensible body is in a place. Hesiod too may be held to have given a correct account of it when he made chaos first. At least he says: 'First of all Chaos came to be, and then broadbreasted Earth', implying that things need to have space first, because he thought, with most people, that everything is somewhere and in a place.'[34]

Hesiod thus occupies a solid place in cosmogonical thinking, representing the common (and commonsense) theory positing some sort of emptiness before creation could take place.[35] Elsewhere Aristotle makes it clear

---

[30] K-A 1.275.4: μὴ ἔχον γ' ἀπὸ τίνος μηδ' ἐς ὅτι πρᾶτον μόλοι.

[31] Ar. *Av*. 693: Χάος ἦν καὶ Νὺξ Ἔρεβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον καὶ Τάρταρος εὐρύς. Cf. *Th*. 123 ἐκ Χάεος δ' Ἔρεβός τε μέλαινά τε Νύξ ἐγένοντο ('from Chaos came black Erebus and Night').

[32] Plu. *Mor*. 678F; the reference is to Anaxagoras' dictum that at the beginning 'all things were one solid mass' (πάντα χρήματα ἦν, DK 59 B 1). Hesiod's Chaos was also well-known in Rome, see e.g. Verg. *Georg*. 4.347, Ovid *Pont*. 4.8.57, Varro *LL* 4.20 and Manilius 1.125–127 (in fact Rosati 2009 goes so far as to say that Chaos is such a Hesiodic concept that 'any mention of Chaos is, in itself, a virtual reference to Hesiod', p. 373).

[33] Call. *Aet*. fr. 2.3 Pf.

[34] Arist. *Ph*. 208b27–33 (transl. slightly altered).

[35] Cf. e.g. Plu. *Mor*. 374C; S.E. *P*. 3.121, *M*. 9.11 (granting the discovery of the void to

that it is not just him making the connection between Hesiod and the opinion of *hoi polloi*, but that the masses themselves credit Hesiod with the theory of Chaos as an empty receptacle as well.[36] This image of Hesiod may also have made him useful to Epicurus, though there are no explicit links between these two.[37]

It is particularly interesting to see how the Stoics treated Hesiodic Chaos. They felt obliged to incorporate the concept,[38] but were troubled by its common interpretation: the Stoics' view of the cosmos leaves no place for a vacuum, but instead they conceive the universe as a plenum.[39] What they *do* allow for in their system, however, are the four elements, and this provides the solution: chaos is turned into one of the elements. Zeno apparently believed chaos was derived from χέεσθαι ('to flow' or 'to stream') and thus represented water, which could turn into earth when it 'hardens' (στερεμνιοῦται).[40] This idea was widely followed: it turns up in the other Stoics and the scholia as well. The Hesiodic idea on the primacy of chaos could thus be used by the Stoics too, since (as a Stoic source

---

Hesiod). In Σ *Th.* 116c1 Chaos is identified with Plato's 'all-receiving nature' (πανδεχὴς φύσις, cf. Pl. *Ti.* 50b and 51a); see on this equation also Sedley (2009).

[36] Arist. *Xen.* 976b14–19 (cf. 975a7–14). The connection of Hesiod to the masses is perhaps a strategy to downplay his importance as a thinker; generally speaking, Aristotle does not think highly of Hesiod as a physiologist (cf. p. 164 n.17 and n.40 below). He mostly connects Hesiod and his 'school' with thoughts on generation and destruction, a rather old-fashioned discipline in philosophy. By counting him among the θεολόγοι, he contrasts him sharply with the oldest 'real' physicists, but still seems to regard him as a forerunner of philosophy (cf. Jaeger 1947 4–5, 10).

[37] All we have is the anecdote related by Diogenes how Epicurus 'took to philosophy because he despised the teachers of literature, since they were not able to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod' (ἐλθεῖν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν καταγνόντα τῶν γραμματιστῶν ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθησαν ἑρμηνεῦσαι αὐτῷ τὰ περὶ τοῦ παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ χάους, 10.2). The story classifies Hesiod as a philosopher, since the schoolteacher (treating the text as poetry) could not answer Epicurus' philosophical question. The anecdote was taken from a biography, a genre that often tries to discern the germs of a person's later interests and character traits in the period of his childhood. The Hesiod incident in the classroom should probably be understood as a sign that Epicurus would later develop a theory concerning the void and the elements.

[38] Cf. Algra (2001) 576 '… in Zeno's days Hesiod's *Theogony* still proved *the* most authoritative version of mythical cosmogony'. See Long (1996) 80–81 for Zeno's (and Cornutus') focus on Hesiod instead of Homer.

[39] According to the Stoics, the cosmos, from its beginning as pure fire and throughout its ever more intricate development (fire eventually turning into other elements), is completely full; there is a vacuum, but it exists outside the cosmos and serves as the necessary room for the cosmic fire at the world's end.

[40] SVF 1.104; this may have been a way of linking the two 'passive' elements of water and earth opposed to the 'active' elements fire and air (cf. SVF 1.103–105). See also Arist. *Metaph.* 989a5–12, where Aristotle wonders why earth was the only element never to have

explains) water was the first of the elements to come into being;[41] perhaps it was also the last element to disappear before the cosmic ecpyrosis.[42] Hesiod's reputation as an authority on the beginning of the universe could thus be saved and used by the Stoics as well.

What goes for Chaos also goes for the second concept of Hesiodic cosmology: Eros. It is a) well-known and of central importance, b) commonly understood as a scientific notion, and c) closely connected to Hesiod. Some examples will suffice to demonstrate this. Its central importance, for instance, is shown by the remarkable fact that in the many passages quoting Hesiod on the origin of the universe, not only Chaos but also Eros is mentioned, and the intervening verses of the *Theogony* are usually left out.[43] That it was taken as a concept of physics is made clear by Aristotle, who said that Eros could be understood as Hesiod's attempt to formulate the *causa efficiens*, the 'cause to move things and combine them' (αἰτίαν ἥτις κινήσει καὶ συνάξει τὰ πράγματα);[44] moreover, it was Eros' prominent place in Hesiod's cosmogony that made Plutarch say that Hesiod was more 'scientific' (φυσικώτερον) than Parmenides.[45] The connection to Hesiod is obvious as early as Plato's times; see, for instance, how the poet Agathon in the *Symposium* discusses Eros and explicitly counters Hesiod's authoritative statement that the god is

---

been picked as a first principle by the natural philosophers. As a concept both ancient and popular, he argues, it is such a likely candidate: both ordinary people say 'everything is earth', and Hesiod said 'earth was generated first of corporeal things' (τὴν γῆν πρώτην γενέσθαι τῶν σωμάτων).

[41] See SVF 2.565. The Hesiodic story of Styx being the first god to offer her allegiance to the new ruler Zeus (*Th.* 397) was also explained as water being the first element to be separated (SVF 2.573 = Σ *Th.* 397).

[42] One of the speakers in Plutarch's *On the Obsolescence of Oracles* (*Mor.* 415F) says the Stoics believed Hesiod to have hinted at the ecpyrosis and the world cycle: apparently Hesiod's verses on the age of nymphs (here apparently interpreted as water-nymphs, see fr. 304 MW) were taken to indicate the duration of the cosmic cycle: when the water-nymphs die, the world ends.

[43] See Pl. *Smp.* 178b and 195c, Arist. *Metaph.* 984b23–31 and *Xen.* 975a7–14, Zeno SVF 103–105, and S.E. *M.* 9.7 quoting *Th.* 116–117 and 120; Plu. *Mor.* 374C and Paus. 9.27.2 quote *Th.* 116–117 and 119–120; Corn. *Epidr.* 17 cites *Th.* 116–117, 119–120 and 123–124. Against these 9 quotes, *Th.* 120 is quoted 4 times without 116–117. See on the incomplete citations of the passage also Ford (2010) 139–143.

[44] Arist. *Metaph.* 984b23–31.

[45] Parmenides pictures Eros as an early god, but says he was created by Aphrodite: '… but Hesiod, in my opinion, was more scientific when he depicted Eros as the first-born of them all, in order to make him indispensable for the generation of all things' (Ἡσίοδος δὲ φυσικώτερον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ποιεῖν Ἔρωτα πάντων προγενέστατον, ἵνα πάντα δι' ἐκεῖνον μετάσχῃ γενέσεως, *Mor.* 756F). See also Plu. *Mor.* 927A and 374C.

ancient. According to Agathon, Eros is the very epitome of youth and delicacy, and needed a Homer to describe him correctly—but alas, the poet of Eros is harsh Hesiod.[46]

Eros, like Chaos, is turned into one of the elements by the Stoics; this time, that of fire.[47] This interpretation is hardly coincidental. We have already seen above that philosophers like Anaximenes and Empedocles, obviously encouraged by the prominent place of earth in Hesiod's cosmogony,[48] took the *Theogony* as dealing with nature's elements, and there is ample evidence (especially in the scholia) that allegorical interpretation such as theirs continued and was elaborated further in later times, so that eventually many parts of the poem were understood as imparting knowledge on the physical components of the universe. The Titans Coeus, Creus and Hyperion, for instance, are supposedly meant to be interpreted as quality, separation and heaven (as the scholia on *Theogony* 134 claim); the Meliae stand for the creatures without reason (187); Nereus represents the downward flow of matter (233); Perseus killing Medusa stands for the sun evaporating the sea (276); Iapetus is the movement of heaven (507), etc.[49] Little wonder, then, that one Stoic, presumably Chrysippus, ranked Hesiod among the 'ancients who organized the entire universe' (παλαιοὶ καὶ τὰ ὅλα διακοσμήσαντες).[50] This is perhaps the neatest description of Hesiod the natural philosopher: a meticulous organizer who has categorized and ordered the entire cosmos.

The earliest recipients of the *Theogony* saw Hesiod as a respectable authority on natural philosophy, and thanks to his concepts of Chaos, Eros, and the elements, he managed to hold on to this reputation throughout antiquity, remaining highly influential.[51] We will see, in section 3, how his image as a collector and organizer of the universe spilled over into

---

[46] Pl. *Symp*. 195c–d: 'It takes a poet as good as Homer to show how delicate the god is' (ποιητοῦ δ' ἔστιν ἐνδεὴς οἷος ἦν Ὅμηρος πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδεῖξαι θεοῦ ἁπαλότητα).

[47] SVF 1.104 (Zeno); this was probably a more common Stoic view (cf. SVF 2.445).

[48] See n.40 above on the importance of Earth (*Th*. 117) in Hesiod's earliest stage of cosmic development.

[49] There are also examples from the Stoa, see e.g. SVF 1.100 and 1.118 (Zeno).

[50] SVF 2.501. It is interesting that Zeno used the verb διακοσμεῖσθαι for the cosmos 're-establishing' itself after the ecpyrosis (SVF 1.27; see also 1.28 et passim for the noun). The use of the same word implies that the cosmos' own structure is in perfect accord with Hesiod's description of it.

[51] It is thus quite wrong to claim, as does Kassies (1989) 28, that 'as the poet of the *Theogony*, Hesiod is condemned and reviled again and again, but never as the poet of the *Works and Days*' (my translation).

other areas of philosophical inquiry. First, however, we will turn to an interesting (if perhaps unexpected) branch of philosophy on which Hesiod, through the principle of assimilation, also came to be seen as an expert: epistemology.

2. *The Problem of Revelation*

As we have seen above, Hesiod's status as a natural philosopher was widely acknowledged: the earliest physiologists and their immediate successors shaped him after their own image, and so created a long-lasting tradition. Obviously, the principle of assimilation allows for smaller and bigger leaps of interpretation. To understand 'broad-breasted Earth' as the element with the same name is relatively easy, but once this step has been taken, the sky is the limit, so to speak. And it appears that such an initial step opens up not only different *degrees* of the philosophical assimilation of Hesiod, but also different *kinds*. Once established as a source-text on natural philosophy, the *Theogony* came to be investigated on other questions that concerned the earliest philosophers as well. Some of the most important questions related to (what we see as the distinct field of) epistemology: 1) how can we attain knowledge?, and 2) how can we be sure if we have it?

Hesiod's own solution to this problem was as easy as it was well-known: he was inspired by the Muses, an event (as we have seen in chapter 4) that was central to the Hesiodic persona. Divine inspiration answered both difficult questions: it accounted for the way Hesiod got his information, and at the same time guaranteed its truth. It is useful to quote the inspiration-scene from the *Theogony* in full (*Th.* 22–34):

αἵ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν,
ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ' Ἑλικῶνος ὕπο ζαθέοιο.
τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον,
Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο·
"ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἷον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι."
ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι,
καί μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον
δρέψασαι, θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν
θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα,
καί μ' ἐκέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν.

'One time, they taught Hesiod beautiful song
while he was pasturing lambs under holy Helicon.
And this speech the goddesses spoke first of all to me,
the Olympian Muses, the daughters of aegis-holding Zeus:
"Field-dwelling shepherds, ignoble disgraces, mere bellies:
we know how to say many false things similar to genuine ones,
but we know, when we wish, how to proclaim true things."
So spoke great Zeus' ready-speaking daughters,
and they plucked a staff, a branch of luxurious laurel,
a marvel, and gave it to me; and they breathed a divine voice
into me, so that I might glorify what will be and what was before,
and they commanded me to sing of the race of the blessed ones who always are,
but always to sing of themselves first and last.'

This is a passage as interesting as it is difficult, perhaps even the most intensively studied and most widely interpreted lines in the history of modern Hesiodic scholarship.[52] The Greeks, however, seem to have read it as a fairly straightforward statement: Hesiod narrates how the Muses made him their mouthpiece and so guarantee the truth of what the poet tells us.

In this section I will discuss the ways Greek thinkers reacted to Hesiod's *Dichterweihe*, which some interpreted as a statement on his philosophical 'method'. I will focus on four philosophers, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, who in early classical times stand out for their interest in Hesiod—they are also the same four singled out by Lesher as the 'four early thinkers in particular' who 'explored the conditions under which knowledge—especially in the form of a broad understanding of the nature of things—can be achieved by human beings'.[53] The discussion will focus on two aspects of the reception of Hesiod's encounter with the Muses: 1) the value of divine revelation as a mode of communicating truth and knowledge, and 2) the distinction between true things (ἀληθέα) and things that merely resemble true things (ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα). We will see that the *Theogony*'s picture of a (divine) voice imparting knowledge about reality in a truthful way is attacked by some (2.1), but used by others, either as a topos to present a philosophical programme (2.2), or as a means to create an air of truthfulness (2.3, where the sophists Protagoras and Prodicus come in).

[52] See for an elaborate treatment of scholarship on this passage ch. 9, pp. 300–304.
[53] Lesher (1999) 228.

2.1. *The Attack on Revelation (Xenophanes and Heraclitus)*

In the *Professor of Public Speaking*, Lucian satirizes the latest fashion in oratory, i.e. delivering speeches without first receiving the arduous training prescribed by authorities like Cicero and Quintilian. The treatise is cast in the form of a monologue by a 'professor of public speaking' who mocks traditional education and argues that there is a quick road to success, naming an illustrious precedent:

> Ἡσίοδος μὲν ὀλίγα φύλλα ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλικῶνος λαβὼν αὐτίκα μάλα ποιητὴς ἐκ ποιμένος κατέστη καὶ ᾗδε θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων γένη κάτοχος ἐκ Μουσῶν γενόμενος, ῥήτορα δέ, ὅ πολὺ ἔνερθε ποιητικῆς μεγαληγορίας ἐστίν, ἐν βραχεῖ καταστῆναι ἀδύνατον, εἴ τις ἐκμάθοι τὴν ταχίστην ὁδόν;
>
> 'Hesiod was given a leaf or two from Helicon, and at once he became a poet instead of a shepherd and sang the pedigrees of gods and heroes under the inspiration of the Muses. Is it impossible, then, to become a public speaker—something far inferior to the grand style of poetry—in an instant, if one could find out the quickest way?'[54]

During the Second Sophistic, Hesiod became the stock example of a verbal artist who had attained both knowledge and skill instantly. His encounter with the Muses is often referred to with admiration, but there is an occasional hint that one can hardly respect a person who skipped all 'upbringing, training, and education' (τροφῆς καὶ μελέτης καὶ διδασκαλίας) and 'has taken refuge in the laurel of Hesiod, which easily gives poetic inspiration to shepherds.'[55]

The suspicion toward the quick and easy way of revelation, and toward the knowledge thus obtained, goes back many centuries. In fact, I believe that some of the earliest critics of Hesiod, i.e. Xenophanes and Heraclitus, focus on the famous *Dichterweihe*, understanding his inspiration as a way of attaining truth, as if it were his philosophical 'method'. Their objections against revelation are strikingly similar, although there are some differences. For instance, it appears that Heraclitus (who was slightly later than Xenophanes) presents a more developed view, because his critique is more elaborated. Heraclitus also separates Hesiod and Homer with regard to the question of inspiration, whereas such a separation is hardly (if at all) visible in the critique of Xenophanes.

---

[54] Lucian *Rh.Pr.* 4.

[55] Lucian *Dem.Enc.* 12: ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡσιόδου δάφνην καταφυγόντα, τὴν ῥᾳθύμως καὶ τοῖς ποιμέσιν τῶν ἐπῶν ἐπιπνέουσαν. Cf. Aristid. 2.97, and see on poetic inspiration further ch. 9, pp. 319–341.

Xenophanes speaks out most clearly against divine revelation as an epistemological tool in fragment 18: 'Indeed not from the beginning did gods intimate all things to mortals, but as they search in time they discover better' (οὔ τοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν, / ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον).[56] This is a couplet filled with oppositions, the clearest of which is that concerning the way we acquire knowledge: people do not passively 'receive' all there is to know, but only when 'searching' can we come closer and closer to knowledge.[57] Revelation is rejected in favour of investigation, the new method of philosophy.

Xenophanes is arguing against poetic inspiration here, and more specifically, I think, that of Hesiod. He does not mention him explicitly, but an examination of the two other oppositions in the fragment makes it likely that the *Dichterweihe* should be considered as the intended subtext. As the first of these oppositions, we see how revelation is described as taking place ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, 'from the beginning', whereas proper investigation proceeds χρόνῳ, 'in time'. Most scholars focus on the second line and take the couplet as a whole as 'an early expression of a faith in human progress'.[58] The first line is then regarded as presenting the 'wrong' view (presumably common in Xenophanes' time) that once, long ago the truth was simply *revealed*. But it is worthwhile to examine the formula ἀπ' ἀρχῆς in more detail. Scholars usually cite Xenophanes B 10[59] as a parallel and then disagree whether ἐξ ἀρχῆς / ἀπ' ἀρχῆς 'refers to the beginning of the whole of Greek culture or to the beginning of an individual's education'[60]—a discussion of relatively little interest.[61] But even though I agree that ἀπ' ἀρχῆς must surely refer to *a* process of learning, I think the expression can also refer to the poetic practice of asking the Muses for the 'beginning' of things. This is a practice most pertinent if one thinks of Hesiod, who learned the ἀρχή of the entire universe from the gods.[62] In

[56] DK 21 B 18, transl. Lesher (1992).

[57] For the importance attached to 'searching' in Heraclitus see DK 22 B 22 (very similar to Xenophanes' fragment 18) and 101.

[58] Lesher (1992) 150 indicating the traditional interpretation, which he himself opposes (150–155).

[59] Xenophanes DK 21 B 10: ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες … ('Since from the beginning all have learned according to Homer …', transl. Lesher 1992).

[60] Lesher (1992) 81.

[61] Lesher (1992) 81 (citing Gorg. DK 82 B 11a 29 as a parallel) seems inclined to the second view, which is defended by Verdenius (1970) 7. But neither considers Ar. *Ra.* 1030–1031, which greatly favours the first view.

[62] The expression ἐξ ἀρχῆς occurs nine times in the *Th.*; of special relevance are *Th.*

that case, χρόνῳ in the second line perhaps points to the impossibility of discovering the very first beginning: mankind, situated 'in time' (χρόνῳ), may never reach knowledge concerning the primeval state of ἀρχή. Such an interpretation would be in line with Xenophanes' general scepticism.

The second opposition contrasts πάντα (the object of ὑπέδειξαν) with ἄμεινον (the object of ἐφευρίσκουσιν). In line with the interpretation set out above, I take this as a negative comment on the 'method' of revelation, criticizing its supposedly all-encompassing scope. The poets claim they know 'everything', and Hesiod's claim to be singing 'what will be and what was before' (τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, *Theogony* 32) is particularly inclusive. Xenophanes sets this poetic πάντα against something 'better' (ἄμεινον). Not only does this contrast the mythological cosmos with Xenophanes' own view of 'physical realities to be described and understood in terms of observable properties and familiar natural forces';[63] it also comments on the pretentiousness of the poets' claims. To know or find out 'everything' is not a realistic aim for a sceptic like Xenophanes, who said that 'no man knows, or ever will know, the truth about the gods and about everything I speak of',[64] since 'seeming is wrought over all things'.[65] It seems, then, that the 'method' of revelation criticized in fragment 18 is described in terms particularly applicable to Hesiod: in the proem to the *Theogony*, we find gods telling some rather passive human being 'everything' from its earliest beginning.

There are other passages in the poems of Xenophanes that single out Hesiod for critique. It is obvious that Xenophanes in fragment 1 is thinking primarily of the *Theogony* when he speaks of wrongful conduct at a symposium. After drinking, a man should sing of noble deeds that inspire virtue: 'he deals neither with the battles of Titans nor Giants / nor Centaurs, fictions from men of old, / nor furious conflicts—for there is no use in these. / But it is good always to have forethought (προμηθείην) of the gods.'[66] Hesiod is employed here again as a negative foil, since he has

---

45 and 115, where the expression is used twice for the Muses singing of the origin of the gods and the universe. In Homer, ἐξ ἀρχῆς occurs only four times (only *Od.*), and is never connected to the Muses (in three cases, the expression indicates the old age of a ξενία). The expression ἀπ' ἀρχῆς does not occur in either Hesiod or Homer.

[63] Lesher (1992) 154.

[64] DK 21 B 34.1–2: τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων (transl. Lesher 1992).

[65] DK 21 B 34.4: δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται (transl. Lesher 1992).

[66] DK 21 B 1.21–24: οὔτε μάχας διέπει Τιτήνων οὔτε Γιγάντων, / οὐδέ ⟨τι⟩ Κενταύρων, πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων, / ἢ στάσιας σφεδανάς· τοῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἔνεστι· / θεῶν ⟨δὲ⟩ προμηθείην αἰὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν (transl. Lesher 1992, slightly adapted).

made the battles of Titans and Giants the very subject of his poem;[67] and the *Theogony*'s tale of Prometheus has in fact demonstrated that Hesiod has no right 'forethought' concerning the gods at all.[68] The obvious pun in the last line leaves no doubt about Xenophanes' opponent; only serious Homerocentrism is able to suggest that someone other than Hesiod is the prime target.[69]

More directly relevant to us is the critique aimed at Hesiod in Xenophanes' fragment 35. In this verse (perhaps originally placed at the end of his book) the philosopher says of (presumably) his own views that 'these things should be opined as resembling the truth' (ταῦτα δεδοξάσθω μὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι), a careful expression reminding his audience that it may be ultimately impossible to achieve absolute truth. It has long been recognized that this fragment may contain a reference to *Theogony* 27, where the Muses say that 'we know how to say many false things similar to genuine ones (ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα)'[70]—even though the interpretation of the allusion is uncertain. In my view, Heitsch is right to stress the influence of Hesiod's distinction between truth and apparent truth, but wrong to claim that the meaning of the fragment ('daß nur unter Vorbehalt etwas als wahrheitsgleich gelten soll') is directly derived from the Hesiodic *Vorbild*:[71] Hesiod's ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα refer to 'false things' (ψεύδεα), while Xenophanes' ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι (in all likelihood) are the near-truths of his investigation.[72] This difference, however, should in no way disqualify Hesiod as a philosophical model altogether, as Lesher seems to think.[73] I would rather say that Xenophanes deliberately describes his own findings in a phrase that Hesiod's Muses use to indicate non-truth. As a full-blooded sceptic, Xenophanes would not presume that his words are absolutely true: for him, it is enough to state things that resemble the

[67] The equation of these 'fictions' with the 'furious conflicts' in the next line points to the unedifying effect of such tales on society, an objection often levelled against Hesiod and Homer together, see ch. 2, pp. 78–86.

[68] The response to Hesiod is even clearer when one reads ἀγαθήν (thus commending a divinity as 'good', like Eris in the *WD*) instead of ἀγαθόν, as does Scaliger, who is followed by Untersteiner (1955) 108.

[69] So Lesher (1992)—who is only one among many—who in his commentary on lines 21–22 (p. 50) refers his readers to Hesiod *and* a very brief summary of the battle between Lapiths and Centaurs in *Od.* 21.295–304; he concludes that Xenophanes' targets of rebuke 'almost certainly include Homer and Hesiod' (53).

[70] See e.g. Guthrie (1962) 396 n.2, Heitsch (1966) 232–233.

[71] Heitsch (1966) 232.

[72] See Lesher (1992) 172–176.

[73] Lesher (1992) 172–173, who assumes a 'general improbability that Xenophanes took his cues to philosophical truth from anything Hesiod had to say.'

truth, the option scorned by Hesiod himself.[74] And so he uses Hesiod's own formulation against him, criticizing the poet for the way he received his knowledge, and for the pretentiousness of his claim to know everything.[75]

I have tried so far to demonstrate that Xenophanes, in certain fragments now generally thought to attack the poets as a group, in fact criticizes Hesiod in particular, and even more specifically his 'method' of revelation. I do not wish to imply that Hesiod is the only target in this respect. Obviously, Homer too appeals to the Muses when asking for 'beginnings' (although his scope is considerably smaller),[76] and Homer is even explicitly connected to the ἀρχή by Xenophanes.[77] Moreover, that he thought of Hesiod and Homer as comparable is clearly shown by fragment 11.[78] I suggest this 'coupling' is caused by Xenophanes' explicit refusal to turn Hesiod into a natural philosopher: he shows none of the Milesian willingness to interpret at least part of the *Theogony* as allegorical. The Hesiodic gods are not regarded as principles, substances, or elements, for it is the anthropomorphism of the Hesiodic and Homeric gods that Xenophanes wishes to reject. Xenophanes thus deliberately avoids modernizing Hesiod by means of allegory, and thus presents him as a poet instead of a thinker, a poet belonging to the outdated paradigm of Muses and monsters.

Xenophanes' treatment of Hesiod and Homer seems to imply that there is a direct connection between Hesiod being presented as a poet and Hesiod being presented as comparable to Homer. This is confirmed by the fragments of Heraclitus, who *does* separate them and treats only Homer as a poet, but Hesiod as a natural philosopher. Heraclitus mentions Homer together with Archilochus, whereas he lists Hesiod among thinkers like Pythagoras, Hecataeus and Xenophanes.[79] It is also telling

---

[74] See also DK B 8, where Xenophanes is careful even about his age: after he has given an account of his years, he concludes: 'if I know how to speak truly (ἐτύμως) concerning these things.'

[75] Cf. Morgan (2000) 51 '[Xenophanes] contrasts programmatically his own limited formulations with the claims made by the poets'. I would say that Xenophanes is thinking of one poet in particular here.

[76] See for Homer hailing the Muses and immediately asking for a beginning *Il.* 1.6–7, 11.218, and 16.112. Clay (1992) 132 contrasts Hesiod's cosmic scope to the more limited one of Homer.

[77] DK 21 B 10, see note 59 above.

[78] See on this fragment ch. 2, pp. 82–84.

[79] DK 22 B 42 and 40. DK 22 B 42 runs thus: τόν τε Ὅμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν

that Heraclitus, the most overtly polemical of all presocratics, who mentions both Homer and Hesiod three times, *nowhere* mentions them together.[80] Although Heraclitus points to several similarities between the two—the most important one being their reputation for wisdom which so poignantly clashes with their inability to reach true knowledge[81]—they do not belong to the same category: Homer is a poet, Hesiod a scientist or natural philosopher.[82]

That Hesiod is indeed understood as a philosopher is suggested by Heraclitus' critique in fragment 106 (and 57). Hesiod, so the fragment runs, did not understand the 'nature' (φύσις) of day and night; whereas he sees two natural phenomena, they are in fact one.[83] This comment is important, for it means that Heraclitus takes Hesiod more seriously than Xenophanes does, and interprets his poem as a cosmological allegory;

ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁμοίως ('[Heraclitus] said that Homer deserved to be thrown out of the competitions and be beaten with a stick, just like Archilochus'). The *agones* mentioned are usually taken to be poetic competitions, from which the poets are to be ejected because they, as 'princes de la poésie', hold an eminent place in Greek culture and education (see e.g. Babut 1976 477). The beating with the stick (ῥαπίζεσθαι) may be a pun on the *rhap*sode's usual attribute, the ῥάβδος or 'staff' (cf. Graziosi 2002 29–31). Such an interpretation, however, perhaps downplays the significance of the stick, which was commonly used in ancient athletic competitions by the referees, to strike those who played against the rules (see e.g. Hdt. *Hist*. 8.59). In that case, Homer has committed a foul, which means it can hardly be a poetic competition Heraclitus is talking about. It is therefore more likely that Heraclitus speaks of the very competition he is himself engaged in: the search for truth. Homer entered this competition on his claim to be wise (cf. DK B 56), but he, *as a poet*, does not belong there and should therefore be disqualified. That it is in fact Homer's status as a poet that is stressed here is, I think, proven by his comparison with Archilochus (cf. D.Chrys. 33.11, who names Homer and Archilochus as the two greatest poets, the first praising everybody, and the second censuring everybody; and D.Chrys. 55.6, where Archilochus is called a follower of Homer).

[80] Hesiod DK 22 B 40, 57, 106; Homer DK 22 B 42, 56, 105. Heraclitus mentions Homer and Hesiod more often than all the presocratics taken together. One could perhaps argue that these cases are too few to be significant, but this would be to take too little account of the doxographical tradition, which is usually eager to record polemics.

[81] Hesiod 'does not know' (οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν, DK 22 B 57) and is 'un-knowing' (ἀγνοοῦντι, DK 22 B 106), and Homer does not attain 'knowing' (γνῶσις, DK 22 B 56).

[82] Cf. Lamberton (1988) 148 stating that Heraclitus' attack on Hesiod 'is not directed toward a powerful poet but toward a purveyor of empty superstitions'; I agree with the first part.

[83] DK 22 B 106: '… Whether Heraclitus was right in upbraiding Hesiod … for not knowing that the nature of each day is one ⟨and the same⟩ …' (εἴτε ὀρθῶς Ἡράκλειτος ἐπέπληξεν Ἡσιόδῳ (…) ὡς ἀγνοοῦντι φύσιν ἡμέρης ἁπάσης μίαν οὖσαν, transl. Robinson 1987, slightly modified). Kirk (1954) 155–156 is right to say that this critique is probably not aimed at *Th*. 746–758 ('[Heraclitus] would surely have applauded Hesiod's

but even at this deeper level, he finds fault with Hesiod. Despite this difference, however, Heraclitus' criticism of Hesiod resembles that of Xenophanes very strongly with regard to the problem of revelation. Xenophanes, as we have seen above, objected to 1) passive reception instead of active seeking, and 2) the claim to know everything. These points return in the particulars of Heraclitus' critique—even though, of course, they are couched in the terms of his own distinct epistemology. Our key fragments are 40 and 57:

B 40 Πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.

'A lot of learning does not teach ⟨a person the possession of⟩ understanding; ⟨could it do so,⟩ it would have so taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, or for that matter Xenophanes and Hecataeus.'

B 57 Διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· τοῦτον ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἕν.

'For very many people Hesiod is ⟨their⟩ teacher. They are certain he knew a great number of things—he who continually failed to recognize ⟨even⟩ day and night ⟨for what they are⟩! For they are one.'[84]

Just like Xenophanes, Heraclitus responds here to Hesiod's reputation of vast knowledge: he is ranked among the polymaths (B 40), and according to the many knows πλεῖστα (B 57). Heraclitus, however, is slightly more careful and chooses not to associate Hesiod with knowledge of 'everything' (πάντα), because this would blur his issue. According to Heraclitus' system of oppositions, to know 'everything' would mean knowing that everything is one. But it is exactly the lack of this particular insight that is the core of his critique on Hesiod: he has brought together an impressive collection of information, but instead of investigating this leaves it as a heterogeneous mass of data.[85] The actual

graphic account of their mutual succession') but at *Th.* 123–125, where Day is said to be born from Night. It is possible that Heraclitus' critique is not limited to Hesiod alone but is aimed at Parmenides' duality of Light and Night as well.

[84] The translations are those of Robinson (1987).

[85] Polymaths are people who have gathered much data, through observation or otherwise, but are unable to see (as Heraclitus sees) that all these facts are connected through a deeper-lying unity. Heraclitus is not against gathering information *per se*, for this is a necessary part of philosophical investigation (cf. fr. 95, 123, and 55, on which see Hussey 1982 58); but his point is that it is only a *preliminary* stage (cf. Granger 2004 250–252). On polymathy as a mere collection see fr. 129, where Pythagoras—connected to Hesiod in fr. 40—is presented as piecing his own knowledge together from the books of others, a practice called polymathy.

investigation[86] is left undone, and the facts are taken at face value, as if they speak for themselves.[87] Heraclitus thus identifies Hesiod's inspiration, so to speak, with polymathy or 'much-knowing': Hesiod got his knowledge from an accumulation of facts, and as a faithful mouthpiece only passes these facts on as a teacher in his turn.

It is also this very practice of 'teaching' that calls for critique. We have seen above that Xenophanes was already wary of an 'easy' transfer of knowledge: the gods did not simply 'intimate' everything to mortals, but we have to find out for ourselves. Heraclitus is equally sceptical about such teaching: time and again he warns us to use the *logos*, which is common to all, to search for the truth.[88] Teaching, on the other hand, will not lead to insight, and the verb 'to teach' is always associated by Heraclitus with the false beliefs of the many, who have no clue as to the true nature of the universe.[89] It is obvious that the critique of teaching and of polymathy are two sides of the same coin, two aspects of an epistemologically faulty system—and Hesiod is apparently at the heart of it.

Heraclitus can thus be seen to take over and transform Xenophanes' critique of Hesiod. Xenophanes pictured Hesiod's method of revelation as too easy: receiving 'everything' without proper searching, and simply claiming it is all true. Heraclitus does ascribe a great deal of knowledge to Hesiod, but also criticizes the lack of active investigation. Both agree on Hesiod's reputation for wisdom and both reject it, but Xenophanes does so out of a general (epistemological) scepticism and Heraclitus because he believes one can only really know that everything is

---

[86] Heraclitus' term for such an investigation is δίζημαι (DK 22 B 22 and 101), cf. Xenophanes' ζητοῦντες (p. 203 above).

[87] This is the main point of DK 22 B 40. The four thinkers under attack all remain at the surface level of observable and sometimes apparently contradictory facts and thus fail to penetrate to the deeper-lying truth saying that everything is one. The four are carefully selected, not, I think, to cover all known branches of science (so e.g. Ferrari 1984 202) or to demonstrate 'the oral situation in which the society of Heraclitus operates' (so Havelock 1983 16), but rather because Hesiod, who obviously holds the most prominent position in the list of four (being first and rather apart from the rest), was a known polymath, and the three others, Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus, all attacked him (this suggestion is put forward by Babut 1976 489). The supposedly 'modern' thinkers are thus shown to be no better than the very man they attacked themselves, since polymathy leads only to an enormous amount of collected data and mutually exclusive theories (cf. Mackenzie 1988 22, who argues that Hesiod's thinking exemplifies (in Heraclitus' view) the 'contradictory properties of the objective world').

[88] A well-known tenet of Heraclitean philosophy; see e.g. DK 22 B 2, 22, 101, and 113.

[89] See DK 22 B 40, 57 (both connected to Hesiod) and 104.

one. Most importantly, however, Heraclitus shifts Xenophanes' attack on the revelation-technique from Homer and Hesiod together to Hesiod alone: Xenophanes deliberately keeps the two together, whereas Heraclitus treats Hesiod as a philosopher like himself, but Homer as a poet or a wise man. It appears this distinction is part of a larger trend, since it was especially Hesiod who was among philosophers associated with revelation. This is an aspect we will further explore in the following section.

2.2. *Revelation Modified (Parmenides and Empedocles)*

Despite the attacks of Xenophanes and Heraclitus, revelation remained an attractive mode of communicating truth and knowledge; both Parmenides and Empedocles inserted a revelation-scene in their philosophical poems. Perhaps they included these encounters with the divine because of the authority connected to revelation, as some scholars believe.[90] I wish to argue, however, that Parmenides and Empedocles shaped their revelation-scenes in a way that shows that they were well aware of previous criticism. In their revelation scene, they address the problems of its all-encompassing scope, of the passive recipient, of the value of data-collection, and of the truth-guarantee by the Muses. By dealing with these points and adapting the traditional, Hesiodic setting, they can show to their audience that their respective philosophies are new and improved. It is thus not so much *despite* the attacks of Xenophanes and Heraclitus, but rather *because* of them, that revelation is retained.

In this section I will demonstrate how Parmenides and Empedocles modified the topos of revelation to turn it into a programmatic statement that defines their own methodology and its difference with other thinkers. Moreover, we will see how Hesiod, despite the many modifications, remains the model; his introduction to the *Theogony* was regarded as the first statement on epistemology, so the Hesiodic framework came natural to those who believed themselves to be his successors.

Parmenides most clearly presents his philosophical views through revelation. At the beginning of his poem we find a hero carried by mares past the gates of Night and Day to a mysterious goddess, who addresses him thus (DK 28 B 1.24–32):

---

[90] See Robbiano (2005) 38–53 for a brief discussion of this view and related interpretations.

ὦ κοῦρ' ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν,
ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι
τήνδ' ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν),
ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.
ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.

'Young man, you who come to my house in the company
of immortal charioteers with the mares which bear you,
greetings. No ill fate has sent you to travel
this road (far indeed does it lie from the steps of men)
but right and justice. It is proper that you learn everything,
both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth,
and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance.
But nonetheless you shall learn these things too, how what is believed
would have to be assuredly, pervading all things throughout.'[91]

In this revelatory speech from the goddess to the *kouros* there are some references to Hesiod,[92] the most important of which is the distinction between truth and non-truth, expressed in *Theogony* 27–28. Perhaps Parmenides was influenced by Xenophanes' reference to these verses, since untruth is defined here as the βροτῶν δόξαι, 'opinions of mortals' (30).[93] Parmenides, however, is not a sceptic, and does not stop at the level of *doxa*—this is why his goddess can proclaim to teach πάντα ('everything') again (28). Moreover, this 'everything' taught to Parmenides[94] consists of two things: the truth (claimed by Hesiod) and the apparent truth (claimed by Xenophanes). And so Parmenides' self-presentation as an all-inclusive philosopher (going beyond what was done before) is stated at the beginning of the poem.[95]

Parmenides keeps the Hesiodic, problem-ridden mode of revelation but adjusts it to fit his own epistemological program. Two major departures from the Hesiodic model (as criticized by Xenophanes and

[91] Transl. Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983), slightly modified.

[92] Such as the difficulty of the road just travelled, and the connection between θέμις and δίκη (on which see Diller 1946 149–150).

[93] Cf. Xenophanes' remarks in fr. 34 and 35 that δόκος is all that can be achieved (see also above, pp. 204–206).

[94] I am assuming that the *kouros* is to be understood in some way or another as Parmenides himself; cf. e.g. Granger (2002) 101 simply speaking of 'the 'youth' Parmenides'.

[95] See also Most (2007) 283 on Parmenides presenting himself as going further than Hesiod.

Heraclitus) indicate how he upgraded his own revelatory tale. First of all, the appearing goddess does not move towards the initiate, but instead the young man comes to her. During his voyage, presumably in an upward direction towards the light,[96] he has left the world of *doxa*, which not only shows that he is meeting the goddess in an untainted environment, but also that he has made a considerable intellectual effort by himself: he has left the world of ordinary experience[97] and has gone beyond mortal opinion.[98]

Secondly, the actual reception of 'all there is to know' is not presented anymore as a straightforward transfer of knowledge from an authority that one cannot but put one's trust in, as in the process of teaching attacked by both Xenophanes and Heraclitus. Parmenides' goddess displays none of the ambiguity present in Hesiod's Muses, who can tell the truth but also untruths, 'when we wish'. This expression signifies a complete power over others[99] which is attacked by Heraclitus: as a 'teacher of most', Hesiod can determine what people believe—and this runs contrary to Heraclitus' view that people should investigate by themselves and depend only on their own *logos*. Parmenides answered this critique by ruling out the element of choice, for the goddess too is 'constrained by argument'.[100] In fact, in fragment 7.5–8.1 the recipient of knowledge is actually encouraged to verify the account of the goddess: 'judge by reason the strife-encompassed refutation [= that things that are not are] / spoken by me' (κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον / ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα). So here we have a truth-telling 'Muse' we can trust, and at the same time we are told to use our *logos*.

The mode of revelation was obviously important to Parmenides, since he decided to purge the Hesiodic prototype from its defects instead

---

[96] This is the *communis opinio* among scholars (cf. Granger 2002 112), although some believe it is the other way around (cf. Morrison 1955 59–60 who thinks the goddess is to be equated with the goddess Night from the *Theogony*). Others think the direction is deliberately left undefined.

[97] The world of *doxa* is characterized by duality, the escape from which is indicated at several points in the proem; see Morgan (2000) 73–81.

[98] I wonder whether this could be the reason why the goddess does not yell at him, which is what the Muses do when they meet Hesiod, wholly immersed in his mortal enterprise of 'herding his sheep'—instead, Parmenides tells us 'the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand in hers' (με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶ / δεξιτερὴν ἕλεν, DK 28 B 1.22–23).

[99] Cf. e.g. *WD* 209, where the hawk holding the nightingale in its talons says he can eat the creature, 'if I wish' (αἴ κ' ἐθέλω), or choose to let it go. For more on the expression, see ch. 9, p. 302 n.17.

[100] Morgan (2000) 75; cf. e.g. Mourelatos (1970) 219.

of simply rejecting it. Revelation was useful in several ways: it was a concept linked to power and authority, it could emphasize the 'objectivity of his method',[101] and it allowed Parmenides to situate his exposition of truth in a special, superhuman environment.[102] But there is another important use of revelation: Parmenides' radically new philosophy can only be appreciated as such when he takes up a traditional image and radically transforms it: this is why it is not the goddess but the *kouros* approaching the other, why the mutually exclusive parts of the truth-untruth dichotomy are *both* appropriated by Parmenides, and why the mortal through using his *logos* can come near the level of the revealing goddess. It is not enough to conclude that 'Parmenides presents himself as one who followed in Hesiod's footsteps and beat him at his own game'[103]—it is supposed to be clear to everyone that Parmenides is in a different league.

It appears, from what we have seen so far, that the early philosophers seized the Hesiodic model of revelation to make a statement on epistemology. Successive references to the initiation-scene from the *Theogony* create a snowball-effect: Parmenides, for instance, can incorporate earlier critique on the implications of Hesiodic revelation while constructing his own imitation of Hesiod. This process of snowballing culminates in the relationship between Empedocles and his Muses, the description of which turns into a veritable battleground for contending philosophical notions.

Empedocles' epistemology is different yet again from that of the thinkers before him; his 'revelation' is thus also different. What follows now is a passage from fragment 3, which combines an appeal to the Muses with a short explanation of Empedocles' method, directed at his addressee Pausanias:[104]

---

[101] Cf. Tarán (1965) 31.

[102] 'Outside the realm of mortal enquiry', Morgan (2000) 83. Morgan remarks that the goddess has powers we do not have, so that she can speak of the road of non-being, which actually cannot be referred to.

[103] Dolin (1962) 94 citing Jaeger (1947) 93.

[104] DK 31 B 3. The fragment of 14 lines is quoted in one piece by Sextus, but it is clear that there is a break after line 8, where the addressee changes. See Wright (1981) 157 and 160–161; Inwood (2001) also separates the lines. Nonetheless, the passages must have been close together.

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,
ἐκ δ' ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν
καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,
ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
πέμπε παρ' Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ' εὐήνιον ἅρμα.
...
ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάμῃ πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,
μήτε τιν' ὄψιν ἔχων πιστὴν πλέον ἢ κατ' ἀκουήν
ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,
μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσῃ πόρος ἐστι νοῆσαι,
γυίων πίστιν ἕρυκε, νόει δ' ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον.

'But gods! turn aside their madness from my tongue
and channel a pure stream from holy mouths.
And you, maiden Muse of the white arms, much-remembering,
I beseech you: what is right for ephemeral creatures to hear,
send [to me], driving your well-reined chariot from [the halls of] piety.
...
But come, consider, by every device, how each thing is clear
not holding any vision as more reliable than what you hear,
nor the echoes of hearing than the clarities of the tongue,
and do not in any way curb the reliability of the other limbs by which there is
a passage for understanding, but understand each thing in the way that it is clear.'[105]

Empedocles' invocation of the Muses serves a programmatic purpose; for him, the topos of revelation provides an appropriate scene for both a statement on epistemology and a polemic against earlier thinkers.[106]

A brief summary of Empedocles' epistemology, as we can gather from several fragments, is this: Empedocles held that the evidence gathered by the senses could lead to the insight that everything in this world consists of the four elements either held together by Love or divided by Strife. Our quest for truth is hindered by the fact that people die young and usually cannot gather enough data; wise men, however, can see all the things 'which are in ten or twenty lifetimes' (B 6.6). We can see these beliefs, together with responses to earlier thinkers, informing the scene featuring the Muse. There are references to Xenophanes in the notion of people as 'ephemeral creatures' (ἐφημερίοισιν,

[105] Transl. Inwood (2001), slightly altered.

[106] The Hesiodic subtext (on which see further below) is less directly obvious here, but Empedocles implicitly refers to Hesiod's inspiration elsewhere (see Most 2007 291–292 on DK 31 B 131).

4)[107] and in the idea of attaining knowledge through assiduous investigation—but in contrast to Xenophanes, Empedocles believes that men *can* attain knowledge, since it is apparently right for them to hear at least *something* from the Muse (i.e. what is 'right', θέμις, 4).

The most serious disagreement, however, is with Parmenides and Heraclitus. In contrast to Parmenides, Empedocles believes that data gathered by the senses will lead to knowledge; but he is talking of knowledge of a world filled with mortal concepts like movement, mixing and separating.[108] This radical departure from Parmenides' views and interest is indicated by the inverted scene of the Muse driving her chariot towards us mortals, which is in obvious contrast to the Parmenides-like *kouros* who leaves our world and drives his chariot to meet the goddess in a different place. Contrary to Heraclitus, Empedocles does not believe in the unity of opposites or the truth being a hidden quality only attainable through the power of the mind; he states both objections at the end of the fragment: 'understand each thing in the way that it is clear' (νόει δ' ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον).[109] The rejection of Parmenides' and Heraclitus' notions of (hidden) unity is accompanied by a re-appraisal of polymathy;[110] that is also why the Muse is called 'much-remembering' (πολυμνήστη, 3).[111]

It is clear that Empedocles' treatment of the topos of revelation entails a further transformation: the setting of the revelation is considerably less elaborate, the Muses are mentioned in several places in his poem(s), and since Empedocles presents himself as an omniscient god the distinction between himself and the Muses is somewhat blurry. Of greatest interest is perhaps that the polemical element, already (at least) implicitly present

---

[107] For the ephemeral nature of man see also DK 31 B 2 and 131 (where the 'immortal muse' is also invoked).

[108] See Empedocles' insistence on the 'reliability' (πίστις, 10) contained in the (data coming from the) senses, which contrasts with Parmenides' goddess saying there is no 'true reliance' (πίστις ἀληθής, DK 28 B 1.30) in the opinions of mortals.

[109] Division instead of unification is again advocated by the Muses in Empedocles' fr. 4: ὡς δὲ παρ' ἡμετέρης κέλεται πιστώματα Μούσης / γνῶθι, διατμηθέντος ἐνὶ σπλάγχνοισι λόγοιο ('And [you], know in the way that the assurances given by our Muse urge, by dividing up the discourse in your heart', transl. Inwood).

[110] Cf. Hershbell (1970) 161 who suggests that Empedocles DK B 17.14 ('learning will increase understanding', μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει) is directed against Heraclitus' critique of Hesiod in DK 22 B 40.

[111] We already saw that Empedocles praised the wise for seeing things 'which are in ten or twenty lifetimes'. Perhaps this should be taken quite literally. Empedocles had gone through a long cycle of incarnation in plants, animals, and men, and so would count as 'much-remembering' himself.

in the Hesiodic source-text, seems to have become most important—a development that we can clearly discern when retracing the track of the snowball.

There is, however, one other element of the original scene whose reworking by Empedocles deserves some attention, and that is the dichotomy between truth and untruth. In the *Theogony*, the Muses say they lie to some and tell the truth to others, apparently adapting their speech to the listener. Empedocles in his turn asks the Muse to tell him 'what is right for ephemeral creatures to hear' (ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν, 3.4). Obviously, these 'creatures' are ordinary mortals who can only be enlightened by those who have a superior knowledge comprising data from several life times, i.e. the Muse and Empedocles himself. Empedocles thus creates a dichotomy between the knowers on the one hand and the ephemerals on the other. It is of great interest that the members of this second group use a different language; Empedocles often states that they cannot see the elements mixing and separating and thus mistakenly speak of things like 'coming to be', 'life', 'death' and 'fate'.[112] In fragment 9 the dichotomy is emphasized when Empedocles first mentions some of those mistaken names and then concludes: 'it is not right, the way they speak, but I myself also assent to their convention' (οὐ θέμις ἣ καλέουσι, νόμῳ δ' ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός).[113] Since Empedocles must speak to the day-creatures, he has to use their language. This is why he returns to mythological discourse, presenting his elements, for instance, as gods (epithets and all): 'Hear first the four roots of all things: / shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus / and Nestis who with her tears waters mortal springs'.[114]

This mythological discourse, as we have seen above, is largely Hesiodic. It is his cosmological language which is presented as the *nomos*.[115] This allows for two conclusions. The first is the rather paradoxical one that Hesiod's divine speech is taken by Empedocles as the prime example of an essentially mortal or 'ephemeral' way of expression. Of course this is

[112] See DK 31 B 8, 9 and 15. The examples are taken to emphasize their quality as 'ephemerals' (who are thus presented as ignorant even of their own essence).

[113] The concept of θέμις is used in a relative sense in DK 31 B 3.4 ('right *for ephemeral creatures*') and in an absolute sense in DK 31 B 9.5 (plain 'right').

[114] DK 31 B 80: τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε· / Ζεὺς ἀργὴς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ' Ἀιδωνεύς / Νῆστις θ', ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον (transl. Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983).

[115] There is an interesting parallel from the *Timaeus* where Socrates speaks of those who have written on the origin of the gods; since their accounts are unfalsifiable, 'we must conform to custom and believe them' (ἑπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον, Pl. *Ti.* 40e).

hardly new, since Hesiod's theogony was often interpreted as allegorical, apparently speaking of gods and their pedigrees but in fact referring to physiological principles underlying the cosmos—but the point is that Empedocles consciously constructs and places himself in this tradition of allegorical speech. He expresses himself again in the oft-attacked poetic language, doing what he no doubt believed Hesiod had done before him: practising strong allegory. The second point is that mythological language is thus used to point to the conventional nature of language in general. 'Zeus' and 'Hera' turn out to be as conventional as 'life' and 'death'. The return to myth is a sign that language in itself is a problematic tool for expressing the truth.[116] We will see more of this particular problem in the next section.

2.3. *The Use of Good Old-Fashioned Revelation (Protagoras and Prodicus)*

Empedocles' concern about the possibilities of expressing truth in language was widely shared, not least by his predecessors Xenophanes, Parmenides and Heraclitus.[117] The problem was of central importance to the sophists, who—somewhat like Empedocles—made use of the poetic tradition to alert their audience to the difficulty of expressing truth. The sophists, however, centered their attention on Homeric myth as language pointing to its own inherent untrustworthiness. The language of Hesiod, by contrast, seems to have been generally credited with an air of transparency and truthfulness.

In her admirable study on the interplay between myth and philosophy, Morgan has shown how the sophists manipulated myth in order to achieve their various goals. Particularly relevant to our case are two of her conclusions. The first is that the sophists in choosing mythological themes and settings for their speeches and arguments openly sought to connect with tradition and the traditional discourse of education in order to downplay any suspicion or hostility. Protagoras, for instance, explicitly says that he is in the same line of business as Homer and Hesiod to create an image of reassuring continuity with the past, instead of an alarming break.[118] The second is that mythological material is regularly (more or less subtly) employed in speeches in order to indicate a certain tension between language and reality; the point of such speeches is often

[116] Cf. Morgan (2000) 60–62 and further below.
[117] See Morgan (2000) ch. 3.
[118] Pl. *Prt.* 316d.

to demonstrate how such tension can be exploited by good speakers. One example is Antisthenes' dialogue between Odysseus and Ajax, who both lay claim to Achilles' weapons in front of a jury.[119] Ajax represents the outdated hero who values deeds over words, and does not understand that words are deeds too; and so he loses to an Odysseus fully adapted to fifth-century rhetorical culture. Similarly, Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, a defence speech for the mythical Helen who went to Troy, centers on the problems inherent in language: 'the more successfully Gorgias argues that the magical power of speech compelled Helen to do what she should not have done, the less effective is his speech, for we become aware that he is exercising that same persuasion on us, to induce us to believe what we should not.'[120] Myth is thus used to destroy the old-fashioned notion of truth as the straightforward relationship between words and things.

Morgan, however, does not distinguish between the reception of Hesiod and that of Homer; her study is concerned with myth in general and the response to the poetic tradition as a whole.[121] She does not note, therefore, that the sophists treat Hesiodic myth and Homeric myth differently. One indication for this is that Hesiodic material is far less popular among the sophists.[122] This is of course partly explained by Hesiod's relative lack of heroes or role models, who so often feature as the main subjects of the sophists' epideictic speeches.[123] But the main difference is not quantitative but qualitative: while both Hesiodic and Homeric myth are employed to create a socio-politically desirable image for the sophist, Homeric material is used in speeches pointing to the problems of language, whereas Hesiodic myth seems to keep alive the belief in 'truthful' language consisting in a one-on-one correspondence between words and things. In speeches with a Homeric setting, traditional values are openly embraced but secretly subverted—the hidden message, which a clever audience is supposed to pick up, is that the old world is gone and those with ambition will need to adapt to new circumstances (cf. the dialogue between Odysseus and Ajax mentioned above). In speeches with

[119] Antisthenes fr. 14–15 Caizzi; Morgan (2000) 115–119.

[120] Morgan (2000) 126.

[121] In a similar vein, Boys-Stones (2010) construes an eristic relationship between Plato and Hesiod by associating Hesiod broadly with 'the sophistic movement' (43), not distinguishing between sophists. Yamagata (2010) argues that in Plato Hesiod is sophistic while Homer is Socratic.

[122] This *is* signaled by Morgan (2000), see pp. 96–97.

[123] Heracles and Prometheus (see further below) are notable exceptions; the *WD* was probably too 'realistic' or 'historical' (as opposed to mythical) to allow for something like a *Defence of Perses*.

Hesiodic elements, however, the traditional values advocated seem to be reinforced by an archaic notion of truthfulness. I will now demonstrate this by turning to two examples of the sophists' use of Hesiodic material: Protagoras' myth in Plato's *Protagoras*, and Prodicus' myth of Heracles on the crossroads.

Protagoras' myth (*Protagoras* 320c–323a) is a story of the birth of man and his development into a rational and social creature.[124] When people and animals were first created by the gods, Epimetheus equipped all animals with suitable means of survival but forgot man, who was left naked and unarmed. Prometheus tried to compensate for his brother's mistake by stealing fire and the arts, but because they still lacked 'political skill' (πολιτικὴ τέχνη, 322b) men lived apart from one another and were easily attacked. When their race faced extinction, Zeus made Hermes distribute αἰδώς ('reverence') and δίκη ('justice') among all men so they could form cities and thus survive.

It must have been as obvious to an ancient Greek as it is to a modern scholar that Protagoras made use of Hesiodic material for his own μῦθος.[125] It is also clear that this Hesiodic myth is employed to formulate a politically correct statement: its main point is that everybody is endowed with political skill, a welcome message in democratic Athens. We see here the sophists' familiar trick of using myth to express values that they know are widely shared and appreciated.[126] That Protagoras was attracted to the Hesiodic model can be easily explained: Hesiod had a reputation for speaking of beginnings (either of the universe or of man), and was

[124] The question of authenticity is undecided and probably undecidable. There are some strong arguments in favour of Protagorean authorship (on which see Taylor 1991 78–79), and I am inclined to think the story was originally created by Protagoras.

[125] There are so many similarities between Protagoras' myth and Hesiod's account of the earliest stages of human history that Aelius Aristides even seems to confuse them (see *Or.* 26.106). Some of the most conspicuous similarities are that mankind is created by the gods from earth and fire (in *WD* 60–61 and 70–71 womankind is created by Hephaestus from earth and water); that the clever and compassionate Prometheus and the dull-witted Epimetheus play an important role in determining the human condition; that Epimetheus' foolishness all but ruins mankind; that Prometheus in coming to man's aid steals fire; that the political art comes from Zeus; that the supreme god has sentinels; that there exists a kinship between men and gods (*Prt.* 322a, *WD* 108); that αἰδώς and δίκη are qualities essential for living in a society (according to Taylor 1991 85–86, Protagoras used the words αἰδώς and δίκη instead of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη to recall the archaic personifications from the *WD*); and that these qualities come from Zeus. Sihvola (1989) also points to several agreements on ideological issues (esp. 148–150), but sometimes goes too far; Ferrarin (2000) downplays the Hesiodic influence.

[126] Cf. e.g. Adkins (1973) explaining how Protagoras manipulates and confuses terms in order to make the audience believe they all possess political skill.

usually interpreted allegorically. But I think that Protagoras had another reason for choosing Hesiod: he wanted to make use of Hesiod's association with good old-fashioned truth, defined as the one-on-one relationship between words and things. This use of Hesiod comes to the fore if we consider more closely two things: the communication between Zeus and Hermes as presented by the myth, and the context of Protagoras' myth in the dialogue.

First, we will have a close look at the dialogue between Zeus and Hermes (*Protagoras* 322c3–d5). When Zeus has decided to preserve the human race by sending Hermes with the gift of αἰδώς and δίκη, Hermes asks him how they should be distributed: like the crafts, in which case one specialist among many lay people will be enough? Or should they be given 'to all' (ἐπὶ πάντας)? 'To all' (ἐπὶ πάντας), is the response of Zeus; and we are subsequently told that it was so: this is why the Athenians take advice on political matters from every man (ἅπαντος ἀνδρός, 323a2), because they think it belongs to all (παντί, *ibid.*). The many repetitions of forms of 'all' (πᾶς)[127] serve to drive home Protagoras' main point, i.e. the universal distribution of political skill; but they also imply the possibility and value of felicitous, 'truthful' communication, exemplified by the exact repetition of Hermes' words by Zeus and the succesful rescue of mankind resulting from it. The words and the things match perfectly.

This point emerges more clearly once we realize that the exchange between Hermes and Zeus is meant as a positive foil to the earlier meeting between Prometheus and Epimetheus (*Protagoras* 320d6–8), where we find the ultimate origin of the human predicament (eventually solved by Zeus). The communication between the two brothers is characterized by several flaws: only Epimetheus speaks, and there is no such 'tautology' as demonstrated by Zeus and Hermes, but persuasion instead (πείσας, 320d7). Whereas *both* brothers were ordered to 'divide' (νεῖμαι, 320d5) the qualities among the earthly creatures, Epimetheus sets to it alone (νείμαντος δέ μου, 320d7). Finally, the relationship between words and deeds is wholly distorted when Epimetheus gives Prometheus the task of inspecting his work afterwards (ἐπίσκεψαι)—a complete upheaval of the correspondency between words and things, which we are meant to

[127] There is also a subtle allusion (to my knowledge not noted before) to Hesiod's Pandora here, also a gift devised by Zeus and sent by Hermes (*WD* 83–85). Her name was taken to mean 'gifted by all (the gods)', or 'gift from all (the gods)', see the scholia and West (1978) ad loc. Protagoras' Pandora, however, is a 'gift *to* all (people)'. Perhaps this is a correction of Hesiodic etymology.

notice (see the paradox in 321c3–4: 'to inspect came the Fore-thinker afterwards', ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος).[128] This is an ominous start for mankind, and it need not surprise us that people initially had no skill whatsoever to work together. Only πολιτικὴ τέχνη, originating from the exemplary communication between Zeus and Hermes, will lead to cooperation in cities. The myth is thus also a cautionary tale warning against the distortion of the relationship between words and things, and advocates matching or 'true' speech instead.

We will see how emphasizing the Hesiodic notion of truth is important to Protagoras when we consider the context. The reason for Protagoras telling his myth is his claim to make people better; Socrates was sceptical about the possibility of virtue being taught, and had challenged Protagoras to prove it. At the start of his great speech, the sophist asks his audience whether he should put the explanation in the form of a 'story' (μῦθος) or an 'argument' (λόγος, 320c3–4); when the audience replies he can relate it in whichever form he wants, the sophist chooses the story because it is supposedly 'more pleasant' (χαριέστερον, 320c6–7). But Protagoras, as has often been noted, is tricking the audience, for he knows that *mythos* and *logos* are not really equivalent options. That Zeus has given the art of politics to each and every man, the very point of the *mythos*, is a completely arbitrary element in the story which in fact cannot be proven by any *logos* he might think of. Protagoras *needs* the myth. Morgan rightly argues that the rest of the speech, which in fact *is* a *logos*, 'will hold *only if* we presuppose the myth'.[129] The myth, therefore, is a mode of expressing a supposition that should be taken as an absolute truth that ultimately legitimizes Protagoras' work as a teacher of virtue. This unprovable truth, that the opinion of one man is as true as that of the other, is the only absolute truth Protagoras needs in his otherwise relativistic universe.[130] It underlies the *homo mensura*-statement which, by allotting a partial truth to all private opinions and thus denying an absolute truth, is nonetheless absolutely true itself.[131] In the myth of the *Protagoras*, this Truth is in Hesiodic fashion imparted by a god, no Muse

[128] Several scholars have noted an incongruity between Zeus' orders and their execution by various gods in the 'production' of Pandora in the *WD*, cf. Tsagalis (2009) 159.

[129] Morgan (2000) 141; see her useful discussion on Protagoras' choice of myth on pp. 138–147. See also Blumenberg (1979) 362–365 on Protagoras' trick of his *Kunstmythos*.

[130] According to Bett (1989), Protagoras is the only real (or 'deep', as he calls it) relativist among the sophists (see further n.142 below).

[131] This is already pointed out in Plato's *Theaetetus*, e.g. 170e–171a.

but Zeus himself. There is a return to the divine plane for the expression of truth, a truth that may not be subject to the manipulative power of language that Protagoras exploits elsewhere.

We may compare Protagoras' use of Hesiod to that of his fellow-sophist Prodicus. Prodicus also exploited the Hesiodic model of the decent myth, i.e. a myth characterized not only by a morally approvable content but also by the advertisement of straightforward language that does not allow for (willful) confusion and distortion. We can see this in Prodicus' myth of Heracles at the crossroads, a story in which the young Heracles, thinking about which road to take in life, is approached by two women representing Virtue and Vice.[132] Prodicus incorporated into this myth both Hesiod's road-image and his work-ethic:[133] as Virtue explains, the gods give nothing to man without toil, so one must work hard to achieve anything and be content with simple pleasures.

Prodicus thus created a morally acceptable story, for Heracles of course chooses Virtue: he learns to work hard and avoid evil and luxury. At the same time, the myth presents a rather straightforward (and archaic) stand on the matter of truth and language. After Vice has introduced herself and promised Heracles the world without ever having to work for it, Virtue steps up and says 'I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will rather tell you truly the things that are, as the gods have ordained them.'[134] As in the myth of Protagoras, reality ('the way things are') is created by a divinity, and perfectly communicable in words. Virtue represents this truth, whereas Vice stands for (pleasurable) falsehood. The message is that one can simply choose between them. There is the danger of lies, flattery, and falsehood, but language *can* be truthful. It is a matter of choice, just as Hesiod's Muses proclaim: 'we know how to say many false things similar to genuine ones, / but we know, when we wish, how to proclaim true things'.

Apart from the resemblances between Protagoras' and Prodicus' use of Hesiodic myth, there appears to be one striking difference. Protagoras is especially interested in Hesiodic truth for rhetorical purposes: his *mythos* (constructed from mainly Hesiodic material) serves to convince his audience of a truth that he could never prove. But there is nothing in

[132] The story is retold by X. *Mem.* 2.1.21–34 (= DK 84 B 2).

[133] Cf. O'Sullivan (1992) 76–77.

[134] DK 84 B 2 (27): οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω δέ σε προοιμίοις ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' ἥπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν τὰ ὄντα διηγήσομαι μετ' ἀληθείας.

the other fragments ascribed to him that suggests he really believed in an absolute truth, as the exact correspondence between words and things; quite the contrary. It is interesting to note that his tale is also the only of his fragments containing references to Hesiod. By contrast, his fellow-sophist Prodicus *does* seem to have held the view that words and things can match precisely. Hesiod, moreover, was of far more than fleeting interest to Prodicus. Their relationship calls for further investigation, which is one of the subjects of the next section.

3. *Language and Truth*[135]

In section 2.1, I tried to show that Hesiod, largely because of his revelation scene in the *Theogony*, was in the early classical age taken to represent the view that a) there is an absolute truth and b) it is possible to express that truth in language. This view (and the polymathy that went with it) was attacked for its pretentiousness and naiveté by Xenophanes and Heraclitus, while the topos of inspiration was updated by Parmenides and Empedocles from an epistemological and polemical point of view. Protagoras and Prodicus, as we have seen, regenerated the old-fashioned view for their own purposes. And so, Hesiod remained connected to (divine) truth and the possibility of communicating it with words.

In this section, we will see that some Greeks believed that this old, Hesiod-related idea could still somehow hold in the fifth- and fourth-century 'new age' of sceptics and relativists. They thought a careful investigation of the exact meaning of words would reveal the truthful relation between words and things, and would expose rhetoric and relativism for nothing more than the incorrect use of language.[136] Here too Hesiod seems to have been the model for the 'scientific' method that explains the whole of reality by beginning with an understanding of its smallest building-blocks; not the elements this time, but letters, syllables and words. This is the main example of the 'spillage' mentioned at the end of section 1: Hesiod's earlier reputation for thinking in 'elements' was transferred from natural philosophy to the philosophers' new field of interest:

---

[135] A large part of this section appeared earlier as 'Plato's Hesiod: not Plato's alone', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 89–110.

[136] Struck (2004) 58 formulates this one-on-one relationship between words and things most correctly by speaking of an 'isomorphism between the taxonomy of language and the taxonomy of reality'.

language. This transferral was facilitated by Hesiod's manifest interest in language,[137] especially concerning words that have an (apparently) double meaning.[138]

This section will focus on Prodicus and especially Plato, whose work provides the best proof for this particular Hesiod, i.e. the Hesiod of the 'correctness of names'.

The sophist Prodicus, as O'Sullivan noticed, seems to have had a particular interest in Hesiod. His cosmogony, for instance, strongly resembles that of Hesiod, and we have already seen how his myth featuring Heracles was indebted to the poet.[139] Furthermore, and this is especially relevant here, Prodicus may have presented Hesiod as a thinker who foreshadowed his own theory concerning synonyms and ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων or 'correctness of names'.[140] Prodicus' theory, in short, holds that there is a one-on-one relationship between words and their referents, and that there are no real synonyms. Whenever two words appear to have the same meaning, it is the philosopher's task to investigate their exact definitions and distinguish them accordingly—a process which reflects our organization of reality.[141] Prodicus seems to have occupied a rather unique posi-

[137] See e.g. Lamberton (1988) 80 on how 'the Hesiodic voice insists on the centrality of language'.

[138] Cf. Claus (1977) on Hesiod's interest in words that have a double, 'potentially paradoxical' meaning, and Kirby (1992) 44–46 briefly on Hesiod's distinction between two types of Eris resembling the ὀρθότης λόγου of the 'Sophists'. Of course Ἔρις ('strife', *WD* 11–26) and αἰδώς ('shame', *WD* 317–319) are the most obvious examples (see Arrighetti 1996 66–67 on others, such as νέμεσις, φήμη and ὅρκος); oxymora like the κακὰ κέρδεα (*WD* 352) and the καλὸν κακόν (*Th.* 585) betray a similar interest in the ambiguity contained in words. Hesiod was already in antiquity linked to the 'doubleness' of concepts: see e.g. Eur. *Hipp.* 385–386 copying Hesiod's distinction between two types of shame (a reference noted by [Lucian] *Am.* 37), and Call. fr. 200a Pf. imitating the *WD*'s overture by distinguishing two Aphrodites; Thgn. 1.873–876 suggests, perhaps, that it was this particular knowledge that led to the praise of wisdom in Hesiod's epitaph ('having the measure of wisdom', μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης, *EG* 428, see pp. 163–164 above). The scholion on *Il.* 24.45 considers the notion of the doubleness of shame Hesiodic enough to strike it out of Homer's text; see also Aristarchus in Σ *WD* 97a explaining away the well-known problem of Ἐλπίς by positing (in Hesiodic fashion) two types of 'hope'.

[139] O'Sullivan (1992) 75–79. Interestingly, Prodicus was also considered a polymath (see e.g. Pl. *Prt.* 315e–316a, 'a man who in my opinion is godlike in his universal knowledge', πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος).

[140] Cf. Arrighetti (1996) 61–64 on Hesiod trying to make visible the 'correspondance entre la réalité et le langage' (62), and Too (1998) 24 describing Hesiodic language as 'homonymous and to some degree coterminous with the world that it signifies'.

[141] There is independent proof of Prodicus separating alleged synonyms, but only Plato links Prodicus to a theory explicitly called ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων (see *Euthd.* 277e, *Cra.*

tion, as most of his fellow-sophists believed that words exist 'by convention'. Their rhetorical exercises, often featuring terms of ethical content, led to a 'practical relativism'[142] that Prodicus tried to oppose.

Plato refers several times to the way Prodicus reconstructed and used the 'linguistic purist' Hesiod. The most illustrative example comes from a passage from the *Protagoras*, which establishes a clear link between ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων, Prodicus and Hesiod. In this passage (*Protagoras* 338e6–341a2) Socrates and Protagoras are discussing a poem by Simonides. According to Protagoras, Simonides is inconsistent since he in one and the same poem claims that it is hard to become good and easy to be good. Socrates, however, calls in the aid of Prodicus, and defends Simonides by pointing at the difference between 'becoming' and 'being'. It is at this point that Socrates suddenly quotes Hesiod's verses on the tough road to virtue: 'The gods put goodness where we have to sweat / to get at her. But once you reach the top / She's easy to have as she was hard at first'.[143] In this passage from the *Works and Days* Hesiod, we are supposed to infer, has taught us to differentiate between becoming virtuous and being virtuous. When Socrates immediately thereafter remarks that the 'divine wisdom' (σοφία θεία, 341a1) of Prodicus is apparently as old as Simonides or 'even earlier' (ἔτι παλαιοτέρα), it is clear to whom that more ancient wisdom belongs: Hesiod. I believe it is very likely that Prodicus himself had actually used this very passage from Hesiod to illustrate his investigation into words.[144]

384b; he can be seen practising his art in e.g. *Prt*. 337a, 340a, 341, and 358a, where the theory is described in other words); we should therefore be careful not to attribute to Prodicus things that are part of the theory of ὀρθότης as Plato conceived it (see Mayer's warning in Untersteiner 1954 214, and Fehling 1965—but against overmuch caution is the obvious connection between Prodicus and ὀρθότης *sec* in Ar. *Av*. 690–692). Important to my argument, however, is the link to Hesiod.

[142] Momigliano (1929) 102. Bett (1989) further examined the relativism of the sophists and only regards Protagoras as a genuine or 'deep' relativist; he ascribed a 'weak sense' of relativism (i.e. ethical or evaluative relativism) to the other sophists.

[143] *Prt*. 340d, *WD* 289 and 291–292.

[144] The likelihood of the historical Prodicus having used this passage increases considerably once one takes into account the preceding passage (*Prt*. 340a–b). Here Socrates calls on Prodicus to help him against Protagoras and cites *Il*. 21.308, where the river Scamander asks his brother Simois to help him against the unleashed Achilles. We know that Protagoras commented on this very passage from the *Iliad* (DK 80 A 30; see also Capra 2005). When Protagoras' attack on Simonides is accompanied by an allusion to his actual practice of Homeric criticism, it is not unlikely that Prodicus' defence of Simonides refers to his actual use of Hesiod. Incidentally, there may be another hint at the association of Hesiod and Prodicus in Pl. *R*. 600d, where the wandering bards Hesiod and Homer are compared to the travelling sophists. The presence of the notoriously

It seems that Plato wants to associate Prodicus with the investigation into the exact meaning of words. What is most interesting to us, however, is that this sort of investigation is firmly connected to Hesiod. In the *Charmides*, Critias says that *Works and Days* 311 (ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, 'work is no disgrace') was composed by Hesiod to explain the difference between 'working' (ἐργάζεσθαι) and 'doing' (ποιεῖν). Hesiod's verse was apparently interpreted as a charter to engage in any kind of occupation, even indecent ones,[145] but Critias explains that since Hesiod was obviously a wise and good person he must have meant by work only 'things that are done in a good and useful way'.[146] This notorious verse and a similar defence come back in a scene from Xenophon's description of the trial of Socrates, where Xenophon tries to show that Socrates did not, as his accuser claimed, 'select from the most famous poets the most immoral passages, and used them as witnesses to teach his companions to be criminals and tyrants'.[147] Xenophon's defence consists of giving two examples of Socrates' alleged abuse of the poets, and then exonerating him in both cases. One of the examples comes from Hesiod (*Works and Days* 311 again), and the other one is from Homer[148]—but interestingly enough, only Hesiod's verse is neutralized by investigating the exact meaning of the words: since Hesiod's ἔργον means '*good* work', there is nothing wrong with the line.[149] The Homeric passage, quoted for its (alleged) anti-democratic content, is in fact not defused at all; Xenophon suggests that Socrates interpreted the lines from the *Iliad* differently, but is especially eager to point to the non-aristocratic way of life of the actual Socrates.[150]

---

home-bound Hesiod here has often puzzled scholars (see e.g. Jowett and Campbell 1894 ad loc. for the easiest, Homerocentric solution of simply ignoring Hesiod), but may have to do with his connection to Prodicus: Socrates first mentions Protagoras and Prodicus, and then compares them to Homer and Hesiod.

[145] Prostitution and making shoes being the prime examples. Since both ἔργον and ὄνειδος are neuter, the verse could also be read as 'no work is a disgrace'. See Graziosi (2010) 120–125 for an excellent discussion of the relevant passages.

[146] Pl. *Chrm.* 163c: τὰ γὰρ καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα ἔργα ἐκάλει.

[147] X. *Mem.* 1.2.56: ἔφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ πονηρότατα καὶ τούτοις μαρτυρίοις χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακούργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικούς. See on this passage also ch. 2, pp. 89–90.

[148] *Il.* 2.188–191 and 198–202; Odysseus, bringing the army back under control after Agamemnon's confused speech, addresses the aristocracy with gentle words but is rude to the people of lower status.

[149] X. *Mem.* 1.2.57: 'Interpreted like that, it can stand as correct' (ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι).

[150] See Aeschin. *Fals.Leg.* for another link between Hesiod and the theory of ὀρθότης.

It appears, then, that Hesiod is connected to a 'scientific' method of understanding not only the physical world, but its representation in words as well, by separating and categorizing the constituent parts. This is an admittedly vague observation,[151] but it can be further specified and elaborated. In order to do this, we will take a look at some passages in the Platonic corpus where Hesiod is associated with what might be called 'scientific approaches' that are similar to that of separation and categorization. I distinguish two of these approaches, which will now be briefly discussed.

The first of the approaches is etymology.[152] In the *Cratylus*, the dialogue exploring the correctness of names and the reasons for why names are as they are, Hesiod is frequently mentioned. First of all, he features as a proto-etymologist: Socrates, for instance, makes fun of Hesiod's own explanation of the name Aphrodite, which Socrates calls 'child-like' (παιδικός).[153] Secondly, Hesiod supplies names on which the method of

---

As we have seen above (ch. 4, pp. 149–150), Aeschines had quoted Hesiod's passage on the divinity of Φήμη to show there had to be truth in all the rumours concerning the many excesses of Timarchus, a friend of Demosthenes' (Aeschin. *Tim.* 129). When Demosthenes re-used the Hesiodic passage to argue that the rumours of Aeschines' treason would then have to be true as well (Dem. *Fals.Leg.* 243), Aeschines responded by distinguishing between rumour and slander, placing Demosthenes' accusations in the second category (Aeschin. *Fals.Leg.* 144). Aeschines thus brilliantly defuses the attack by replying in the manner of Hesiod, splitting words, at the same time showing his superiority over Demosthenes in Hesiodic matters.

[151] It is deliberately vague because I wish to avoid connecting Hesiod to Plato's method of *diairesis*. There are some superficial similarities that could lead to broad-sweeping equations (see Solmsen (1962) 179–181), but *diairesis* is—in contrast to Hesiod's genealogies—not so much about categorization *per se*, but rather about definition. This can be clearly seen from the fact that the method of *diairesis* creates a 'tree' in which only one branch is followed to its end (the actual definition), whereas Hesiod's genealogical tree tries to follow all its branches.

[152] Modern scholars typify Hesiod as a 'keen etymologist and cultivator of word-play' (Miller 2001 261, see also Leclerc 1993 272–278 and Joyal 1991 184–186). Regali (2009) too notes that the *Th.* 'is unusually explicit in its search for the true meaning of divine names' (262). Incidentally, etymology was employed by Prodicus as well, though how exactly is uncertain, cf. Untersteiner (1954) 213. Most (2010) 62 notes that Plato tends throughout his career 'to accept Hesiod's *Theogony* as an authority on the names, genealogies and etymologies of the gods'.

[153] *Cra.* 406c. Why Hesiod's explanation of Aphrodite, coming from 'foam' (ἀφρός), is called 'child-like' is not clear. It is presumably a sign of inexperience to hold on to the apparent root when searching for an etymological explanation; older and wiser etymologists look beyond the superficial to a word's true root. I do not understand why Levin (1997) 49 n.21 claims Plato agrees with Hesiod's etymology here; Herodian, on the other hand, does express his approval (2.367.27 Lentz).

etymology can be practised.[154] Of course this second qualification does not exclusively fit Hesiod, but Homer as well—but I believe it can still be maintained that etymology is a particularly Hesiodic practice.[155]

We can see such practice in action when Socrates is analyzing, for instance, the names of Zeus, Cronus, and Uranus (*Cratylus* 396b–c). 'Zeus', it is claimed, means 'he through whom there is life'.[156] The supreme god is born from a mighty intellect, for contrary to what most people believe the name Cronus signifies 'the pure and clear mind', and he is himself a son of Uranus, 'he who looks at the things above' like a philosopher.[157] Socrates then continues:

> εἰ δ' ἐμεμνήμην τὴν Ἡσιόδου γενεαλογίαν, τίνας ἔτι τοὺς ἀνωτέρω προγόνους λέγει τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἐπαυόμην διεξιὼν ὡς ὀρθῶς αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται …
>
> 'If I remembered Hesiod's genealogy, who are the even earlier ancestors of the gods he mentions, I wouldn't stop investigating how their names are correct …'[158]

Hesiod's genealogy is referred to because Socrates in etymologizing the names of Zeus, Cronus and Uranus has followed the backbone of the succession myth in the *Theogony* (Uranus-Cronus-Zeus), but in reverse order: he is retracing the origin and cause of all living creatures to an intellectual principle ('the pure and clear mind') which in turn derives from the study of astronomy ('looking at the things above', perhaps a less developed state).[159] The etymology linking the three gods reaffirms

---

[154] E.g. *Cra*. 397e (etymology of demons) and 414d (the Sphinx).

[155] Even though Homer is mentioned even more often than Hesiod in the *Cratylus*, there are some arguments for maintaining that etymology is particularly Hesiodic. For instance, Homer is in the *Cratylus* mentioned seven and Hesiod five times (a very un-Platonic ratio; the ratio of Homeric versus Hesiodic references throughout the Platonic corpus is roughly 3:1), and Homer is nowhere in the *Cratylus* said to have explained names himself. Moreover, since Homer was generally regarded as the founding father of practically *all* science and philosophy (see in this respect e.g. [Plut.] *De vita et poesi Homeri* and on a less serious note D.L. 9.71), it would be odd if the science of etymology was an exception. But I do not wish to press this point; it is the more specific combination of etymology and genealogy (on which see below) that I want to connect to Hesiod in particular.

[156] Zeus' name in the accusative form is either Δία or Ζῆνα, hence the etymology δι' ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει.

[157] Κρόνος or Κόρος is said to be not from κόρος ('child') but from κορός ('pure') and thus indicates τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ. Uranus' name is explained as coming from τὸ ὁρᾶν τὰ ἄνω.

[158] Pl. *Cra*. 396c (transl. slightly altered).

[159] See Sedley (2003) 91 for the wider resonance of this idea in the Platonic corpus.

their genealogical connection. We should compare this practice to a passage from the *Theaetetus*, where Socrates says (155d):

> μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἶριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν.
>
> 'For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering (*thaumazein*): this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else. And the man who made Iris the child of Thaumas was perhaps no bad genealogist.'

Socrates means here that 'speaking' (εἴρω) is begotten by or comes after 'wondering' (θαυμάζω).[160] The genealogist referred to is, of course, Hesiod, who in fact calls Iris the daughter of Thaumas twice in the *Theogony* (266 and 780).

These two passages strongly imply that the practices of genealogy and etymology, both connected to Hesiod, are largely comparable. The similarity between the passages has also been noted by modern scholars such as Sluiter, who states that they are both 'strategies to gain control over the present',[161] or at least to gain knowledge of the present. Apart from the similar goal, however, their respective 'methods' (if I may call it so) can be compared in at least three other respects.

First, both attempt to organize and clarify the past. This is obvious for genealogy, but etymology too, though basically synchronic and without historical interest,[162] often searches for an original namegiver and works on the assumption that names have become less perspicuous through time—it is the etymologist's job to clear up the distortion and restore the original structures.[163] Second, both practices are rather unsystematic and often serve an *ad hoc* purpose. The tree-like structure of genealogy (especially when executed so systematically as in the *Theogony*) may seem different from the 'anything goes'-strategy of etymology, but this is only apparently so: in genealogy derivation is almost equally irregular, since children can be born from one or two parents, or none at all; moreover, different pedigrees can exist side by side, all

[160] The etymology of Iris is mentioned in *Cra.* 408a (though without Hesiod).
[161] Sluiter (1997) 156.
[162] Cf. Herbermann (1991) 365–366.
[163] See e.g. *Cra.* 414c–d, where Socrates says that people kept embellishing the 'first names' (πρῶτα ὀνόματα) until finally 'a name is reached that no human being can understand'. The example he chooses is the word *Sphinx*, the original form of which is still visible in Hesiod's *Phix* (*Th.* 326).

grounding the present.[164] And thirdly, and perhaps rather obviously, both genealogy and etymology are based on a preconceived notion of what the result will be: the outcome is usually known before the investigation.

The similarity between etymology and genealogy may have been even more visible in antiquity because the mythical data used for etymology are often genealogically structured; hence the implication in the passages from *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus* just mentioned that Hesiod had knowledge of both. The *Benennungsgrund*[165] for the names of the gods featuring in the *Theogony* is given through their ancestry. It is etymology through genealogy, or the other way around. No matter what Socrates or Plato may have thought about it, the practice referred to was very real—and Hesiod is definitely connected to it.

Apart from etymology, there is another 'scientific approach' connected to separation and categorization. This is a philosophical position I will call 'atomism' here (for lack of a better term); it operates on the basic assumption that the sum total of reality can be divided into and explained from its smallest parts.[166] As has been shown in section 1, the natural philosophers attributed such a view to Hesiod with regard to cosmogony and cosmology. When the concept was applied to language, the link to Hesiod remained, and so he became associated with the hypothesis that knowledge was made up from the basic building-blocks of speech: letters, syllables and words. Evidence for this 'atomistic' Hesiod is scanty, but there are some traces of him in Plato.

One of these can be found in the *Theaetetus*. Near the end of this dialogue, knowledge is tentatively defined as a 'true opinion with an account' (μετὰ λόγου ἀληθής δόξα, 201d–202c). One of the three proposed ways of understanding this λόγος or 'account' is as an enumeration of all the elements of the thing known (206e–207a). Theaetetus, however, who

[164] One can think, for instance, of the theogonies of Hesiod, Orpheus, and Pherecydes, or of *ad hoc* theogonies like the birth of Eros from Poros and Penia in Pl. *Smp*. 203b–d. Here the link with etymology is especially apparent; see e.g. *Cra*. 404e–406a, where no less than four equally valid etymological explanations of the name 'Apollo' are given (corresponding to the four powers of the god). The scholia abound with such multiple, co-existing etymologies.

[165] The term is that of Herbermann (1991).

[166] This notion is vaguely reminiscent of Jaeger (1947) 16 ascribing to Hesiod a 'method of mythical hypostasis' (by which a primal abstract deity creates a number of more specific and concrete gods), which became 'a particularly important device for explaining the world in the theological cosmology of post-Hesiodic times.'

does not immediately understand what Socrates means by this reference to 'elements', needs an example first. Socrates then cites *Works and Days* 456: 'One hundred are the timbers of a wagon' (ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ' ἁμάξης, 207a). He explains: 'Now I couldn't say what they are; and I don't suppose you could either. If you and I were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could answer 'Wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke."[167] It is implied, of course, that Hesiod *does* know all the constituent parts of a wagon, and that Hesiod is 'the man who can explore [the wagon's] being by going through those hundred items (. . .), who has passed from mere judgement to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon; and has done so in virtue of having gone over the whole by means of the elements'.[168] Hesiod is cited not only to illustrate this 'atomistic' interpretation of the *logos*, but also figures as a well-known supporter (or perhaps even the initiator) of this atomistic theory.

That this view is applicable to language is made clear by the other example given by Socrates, i.e. that of the grammarian: whereas we laymen understand names (such as that of Theaetetus) only 'in terms of the syllables' (κατὰ συλλαβήν, 207a), a grammarian has in-depth knowledge of the smaller elements that make up the name, and can thus provide a truly scientific account. The equation between Hesiod's and the grammarians' theory of knowledge is obvious from Socrates' summary of their atomistic view: 'that going through the elements of any given thing is an account, whereas a description in terms of syllables or anything larger is not an account yet.'[169] In terms of the wagon, Hesiod knows of all its timbers whereas we only see the larger components; in terms of names, grammarians know the smallest constituents whereas we can only discern the syllables.[170] Hesiodic atomism is apparently a

[167] Pl. *Tht*. 207a; cf. Galen 15.103 Kühn referring to this passage in Plato when explaining what an element is.

[168] Pl. *Tht*. 207c: τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν (. . .) ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἁμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα. See *Tht*. 207b for a similar explanation of this theory, according to which 'it is not possible to give an account of a thing with knowledge till, in addition to his true judgement, he [the unnamed supporter of the theory] goes right through the thing element by element . . .' (οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τὴς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνῃ τις).

[169] Pl. *Tht*. 207c: τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν.

[170] Throughout the Platonic corpus, the γραμματικὴ τέχνη is characterized as the art of understanding how a limited set of letters makes up the endless mass of individual words; see Pl. *Cra*. 431e, *Sph*. 253a, *Plt*. 285d, and esp. *Phlb*. 17b and *R*. 402b.

model for an atomistic approach to language, as practised by the alleged linguistic experts the grammarians.[171]

Another example, coming from the *Cratylus*, shows how interconnected the several aspects of Hesiod 'the intellectual' are. Somewhere in the dialogue, Cratylus is invited to join the discussion so far conducted by Socrates and Hermogenes alone. Cratylus, an etymologist himself, who believes that the correctness of names is determined by nature, at first declines the invitation: surely Hermogenes and Socrates do not presume to understand everything about such a large and important subject so quickly? 'No by god, I don't', Hermogenes replies, 'but I think that Hesiod is right in saying that 'If you can add even a little to a little, it's worthwhile'.'[172] It is not a coincidence that Hesiod is cited here; the quote, I submit, is effective on at least three levels. First, it is there for the obvious purpose of inviting Cratylus to join them and not be shy: even if he can add only a little, his contribution is welcome. Second, it is also a comment *on* the conversation since Socrates and Hermogenes were engaged in a discussion of the meaning of letters, the smallest elements of language. And third, Hesiod, who could be interpreted as an etymologist associated with the theory of the correctness of names, may have been particularly appealing to Cratylus—at any rate, he eventually agrees to participate.

It is somewhat beside the point of the present investigation to find out what Plato's reasons were for referring to this atomistic Hesiod; obviously, 'Plato manipulates Hesiod to present both his own ideas and to critique his predecessors'.[173] The main point of this section as a whole is concerned with the recycling of Hesiod the archaic truth-teller. We have seen how, in the fifth and fourth century BC, relativists and rhetoricians denied the necessity of absolute truth and exploited the gap between words and their referents; language did not need to be true but only convincing. Thinkers like Gorgias had no use for the age-old image of truth-telling Hesiod, who

---

[171] In the end, however, this proposed interpretation of *logos* is rejected because of the analogy with the smallest elements of language, i.e. its letters: it does not follow that someone who can spell (and therefore has knowledge of letters), also has knowledge of either the syllables or the entire name (Pl. *Tht*. 207c–208b). Similarly, knowledge of timbers will not lead to knowing a wagon.

[172] Pl. *Cra*. 428a: ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου καλῶς μοι φαίνεται ἔχειν, τὸ εἰ καί τις σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθείη, προὔργου εἶναι (referring to *WD* 361).

[173] In the words of Edmonds (2001), but replacing 'the myth' by 'Hesiod'. See for Plato's goals in employing Hesiod the etymologist and atomist Koning (2010).

believed in an absolute truth which he separated from an untruth that merely resembled it, and who organized reality by carefully collecting, labeling, and categorizing all its parts. Prodicus, however, and (probably) other thinkers like him, continued to see Hesiod as a model since they believed that the elements of speech corresponded to the elements of reality. Through a careful investigation of the smallest components of language, and meticulous research into the exact meaning of words, truth was possible again. There was thus still use for Hesiod's method, which remained essentially the same; only the object of inquiry changed, from the universe to language.[174]

4. *Conclusion*

Hesiod was from his earliest reception onwards considered as a (natural) philosopher credited with a distinct view on a wide range of important questions. In the three sections above, I have discussed the nature of Hesiod's philosophy from three different points of view. It should be clear, however, that Hesiod's thoughts on matters of physics, his mode of revelation and his belief in truthful language are complementary; when understood together, they present a very coherent picture of Hesiod as a thinker. In this conclusion, I will point out the three qualities that are most characteristic of Hesiod as a philosopher.

The first quality is the immense magnitude of Hesiod's scope, as demonstrated in his *Theogony*, where he describes nothing less than the complete history of the entire universe, from primal Chaos to present day processes of condensation and evaporation. This is what attracted the first cosmologists and physical theorists, as is clear from the writings of Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Empedocles. The ambitious claim to know everything, however, also triggered the first critique, coming from Xenophanes and Heraclitus, who both believed Hesiod's knowledge of πάντα or πλεῖστα was fake in some sense (either because knowledge of everything was unachieveable, or because being a polymath was not enough to attain true knowledge).

[174] As was noted before, evidence for the atomistic Hesiod is rather scarce, and it is hard to determine how widespread this notion was. We do know, however, that Plutarch still needed to defend Hesiod against those who made fun of him for his σμικρολογία ('talking about small things', Σ *WD* 423–427).

Second, there is Hesiod's method of acquiring—and passing on!—knowledge through enumeration; this is the 'atomist' approach of meticulously collecting and categorizing all constituent parts that together account for the whole. We have seen this approach to a lesser or larger degree in all three sections. It may appear, at first, that the method of enumeration is in conflict with the mode of revelation, which implies a sudden breakthrough of insight instead of a slow process of collecting data. This conflict is in fact notable in the two earliest responses described in section 2, i.e. those of Xenophanes and Heraclitus. As we have seen above, Xenophanes deliberately archaized Hesiod, rejecting an allegorical interpretation of his gods and attacking the surface reading; in keeping with this approach, he ignored Hesiod's atomism (which does not seem incompatible with Xenophanes' belief in slow progress) and focused on the absurdity of revelation. Heraclitus did the exact opposite and focused on Hesiod's reputation as a polymath, insisting that knowing much is not enough to attain true knowledge, implicitly rejecting Hesiod's truth-claim resulting from revelation. Parmenides and Empedocles, however, bypassed the conflict and understood the mode of revelation as a topos belonging to philosophical discourse: contact with the divine thus became compatible with a rational method for acquiring and verifying knowledge.

It is obvious that the method of enumeration ascribed to Hesiod was to a large degree suggested by the *Theogony* itself, a work filled with catalogues and genealogies. On the other hand, the method was also given shape (and evaluated) by the recipients themselves. Heraclitus, for instance, turns Hesiod into a polymath who endlessly collects data but does not come to real knowledge since he fails to look beyond the superficial many to the underlying one. Empedocles, however, considers Hesiod as a forerunner of his own theory that reduces all of physical reality to a limited number of building-blocks; enumeration is a prelude here, necessary but not final. Other variations of Hesiod's method appear, but they all share the atomist perspective.

Third, there is the assumption that straightforward and unproblematic communication is possible, and results from a fairly transparent relationship between words and things, or an 'isomorphism between the taxonomy of language and the taxonomy of reality'.[175] This philosophical quality of Hesiod is obviously connected to the method of enumeration, since

[175] See above, p. 223 n.136.

enumeration presupposes that the things indicated are separate entities with distinct denotations. It is also connected to Hesiod's reputation as a truth-teller who can distinguish between true things and things that only look like them. The Hesiodic belief in the one-on-one correspondence between words and things is particularly highlighted through investigation into the exact meaning of words by Prodicus and his followers. It was already foreshadowed, I believe, by the Milesians, who could see the physical phenomena behind the 'thin veil of mythological language'. Of course, there were also hints in Hesiod's work itself, for instance through the etymologies he gives.[176]

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize again that the qualities described above are only separated for the sake of convenience; in texts, they are usually interlocked and so form a coherent whole. As we have seen, tradition is an important factor here: the early construction of Hesiod as a (natural) philosopher is in its essence taken over by later recipients: examples are the snowball-like recurrence of the mode of revelation, or the new appliance of Hesiod's elementary thinking to language instead of physics. Furthermore, it is clear that Hesiod's philosophical reputation rests mainly on the *Theogony*, and that it is through the principle of clustering that parts of the *Works and Days* are occasionally brought in. Plato's use of Hesiod's verse on the wagon is a good example: a simple piece of technical advice is re-interpreted to fit and propagate an atomistic philosophy (that was, of course, attributed to Hesiod in the first place). It is worth noting that such re-interpretation only happens when other lines can reinforce the existing picture—Hesiodic lines that could distort it (such as those on the dual nature of strife and shame), seem to be carefully avoided in these contexts. Several mechanisms of memory thus work together to preserve a consistent and univocal picture of Hesiod the philosopher.

[176] Hunter (2009) 266 interestingly suggests it may also have to do with Hesiod's reputed lack of metaphor.

PART THREE

HESIOD VERSUS HOMER

CHAPTER SEVEN

INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEST OF HESIOD AND HOMER

0. *Introduction*

This chapter forms the introduction to the final Part of the book, dealing with the opposition of Hesiod and Homer in the Greek imagination. In the following two chapters (8 and 9), we will explore the main areas in which Hesiod and Homer were employed to illustrate and represent opposing views and values. By way of introduction, this chapter will focus on a traditional story that in a most explicit way presents the two poets as opposites, i.e. as actual opponents in a legendary singing ἀγών or 'contest'.

In the first section, we will hark back to chapter 1 and discuss the valuable concepts of assimilation (lumping) and differentiation (splitting) again. Naturally, we will now be mostly concerned with the second one (splitting), i.e. with the way Hesiod and Homer were distinguished and separated. We will see how differences between the poets that were marginalized before (see chapters 2–3) can also be blown up in order to create the largest possible 'watersheds'.[1] Of greatest interest, however, is the observation that such differences are very often conceived as polar opposites, so that Hesiod and Homer frequently come to represent the two utmost extremes of several evaluative measure-scales.

In the second section, we will examine the story of the contest between Hesiod and Homer at some length. We will compare the most interesting versions of and references to the ἀγών, with particular attention to the most extended one, the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi*. The main concern of this somewhat elaborate discussion will be to stress the traditional nature of the story and to demonstrate that the tale and its polar presentation of Hesiod and Homer can be shaped in several ways, creating

[1] See on this term ch. 1 and further below.

several oppositions of the two poets. This comparatist approach is different from that of most modern scholarship, which often focuses mainly on the *Certamen* and its compositional problems, and tends to view the other versions as derivative and therefore insignificant.

In the third section, the results of this approach will be briefly analyzed in order to gain a clear view of the three main watersheds that separate Hesiod and Homer: the content of their poetry, the socio-political orientation of their poems, and their impact on the audience. These are the themes that will then be further examined in the next two chapters.

1. *Lumping and Splitting Again: Polar Opposition*

In Part One, we have seen that it was in many ways natural for the ancient Greeks to take Hesiod and Homer together and think of them as a more or less exclusive combination.[2] This, I have shown, is a trend in more recent scholarship as well: whereas scholars in the greatest part of the last century used to focus on differences in the quality, outlook, genre, and subject matter of the poems of Hesiod and Homer, and were keen to point to Hesiod's supposedly greater individuality, the pendulum has now swung to the other side, and it is more en vogue nowadays to emphasize the similarities.[3] It is now cogently (and commonly) argued, for instance, that *both* poets represent an oral tradition going back hundreds of years, and that their poems complement each other in such a way as to express an archaic world view that is essentially the same.

In antiquity, this practice of 'lumping' can be clearly discerned. As we have seen in chapter 1, Hesiod and Homer were viewed as contemporaries (according to some even relatives) and the only significant poets of the *archaios* or *palaios* age. They were both primary school material, and were often sung at symposia and recited at public festivals. Their language was thought to display great similarities, so that words and expressions from Homer's poems could be explained by comparison with those of Hesiod (and vice versa). Furthermore, as chapter 2 has demonstrated, both poets were seen as mythographers telling (largely similar) stories of a bygone legendary era. At the same time, they were regarded as the two greatest authorities on Greek ethics and *paideia* in its broadest sense, and credited with an almost nomothetical status. And finally, as a team

[2] See esp. ch. 3, pp. 109–125.
[3] See ch. 1, pp. 34–39.

of two, they could represent a certain genre and be contrasted to other types of texts, like tragedy or historiography (chapter 3).

Despite the fact that it may seem obvious or natural to lump Hesiod and Homer together, we must remember that their togetherness is a *construction*, not essentially different from the construction of a 'conventional block of history' like the Middle Ages.[4] We should note that such (anachronistic) organizations of the past also construct the present: the term 'Middle Ages', for instance, was invented by later historians aiming to designate the long slumber of mankind before it was reborn into a state of intellectual and cultural elevation comparable to that of ancient civilization—and so their present was also defined. Similarly, the statement of Herodotus, grouping Hesiod and Homer together and placing them around four hundred years before his own time, organizes the past and informs the present: it makes Greek religion a relatively young phenomenon, and installs the poets as the most important authorities on the subject in the present (i.e. the time of Herodotus). Time and again, we can see how the poets of the past are shaped in accordance with present goals. See, for instance, Socrates' famous claim in the *Ion* that Homer and Hesiod sing of subjects that are essentially the same: it is part of an argumentation leading up to the conclusion that the knowledge of rhapsodes and poets rests on μανία.[5] In similar fashion, Strabo coupled Hesiod and Homer in order to defend Homer against charges of ignorance, while Plutarch did so in order to create a unified picture of Greek education, and Hippias as part of a demonstration of the all-inclusive scope of the τέχνη of the sophists.[6] The 'lumping' of Hesiod and Homer thus depends to a large degree on purposes in the present.

Different authors, however, have different purposes at different times. It is thus not surprising that on numerous occasions Hesiod and Homer are in fact presented as 'split' instead of 'lumped'. In *Time Maps*, where these terms are used for the process of periodization, Zerubavel vividly describes the mechanism behind the technique of splitting: 'In order to promote the sociomnemonic vision of two contiguous yet conventionally 'different' chunks of history as actually discrete, we tend to inflate the

[4] Zerubavel's example; see ch. 1, p. 27.

[5] Pl. *Ion* 531c; see ch. 5, p. 177. See for Plato on μανία further ch. 9, pp. 307–308 and pp. 324–332.

[6] Strabo 1.2.13–14 and 1.2.35 (ch. 3, pp. 121–125), Plu. *Mor.* 36A–B (ch. 2, pp. 99–100), Hippias DK 86 B 6 (ch. 3, pp. 112–113).

imaginary divides supposedly separating them from each other. As a result, crossing such 'historical Rubicons' transforms metrically small steps in physical time into topologically giant leaps in social time'.[7] What we do when we 'split', therefore, is to focus on 'watersheds' and make them as large as possible.[8]

This process can *mutatis mutandis* also be seen at work where the sociomnemonic construction of Hesiod is concerned. The small gaps separating Hesiod and Homer can be blown up into giant ravines by searching for and emphasizing the differences between them. But instead of focusing on watershed moments in time, like the Battle of Marathon (or the discovery of America, the example Zerubavel himself employs), the splitting of Hesiod and Homer employs watersheds of a different kind. These 'imaginary divides' could be (and were) found in the poems themselves, and to a considerable degree in the traditions surrounding both the poems and their authors. The watersheds are concerned with differences of style, content, socio-political orientation and philosophical attitude that are believed to be present in the poems.[9] And so the notion of Hesiod and Homer as two distinct and separate entities could emerge.

Very often (though by no means exclusively so) watersheds are marked by opposites on either side. The following dichotomies, somewhat exaggerated for the sake of clarity (and do not necessarily reflect my views), are familiar to everyone: before 490 the Greeks were strictly polis-minded, but after the Persian Wars acquired a sense of nationalism; hellenistic literature, in contrast to classical, is not creative but imitative; Rome was a republic before the battle of Actium, and an empire after; with the fall of Rome, Western Europe descended from high culture into barbary; the discoveries of Galileo turned our world-view from geocentric to heliocentric, etc. This recurrent polarizing characteristic of the watershed calls for two relevant observations. First, there is the rather obvious one that such contrasts are greatly oversimplifying—but this is exactly what is necessary for cutting up the past into convenient 'chunks': the simplification makes it understandable and useable in the present (i.e. the time in which the splitting takes place). The second is that the opposi-

[7] Zerubavel (2003) 88.

[8] 'In order to help maintain the illusion of wide historical gaps actually separating 'different' periods from one another, we thus mnemonically inflate the distance between everything that happened prior to the particular 'watersheds' marking their boundaries and everything that has happened since', *ibid.*

[9] Criteria in fact not unlike those used by modern scholars up to the 1970s (and sometimes beyond) to separate and oppose the two poets.

tions are framed in 'modern terms', by which I mean terms of the present. Splitting uses oppositions that are 'actual', i.e. relevant to this day and this world. Nationalism, for instance, was a term unknown to the Greeks, and the scholar-poets of Alexandria would not apply the creative-imitative dichotomy to their own work. It is present-day interests that create the watersheds, and we use present-day terminology for framing the oppositions that we project back into the past.[10]

These two observations can also be made with regard to texts in which Hesiod is opposed to Homer. First of all, in focusing on differences and downplaying similarities, the Greeks considerably oversimplified matters. But the skewed relation between reality and imagination does not disqualify the imaginary divide, for 'neither whatever is out there in reality nor actual linguistic usage as a dynamic semantic system of continuums and networks can prevent imaginary binary constructions from being developed and meaningfully deployed';[11] it is the *construction* of Hesiod with which I am concerned. And second, the Greeks used their present-day oppositions to set Hesiod and Homer against each other. This can clearly be demonstrated (as we will see in the next chapters) by their employment of such well-known oppositions as ruled versus ruler or *ars* versus *ingenium* when framing the opposition of Hesiod versus Homer.

Our specific interest, the opposition of Hesiod and Homer by the Greeks, makes it necessary to further consider—if only briefly—this notion of polarity (which is of less interest to Zerubavel). Whether or not the Greeks, as a people, really entertained a more than average propensity toward polar, binary thinking, as is often maintained,[12] it nonetheless remains true that they did apply such polarity in their construction of Hesiod and Homer.[13]

---

[10] I leave aside the observation that the opposites are in most cases not opposites in a strict sense, i.e. exhaustive and mutually exclusive. See on this e.g. Needham (1987), esp. his chapters on lexicology and complementarity.

[11] Sluiter and Rosen (2006) 5 on the ancient representation of city and countryside.

[12] See e.g. Lloyd (1966) 7 'Few of those who study early Greek thought can fail to be struck by the recurrent appeal to *pairs of opposites* of various sorts both in general cosmological doctrines and in accounts of particular natural phenomena' (cf. Philippson 1966 685); Cartledge (1993) 16 'the hypothesis of structural dualism does (...) have a peculiar purchase on the culture of the ancient Greeks'; Clay (2003) 9 'the Greeks (...) seem to construct their views of the world in terms of binary oppositions'.

[13] Oppositional thinking may be even stronger in the case of the poets. Needham (1987) believes that thinking in oppositional schemes may be 'a propensity of the human mind' (29), though he also suggests that 'the concept may respond to an intellectual necessity in coming to terms with *representations* (*ibid*., italics mine)'.

Two characteristics of polar thinking are particularly relevant to us. First, there is the strategy of defining one pole in terms of the other, i.e. through denying or inverting qualities that belong to the one. Hesiod, as we will see later, is often described as the anti-Homer, that is, a poet with qualities opposite to those of Homer, or the non-Homer, that is, a poet without any Homeric qualities—and it can be the other way around. Here too we perhaps encounter the Greek 'ideological habit of polarization that was a hallmark of their mentality and culture'.[14] Hesiod is thus often (negatively) defined by Homer.[15] Second, it should be noted that polarization is subject to change over time: since oppositions are projected backwards (as described above), different present-day dichotomies cause oppositions that are framed in a different way; this peculiar characteristic can perhaps be most clearly demonstrated with the Greek view of the inspiration of Hesiod and Homer, as described in chapter 9.[16]

Oppositions between Hesiod and Homer in the Greek imagination are not, as some scholars would have it, scarce or exceptional;[17] they recur often throughout antiquity, whether implicitly or explicitly, whether as a casual remark or an elaborate treatment. The most elaborate and most explicit of them all is the so-called *Certamen*, an account of the story in which Hesiod and Homer are actual opponents facing each other head on in a poetic competition. A close investigation of this story will not

[14] Cartledge (1993) 11. He continues: 'Moreover, [the Greeks] pressed polarization to its (ideo)logical limits. Thus whereas Greeks were ideally seen as not-barbarians, barbarians were equally envisaged as being precisely what Greeks were not'.

[15] The dynamics of polar thinking are strongly reminiscent of the theory of alterity, according to which one group, also called the Subject or the Self, describes and visualizes the unknown and alien group, also called the Object or the Other, in terms of polar opposition: the Object is given shape by denying or inverting the characteristics the Subject ascribes to itself—hence 'othering' also shapes and informs the identity of the Self. Just as in the process of periodization, the complexity of reality is thus greatly reduced (see on this last point Kommers 1991 111). The concept of the Other is of course of limited applicability since we are not dealing with a subject-object relationship but one that involves three parties: a) the Greeks opposing b) Hesiod and c) Homer.

[16] Again, one is reminded of the theory of alterity, since the Other can develop over time; see e.g. McGrane (1989), who has shown that different times produce different Others: from the Renaissance onwards, he argues, the Other developed from infernal pagan to potential Christian to ignorant savage to a representation of historical evolution. Historical developments change the views of Self and Other (cf. also Fabian 2002), and this mechanism can also be seen in the splitting of Hesiod and Homer.

[17] Cf. e.g. Latte (1946) 163 claiming that Hesiod 'bleibt noch so stark in der bunten Welt des Mythos befangen' that later Greeks did not notice the 'grundlegende Unterschied' between Hesiod and Homer.

only illustrate the polar construction of Hesiod and Homer by the Greeks, but also indicate the watersheds that will be further examined in the two following chapters.

2. *The Tradition of the Contest*

It is extremely likely that stories of a contest between Hesiod and Homer emerged at a rather early date, i.e. the sixth century or even earlier.[18] Circumstantial evidence is all we have, but its cumulative power seems decisive. First of all, we have already seen that Hesiod and Homer were both enshrined in an *archaios* age, and that most Greeks believed them to have been (at least roughly) contemporary;[19] it is only natural, then, that the Greeks at a certain point in time started wondering about how to imagine this historical coexistence, and—equally natural, perhaps—that they conceived this coexistence in terms of competition.[20] Second, there is some (early) evidence for rivalry between Hesiodic and Homeric rhapsodes, for instance in Plato's *Ion*, which might have given rise to a story of a contest.[21]

Third, there are numerous suggestions in the work of Hesiod itself. It has been noted that Hesiod himself had described a competition in wisdom between two seers,[22] but it is far more interesting that there are

[18] Among scholars pushing the origin of the story back to the sixth century are Schmid-Stählin (1929) 254, who believes that the story was originally in poetic form, invented by Hesiodic poets fighting for *Anerkennung*, Skiadas (1965) 41 speaking of 'allgemeines Erzählgut', Froleyks (1973) 59, Richardson (1981), and Lamberton (1988) 6 saying 'the story is (...) doubtless to be traced right back to the archaic period'; others think a fifth-century (Athenian) origin is more likely: see e.g. Graziosi (2002) 102. I strongly reject the view advocated by Nietzsche (1873) and Busse (1909), later reinvigorated by Hess (1960, though he is more dogmatic in some places than in others), that the fourth-century rhetorician Alcidamas had invented the contest of the two poets (see on Alcidamas further below).

[19] See ch. 1, pp. 40–46.

[20] On 'the pervasive Greek impulse towards competition', see Griffith (1990) 188 with the bibliography contained in notes 9 and 10.

[21] In Pl. *Ion* 531a–e Ion claims he knows only Homer's poetry and not that of Hesiod; in his opinion, Homer wrote 'better' (ἄμεινον, 531d). Perhaps the rivalry between Hesiodic and Homeric rhapsodes was exploited in Cratinus' *Archilochoi* as well (see Whittaker 1935 185–186); in Teleclides' *Hesiodoi*, the chorus may have consisted of Hesiodic rhapsodes (cf. Kassel-Austin IV p. 121). See also Nagy (2009) 298–304 for the belief in a 'tradition of rhapsodic competition involving rival performances of Hesiodic and Homeric poetry' (298).

[22] This is the riddle-*agon* between Calchas and Mopsus, described in Hesiod's

some potentially rivalrous references to the poems of Homer in both the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*.[23] Furthermore, Hesiod himself claims that κότος ('anger') and φθόνος ('spite') exist between people of the same profession, and explicitly states that that maxim holds true for his own trade as well.[24] Moreover, he gives us an account of his own victory at a poetic competition (*Works and Days* 654–659); and even though the opponent is not named, Hesiod nonetheless may suggest that it was Homer.[25] Finally, in a fragment attributed to Hesiod, the poet speaks of a rhapsodic event in which both he and Homer participated: 'In Delos for the first time Homer and I, bards, / sang, stitching together our song with new hymns, / of Phoebus Apollo with his golden sword, whom Leto bore'.[26] The 'first time' even suggests that the paths of the poets had crossed more often.[27] Incidentally, Graziosi's important remark that in

---

Melampodia. In this version of the agon, Hesiod has Calchas ask Mopsus about the amount of figs in a wild fig tree. When Mopsus names the exact number (999), Calchas dies (MW 278). Maehler (1963) 16 already pointed out that Homer too refers to *aoidoi* competing (see the story of Thamyris in *Il.* 2.594–600). A series of riddles also featured in the *Wedding of Ceyx*, another poem attributed to Hesiod (see Cingano 2009 126).

[23] One of those can be found in the enigmatic claim of the Muses to speak both truth and falsehood (*Th.* 27–28); see for a discussion of the anti-Homeric reading of these verses ch. 9, pp. 303–304. See also Rousseau (1996) on the 'polémique' (166) between the Homeric and Hesiodic traditions present in the proem of the *WD*. Such polemical readings of Hesiodic passages (see also note 25) make it improbable that the development of the points of contrast between Hesiodic and Homeric poetry should know such a late and precise locus as Peisistratean Athens (so Nagy 2009 294).

[24] *WD* 26: '… and beggar begrudges beggar, and poet poet' (καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ).

[25] Heldmann (1982) 18 is sceptical because Homer is not explicitly named, but he ignores the several (potentially polemical) references to the *Iliad* in this particular passage (the so-called *nautilia*) of the *WD*; see on these e.g Nagy (1990) 77–78, Rosen (1997) 477–479 and Steiner (2007) 182–185 (Thalmann 1984 153 rather oddly believes the reference is meant to assimilate rather than contrast, and 'gives [Hesiod] something of the aura of the epic hero'); to these should be added the obviously Hesiodic reference in Thgn. 1.1197–1202 who opposes *nautilia* to agriculture. Notopoulos (1960) on the other hand believes (though for what reasons in unclear) that the song Hesiod performed in Chalcis was Homer-like both in length ('the average length of a Homeric aristeia episode', 182 n.18) and subject (the glorious deeds of the hero Amphidamas, *ibid.*).

[26] Fr. 357 MW: ἐν Δήλῳ τότε πρῶτον ἐγὼ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἀοιδοὶ / μέλπομεν, ἐν νεαροῖς ὕμνοις ῥάψαντες ἀοιδήν, / Φοῖβον Ἀπόλλωνα χρυσάορον, ὃν τέκε Λητώ.

[27] The fact that Hesiod and Homer are working on *one* song together (as has been stressed most recently by Collins 2004 181) does not mean they were not opponents (as e.g. Heldmann 1982 16–17 seems to think): 'relay' performances were just as competitive as the duel we see in the *Certamen* (cf. Nagy 2002 18–22). Graziosi (2002) 34 rightly remarks that the epigram may have been the result of an 'attempt, on the part of the rhapsodes themselves, to represent Homer and Hesiod in their own image.'

the biographical tradition Hesiod and Homer never exchange gifts or favours between them (whereas they do appear as friends or benefactors towards other poets) may also be an indication of a long tradition of rivalry. The cumulative weight of the observations above makes it likely that the story of a contest goes back to the fifth or sixth century at least.[28]

Many Greek authors refer to the legendary duel of Hesiod and Homer, especially in late antiquity.[29] The numerous versions that have come down to us show some interesting differences, but they all have one thing in common: Hesiod beats Homer. The decision to proclaim Hesiod the victor was considered highly remarkable, and could still move Tzetzes to exclaim 'O, what insanity! O, what folly! O, what lack of education! Excellence of words, and education, aren't you crying?'[30] There can be no doubt that the surprising outcome is by far the most important element of the story: if Homer had beaten Hesiod, there would be no story at all. What is of greatest relevance to us, however, is that most of the writers reporting the contest feel that the ἀπροσδόκητον of Hesiod's victory needs an explanation in some form or another[31]—and this makes them shape the contest in a way that suits them best, adapting, for instance, the course of the duel or the identity of the judge. It is these explanations that cast an interesting light on the opposition between Hesiod and Homer.

I will now, in the following two sections, proceed to a brief discussion of the most interesting versions of the contest. The first and most elaborate section will deal with the *Certamen*, and the second with the other accounts. This is not to imply that the *Certamen* is the most important or most authoritative version, and that the others are in some way derivative and less interesting. On the contrary: in my view, all versions contribute equally to the tradition of the contest and are equally

[28] See for other arguments against the position of Nietzsche c.s., such as the earlier attestation of motifs present in the *Certamen*, and its resemblance to Aristophanes' *Frogs*, e.g. Vogt (1959) and Rosen (2004).

[29] I have been able to find thirteen (more or less extended) references in total: 1) the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (Allen V 225–238); 2) Σ Pi. *Nem*. 2.1; 3) Plu. *Mor*. 153F–154A; 4) Plu. *Mor*. 674F; 5) D.Chrys. 2.2–13; 6) Lucian *VH* 2.22; 7) Philostr. *Her*. 18.2; 8) Them. *Or*. 30.348d; 9) Lib. *Decl*. 1.65; 10) Procl. *Vit. Hom*. 27.11–19 Wil.; 11) Tz. *Vit. Hes*. p. 48.26–49.11 Wil.; 12) five short references in Tzetzes' scholia on the *WD* (Gaisf. III 144.31–146.6; 159.1; 161.1–8; 164.2–12; 304.19–27); 13) Eust. 1.6.38 Van der Valk. Most of these texts are collected by Allen (V 218–221). On the contest's popularity in later antiquity see below, pp. 259–265.

[30] Gaisf. III.164.10–11: Ὢ τῆς ἀβελτερίας! Ὢ τῆς ἀνοίας! Ὢ τῆς ἀπαιδευσίας! Ὢ λόγου ἀρετὴ καὶ παιδεία, οὐχὶ δακρύετε;

[31] As does Heldmann (1982) 64, who (apparently in defence of Homer) thinks the victory can be partially explained by Homer's relatively young age.

significant in shaping the opposition between the poets. The special treatment of the *Certamen* is chosen only for reasons of convenience, since it is by far the most complete and detailed version; a somewhat longer summary of the work, followed by a brief analysis, makes it possible to treat the others in a more cursory way.

2.1. *The* Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi

The date and authorship of the *Certamen* are unknown. The terminus post quem of the text as it has come down to us must be around 160 AD, since emperor Hadrian is mentioned (Ἀδριανοῦ, line 33).[32] However, since the text is an obvious compilation,[33] much work has been done to trace its sources. As early as 1873 Nietzsche suggested that the *Certamen* goes back to a 4th-century work called *Mouseion*, authored by the Gorgias-trained rhetor Alcidamas. He made a good case,[34] which was later considerably strengthened by the find of two papyri.[35] It is therefore now commonly (and I think rightly) assumed that at least part of the *Certamen* derives from a very similar-looking work composed by Alcidamas.[36] As I have argued above, Alcidamas in turn probably used a tradition that is considerably older still.

---

[32] The lines refer to the edition by Allen.

[33] The first to use the term for the *Certamen* was Wilamowitz (1916a) 396, and he is almost universally followed (cf. e.g. Hess 1960 53 'ein blosser Kompilator', West 1967 esp. 444–449 and again in 2003 299: 'he was no more than a compiler'). It is unclear to me why Lefkowitz (1981) 8 n.27 believes it is 'misleading to think of [the author of the *Certamen*] simply as a 'compiler' '; perhaps it is because she does not want us to 'regard his work as naïve' (19). But in principle the work can be both a compilation and sophisticated at the same time.

[34] The main arguments for Alcidamantine authorship, that still hold today, are 1) Stobaeus' comment ἐκ τοῦ Ἀλκιδάμαντος μουσείου on *Cert.* 78–79 (Stob. 4.52.22); 2) the fact that the *Certamen* itself mentions Alcidamas' *Mouseion* as a source (ὥς φησιν Ἀλκιδάμας ἐν Μουσείῳ, 239–240); 3) certain ideological connections between the text and Alcidamas, esp. the emphasis on spoken, extemporaneous speech (cf. e.g. Richardson 1981 5 on the 'prominence to the value of improvisation'). Alcidamas, pupil of Gorgias, was a great proponent of the spoken versus the written style; see for his debate with Isocrates on this matter O'Sullivan (1992) ch. 2, esp. 23–31.

[35] One is the anonymous Flinders Petrie Papyrus (P. Petrie 1.25.1, published 1891) that contains—in more or less recognizable state—*Cert.* 72–101 and is dated to the third century BC. The other is the Michigan-papyrus (Michigan 2745, published 1925), dated to the 2nd or 3rd century AD, which contains the whole of the *Certamen* and ends with the remark]δαμαντος περι ομηρου.

[36] Cf. e.g. Kirk (1950) arguing carefully that Alcidamas 'may have transmitted' certain parts of the contest but did not invent it (155), Renehan (1971) 103–104 preferring to see Alcidamas as the author over pronouncing the Michigan-papyrus an 'obscure piece

The text now known as the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* is far more accurately described by its Greek title, περὶ Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου καὶ τοῦ γένους καὶ ἀγῶνος αὐτῶν ('On Homer and Hesiod and their descent and contest'), for it deals with more than a poetic contest alone. The work begins with an introduction about the origin of the poets (focusing on parents and place of birth, lines 1–53), then proceeds to the actual contest (54–214), and ends with an account of the rest of the life of both Hesiod and Homer, fitted to a roughly similar story-pattern (oracle, death, epitaph, 215–338).[37] We will later see how the first and last part relate to the middle piece, and first briefly describe the course of the contest and its most interesting peculiarities.

The ἀγών narrative begins with some remarks on the occasion of the contest—the funeral games of Amphidamas, king of Euboea (62–66)—and on the installment of the jury, which consists of some anonymous men of distinction and the new king Panedes, brother of the deceased (68–70). This particular contest is said to be not about strength and speed but about σοφία (65), a notion neatly described by Griffith as covering three categories: 'knowledge and factual accuracy', 'moral and educational integrity', and 'technical skill and aesthetic/emotional impact'.[38] It is important to note that the very sentence introducing the contest proper immediately gives away the outcome: 'they say that after both poets had in a wonderful way contended for the prize, Hesiod won in the following manner.'[39] The narrator obviously knows he cannot surprise the audience with the outcome, so he concentrates on the spectacular course of the contest (θαυμαστῶς) and the way (τρόπος) Hesiod's victory came about. *That* is what makes his story interesting.

---

of Greek of unknown authorship', O'Sullivan (1992) 64. Despite the evidence, however, difficulties remain. One minor problem concerns the title of Alcidamas' work, which is given as *Mouseion* or *On Homer*, although it may be the same. A major problem is the exact relation of the *Certamen* to Alcidamas' composition; there is (so far) no way of knowing how it has changed, although the rather poor quality of the *Certamen* (which seems unworthy of Alcidamas, cf. e.g. Kirk 1950 and Dodds 1952) suggests it must have changed considerably. Still, it is over-cautious to state that the 'theory that Alcidamas' *Mouseion* was the basic source for the *Certamen* is a mere possibility' (Koniaris 1971 129).

[37] Cf. West (1967) 447, who attributes the pattern to Alcidamas.

[38] Griffith (1990) 188–189; according to Snell (1955) 414 the term *sophos* was used by ancient Greeks for anyone who could reach his goal by certain means.

[39] Allen 70–72: ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν θαυμαστῶς ἀγωνισαμένων νικῆσαί φασι τὸν Ἡσίοδον τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

Hesiod takes the initiative for the actual contest. He simply 'walks up to the middle' (προελθόντα εἰς τὸ μέσον, 72)[40] and begins (apparently *sua sponte*) to present his opponent with some riddles and questions.[41] Homer then answers these questions successfully, that is to say, in a way that wins favour with the audience.[42] This pattern—Hesiod starts asking questions—Homer answers them—approval of Homer—repeats itself five times, each time with a different type of riddle.[43] This cycle forms the backbone of the ἀγών, so that it is convenient to present an overview of it:

Round	*Type of riddle*	*Hesiod takes initiative*	*Approval of Homer*
1 72–94	'Question and answer' (2 ×)	προελθόντα εἰς τὸ μέσον … (72)	σφοδρῶς φασι θαυμασθῆναι τοὺς στίχους ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὥστε χρυσοῦς αὐτοὺς προσαγορευθῆναι … (90–92)[44]
2 94–102	ἐπερώτησις τῶν ἀπόρων (1 ×)	ὁ δὲ Ἡσίοδος ἀχθεσθεὶς ἐπὶ τῇ Ὁμήρου εὐημερίᾳ ὥρμησεν … (94–95)	καλῶς δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀπαντήσαντος … (102)
3 102–138	ἀμφίβολοι γνῶμαι (14 ×)	ὥρμησεν ὁ Ἡσίοδος … (103)	πρὸς πάντα δὲ τοῦ Ὁμήρου καλῶς ἀπαντήσαντος … (138)

[40] The standard expression for those who wish to speak in public on topics of common interest (on τὸ μέσον see Détienne 1990 83–98).

[41] According to Rosen (1997) 475 Hesiod 'orchestrates' the contest, which 'seems to imply that his poetry was felt to be inherently didactic and philosophical, whereas Homer's was less explicitly so, and so had to prove itself on this score'. But this does not explain the preponderance of Homeric themes, nor the attention paid to the ἀμφίβολοι γνώμαι which test poetic skill instead of wisdom. Hesiod probably goes first for narratological reasons (see further below).

[42] An unspecified group, called οἱ Ἕλληνες πάντες (176) and οἱ Ἕλληνες (205). They are presumably just a crowd of people come to see the spectacle, called 'Greeks' because they came from different *poleis*. On the other hand, the author may imply that we need to broaden our scope and understand 'all Greeks' of all times and places.

[43] Usually, in verbal duels, the future loser is the first to take the floor, and the future winner plays his part more fittingly (see Froleyks 1973 385). It may be that the author reversed roles to (further) indicate the remarkable course of the contest, or that he made use of a version of the contest in which the outcome was not revealed beforehand (so that he could still surprise his audience).

[44] This is the only case in which the author reports the approval on hearsay ('*they say* the lines were so intensely admired …').

Round	*Type of riddle*	*Hesiod takes initiative*	*Approval of Homer*
4 138–149	προβλήμα λογιστικόν (1 ×)	πάλιν φησὶν ὁ Ἡσίοδος … (138–139)	κατὰ πάντα δὲ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ὑπερτεροῦντος … (148–149)
5 149–177	'Questions of wisdom' (8 ×)	φθονῶν ὁ Ἡσίοδος ἄρχεται πάλιν … (149–150)	οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες πάντες τὸν Ὅμηρον ἐκέλευον στεφανοῦν … (177–178)

The author is remarkably faithful to his own scheme;[45] keeping to the pattern was apparently the only way to impose some sort of unity on the heterogeneous material.[46] It is obvious that the author, in trying to make his story as 'wonderful' as possible, collected all the riddles and questions he could think of[47] and presented them together in the new context of the *Certamen*, taking very little trouble to connect the different rounds in an organic fashion.[48] Nonetheless, we can find a modest crescendo in the series of riddles. From κατὰ πάντα δὲ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ὑπερτεροῦντος ('Homer was superior in everything', round 4) we can deduce that Homer proved himself better than Hesiod during the *entire* contest,[49] and it is

[45] A division in five parts, with an additional part consisting of the recital, is the most obvious and natural one (cf. Hess 1960 2–7). I do not understand Busse's quadripartite division, nor do I see how the reductionism of Wilamowitz (1916a) 403 and Froleyks (1973) 54, who both assume an (originally) tripartite division (so that the poetic contest matches that of a wrestling match), can help to understand the *Certamen* better.

[46] The structure is crude, but it is surely over-critical to say here that 'the compiler of the *Certamen* fails to subordinate his material to any consistent plan' (West 1967 449; see also Heldmann 1982 36 'Ein Kompositions-prinzip fehlt in dem uns erhaltenen *Certamen*').

[47] Cf. Froleyks (1973) 58, who recognizes almost all of the elements of the traditional *Weisheitsagon* in the *Certamen*.

[48] There are at least four signs of his carelessness: 1) eye-catching word-repetition (though not a symptom of sloppiness *per se*): in rounds 2 and 3 the same phrases are used for both initiative and approval; 2) the disproportional distribution of the questions: the rounds consist of 2, 1, 14, 1, and 8 specimens of the different types of riddles; 3) the heterogeneity of the riddles itself, ranging from the 'questions of wisdom' from round five to the 'twofold sentences' from round three; 4) general sloppiness: in round 2 an ἐπερώτησις τῶν ἀπόρων is announced (line 95), but only one ἄπορον is in fact treated; the πρόβλημα λογιστικόν is a bit of an odd one out since it presents the only instance where the author interrupts the narrative to doubt the quality of Homer's answer, even though the audience continues to admire Homer (but this could be a Byzantine addition, as West 2003 335 n.13 suggests); and in round five we meet a question that we had already encountered in the first round (τί θνητοῖς κάλλιστον, 85 = τι δὴ θνητοῖσι κάλλιστον, 153–154).

[49] κατὰ πάντα cannot refer to the fourth round alone, since there is only one question being answered there.

this remark that paves the way for the even stronger οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες πάντες τὸν Ὅμηρον ἐκέλευον στεφανοῦν ('all the Greeks said that Homer should be crowned') after round 5. Evidently, the story reaches some kind of climax here.

It is at this point of the story that king Panedes interferes with the proceedings and the pattern described above is abandoned. It is the king's role in the story to counterbalance the opinion of the crowd, since he is only mentioned in those instances where the audience attempts to usurp the function of judge.[50] The king (it is unclear what has happened to the other judges appointed in line 68–70)[51] now asks the contestants to recite 'the very best piece of their work' (τὸ κάλλιστον ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ποιημάτων, 178). For the first time, Hesiod is now acting on another's impulse; ironically enough, it is this part of the contest that will lead to his victory.

Hesiod picks as his finest *Works and Days* 383–392, a poetic piece of advice about the right time and *modus operandi* in the business of ploughing, sowing, and harvesting.[52] The passage underlines like no other Hesiod's image of the peace-loving farmer poet; it is difficult to find another passage in his work that is so quiet and peaceful. We should note that this passage, which was very well-known in antiquity, represents in a sense a new beginning in the *Works and Days*, since it appears at the

[50] After the fifth round, 'the Greeks all called for Homer to be garlanded as victor' (οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες πάντες τὸν Ὅμηρον ἐκέλευον στεφανοῦν, 176–177), but Panedes then decides the poets should perform their finest passage; after that, again 'the Greeks … called for him [Homer] to be awarded the victory' (οἱ Ἕλληνες … ἐκέλευον διδόναι τὴν νίκην, 205–207), and Panedes chooses to award Hesiod the prize. The differing opinions of the crowd and the king reflect an age-old discussion about who is more able to judge poetry, cf. Pl. *Lg.* 659a '… a judge won't be doing his job properly if he reaches his verdict by listening to the audience and lets himself be thrown off balance by the yelling of the mob and his own lack of training …'. Panedes' role in the *Certamen* and the parallel from the *Laws* (as well as the variant readings Panides in Philostr. *Her.* 43.7 and Paneides in Tz. *Vit. Hes.* 49.10 Wil.) make it clear that his name means 'he who knows all', not 'he who pleases all' (so Clay 2004 76)—it is his very function *not* to please all. I do not agree with Heldmann, who believes the Panedes-scene did not form part of the *Certamen* in its earliest form (the so-called '*Urcertamen*') because he thinks the figure of the judging king was only introduced as a response to the contest-version of Dio (on which see further below).

[51] As the new king and the brother of the deceased, it is natural enough for him to take the initiative; still, the disappearance of the other judges suggests an oversight by the compiler.

[52] The second half of the last line (*Cert.* 189) deviates a little from our *WD*-text. The selected verses are cut off somewhat prematurely, presumably to prevent Hesiod from starting to address Perses in the ἀγών.

head of the section actually dealing with works and days;[53] the selection of these lines suggests that we are dealing here with the essential Hesiod.[54] Homer cites a passage from *Iliad* 13, describing the two Ajaxes and their close-knit battle-ranks, eager for war.[55] The contrast between the content of the two recitals could not be greater: whereas Hesiod sang of the calm serenity of agriculture, Homer's words almost explode with imminent violence.[56] Whereas the efforts of the farmer are aimed at preserving life, the πόνος ('toil', *Cert.* 204) of the warriors is to destroy it (μάχη φθεισίμβροτος, 199). The farmer works alone, naked, in all his freedom; the warriors on the other hand are covered in bronze from tip to toe and packed together so tightly that their bodies, helmets and shields are in constant contact with each other. Moreover, the universal and timeless 'law of the plains' (πεδίων νόμος, 185) laid down by Hesiod represents the reassuringly unchanging ways of the fields and their workers, whereas an uncertain and dire fate hangs over the head of Homer's heroes.[57]

Like the previous five, the sixth (and last) round comes to an end with a positive evaluation of Homer by the audience: 'in this round too did the Greeks praise Homer, holding him in great admiration' (θαυμάσαντες δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸν Ὅμηρον οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐπῄνουν,

---

[53] Line 383's appearance as a 'first line' is stressed by the OCT printing an extra space between lines 382 and 383. In the edition of West (1978) line 383 is (by chance or not) at the top of a new page. See also Tsagalis (2007) 95, (2009) 148 and Lucian *Hes.* 1 for the Pleiads marking the start of the agricultural section in the *WD*.

[54] There appears to be little support in the text for the claim of Graziosi (2002) 175 that the ancients (like the moderns) regarded the *Th.* as Hesiod's most important work.

[55] The song of Homer in the *Certamen* is actually made up of two passages from *Il.* 13.126–133 and 339–344. That is what inspired Nietzsche (1870) 528–532, who thought the recitals in the *Certamen* were rather short, to claim that the actual recital would have covered all of *Il.* 13.126–344, and Hesiod's piece would have been about 300 lines as well. Tzetzes too (on whose version see p. 266 below) assumed that the original recitals would have been considerably longer than in the *Certamen*.

[56] It is interesting to mention, in this respect, the oft-heard claim (exemplified by Allen 1915 95) that the *Iliad* and the *Th.* are so alike (a claim often based on Hesiod's supposed 'borrowing' of epic diction from the *Iliad*), whereas 'points of contact between the *WD* and Homer are few' (96); see also Sellschop (1934) for such claims on the basis of stylistic analysis, and Edwards (1971) 23–39 demonstrating that of Hesiod's poems the *Th.* is closest to Homeric language. See also Clay (2003), who argues throughout her book that the *WD* characterizes itself in opposition to the *Th.* (itself an older notion, cf. e.g. Sihler 1902 xxvi '*Theogony* and *Opera* illumine one another').

[57] Hunter (2009) 264 suggests that the metaphor in the Homeric passage ('the fight bristled [like a grain field]') responds to the literal reaping in Hesiod. The many oppositions between the two passages indicate that there is more going on than the mere antithesis war–peace; Homer's passage is, I suggest, a specific response to Hesiod's lines (which is the usual practice in verbal contests, see Froleyks 1973 392).

205–206). Panedes, however, grants Hesiod the victory, saying that 'it is right for someone making a case for farming and peace to win, and not someone expounding on wars and slaughter' (δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν ἐπὶ γεωργίαν καὶ εἰρήνην προκαλούμενον νικᾶν, οὐ τὸν πολέμους καὶ σφαγὰς διεξιόντα, 208–210).[58] It is not surprising that Panedes, whose brother has just been killed in war, should make such a decision; or perhaps the newly appointed king uses the contest to announce a change of politics: during his reign, Euboea will promote peace and avoid war.[59] However that may be, Hesiod wins. He inscribes his prize, a bronze tripod, with a victory epigram and dedicates it to the Muses on Helicon (210–214). And so the ἀγών ends.

In order to fully understand what the *Certamen* can tell us about the relationship between Hesiod and Homer, I believe it should be compared to other stories of the contest, which all *together* make up the tradition of the story. Before we proceed to have a look at the other versions, however, there are two points to be made beforehand: one deals with the way the two poets are 'typical', i.e. recognizable as the two poets with their traditional characteristics; the other is concerned with the Homerocentric interpretation of the text.

To start with the latter: almost all scholars studying the *Certamen* believe the work is more about Homer than about Hesiod. There is some reason for this: the work may go back to a treatise called *On Homer*, and the first and the last parts of the *Certamen* (those dealing with the origin and life of the poets) pay considerably more attention to Homer than to Hesiod.[60] More importantly, however, most scholars believe that the author was *pro*-Homer: Homer is credited with several mythical and divine ancestors, during the contest is ever more abundantly complimented after every round, and after the contest makes a glamorous tour through all parts of Greece, producing new poems and reaping admiration everywhere. Hesiod, by contrast, grew up in a sad little town, during

[58] According to Graziosi (2002) 182, it is only at the end of the contest that Homer is defined as a war-poet. But this is only true in an explicit sense, for Homer has throughout the contest been seen to be especially knowledgeable about the Trojan War (see further below)—his characterization as a war-poet has thus been foreshadowed.

[59] Busse (1909) was the first (of many) to see Alcidamas' pacifism reflected in Panedes' judgment (cf. Dornseiff 1944 10). Incidentally, it is atypical for a judge in a verbal contest to clarify his decision (cf. Froleyks 1973 392).

[60] Hesiod's origin is discussed in 5 lines (2–6), Homer's in 37 (7–43); Hesiod's life and death are covered in 45 lines (210–254), Homer's in 85 (254–338). This amounts to a disproportional 50 versus 122 lines.

the contest is childishly annoyed by his opponent's success, and after the ἀγών gets himself killed on the suspicion of adultery. These points taken together strongly indicate, according to most scholars, that Panedes' decision was wrong: it was a *Fehlurteil*, and we are supposed to see it.[61]

This view, however, is far too one-sided and should be abandoned. The brevity of Hesiod's genealogy, for instance, is caused by his own explicit autobiography: since he tells us where he came from, the author—who is only aiming to be complete—can hardly list all the possibilities of his origin, as he did in the case of Homer. Furthermore, his so-called 'sordid end'[62] is followed up by a rather marvellous tale: Hesiod's drowned body was brought ashore by dolphins, and his murderers were punished by none other than Zeus himself;[63] his bones are later moved from Locris to Orchomenus, because they possessed beneficial powers. This is a death fit for heroes, considerably better than that of Homer, who slips on some mud and falls on his side, and dies two days later.[64] I would suggest that this could well be the author's way of compensating for the pre-agonic part of the *Certamen*, where Homer's *birth* was described in mythical terms, and attention was paid to the many cities that claimed *him*. Most importantly, however, there is no explicit indication that Panedes' judgement is a bad one:[65] there is no protest from Homer,[66] the author does not offer any comment, and the audience at the scene, previously quite eager to vent its opinion, does not fight the decision. Apparently, σοφία is in the end defined as knowing what is beneficial to the polis,

[61] As far as I can see, the term was first used by Schadewaldt (1942) 81, but the idea is widespread. According to Nietzsche 1870 539, 'der Sinn der Erzählung ist: der Nichtstegreifredner kann nur durch Ungerechtigkeit siegen.' Busse (1909) speaks of Homer's 'unbedingte Ueberlegenheit' (118); Vogt (1959) says the author wishes to make the decision of Panedes appear as 'flagrantes Unrecht' (199) and speaks of an 'unverdienten Sieg' (200); Heldmann (1982) 21–31 detects a far-going 'Hesiodfeindlichkeit' in the ἀγών-part of the story (but a more neutral *Tendenz* in other parts); Rosen (2004) claims that Panedes' 'unwelcome' (304) decision was 'contrived and tendentious' (302); see also Rosen (1997) on the *Certamen*'s supposed 'anti-Hesiodic bias' (476).

[62] Rosen (2004) 303 citing O'Sullivan (1992) 98, in turn perhaps echoing Scodel (1980) 304 referring to the same affair as a 'sordid anecdote of illicit sex'.

[63] A story that the second-century compiler actually took from the *Mouseion* of Alcidamas, mentioned as the source in *Cert.* 238–240.

[64] The stories of their deaths proper (leaving out the ominous oracles to both of them) cover 26 lines for Hesiod (229–254) and 7 lines for Homer (332–338).

[65] Cf. West (1967) 443 'there is not a word to suggest that the decision was unjust'; so Koniaris (1971) 120 and Heldmann (1982) 27.

[66] The loser of an ἀγὼν λόγων is usually upset and complains about the unjust verdict (Froleyks 1973 396); it could be that Homer is silent because he agrees, or because picturing him as a bad loser would detract too much from his status in antiquity.

a type of wisdom with which Hesiod was traditionally associated (see chapter 5);[67] his victory thus remains unchallenged. The text, then, shows no obvious preference for either Hesiod or Homer, and its interpretation suffers from a Homerocentric approach.[68]

The other point is concerned with the *Certamen*'s presentation of Hesiod and Homer as distinct and recognizable characters. On the one hand, it has recently been suggested that throughout the contest the poetry of Hesiod and Homer is framed as complementary; when taken together, the poets depict several aspects of the 'well known and familiar world' of epic.[69] This is true, to some degree: both poets speak of ancient myth and lore, and 'display an unrivalled mastery of the hexameter verse'[70]—if not, they could not compete in the first place. Moreover, the pieces they have selected, one on peace and one on war, can be said to form a complementary picture of the cosmos.[71] On the other hand, modern scholars always focus on the last round to point out how different the two poets are, since it is here that the qualities of the farmer-poet and the singer of war are most clearly opposed.

It will be worth our while to discuss briefly some other ways in which the author tries to stress the individuality of the poets, for it seems that in the earlier part of the contest (i.e. the first five rounds) they display certain typical characteristics as well.[72] In the first two rounds,

---

[67] Cf. Hesiod asking questions about the *metron* and what is best for the city (cf. n.74 below). There is an interesting parallel to the introductory remark that the contest will not be about 'strength' (ῥώμη) and 'speed' (τάχος) but about σοφία (*Cert*. 65) in Xenophanes DK 11 B 2. In this fragment, the philosopher complains about the competitions in ῥώμη (11, 14, 18) and ταχυτής (17), and claims that it would be better to honour (his) σοφία (12, 14), which aims at a 'better government' (εὐνομίη) of the polis.

[68] Rosen (2004), who compares the *Certamen* with the poetic contest in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, maintains that 'the narrative [of the *Certamen*] strongly implies that the *wrong* person was chosen' (309). I think, however, that the parallels between the *Certamen* and *Frogs* should not be overestimated. The dynamics of the two contests are widely different: *Frogs* presents an exciting ἀγών with two well-matched contestants who are both criticized, whereas the *Certamen* pictures a struggling underdog who against the odds in the end achieves victory.

[69] Graziosi and Haubold (2005) 31.

[70] *Ibid*.

[71] An opposition visible in both Hesiod's and Homer's description of the city in war- and peacetime on the shields of Heracles (*Sc*. 237–285) and Achilles (*Il*. 18.490–540).

[72] See Graziosi and Haubold's clever reading of *Cert*. 94–101 (2005 30–31) on the tomb of Zeus, which they are rightly offering with some caution. See for the Hesiod- and Homer-like quality of some of the questions and answers already Wilamowitz (1916a) 401 and West (1967) 442.

for instance, Hesiod quotes from his own work and Homer from his.[73] I suggest that this is a way of introducing the two contenders: the pieces are in place and the game can begin. The neat distinction, however, soon becomes somewhat blurred when in the following three rounds Hesiod starts asking questions on Homeric subjects, and Homer even succeeds in giving some Hesiodic answers, almost as if he is defeating Hesiod on his own terrain.[74] Perhaps this part of the contest reflects the ancient belief in the encyclopaedic knowledge of Homer, who was generally thought to be able, as Richardson writes, 'to answer questions on a wide range of subjects, and to solve all ἀπορίαι or problems'[75]—much as Homer himself indicates in *Certamen* 156–157: 'I am willing to say what you bid me; I will tell you very gladly' (ἑκόντα με ταῦτα κελεύεις / εἰπεῖν· αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ μάλα τοι πρόφρων ἀγορεύσω). Homer thus assumes a very Homeric role in the contest.

This does not mean, however, that Hesiod is a mere puppet, and that 'anyone else might have taken his place as questioner'.[76] Hesiod refers to his own work, as has been noted above, but the author does so as well. Take, for instance, Hesiod's becoming jealous at Homer (φθονῶν, 149). This is usually understood as an indication of Hesiod's childishness and ultimate inferiority.[77] But such an interpretation is mistaken, for two reasons: first, because it is based on an anachronistic (Christian) notion

[73] Homer's second answer in round 1 (*Cert*. 84–89) is *Od*. 9.6–11; his answer to Hesiod's question how many Greeks went to Troy resembles *Il*. 2.123–128 (on the number of Greeks and Trojans). Hesiod in phrasing his question in round 2 refers to the Muses in a way very reminiscent of *Th*. 38.

[74] In the third round, six of the fourteen ἀμφίβολοι γνῶμαι link up with Homeric material (119–120; 121–123; 124–126; 127–128; 133–134; 135–137), and eight cannot be easily assigned (107–108 ≈ Ar. *Pax* 1282–1283; 109–110; 111–112; 113–114; 115–116; 117–118; 129–130; 131–132). The sole question of the fourth round ('how many Achaeans went to Troy?') has a distinctly Homeric flavour, whereas Homer manages to answer some questions of round 5 in a Hesiodic fashion (esp. the first one, where Homer warns agains evil profit and speaks of punishment for wrongdoers). Too (1998) 37 argues against *Hesiodfeindlichkeit* in the contest by interpreting Hesiod's asking about the *metron* and the best thing for the city (*Cert*. 153 and 161) as demonstrating his 'right priorities'; it is also possible, however, to take these passages as indicating the blurring of categories. See for Homer beating Hesiod on his own turf the contest-version by Dio Chrysostom, discussed further below, pp. 262–265.

[75] Richardson (1981) 8.

[76] West (2003) 300.

[77] See e.g. Clay (2003) 179 claiming that Hesiod 'behaves like a bad sport by envying Homer's success.'

of jealousy,[78] and second, because it misses the reference to *Works and Days* 26, where Hesiod says that 'beggar is jealous at beggar and singer at singer' (πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ). Hesiod in the contest is following his own advice to be encouraged by the good Eris, and in the end this leads to success (just as he predicted in the *WD*).[79] Hesiod is typified by the emotion that is of great importance in his *Works and Days*.[80] Furthermore, Panedes too alludes to Hesiod's work. He calls his own judgement 'just', and Graziosi rightly reminds us here that 'the *Works and Days* opens with a complaint against an unjust verdict issued by kings'[81]—perhaps we should understand that Hesiod inspires a just verdict here as well, and Panedes is a king after his liking.

We may conclude, so far, that the *Certamen* is a story that 'matches' the two poets in several ways. First, they are lumped inasmuch as they are both masters of the hexameter who sing of the same world of gods and heroes. Second, however, they are also split into perfect opposition, especially with regard to their biography (the narrator focusing on Homer's birth and Hesiod's death, but neglecting Homer's death and Hesiod's birth) and of course their 'best' and most representative verses. Most importantly, they are presented as equal, that is, the narrative itself does not present one as better than the other. Such symmetry naturally shifts the interest of the story to the criteria of the judge, i.e. the 'how' (the τρόπος, *Cert.* 72) of the contest and Hesiod's victory. The *Certamen*, therefore, is for a large part about judging poetry, the contest of Hesiod and Homer being the most convenient vehicle to do so. A legendary contest opposing the two icons of Greek poetry is used to expound the many factors (such as the three types of σοφία: 'knowledge and factual accuracy', 'moral and educational integrity', and 'technical skill and aesthetic/emotional impact', and the person of the judge: uneducated masses or appointed expert) to be taken into account when judging poetry. In this case, Hesiod wins because an appointed judge lets the moral

[78] See Gill (2003) 30–33 on jealousy as a Christian sin, and Most (2003) 139 on the positive evaluation of envy in antiquity as a 'necessary concomitant to great deeds'.

[79] See *WD* 21–24, where the idle man sets himself to work because he sees his rich neighbour.

[80] Most (2003) notes that Homeric poetry, though full of strife and rivalry, 'never uses the language of jealousy and envy' (129), whereas Hesiod 'puts envy into the very centre of the account of the fundamental conditions of human existence he provides in the *Works and Days*' (130).

[81] Graziosi (2002) 174.

value of the poem's subject matter prevail over all other considerations.[82] When we consider the other versions of the contest, we will encounter again the *Certamen*'s function as a text concerned with the evaluation of poetry.

2.2. *Other Contests*

It is important to remember that the *Certamen* is only the most elaborate version of a story that is amply attested elsewhere in Greek literature. Other versions can be remarkably different or strikingly similar. Two of the most interesting ones, coming from Plutarch's *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men* and Dio Chrysostom's *Second Oration on Kingship*, will be briefly discussed here, with some references to the others. A complete overview of the most relevant information of all the versions can be found in the table at the end of the section.

The *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men* tells the story of several great σοφοί from the Greek past discussing all kinds of matters over dinner. At a certain point in the conversation, the subject of riddles presents itself, and the company is for some time engaged in 'questions of wisdom'. When one Cleodorus expresses his contempt for the game of questions and answers, Periander interrupts:

> 'ἀλλὰ μήν,' ἔφη, 'καὶ τοῖς παλαιοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἔθος ἦν, ὦ Κλεόδωρε, τοιαύτας ἀλλήλοις ἀπορίας προβάλλειν. ἀκούομεν γὰρ ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς Ἀμφιδάμαντος ταφὰς εἰς Χαλκίδα τῶν τότε σοφῶν οἱ δοκιμώτατοι ποιηταὶ συνῆλθον· ἦν δ' ὁ Ἀμφιδάμας ἀνὴρ πολεμικός, καὶ πολλὰ πράγματα παρασχὼν Ἐρετριεῦσιν ἐν ταῖς περὶ Ληλάντου μάχαις ἔπεσεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ παρεσκευασμένα τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἔπη χαλεπὴν καὶ δύσκολον ἐποίει τὴν κρίσιν διὰ τὸ ἐφάμιλλον, ἥ τε δόξα τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν, Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου, πολλὴν ἀπορίαν μετ' αἰδοῦς τοῖς κρίνουσι παρεῖχεν, ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοιαύτας ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ προέβαλ' ὁ μέν, ὥς φησι Λέσχης,
>
> > Μοῦσά μοι ἔννεπε κεῖνα, τὰ μήτ' ἐγένοντο πάροιθε
> > μήτ' ἔσται μετόπισθεν,
>
> ἀπεκρίνατο δ' Ἡσίοδος ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος

[82] It is too reductionist, therefore, to conclude that the *Certamen* is simply moralizing, told in order 'to illustrate the moral value of the works of Hesiod and Homer' (Richardson 1992 34).

ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀμφὶ Διὸς τύμβῳ καναχήποδες ἵπποι
ἅρματα συντρίψωσιν ἐπειγόμενοι περὶ νίκης.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται μάλιστα θαυμασθεὶς τοῦ τρίποδος τυχεῖν.'[83]

'Nevertheless it is a fact, Cleodorus, that the ancient Greeks also had a habit of propounding such perplexing questions to one another. For we have the story that the most famous poets among the wise men of that time gathered at Chalcis to attend the funeral of Amphidamas. Now Amphidamas was a warrior who had given much trouble to the Eretrians, and had fallen in one of the battles for the possession of the Lelantine plain. But since the verses composed by the poets made the decision a difficult and troublesome matter because they were so evenly matched, and since the repute of the contestants, Homer and Hesiod,[84] caused the judges much perplexity as well as embarassment, the poets resorted to questionings of this sort, and Homer, as Lesches[85] asserts, propounded this:

---

[83] Plu. *Mor*. 153F–154A. The question is the (probable) *incipit* of the *Ilias parva* (fr. 1 Bernabé). Hesiod's answer is very similar to Homer's answer to the ἄπορον posed in the *Certamen*: οὐδέ ποτ' ἀμφὶ Διὸς τύμβῳ καναχήποδες ἵπποι / ἅρματα συντρίψουσιν ἐρίζοντες περὶ νίκης (100–101).

[84] Wilamowitz in 1879 deleted Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου (which is in all the mss.), and he is followed by the most recent editors Paton-Wegehaupt (Teubner 1974) and Defradas-Hani-Klaerr (Budé 1985). There are three reasons for this deletion: 1) Plutarch himself rejected the story of Chalcis, Amphidamas, and the entire competition as an interpolation (it says so clearly in Σ *WD* 650–662 (fr. 62 Bernardakis), referred to by Wilamowitz (1916b) 55 and mentioned also by Teubner and Budé); 2) the alleged reason for Plutarch's rejection of the story is that he believed that Amphidamas died in a seabattle against the Eretrians and thus *bellum gestum esse credebat diu post Hesiodi et Homeri aetatem* (Wilamowitz 1916b 55); 3) *Mor*. 674F is another place where Plutarch rejects the story of the contest as 'une invention de grammairiens' (Defradas-Hani-Klaerr 1985 334). The conclusion is, according to Wilamowitz (and his followers), that Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου must be a gloss from a later reader: 'diese ganz entbehrlichen Worte muss man tilgen, dann ist Satz und Sinn in Ordnung' (Wilamowitz 1890 217). But the reasons for deletion are not *in Ordnung* at all. Argument 2 is in part prompted by a different reading of the scholia (compare Gaisford ad *WD* 648, which Wilamowitz used, with Pertusi ad *WD* 650–662), but it still makes no sense whatever to argue that the battle was *diu post Hesiodi et Homeri aetatem* and then nonetheless allow Hesiod to contend: in Wilamowitz' text, Hesiod is still the person answering the riddle. Argument 3 is simply wrong since the speaker at *Mor*. 674F does not reject the story of a contest between Hesiod and Homer because it is untrue but because it is so hackneyed; it is repeated *ad nauseam* by the grammarians. And then there is argument 1, which is the most important one. Of course the scholion is perfectly clear about Plutarch's deletion, but this deletion comes from a totally different context. In the scholion we see the textual critic Plutarch at work, making a note in his commentary on the *WD*. But this is something else entirely from the *character* Periander in the *Dinner* referring to a story; a story, moreover, the truth of which he does not dare vouch for himself (ἀκούομεν, 'we have the story'). I conclude that there is no reason to doubt the mss.: Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου should be in the text.

[85] Wilamowitz (and Teubner and Budé) read φασι instead of φησί (both have mss. support), turning Lesches into Hesiod's opponent, presumably because it is improbable

> 'Tell me, o Muse, of events which never happened aforetime,
> Nor in the future shall ever betide',
>
> And Hesiod answered quite off-hand:
>
> 'When round Zeus in his tomb rush the steeds with galloping hoof beats,
> Crashing car against car, as they eagerly run for a trophy.'
>
> And for this it is said that he gained the greatest admiration and won the tripod.'

There are some striking similarities with the *Certamen*, such as the answer to the question[86] and the name of the game.[87] But of far greater interest are the differences, which amount to an almost complete reversal of the contest we have seen in the previous section. In the *Certamen*, the contest consists of riddles; the round of recitals, the obvious climax of the story, is necessary for a decision. In Plutarch's version, the competition consisted of a recital of poems briefly referred to as τὰ παρεσκευασμένα τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἔπη ('the verses composed by the poets'),[88] and the riddle is the exceptional addition necessary for a decision.[89] Furthermore, in the *Dinner* it is Homer who asks the question, and Hesiod who answers—consequently, it is Hesiod who wins admiration (μάλιστα θαυμασθείς). Another reversal is Plutarch's emphasis on the improvisational skills of Hesiod, who answers ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος ('quite off-hand'), whereas

---

for Lesches to merely *report* a contest of two poets. But I believe it is far more improbable for Lesches to be counted among τῶν τότε σοφῶν οἱ δοκιμώτατοι ποιηταί, 'the most famous poets among the wise men of that time', or to be of such δόξα ('repute') so as to embarass the judges. Hess (1960) 19–20 believes that Plutarch refers to an ἀγών with more than two contestants, where Lesches happened to ask a question which was successfully answered by Hesiod. West (1967) 438–440 suggests we read προύβαλε μέν, ὥς φασιν, Ὅμηρος, arguing that a reader wrote the name Lesches in the margin because he was reminded of this poet, and then the names got mixed up.

[86] See n.83 above.

[87] Plutarch calls this an ἀπορία and also uses the word for 'questioning', ἐρώτησις, whereas the *Cert*. speaks of an ἐπερώτησιν τῶν ἀπόρων (95). There is an even greater resemblance to the Flinders Petrie papyrus, which uses the words ἀπορία (line 36 and probably 42) and ἐρώτησις (36) as well.

[88] What this means precisely is not clear. Do they recite a (well-known) piece of their work, or are these ἔπη composed for the occasion? What *is* clear, however, is that the verses are created beforehand (παρεσκευασμένα); there is no mention of improvization here. Incidentally, in Plu. *Mor*. 674F Hesiod and Homer are also said to contend 'in epic verse' (ἔπεσι).

[89] According to Heldmann (1982) 53–63, the *Urcertamen* must have been shaped like this as well; he argues that the *Zusatzagon* must be caused by *aporia* on the part of the judge(s).

the *Certamen* supposedly focuses on Homer's talent for extemporaneous speech. Apart from these obvious reversals, there are some other differences: in the *Dinner*, the reason for calling for an extra round is made explicit (the competitors are evenly matched),[90] and there is more than one judge (whose names we do not learn).

The version of the contest preserved in Dio Chrysostom's *Second Oration on Kingship* is again significantly different from both the *Certamen* and Plutarch's version. The oration presents a dialogue between Alexander the Great and his father Philip, who discuss several aspects of kingship. When Alexander expresses his admiration of Homer and Homeric poetry, Philip asks him what he thinks of Hesiod. Alexander replies he values Hesiod very highly, although he feels that Hesiod's poetry is of little interest to generals and kings; his advice is more useful to shepherds, carpenters, and farmers, that is, people who live a life of slaves, not leaders (2.3–8). But then Philip decides to put his son's convictions to the test (9–12):

> 'Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τὸν σπόρον', ἔφη, καὶ τὸν ἀμητόν', ὁ Φίλιππος, 'ἀρέσκει σοι τοῦ Ἡσιόδου μεγαλοπρεπῶς οὕτως εἰρημένα;
>
> Πληιάδων Ἀτλαγενέων ἐπιτελλομενάων
> ἄρχεσθ' ἀμητοῦ, ἀρότοιο δὲ δυσομενάων.'
>
> 'Πολύ γε μᾶλλον', εἶπεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, 'τὰ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ γεωργικά.' 'Καὶ ποῦ περὶ γεωργίας εἴρηκεν Ὅμηρος;' ἤρετο ὁ Φίλιππος. 'ἢ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἀσπίδι μιμήματα λέγεις τῶν ἀρούντων καὶ θεριζόντων καὶ τρυγώντων;' 'Ἥκιστά γε, εἶπεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνα πολὺ μᾶλλον·
>
> οἱ δ' ὥστ' ἀμητῆρες ἐναντίοι ἀλλήλοισιν
> ὄγμον ἐλαύνουσιν ἀνδρὸς μάκαρος κατ' ἄρουραν
> πυρῶν ἢ κριθῶν· τὰ δὲ δράγματα ταρφέα πίπτει·
> ὣς Τρῶες καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι θορόντες
> δῄουν, οὐδ' ἕτεροι μνώοντ' ὀλοοῖο φόβοιο.'
>
> 'Ταῦτα μέντοι ποιῶν Ὅμηρος ἡττᾶτο ὑπὸ Ἡσιόδου,' ὁ Φίλιππος εἶπεν· 'ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τὸ ἐν Ἑλικῶνι ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίποδος·
>
> Ἡσίοδος Μούσαις Ἑλικωνίσι τόνδ' ἀνέθηκεν
> ὕμνῳ νικήσας ἐν Χαλκίδι θεῖον Ὅμηρον;'

[90] It is interesting to see that it is in fact the judges who are facing an ἀπορία, which they try to solve by letting the competitors deal with one.

'Καὶ μάλα δικαίως', εἶπεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, 'ἡττᾶτο· οὐ γὰρ ἐν βασιλεῦσιν ἠγωνίζετο, ἀλλ' ἐν γεωργοῖς καὶ ἰδιώταις, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις φιληδόνοις καὶ μαλακοῖς …'

'But do you not like these magnificent lines of Hesiod about seed-time and harvest?' said Philip:

> 'Mark well the time when the Pleiads, daughters of Atlas, are rising;
> Then begin with the harvest, but do not plough till their setting.' '

'I much prefer what Homer says on farm-life', said Alexander. 'And where', Philip asked, 'has Homer anything to say about farming? Or do you refer to the representations on the shield of men ploughing and gathering the grain and the grapes?' 'Not at all', said Alexander, 'but rather to these well-known lines:

> 'As when two lines of reapers, face to face,
> In some rich landlord's field of barley or wheat
> Move on, and fast the severed handfulls fall,
> So, springing on each other, they of Troy
> And they of Argos smote each other down,
> And neither thought of ignominious flight.' '

'And yet, in spite of such lines as these', said Philip, 'Homer was defeated by Hesiod in the contest. Or have you not heard of the inscription which is inscribed upon the tripod that stands on Mount Helicon:

> 'Hesiod offered this gift to the Muses on Helicon's mountain
> When at Chalcis in song he had vanquished Homer, the godlike'?'

'And he richly deserved to be defeated', rejoined Alexander, 'for he was not exhibiting his skill before kings, but before farmers and plain folk, or, rather, before men who were lovers of pleasure and effeminate …'[91]

I have quoted the passage in full instead of only the last part of it (as Allen does),[92] because I think Dio does not just provide us with a reference to the *Certamen* but with a full *re-enactment*, Philip playing the part of Hesiod and Alexander that of Homer. The fact that Philip quotes *Works and Days* 383–384, the lines traditionally sung by Hesiod,[93] and ends with the epigram of Hesiod's victory (as does the *Certamen*), is a sure indication of this. What changes, of course, is the content of Homer's

[91] The lines quoted are *WD* 383–384 and *Il.* 11.67–71.

[92] Allen V 218; cf. the note of Cohoon (1932) on this passage, who refers to the *Certamen* for 'the account of this mythical contest'. But no: this *is* actually a version of the contest.

[93] See *Certamen* and Tzetzes; perhaps Philostratus and Themistius (table below).

song. Instead of the two Ajaxes and their tight formations ready for combat (the traditional ἀγών-piece),[94] Homer sings of the Greeks and Trojans in the midst of battle—a grandiose *Überbietung* of Hesiod's lines since he uses a reaping-metaphor to describe the grim cruelty of war. This magnificent reply not only demonstrates Alexander's mastery of Homer, as he manages to surprise his father with a Homeric passage on τὰ γεωργικά, but also Homer's mastery over Hesiod—Homer moves on a higher, i.e. metaphorical, level, and is thus able to 'beat' Hesiod on his own field.[95]

Dio, however, naturally conforms to the traditional outcome of the story and hence Hesiod must win, the difficulty being solved by a very negative characterization of the crowd judging the poets.[96] This description of the audience is of course meant to reflect on Hesiod: just as Homer's poetry was earlier defined as 'kingly' (βασιλική, 2.6), Hesiod's poetry is defined as suited for farmers and simpletons, or 'rather' (μᾶλλον) for effeminate hedonists.[97] This curious correction is probably caused by Alexander's later reference to Hesiod's inferiority to Homer: '… while Homer wrote of heroes, Hesiod composed a *Catalogue of Women*, and in reality made the women's quarters the subject of his song, yielding to Homer the eulogy of men'.[98] The poet is thus defined by the content of his song, and the audience preferring Hesiod must be similarly

---

[94] See *Certamen*, Philostratus, Themistius, and Tzetzes (table below).

[95] Cf. Homer's Hesiodic answers in the *Certamen* discussed above, pp. 256–257. Heldmann (1982) 43 argues that the 'Gegenüberstellung [of Hesiod and Homer] keineswegs polemisch gemeint ist und daß Homer und Hesiod damit nicht gegeneinander ausgespielt werden sollen', but I detect no such mildness in this passage.

[96] Cf. the strategy of Tzetzes, who describes the judges as μεθύσοι ('drunkards') ἀγοραῖοι ('commoners') and σύρφακες ('rabble'), who picked someone 'of their own company' (τῆς αὐτῶν συμμορίας); or half-blind people with 'styes as great as pumpkins' (see Gaisf. II.161.1–8 and 164.2–12).

[97] It is Dio's explicit statement that there were no kings present when Hesiod won that convinces Heldmann (1982) that the figure of Panedes in the *Certamen* was created as a 'Gegenkönig' to Dio's Alexander. When we accept this thesis, then 'lassen sich mit einem Male alle wesentlichen Anstöße und Widersprüche in der Komposition des *Certamen* erklären' (46). It is unfortunate that the many astute comments on the *Certamen* in Heldmann's book are somewhat overshadowed by this totally unfounded notion that can be countered by several serious objections, of which I will only mention the fact that Panedes is already mentioned on the Flinders Petrie papryus.

[98] D.Chrys. 2.13: ἐκείνου περὶ τῶν ἡρώων ποιήσαντος αὐτὸς ἐποίησε Γυναικῶν κατάλογον καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν ὕμνησε, παραχωρήσας Ὁμήρῳ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπαινέσαι (transl. slightly altered). Clay (2003) seems to agree with Alexander, saying that 'the *Catalogue of Women* (…) constitutes a perfect complement to heroic epic with its narrative form and concentration on the male' (166).

soft and weak. It is explicitly stated that Hesiod achieved his victory in a way that is δίκαιος, but the achievement is at the same time downplayed by disqualifying the judges.

Even though the three versions of the contest between Hesiod and Homer discussed so far—the anonymous *Certamen* and the stories of Plutarch and Dio—show some remarkable similarities, it is obvious that they are fundamentally different. The texts do not agree on the number and order of the rounds, the capacities or the order of the contestants, the content of the songs recited, and the identity and criteria of the judge(s). There are more variations in these and other versions—the most important ones are listed in the overview on the next page.[99] It seems that the only thing they have in common is the fact of Hesiod's victory; *everything else* can be changed and remodelled.

The legendary story of the contest, therefore, because of its undefined and flexible nature, makes an excellent vehicle for observations on how to judge *sophoi* or poets.[100] We have seen that the criteria used are widely divergent: the contestants can be evaluated not only by their strictly poetical merits, but also on qualities that we might call social, political and philosophical.[101] The different versions thus tell us much about the way the opposition between Hesiod and Homer was constructed. In the next section, I will try to isolate the three most interesting 'watersheds' as an upbeat for the following chapters.

---

[99] In the overview are missing the references made by Philochorus, Eustathius, and Proclus, who do not say anything on the course of the contest or on the reason of Hesiod's victory.

[100] Cf. Lefkowitz (1981) 19 'the ambivalence of [the narrative of the *Cert.*], with its alternating successes and failures, balances fourth-century concern about the content of poetry against the poems' continued popularity and cultural importance', and Rosen (1997) 473 'The story of a contest (…) represents an early attempt to confront several fundamental questions (…), namely how a common epic tradition could produce such different poets as Homer and Hesiod, and how the distinctive character of each poet's work might reflect a difference in moral value and utility within an evolving canon'. I cannot agree with the overly reductionist reading of Heldmann (1982) 85, who claims that the story of the *Cert.* is 'motiviert durch den Wunsch nach grösserer Anerkennung für Hesiod'.

[101] There is a very close (though late) parallel offered by Vitruvius (*De Arch.* 7.4–7), who produced yet another decisive criterion, i.e. that of originality. In his story of a literary contest, one of the judges (Alexandria's head librarian Aristophanes) counters the vote of the audience, the other judges and the king himself by crowning the least popular poet because he was the only one presenting an original composition instead of plagiarized texts, thus proving himself the only real *poeta*.

Table 6: The main contests of Homer and Hesiod in Greek literature

Attestation	Judge	Course of the contest	Why Hesiod wins	Relevant information
'Hesiod' (7th BC) *Fr. 357 MW*	Unknown	Rhapsodic relay-competition; song about Apollo	Unknown (victory not stated, but perhaps hinted at in *WD* 654–659)	Contest took place in Delos, in honour of Apollo
'Alcidamas' (4th BC) *Certamen*	Panedes	Five rounds of riddles and questions, Hesiod asking and Homer answering; then a recital of *WD* 383–392 and *Il.* 13.126–133 and 339–344	He sings of peace and agriculture instead of war and slaughter	The crowd favoured Homer after each round
Plutarch (1st AD) *Mor.* 153 F–154 A	Several judges	There is a round of 'composed verses' leading to a draw; then Homer asks Hesiod a question	Hesiod answers the question admirably	Hesiod wins fair and square
Plutarch (1st AD) *Mor.* 674 F	Unknown	Homer and Hesiod contended 'in epic verse'	Unknown (victory not stated)	The contest is called 'hackneyed'
Dio Chrys. (1st AD) *Or.* 2.2–13	Hedonists (says Alexander)	Hesiod performs *WD* 383–384, and Homer *Il.* 11.67–71	He was not judged by kings but a crowd of farmers and softies	Contest re-enacted by Philip and Alexander; Homer presents fighting as farming
Lucian (2nd AD) *Ver. Hist.* 2.22	Achilles and Theseus	A contest in poetry in which 'Homer was really by far the best man, but Hesiod won'	Unknown	Mock-contest situated on the Elysian Fields; the prize is a crown of peacock feathers
Philostratus (3rd AD) *Her.* 43.7	Vine-dresser (judges like Panides [sic])	Homer sings seven epics of the two Ajaxes and their closely joined ranks of battle; Hesiod sings of his admonitions to Perses	He was simpler (φαυλότερον), but happened to win the contest by far	Contest re-played by two contemporary rhapsodes
Themistius (4th AD) *Or.* 30 348	Several judges	Homer sings of war and battles and the two Ajaxes; Hesiod of 'the days in the course of which earth's works are augmented'	He won the support of all the judges	Hesiod won fair and square; there is no confusion
Libanius (4th AD) *Decl.* 1.65	Everybody	Unknown	Everybody or the majority voted for Hesiod	Supporters of the poets probably abused each other after the contest
Tzetzes (12th AD) *Vita Hesiodi*	Paneides [sic] and the sons of Amphidamas	Several rounds of improvized questions and answers (on both sides?), in which Homer was best; then the recital of *Il.* 13.131 ff. and *WD* 383 ff.	He sings of peace and agriculture, instead of war and slaughter	Perhaps the opponent was not the real Homer but a later namesake
Tzetzes (12th AD) scholia on the *WD*	The crowd	Unknown	He sung some morally superior verses…	… but still Tzetzes believes those judging were drunk, stupid, vulgar or blind

3. *Hesiod versus Homer: Points of Divergence*

Minor details and differences aside, I would suggest that there are basically three major watersheds between Hesiod and Homer in the tradition of the contest, that translate into three different aspects of their poetry: 1) the content of their poems; 2) the ethico-political orientation of the poets; and 3) the effect of their performance on the audience. I will now briefly elucidate these three points, with particular attention to the fact that in all three cases the tradition plays with the position of Hesiod and Homer on either side of the watershed.

1) Content: fighting versus farming. In five of the extant versions of the contest, there is an opposition between the martial verses picked by Homer and the agricultural theme chosen by Hesiod. We may thus rather safely conclude that this opposition is very characteristic, and also quite 'total', as especially the *Certamen*-version shows. Boundary-crossing, such as Hesiod asking some war-related questions and Homer giving some Hesiodic answers in the *Certamen*, and Homer encroaching on Hesiod's terrain when he sings of battle in terms of τὰ γεωργικά in the *Oration on Kingship*, seems to confirm their strict opposition in this respect.

2) Ethics and politics: king versus people. In the tradition of the contest special attention is given to the question of who is able to pass judgement; in some stories the judge is a king (*Certamen*, Philostratus, Tzetzes' *Vita*), and it is essential for the narrative of the *Certamen* that this king counters the opinion of the crowd; other versions, however, explicitly state that the judge was *not* a king (Dio) and ascribe the decision to (someone from) the common people (Dio, Philostratus, Tzetzes' scholia). Hesiod thus sometimes owes his victory to a king, and sometimes to the lowest rabble; and this means that Homer too is alternately associated with either the king or the people.

3) Effect on the audience: emotion versus reason. In the *Certamen*, Hesiod's victory depends on moral reasoning by the judge, whereas Homer inspires 'an immediate and universal reaction of wonder and admiration',[102] which is further increased by his talent for extempore speech.

[102] Graziosi (2002) 174.

Traces of such a dichotomy can be detected throughout the tradition of the contest (e.g. Philostratus' vine-dresser calling Hesiod 'simpler', φαυλότερος, *Her*. 43.9; and Tzetzes' remarks on the judges being completely insensitive to poetry). But occasionally, Hesiod too can achieve wonder: Plutarch says he was 'admired' for his reply to Homer's question (μάλιστα θαυμασθείς), which he answers 'quite offhand' (ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος). In Plutarch's version, *both* recitals were prepared in advance (τὰ παρεσκευασμένα … ἔπη), and the *Certamen* states that *both* contestants contended 'in a wonderful way' (θαυμαστῶς).

It is my general thesis that these three watersheds make out the most important distinctions between Hesiod and Homer not just in the tradition of the contest, but in the ancient reception of the poets as a whole. The crucial role of the judging authority and its socio-political orientation, for instance, reflect the appropriation of the poets by all layers of society *throughout* antiquity. The distinction between the morally sound (but poetically poor) Hesiod and the sweeping power of Homer's poetic genius, moreover, is arguably the greatest watershed between the poets as they were constructed by the Greeks.

In the following chapters, this thesis will be closely examined. In chapter 8, I will investigate the first two watersheds: those of content and ethico-political orientation. In chapter 9, we will see how Hesiod and Homer were opposed with regard to strictly 'poetical' qualities such as style and aesthetic/emotional impact.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SWORDS AND PLOUGHSHARES

0. *Introduction*

In the previous chapter we analyzed the tradition of the contest between Homer and Hesiod, and found three areas in which the ancient world opposed the two: the content of their poems (fighting versus farming), their political orientation (king versus people), and the effect on the audience (emotion versus reason). This chapter will be concerned with the first two of these oppositions, which are obviously related. The third area of opposition will be the subject of the next chapter.

The first section of the present chapter consists of a brief overview of modern scholarship concerning the socio-political orientation of the poems of Hesiod and Homer. It is interesting to see that despite many recent studies arguing for qualification, the *communis opinio* stated at the beginning of the 20th century still holds: Homer is generally regarded as aristocratically minded, whereas Hesiod is associated with the lower classes. This common view is more implicit nowadays than a century ago, but it is still alive and fairly widespread. The most striking aspect of this modern dichotomy, however, is that it resembles the ancient one so closely: the Greeks too thought of Homer as a figure of nobility and Hesiod as a peasant, even though such views were occasionally qualified.

Section 2 deals with the poets' role in the ancient opposition of fighting and farming. Both Homer's dominant image as the poet of war and Hesiod's agricultural theme in the *Works and Days* made the Greeks see Hesiod not merely as an expert on farming, but as a peasant himself. Despite the self-proclaimed status as a 'servant of the Muses', Hesiod was often pictured as a poor farmer, and moreover generally credited with a commoner's outlook on all kinds of matters. That is how collective memory works: a present need produces a certain image of the past (in this case, a particular person from the past), and the image is further strengthened or justified by reinterpreting other elements from the past to confirm with it—and so a poet who never said he even had a farm could become an utter peasant. Homer, I suggest, is the great foil further reinforcing this process.

Section 3 continues the discussion of the opposition between Hesiod and Homer, but from another perspective, focusing on a political instead of a social criterion. We will see that Homer was often associated with monarchy or aristocracy, while Hesiod could be constructed as the dissenting voice, speaking for the ruled and oppressed. Evidence for this particular opposition is often indirect or implicit, for Hesiod and (more obviously) Homer are also panhellenic symbols exceeding all partiality[1]—but this does by no means preclude their appropriation by either side.

In section 4, we will examine some cases of 'boundary-crossing', i.e. instances where Hesiod and Homer are presented a-typically: Homer singing of agriculture, for example, and Hesiod displaying a kingly character. It will be argued that even though such anti-traditional pictures are drawn of both poets, their import is not the same. In the case of Hesiod, boundary-crossing is mostly playful and reminds one of how un-Homeric he really is. In Homer's case, by contrast, the crossing of boundaries is indicative of his ever-greater presence—he never crosses back again.

1. *Modern Scholarship*

This section will present a brief overview of modern scholars' opinion on the socio-political stand of Hesiod and Homer and their poems. Obviously, this is a much-debated question (especially in the case of Homer), and it is far beyond the scope of this book to provide a detailed and exhaustive discussion. Instead, I will concentrate on some of the most relevant trends in recent scholarship.

I will begin with Homer. Homer is generally associated with the *Oberschicht* of society and aristocratic or monarchic sentiments. It is important to note that this association is to a large degree implicit: modern scholars often more or less tacitly assume that Homer belonged in some sense to the upperclass of his day because the protagonists of his poems are kings and nobles displaying their valour in all kinds of heroic and martial exploits. Almost all scholars at least agree to this last fact.

[1] See e.g. Robb (1994) 159 'Hellenes at all levels of society had heard Homer's language and had absorbed it', and Zeitlin (2001) 203 on the ancient claim that 'he belongs everywhere and to everyone'.

To give just a few examples: Schmid-Stählin said that the heroes in the Homeric poems strongly resemble the Ionian aristocracy, while Martin argued that the *Iliad* 'is a poem almost wholly about kingship and its abuse'; Finley claimed that Homer informs us only about the nobility, some 'stage props or stock types' aside.[2]

It is only a small step to claim that Homer actually promotes aristocratic values. Beye in a very general introduction on Homer writes that 'the reader can project certain values from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* onto the putative narrators of the poems. These values are an allegiance to hierarchy, the absolute superiority of the male sex, and the overriding obligation to pursue glory.'[3] According to Finley, Homer 'makes no secret of his own preference for kingly rule'; Finley also speaks of 'Homer's indifference to the common people'.[4] It follows that many scholars assumed that the poems of Homer were 'originally' performed in front of aristocratic audiences,[5] or that Homer had aimed his poetry especially at the nobles,[6] or that Homer in some way or another formed part of an aristocratic entourage.[7] This image has doubtlessly been much encouraged by the fact that Homer himself presents the singers in his own poems as court poets

[2] Schmid-Stählin (1929) 79; Martin (1984) 43; Finley (1979) 53.

[3] Beye in Briggs (1997) 230.

[4] Finley (1979) 106, 113. Adkins argued time and again that positive value-terms like *esthlos* and *agathos* are in the Homeric poems also used to commend men who are prosperous and of high birth (1960 30–60, see also 1972 10–21), cf. Long (1970) 137 'Homer speaks primarily from the perspective of the ἀγαθός, Morris (1986) 123–125, Heubeck (1988) 21, and more recently Marks (2005) 5, speaking of the 'poem's [= *Iliad*'s] unmistakable sympathy for a rigid system of social ranking and for the group that occupies the top position in this system.'

[5] Schmid-Stählin (1929) 79 'Das Publikum … war zweifellos die Aristokratie', Burn (1936) 73 Homer sang for 'chiefs'; Maehler (1963) 34 'Gemeinsam ist beiden Epen [sc. *Il.* and *Od.*], daß sie für eine aristokratische Geselschafft gedichtet sind, deren Anforderungen sie erfüllen, deren Anschauungen und Interessen die Dichter jeweils teilen'; Sinclair (1966) xxvii; de Ste. Croix (1981) 413. Countervoices, such as that of Levy (1954) or Thalmann (1988) 3, are few.

[6] See for instance Ford (1999b) 43, who suggests that the theomachy in the *Iliad* functioned as a warning against strife among the nobles.

[7] Svenbro (1976) argued that the oral poet was always 'attaché à un seul groupe social' (6), for which he adapted his song. That Homer sang so much of kings and princes could therefore be an indication that he performed for a similar social stratum. See also e.g. Bowra (1952) 489, who names Homer as an example of 'aristocratic' poetry; Germain (1961) 470 on Homeric bards being connected to 'seigneurs' and having a 'vive conscience de leur dignité'; and Sihvola (1989) 9 voicing the common idea that warrior epic was performed during aristocratic banquets, while didactic poetry featured at public festivals.

as well.[8] The final step, i.e. that Homer was himself an aristocrat, is usually not explicitly taken. Latacz is one of the very few who dares to make the suggestion.[9]

Other voices have of course been heard. Burn noted that the Homeric heroes are craftsmen and farmers as well, and thus relatively close to peasants.[10] Donlan investigated political reciprocity in Homer and concluded that where decisions are concerned, 'evidence (. . .) is overwhelming that in the long run the *demos* has the final say'.[11] Duchemin deduced from Homeric similes drawn from nature that Homeric poetry reminds one of 'la vie pastorale';[12] Dalby argued that Homer's inconsistent and problematic depiction of the daily life of the rich and famous demonstrates that both poet and audience were 'relatively unfamiliar with the houses and ways of contemporary aristocrats or kings'.[13] Griffin pointed to many unheroic attitudes in Homer and actually claimed that Odysseus' behaviour somewhat resembles 'the tight-fistedness of Hesiod'.[14] On the whole, however, studies like this, despite their decent arguments, cannot counter the age-old and ubiquitous assumption that Homeric poetry is aristocratic in origin and in nature. Nonetheless, it is important to note again, with Graziosi,[15] that most scholars are not too explicit about it:

---

[8] See e.g. Svenbro (1976), who assumes that Demodocus, Phemius, Agamemnon's singer and Thamyris together form the 'conception homérique de l'aède' (35), and that such singers resided at the royal court. This is still the majority view; there are some countervoices, such as that of Walcot (1970) 31, who believes that the audience of Demodocus and Phemius were popular rather than aristocratic.

[9] See Latacz' entry for Homer in the *Neue Pauly* (5.687): 'Der Autor steht auf einem gedanklich, sprachlich, ästhetisch, wertethisch, emotional und geschmacklich so hohen Niveau und reflektiert so dominant und zugleich affirmativ die Weltsicht einer Oberschicht, daß er innerhalb der von Bowra [*Heroic Poetry*, 1952] aus dem Vergleich mündlicher Dichtung aller Völker und Zeiten abgeleiteten sozialen Hierarchie von Sängerdichtern auf der obersten Stufe angesiedelt werden muß: Er hat wohl—als Aoide wie Achilleus in *Il.* 9.186–188—dem Adel selbst angehört oder ständig in seinem Umkreis gelebt.'

[10] Burn (1936) 12–13; cf. Murnaghan (2006), who is more interested in the rhetorical benefits of the aristocrat's *pose* as a farmer.

[11] Donlan (1998) 69.

[12] Duchemin (1960) 390; the pastoral aspects of Homeric similes are her main focus.

[13] Dalby (1995) 278; he claimed that we should find 'a model for the epic poets not so much in Phemius and Demodocus' but 'more in Odysseus, who told his tales to king and swineherd and earned what he needed from each' (279).

[14] Griffin (1986) 8; see also Heiden (2008) 127 finding in the *Iliad*'s *Catalogue of Ships* a 'democratic commemoration that privileges the common soldiers and the communities back home as a whole rather than an aristocracy of military leaders.'

[15] Graziosi (2002) 134.

they mostly take Homer's aristocratic connection for granted and generally do not venture into statements concerning Homer's own social status or that of his audience.

Generally speaking, scholars tend to be more outspoken where the political orientation of Hesiod is concerned. Most of them not only agree that Hesiod sings about farming, but also that he sang to farmers and actually was one himself. Rose, for instance, tells us that 'Hesiod's poem looks at life through the eyes of a peasant, not of a noble, and its ethics are narrow', and Millett too concludes that the *Works and Days* is 'a detailed account of the practical working of a peasant society.'[16] More than forty years ago, Sinclair stated the (then already) age-old truism that Hesiod wrote for the farming community in his neighbourhood,[17] to which he himself belonged[18]—and at the begining of the 21st century, scholars still feel the same way: 'aufgewachsen in einem bäuerlichem Milieu (...) hat der Dichter der *Erga* seine Standesgenossen nicht nur zum Publikum, sondern auch zum Gegenstand seiner Poesie gemacht.'[19] Jaeger expressed in almost lyrical terms how in the *Works and Days* 'we smell the rich fragrance of the earth freshly turned by the plough; from the bushes we hear the cuckoo calling the countryman to work'.[20]

Both classicists and anthropologists (who appropriated the *Works and Days* as a document on early lower-class mentality), from the beginnings

[16] Rose (1961) 60; Millett (1984) 106; cf. Trever (1924) 167 saying 'Hesiod presents (...) an accurate picture of the rural life of his Boeotian community'. Sinclair (1966) xi–xii believes Hesiod did his fellow countrymen 'a great practical service' by collecting all kinds of lore and practical information concerning the art of agriculture; cf. Howe (1958) 64, who describes the *WD* as 'a manual for the newly created economy of the tillers of the soil who were beginning to practice independent agriculture full-time and in great numbers.' The 'farmer's almanac' theory, however, has been mostly (and rightly) abandoned; see e.g. Osborne (1987) 17 'it would be an exaggeration to call it a practical manual for arable farming', and for a more detailed discussion Stoddard (2004) 27–33.

[17] According to Sperduti (1950), Hesiod figured that the Boeotian peasant would not be interested in heroes à la Homer, and therefore chose a different subject, 'prompted by the untutored tastes and straitened exigencies of his hearers' (230). Cf. Latte (1946b) 161 claiming (mistakenly) that Hesiod's aetiological tales were of no concern to the 'ritterliche Gesellschaft' but do fulfill the 'primitives Kausalitätsbedürfnis' of poor farmers who 'fragten kummervoll, warum die Lose gerade so verteilt sein mußten.'

[18] Sinclair (1966) xvii–xxv.

[19] Fakas (2001) 100. Compare, too, Sikes (1931) 6 writing that Homeric bards belonged in the royal courts, while Hesiod counts as 'essentially a poet of the people', with Most only some years ago (2003) characterizing Homer as writing for 'wealthy aristocrats' and Hesiod for 'small landowners (131).'

[20] Jaeger (1945) 73.

of Hesiod-*Forschung* to the present day, claim that Hesiod was a peasant: according to Wade-Gery, Hesiod 'was certainly a professional farmer';[21] Will put him in the 'classe du petit et moyen propriétaire', and Tandy and Neale qualified him as a 'typical peasant'.[22] Many focused on the anti-aristocratic tone of certain parts of the *Works and Days*, and concluded Hesiod was the first 'spokesman of the common people'.[23] Provoked by his litigious brother and the unjust behaviour of 'gift-eating' kings, we are to picture Hesiod 'stumping the country (...) making agitation',[24] using his 'poetry as a vehicle of protest for the common folk',[25] singing 'un chant révolutionnaire'.[26] In one of the most recent monographs on Hesiod, Clay too remarks that Hesiod 'seems to invert Odysseus' strategy, reserving his most violent threats for the kings'.[27] No doubt, Hesiod's autobiographical comments were (and still are) of great importance in forming this extremely wide-held opinion, against which other voices are of little consequence.[28]

---

[21] Wade-Gery (1949) 87; cf. Nelson (1998) 37 *et passim*.

[22] Will (1965) 555; Tandy/Neale (1996) xiv, 82. See further e.g. Walcot (1970), esp. 1–24, Gagarin (1973) 94, Forrest (1982) 287 ('Hesiod was of the commons'), and West (1996) 700 (a 'surly, conservative countryman'). Edwards (2004) presents the latest in-depth study of Hesiod's status and describes the *WD* as 'the expression of the values and experiences of the rural population' (26), coming from a 'very small world' (166) even less developed and complex than hitherto assumed (see esp. his ch. 5).

[23] Sinclair (1966) xix; he further describes the *WD* as a 'poem of growing discontent' (xvii); cf. Solmsen (1962) 178 speaking of Hesiod's 'concern for the common man and his work.'

[24] Wade-Gery (1949) 90.

[25] Zanker (1985) 236.

[26] Detienne (1963b) 9, referring to von Pöhlmann's book on ancient socialism, which characterizes Hesiod's 'Lied von der Arbeit' as 'das erste Symptom des Erwachens der Masse' (143), 'die Stimme des Volkes' (145), etc.; cf. e.g. Schmid-Stählin, who claim that Hesiod's reason for composing the *WD* were 'persönliche Erlebnisse [i.e. maltreatment by corrupt kings] und das Mitgefühl mit dem gedrückten Volk der Hirten und Bauern' (248).

[27] Clay (2003) 75; cf. Millett (1984) 103 who notes that modern scholars often regard the *WD* as 'a half-way-house between the apparently unchallenged aristocratic rule of Homeric society, and the overthrow of aristocracies in the later archaic period.'

[28] Such other voices include Østerud (1976) 25–28 pointing out that kings and singers are equated by Hesiod; on this telling equation see also e.g. Van Groningen (1957) 165–166, Walcot (1963) 10–15, Roth (1976) assuming that there is an ancient connection between the Muses and the kings which (oddly enough) Hesiod did not fully understand (338); Nagy (1990) arguing that the *WD* assumes an authority 'that replaces and transcends that of kings' (64), Kirby (1992) 54–55, Clay (2003) 74–75, Stoddard (2004) 176–188. According to Nagy (1996) 44, a theogony is by its very nature a 'poème d'autorité à l'appui du pouvoir royal', cf. Athanassakis (1983) saying that the *Th.* keeps close to the 'elevated tenor' of heroic epic (while there is a 'complete' break with the values of heroic

It is of interest that handbooks on Greek literature often describe Hesiod and his poems by contrasting them with Homer, especially with regard to their socio-political orientation; vice versa, however, this is hardly ever the case.[29] It is remarkable, furthermore, that such comparisons not only emphasize Hesiod's peasant status, but are also very explicit about Homer's aristocratic quality. This is a timeless trend visible, for instance, in Croiset (1910),[30] Lesky (1957),[31] and Easterling-Knox (1985), who can serve as a good example. In the chapter on Homer, the authors avoid the question of the poet's socio-political stand, but in the chapter on Hesiod state on *Works and Days* 174–201: 'Hesiod's preoccupation with ethics and with the justice of Zeus is a whole world away from the old aristocratic view of the divine right of kings, which is unquestioned in the *Iliad* an still largely prevails in the *Odyssey* (. . .). In particular, it is noteworthy that in Hesiod's view injustice leads ultimately to war as the worst of evils. War, of course, is the sport of princes, and in this passage above all Hesiod turns his back on Homer and the heroic tradition.'[32] In comparisons of this kind, the apparent certainty with regard to Hesiod's social status allows for a more explicit view of Homer. We will now look at this mutually reinforcing process taking place in antiquity.

---

epic in the *WD*). Adkins (1972) 23–35, Bravo (1977) 10–12, and Mele (1979) 18–21 think Hesiod is an impoverished aristocrat, and Starr (1977) 126–127 makes him an aspiring non-aristocrat; cf. Starr (1982) 438: 'Hesiod, who cannot be termed an aristocrat, illustrates aspects of ethical and social attitudes which were later part and parcel of aristocratic thought'. According to Desmond (2006) 33 Hesiod was 'relatively rich'—that is why Will (1965) 549 disqualifies him as a revolutionary.

[29] In this respect the modern approach does not differ much from that of the Suda: in the relatively short entry on Hesiod (half a page in Adler) Homer is mentioned three times, while the entry on Homer counts no less than six pages and does not even mention Hesiod once.

[30] Croiset (1910) in his many chapters on Homer does not focus so much on the political orientation of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but says of Hesiod that he is 'loin d'avoir dans l'esprit un type humain comparable en noblesse à celui du héros homérique' (505). Where the heroes of old are concerned, Hesiod does not display 'la moindre sympathie pour leurs grandes passions ni le moindre enthousiasme pour leurs exploits' (*ibid.*).

[31] Lesky says little on Homer's social milieu in the Homer-chapter, but begins the Hesiod-chapter by stating there is a huge gap separating Hesiod from Homer, a gap 'das Hesiod sozial und geistig in eine andersgeartete Welt verweist' (113).

[32] Easterling-Knox (1985) 98–99. Cf. e.g. Burn (1936) 47 on the large social differences between the contexts of Hesiodic and Homeric poetry, Detienne (1963b) 18 speaking of a 'distance profonde' between Hesiodic and Homeric society, Nussbaum (1960) 214 saying the *WD* 'brings within our cognizance the class of the small but independent farmer of whom we learn practically nothing from Homer', and Jaeger (1945) 71 stating that 'it is obvious that Hesiod deliberately sets up against the aristocratic training of Homer's heroes a working-class ideal of education, based on the areté of the ordinary man.'

2. *Fighting and Farming*

This section will focus on the ideological opposition of fighting and farming, which is roughly the same as that between war and peace—these concepts, at least, were opposed to each other by Panedes preferring 'peace and agriculture' (γεωργίαν καὶ εἰρήνην) to 'war and slaughter' (πολέμους καὶ σφαγάς).[33] It should be noted beforehand that this thematic contrast between the two poets in all probability goes back as far as Hesiod himself, who at the very beginning of the *Works and Days* sets his poem off against the Homeric tradition by saying there are two kinds of Eris, and not one.

It has always been—and it still is—one of the basic tenets of Hesiodic scholarship that his mention of the dual Eris right after the proem should be interpreted as a 'correction' of the account of Eris' nature given in the *Theogony*.[34] This passage in fact constitutes the prime evidence for the ubiquitous notion that the *Theogony* was composed before the *Works and Days*.[35] I find this a rather insensitive reading of Eris' dual nature, which at the least sits rather uneasily with the most rudimentary findings of oral

[33] *Cert*. 208–209. It should be noted beforehand that fighting and farming were not thought of as mutually exclusive 'professions': in antiquity, soldiers were often farmers and vice versa (cf. X. *Oec*. stressing time and again that the ideal καλὸς κἀγαθός ('gentleman') is both an agricultural expert and a master strategian). But the activities *were* opposed conceptually, of course, although it is probably an overstatement to say with Marsilio (2000) 59 that there were 'two rival traditions', one that takes war as its subject, and the other 'that exalts the spirit of 'work'.'

[34] *WD* 11–26, supposedly referring to *Th*. 225–232. The argument, exemplified by West (1978) 142–143, is that since Eris in the *Th*. is portrayed as a purely negative force (the mother of notions like Hunger, Battles and Lawlessness), and Hesiod needed an Eris with a positive side as well ('Emulation'), he decided to split them in two, creating a 'good' and a 'bad' Eris in the *WD*. His words in *WD* 11 (οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος) should thus be read as a 'correction' (so e.g. Verdenius 1985 14) that is the result of this new 'discovery' (West 1978 142): 'there is not after all only one Eris' (*ibid*.), cf. the translation by Most (2005): 'So there was not just one birth of Strifes after all'.

[35] Just a few of the veritable host of scholars placing the *Th*. before the *WD* on account of the 'Eris-palinode' are Wade-Gery (1949) 84 n.6, Walcot (1961) 2–3, Most (1991) 77–83 arguing that the correction increased the credibility of the *WD*, Rousseau (1996) 118, Steiner (2005) 353, Clay (2009) 74, Haubold (2010) 15. The argument is usually reinforced by pointing to other places where the *WD* allegedly 'presupposes' the *Th*. (cf. Walcot 1966 81–82), notably the Prometheus-story (cf. Most 1991 84–91); Krafft (1963) 99 argues that the *Th*. was the earlier work because Hesiod expresses his views on the dual nature of women more clearly in the *WD*, obviously as a result of further reflection (and experience, perhaps). The relative chronology gave rise to speculation concerning Hesiod's artistic development, cf. Wade-Gery (1949) 91 n.8 calling Hesiod 'an imaginative boy' while composing the *Th*., a 'Song of Innocence'

theory. Self-correction of this kind belongs to scholars in the modern age of the book, not to the bards of Dark Age Greece, whose poems are in perpetual flux and depend on the particulars of each performance. Of course poems can refer to other poems, critically or not, but this cannot be taken as an indication of chronology.[36] The dual Eris, I think, should be interpreted rather as a signal of departure from heroic epic.[37] In heroic poetry, Eris is often the ultimate cause of war and slaughter—one can think, for instance, of the apple of Eris setting in motion events that lead to the Trojan War, or the *eris* that sets Agamemnon and Achilles against each other at the outset of the *Iliad*. Hesiod, however, is looking for another beginning: he splits Eris in two, acknowledging the evil one that leads to war and then dedicating the rest of his poem to the good one that promotes hard work and competition which leads to wealth and success.[38] Hesiod thus presents himself as a anti-heroic poet of peace, and it is this particular image, together with the obviously agricultural theme of the *Works and Days*, that turns him into the perfect opposite of Homer.

It goes without saying that Homer was throughout antiquity regarded as the war-poet *par excellence*. Plato's Ion, for instance, claims to be the 'best general in Greece' because he knows his Homer best, and Niceratus in Xenophon's *Symposium* in similar fashion says that anyone wanting to become στρατηγικός should study Homer.[39] Homer is generally praised both for his thorough knowledge of warfare and his grand descriptions of battle.[40] And even though Euripides often chooses to use the Homeric

---

followed by the *WD*'s 'Song of Experience'. There were some who claimed the *WD*'s priority (see e.g. Cadoux 1929 263, offering no arguments, and esp. Latimer 1930 78, with some references), but these voices are now silent.

[36] See e.g. von Fritz (1962) 11 explaining the difference in terms of genre (according to him, a double Eris is pedantic in theogony, but does fit a poem on an *Ermahnung des Bruders*); Clay (2003) 6–7, in terms of perspective (there is only one Eris in the divine world, who has a double appearance in the world of mankind); and Gagarin (1990) 174–177, in terms of postmodernism (the ambiguous nature of Eris in the *WD* points to the instability of language).

[37] Cf. Steiner (2007) 187–188, referring to Rousseau (1993).

[38] I am much intrigued by the fact that ancient cosmogonies often posit a pair of opposites at the earliest beginning (cf. Long 1963 101); perhaps Hesiod's dual Eris was influenced by such cosmogonic thinking. Pucci (1996) 204–207 suggests the bad Eris in the *WD* is the Homeric or rather 'iliadique' one (associated with Perses in the *WD*), while the good Eris 'aide aussi Hésiode à mener sa belle compétition avec Homère' (204); cf. Most (1997) 118 arguing that the bad heroes in Hesiod's myth of the races followed the bad Eris.

[39] Pl. *Ion* 541a–b; X. *Smp*. 4.6.

[40] See for other explicit descriptions of Homer as the ultimate poet of war also e.g. Hermog. *Id*. (3.375 Walz), Lib. *Sent*. 1 'those skilled in war must admire Homer for his

legacy to depict the atrocities of war, and presents some of Homer's heroes as cowards or bullies, another poet can still claim in admiration that Homer sang so beautifully of the fires of Troy that unravaged cities have become jealous.[41] But both fans and critics (such as Euripides and Panedes) agree on Homer's focus on war and slaughter.[42]

The stark contrast between Homer's theme and Hesiod's supposedly favourite subject was noted very early.[43] The oldest explicit mention of the division (that can be dated with certainty) can be found in Aristophanes' *Frogs* (produced 405 BC), a comedy that presents two other poets, Euripides and Aeschylus, engaged in an ἀγὼν λόγων. Somewhere halfway, Aeschylus tells us how useful the great poets from ancient times were, Orpheus teaching on the subject of mystic rites, Musaeus on oracles, …

> … Ἡσίοδος δὲ
> γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπῶν ὥρας, ἀρότους· ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ὅμηρος
> ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμὴν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν πλὴν τοῦδ', ὅτι χρήστ' ἐδίδαξεν,
> τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ὁπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν;
>
> '… and Hesiod on agriculture, the seasons for crops, and ploughing. And where did the godlike Homer get respect and renown if not by giving good instruction in the tactics, virtues, and weaponry of men?'[44]

One could argue that this is not, strictly speaking, a case of opposition, since there are four poets instead of two, and the list of poets looks more like a climax (with the θεῖος Homer at the end) than a balanced dichotomy.[45] The opposition is very obvious, however, in a Laconian utterance ascribed to king Cleomenes, ruler of Sparta around 500 BC:

---

tactics' (ὁ μὲν πολεμικὸς Ὅμηρον θαυμαζέτω τῶν τακτικῶν), Maximus of Tyre calling Homer 'bellicose' (φιλοπόλεμον, 23.2; cf. Homer cited as praising war in 29.2); see also the link between Homer and the martial poet Tyrtaeus (on which see Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.56 and Them. *Or.* 15.198c).

[41] *AP* 16.304 (anon.): 'By telling the burnt city's story, Homer, you have allowed unsacked cities to envy her fate' (Διεξιών, Ὅμηρε, τὴν κεκαυμένην / φθονεῖν ἐφῆκας τὰς ἀπορθήτους πόλεις, transl. slightly altered).

[42] According to Dionysius, Homer's very composition is 'manly' (ἀνδρεῖως, *Comp.* 6.47 U-R).

[43] See e.g. Steiner (2005), finding the (implicit) opposition as early as Ibycus.

[44] Ar. *Ran.* 1033–1036.

[45] Still, the list could also be taken to consist of two pairs, the first two poets teaching two things (Orpheus 'rites and to refrain from killing', and Musaeus the 'cures of illness and oracles'), whereas the second pair teaches three subjects each.

> Κλεομένης ὁ Ἀναξανδρίδεω τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον Λακεδαιμονίων εἶναι ποιητὴν ἔφη, τὸν δὲ Ἡσίοδον τῶν εἱλώτων· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ὡς χρὴ πολεμεῖν, τὸν δὲ ὡς χρὴ γεωργεῖν παρηγγελκέναι.
>
> 'Cleomenes, the son of Anaxandridas, said that Homer was the poet of the Spartans and Hesiod that of the helots: for the one gave orders about how to wage war, the other about how to do farming.'[46]

This characterization deals with Homer and Hesiod alone, and the poets—by their typical subjects of 'fighting' and 'farming' (πολεμεῖν and γεωργεῖν)—are opposed in most powerful terms, for the opposition is framed according to the distinction between Spartans and helots; a starker contrast is hardly imaginable. Spoken by the king, the opposition also contains a very negative evaluation of Hesiod, whose poetry is of secondary importance since the helots and their activities are utterly subservient to the Spartans. Obviously, this distinction has strongly political overtones as well. If indeed Cleomenes was its author, the saying would be the earliest explicit contrast between Hesiod and Homer on the basis of the ideological opposition between peace and war.

It is my belief that the contrast with Homer further radicalized Hesiod's image as a farmer or shepherd. Hesiod, it should be noted, is not a farmer-poet *per se*: there is plenty of conflict and battle in the Hesiodic poems.[47] But Hesiod could never be remembered as a poet of war as long as he was compared to Homer. And so, energy was rather spent on developing his image of the countryman, which could take rather extreme forms. In Lucian's *Saturnalia*, for instance, Cronus calls Hesiod 'that shepherd' (τὸν ποιμένα ἐκεῖνον), and Lucian elsewhere describes him as a 'shepherd, a hard-bitten, hairy man displaying rich tan on his body.'[48] Another good example comes from Dio's *Second Oration on Kingship*, where Alexander the Great characterizes Hesiod contemptuously as the

---

[46] Plu. *Mor.* 223A.

[47] In the *Th.*, I counted 337 lines out of a total of 1022 that deal with war and violence, coming to exactly 33 per cent (still leaving out the gruesome descriptions of violent monsters; see also p. 154 n.110). Furthermore, the *Shield* contains a grim scene of battle, and the fragments that we have contain much violence as well. To describe Hesiod as a Boeotian farmer 'for whom all war-struggles are quite strange' (Kaczynska 1998 45) is a misrepresentation based on a construct of Hesiod that goes back to the ancient times themselves.

[48] Lucian *Sat.* 6; *Ind.* 3: ποιμένι (. . .) σκληρῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ δασεῖ καὶ πολὺν τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι ἐμφαίνοντι. Cf. *Rh.Pr.* 9, where the guide on the 'steep road' to good speaking is a 'vigorous man with hard muscles and a manly stride, who shows heavy tan on his body' (καρτερός τις ἀνήρ, ὑπόσκληρος, ἀνδρώδης τὸ βάδισμα, πολὺν τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι δεικνύων); see also the description of the Hesiod-like goatherd Lycidas (Theoc. *Id.* 7.13–19).

poet 'for shepherds, carpenters, and farmers; since he says that shepherds are beloved by the Muses, and to carpenters he gives very shrewd advice as to how large they could cut an axle, and to farmers, when to broach a cask.'[49] He proceeds to say—much like Cleomenes—that this sort of poetry is only useful for people who 'lived a slave's life' (ἐδούλευον), 'herding and farming' (νέμοντες καὶ γεωργοῦντες) for their masters.[50] Hesiod's original occupation as a shepherd was of course well-known from the *Theogony*, but Lucian transforms him into the typically rough and rugged flea-bag so familiar from many other texts. Similarly, in Dio's obviously negative description of Hesiod, we find some other oft-heard stereotypes of countrymen: their limited mental capabilities are exclusively focused on the trivia of day-to-day survival, they learn slowly and only through practical experience, and their life of toil and hard work does not befit the free citizen.

Throughout antiquity, this stereotypical picture of Hesiod as 'Farmer George' was often referred to and further elaborated. In this process, his typically 'rural' qualities could be evaluated either in a positive or a negative mode. Hence, Hesiod can appear as traditional or boorish, wise through experience or dim-witted, and modest or poor. Plutarch, for instance, lauds Hesiod's preference for the simple life and quotes him to lend weight to his own claim that useless things like perfume and jewelry should be expelled from the state, whereas Pausanias explicitly tells us that one of the reasons that Hesiod did not perform at royal courts was his 'boorishness' (ἀγροικία).[51] Similarly, Plutarch can claim (much like Dio's Alexander but this time without the sarcasm) that 'there is no lack of attention or experience shown in what [Hesiod] has to say about the daily course of life' (δῆλός ἐστιν οὐκ ἀμελῶς οὐδ' ἀπείρως περὶ διαίτης … διαλεγόμενος), suggesting there is a sort of timeless validity and wisdom to Hesiod's sayings.[52] At the same time, however, Plutarch very clearly shows us that Hesiod was attacked for the obviousness of (some of) his

[49] D.Chrys. 2.8–9: … τοῖς ποιμέσιν καὶ τοῖς τέκτοσι καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ποιμένας φησὶ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν Μουσῶν, τοῖς δὲ τέκτοσι μάλα ἐμπείρως παραινεῖ πηλίκον χρὴ τὸν ἄξονα τεμεῖν, καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς, ὁπηνίκα ἄρξασθαι πίθου; cf. below, p. 288.

[50] D.Chrys. 2.8–9; references are made to *Th.* 22–35, *WD* 423–425 and *WD* 368–369.

[51] Plu. *Mor.* 527B–C, Paus. 1.2.3; see also Galen 6.652 Kühn connecting Hesiod with ἀγροικία.

[52] Plu. *Mor.* 158A–B; see also *Thes.* 3.2, where Plutarch suggests that the most ancient wisdom of Greece 'had some such form and force as that for which Hesiod was famous' (τοιαύτη τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἰδέα καὶ δύναμις, οἵᾳ χρησάμενος Ἡσίοδος εὐδοκίμει), pointing again to his traditional character.

advice when he defends one of his apparently less insightful sayings, 'invite your friend to the feast, but let your enemy be': since history has shown that it can be dangerous and even deadly to accept dinner-invitations from so-called friends, 'the advice of Hesiod is therefore not absurd or silly, as some assert, but wise.'[53] Dio Chrysostom is one of those sceptics: in his oration on envy (a subject on which Hesiod naturally counted as an expert), he is highly ironical in presenting Hesiod as an abstract thinker speaking to intelligent persons.[54]

Hesiod's position as an advocate of modesty and moderation has been amply discussed in chapter 5. It is not hard to find passages illustrating Hesiod's connection to both hard work and poverty. Apart from the discussions of *Works and Days* 311 that turn him into an expert on ἔργον ('decent work'),[55] Hesiod is often associated with a no-nonsense work ethic; see, for instance, Dio praising Hesiod's attack on idleness, and the Stoics quoting from the *Works and Days* to promote work or to reject procrastination.[56] Theognis referred twice to Hesiod's saying on 'accursed poverty',[57] and it seems that Aristotle too saw Hesiod as an author familiar with dire circumstances—when he in the *Politics* discusses the household, mankind's most basic community, he says that 'Hesiod was right when he wrote 'First and foremost a house and a wife and an ox for the ploughing'—for the ox serves instead of a servant for the poor.'[58]

Considering that such elaborate stereotyping (especially of Hesiod) takes place throughout antiquity, and considering that the explicit opposition between Hesiod and Homer in terms of peace and war can be traced at least to the fifth century (and presumably all the way to Hesiod himself),[59] it is only to be expected that the Greeks also found more

---

[53] Plu. *Mor.* 530D: οὐ γελοῖον οὖν, ὥς φασί τινες, ουδὲ ἀβέλτερον, ἀλλὰ σοφὸν τὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου; see for a similar defence by Plutarch Σ *WD* 797–799 (against the charge of talking 'ridiculously', γελοίως) and 423–427 (against the charge of 'talking about small things', σμικρολογία).

[54] D.Chrys. 77.5.

[55] See ch. 6, p. 226.

[56] D.Chrys. 7.116, SVF 3.648, SVF 3.138 (Chrysippus).

[57] Thgn. 1.155–156 and 1.1062 (*WD* 717), see ch. 5, pp. 183–184.

[58] Arist. *Pol.* 1252b9–12 (*WD* 405): ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας 'οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα·' ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησίν ἐστιν. See also Strabo 9.2.24, who refers to Hesiod's 'rough' path in his description of Ascra as a high and 'rough' place (ὑψηλοῦ καὶ τραχέος τόπου), emphasizing its poverty.

[59] See for an explicit contrast in Latin literature Man. *Astr.* 2.1–24, who characterizes Homer's work as concerned with *certamina* and *bellum*, while Hesiod's *Astronomy* is called a *pacis opus*.

subtle ways of contrasting the two poets in this respect.[60] I will demonstrate just how subtly such oppositions could be framed by entering into a brief discussion of an intriguing papyrus containing, as the title suggests, the words that Hesiod spoke at the very moment he was inspired by the Muses. This discussion will also round off the present section.

Papyrus Oxyrhynchus 3537, roughly dated to the third century AD, is a small poem of unknown date by an unknown author imagining what Hesiod might have said at the very moment of inspiration. 'Hesiod' first asks himself which of the gods has 'shaken' him (1–4), and then asks the Muse to tell him of gods, giants, heroes, women and the universe (5–7). Most interesting is his elaborate rejection of insignificant Ascra and the small bucolic poem, which 'rustics sing' (8–21); the poem ends with the poet's intention to reveal what he has learned from the Muses: 'now I begin to sing' (22–24). The papyrus is severely damaged, and discussion so far has mostly focused on restauration.[61] Of great interest is Agosti's discovery that the poem is an acrostic, spelling out the epic (but only Homeric, and not Hesiodic) formula τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη ('and answering him he said'). Most, however, has been the first to ask the really interesting questions.[62] In his article, he convincingly shows that the poem entails a devaluation of the *Works and Days* in favour of the more serious poetry to which the *Theogony* and *Catalogue* belong, the moment of inspiration marking the caesura in this developmental scheme; the papyrus thus offers a rather unique testimony to the priority of the *Works and Days* in Hesiod's oeuvre.[63]

---

[60] We have already seen (ch. 4, p. 146), how the Homeric war-poet Tyrtaeus gave a particularly martial twist to the work-ethic advocated by the image of the rough road to excellence (*WD* 291). Another example is the 24th oration of Maximus of Tyre, where a dispute between a soldier and a farmer is fought out with the aid of references to Homer and Hesiod.

[61] Esp. West (1984) reacting to the papyrus' publication by Parsons (1983).

[62] Most (2008), offering an excellent analysis, even though he only does so 'in the hope of attracting the attention of other scholars to it' (65).

[63] See Most (2008) 68. This observation needs some qualification, however, since there are but few explicit ancient statements on the priority of the *Th.* over the *WD* as well. Incidentally, I wonder whether the first two lines of Hesiod's epitaph ('Ascra rich in corn was his fatherland, but now that he is dead, the land of the horse-striking Minyans holds the bones [of Hesiod]', Ἄσκρη μὲν πατρὶς πολυλήϊος, ἀλλὰ θανόντος / ὀστέα πληξίππων γῆ Μινυῶν κατέχει, see ch. 5, p. 163) point to a similar development from didactic-agricultural to heroic-martial poetry, the first epithet ('rich in corn') having obviously agricultural overtones, while the second one ('horse-striking') is mainly Homeric, though Hesiod uses it twice (but not in the *WD*; horses of course being typically attributes of heroes and not used on the farm). Such a concern with Hesiod's theme may also be present

The Homeric reference caught in the acrostic, Most argues, is meant to 'render Hesiod more serious by associating him with Homer.'[64]

My only problem with Most's analysis is that he does not go far enough. It is only the acrostic that makes him remark on Hesiod's wish to attain Homeric grandeur, but in my view this is the main theme of the poem as a whole. Throughout the poem, Hesiod denounces those qualities that normally characterize him when opposed to Homer, most obviously his agricultural theme: the cattle-stables are 'thrice-wretched' (8), a bucolic poem is 'small' (18), and Hesiod hates the 'rustic sound' of the 'goatherd's pipe' (20–21); moreover, he is leaving behind the mountains and their sheep (2) in order to go to the cities[65] and the 'circle of contests' (9). But there are other ways in which this Hesiod seeks to become Homeric: he wants to sing of things '[which I have never] seen with my eyes' (7), steering his subject away from self-observed everyday life to mystical truths (much like blind Homer); he wants to drink 'much' from the Aganippe, rejecting the typically Hesiodic sips and instead taking a big swallow;[66] and he takes much time to say goodbye to his roots (both Ascra and his father's hometown Cymae, 11–12), and, I think, to his family as well (15–16)—not only because they are mentioned in the (now to be rejected) *Works and Days*, but also because they are essential to the Hesiodic persona.[67] Only if Hesiod gets rid of all his defining characteristics can he become like Homer, and now we can better understand the meaning of the acrostic. The poet did not choose τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη at random, as just any typically Homeric formula. 'Hesiod' himself is speaking in this poem, and the τόν whom Hesiod is trying to 'answer' with his career move is Homer.

---

in the second part of the epitaph, which ascribes great 'glory' (κῦδος) to Hesiod's wisdom. The term κῦδος is normally used for martial exploits, and its appearance here may suggest that Hesiod's σοφία is as important as physical excellence (cf. Xenophanes DK 11 B 2, discussed in ch. 7, p. 256 n.67).

[64] Most (2008) 70; Most argues that the poem presents the *Th.* and *Cat.* as mystical poems, far exceeding the juvenilia contained in the *WD*.

[65] πτολ- in line 9 must surely be restored as πτολίεθρον (or -α), not as (a form of) πτόλεμος, cf. Most (2008) 66–67. Pausanias says Hesiod did not perform at courts because of his 'boorishness and reluctance to travel' (ἀγροικία καὶ ὄκνος πλάνης, 1.2.3).

[66] See ch. 9, pp. 333–341 for the water-metaphor distinguishing two types of poetry, little drops representing Hesiodic poetry (or at least the hellenistic reconstruction of it), and big amounts symbolizing the Homeric type.

[67] See ch. 4, pp. 130–133 for Hesiod's human nature and 'knownness' distinguishing him from Homer.

In this remarkable poem too, then, we see just how fundamental the fighting-farming contrast is—without his agricultural theme, Hesiod ceases to be Hesiod.

3. *The King and the People*

This section will deal with the question of the poet's socio-political stand, a significant 'watershed' in the tradition of the contest. It will be argued that both Hesiod and Homer can be associated with either high (the rulers or the few) or low (the ruled or the many), even though certain preferences can easily be discerned: Hesiod is generally associated with the people, and Homer with kings and aristocrats. When the poets are opposed to each other, however, such preferences radicalize into more extreme polarization.

Before we start our discussion proper it is perhaps worth our while to ask whether this thematic contrast, like that between fighting and farming, can also be traced back to the age of the poets themselves. To be sure, Hesiod is well-known for his criticism of kings in the *Works and Days*:[68] he calls them 'gift-eating' (*WD* 39, 221, 264), tells them a fable teaching that might is *not* right (202–212), and warns them several times against (the evil deriving from) 'crooked judgements'.[69] There seem to be no obvious signs, however, that Hesiod in such passages is referring in some way to Homeric epic. Homer, on the other hand, may have been provoked by the anti-aristocratic tone of the *Works and Days*. There is one (and only one) character in the *Iliad* who voices similar sentiments, 'ugly beyond all men who came to Troy', who is immediately beaten back into submission with Agamemnon's sceptre: Thersites. I would suggest that Homer's Thersites-episode is fashioned (in part) as a response to Hesiod's epic of peasants.

The Thersites-episode in the *Iliad* (2.211–277) is as famous as it is ambiguous. Even if it should be regarded as an example of class struggle

[68] The *Th.* takes a far more positive stand on kings, calling them 'Zeus-nourished' (82; cf. *Th.* 96, to which refers Call. *Jov.* 78) and 'wise' (88), and describing their justice and respect (81–92).

[69] Esp. in *WD* 238–273, which deals with the city suffering for the sins of one person, the works of the maiden Justice, and the thrice ten thousand guardians of Zeus.

in Dark Age Greece,[70] scholars disagree widely on its meaning and the right approach to retrieve it.[71] Instead of offering a new 'solution', I would like to add to the complexity of the episode by pointing to the thematic connection between Thersites' speech and the *Works and Days*. Thersites is introduced by the narrator as one engaged in 'seeking *eris* with kings' (ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν, 214), and these very same words are used again by Odysseus to describe him (247). Obviously, this is the man's main occupation,[72] but more importantly, he is the only one in Homeric epic to regularly do so.[73] His speech contains Hesiodic reminiscences, notably a warning against greed and the abuse of power; furthermore, Thersites' suggestion to leave Agamemnon on the shores of Troy to 'digest his prizes' (237) resembles Hesiod's oft-heard description of kings as 'gift-eating'. Thersites is an odd one out in the *Iliad*: the only commoner to speak in the assembly, the only one to seek *eris* with kings, the only one described as ugly—is he meant to be (understood by the audience as) alien to heroic epic, because he is imported from some place else? In other words: could Thersites be (in part) a caricature of Hesiod? If he is, the Homeric narrator takes a strong stand against the political orientation of the *Works and Days*. It is impossible to know for sure, but it is an interesting possibility.

Let us return to the socio-political image of the poets. Hesiod, to begin with, is most often associated with the common people. According to some versions of the contest, for instance, Hesiod won because he was judged by the crowd instead of by the nobility. We have seen above that Hesiod could be described as poor, and chapter 5 paid ample attention to his embrace of the victim's perspective, and his warnings—addressed to the kings—against greed and abuse of power. His sayings are 'popular' in the sense that they are used by the people, and Aristotle is often keen to point out that Hesiod's reputed 'philosophy' does not transcend

[70] The majority view; see the lucid overview by Marks (2005) 1–6, who himself takes the opposite view.

[71] See Rose (1988) on the historical, literary and ideological approach; in his article, he stresses the inadequacy of all of those, and assumes a 'plurality of meanings' (15); see also the careful analysis by Thalmann (1988), and recently Steiner (2007) 193 and 199 on Thersites as representing a certain genre of poetry.

[72] Cf. *Il.* 2.220, where it is said that Thersites 'was in the habit of reviling' (νεικείεσκε) Achilles and Odysseus.

[73] Achilles (who is often regarded as Thersites' 'double', see e.g. Thalmann 1988 19, Rose 1988 19) is the only other seeking *eris* with a king (*Il.* 1.277), but that is an isolated incident.

the ordinary notions of *hoi polloi*.[74] Generally speaking, then, Hesiod is usually pictured as belonging to the *Unterschicht* of society.[75]

Homer, by contrast, is often associated with kings and the ruling faction in general. His aristocratic image is obviously connected to the almost universal belief in his knowledge of warfare and tactics—in any case, Socrates summarizes Homer's poetry as dealing with 'wars and generalships and the government of cities and the education of mankind'.[76] But there are many more indications. One of these is provided by Ford, who has argued persuasively that Homer was in classical times so closely associated with the aristocracy that Athenians had to be careful about quoting Homer in the courtroom.[77] Aristotle, who speaks of kingship on numerous occasions, very often cites Homer to prove his point—it is obvious that he associated him with kingly rule.[78] Philodemus wrote a book called *On the good king according to Homer*, in which the philosopher 'derives the character of the ideal king from the Homeric poems',[79] and Dio Chrysostom explicitly characterizes Homer as being preoccupied with kings and kingship, displaying a marked aversion for *hoi polloi*.[80]

---

[74] See e.g. *EN* 1155a32–b8, where Hesiod's saying on friendship (*WD* 25) is first called a mere proverb, after which Aristotle proceeds to the opinions of 'those who try to find a more profound and scientific explanation' (ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον), like those of Empedocles and Heraclitus; cf. *Metaph.* 989a10–12 and *Oec.* 1343a18–21. Hesiodic lines are regularly reported as being proverbial; see e.g. Plu. *Thes.* 3.2 saying Hesiod was famous for his γνωμολογίαι, and Athen. 3.101f describing Hesiod's speech as γνωμικός.

[75] It is occasionally seen, however, that Hesiod can be positive about the social elite as well, which in these cases almost immediately brings up the explicit comparison with Homer. See Σ *Il.* 1.175c (T), 2.360b (bT), 17.251a (A), Plu. *Mor.* 801E, D.Chrys. 2.23–24.

[76] Pl. *R.* 599c: πολέμων τε πέρι καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ διοικήσεων πόλεων, καὶ παιδείας πέρι ἀνθρώπου.

[77] Ford (1999a) 232–241; see also Perlman (1965) 55–58 arguing that the Athenian jury preferred quotations from tragedy, a (more) democratic art form. See for (democratic) anger about the aristocratic abuse of Homer also X. *Mem.* 1.2.56 (discussed in ch. 2, pp. 89–90) and Iambl. *VP* 259.

[78] In *EN* 1113a7–8 it is said that Homer 'represented' (ἐμιμεῖτο) 'ancient constitutions', by which Aristotle means kingship. Homer illustrates the 'kingly' relationship between father and son in *EN* 1160b24–27 and *Pol.* 1259b10–14, and between pater familias and the household in *Pol.* 1252b20–23; the kindness of the king towards his subjects in *EN* 1161a10–15; and kingship as life-long generalship in *Pol.* 1285a10–15. See *Pol.* 1292a13–15 for Homer's criticism of democracy.

[79] DeLacy (1948) 264.

[80] In *Or.* 61.1, for instance, Dio says that Homer's usual topic consists of 'kings and generals' (τὰ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν); in 53.11–12 he singles out the king as a special person on whose ἀρετή Homer has much to say. *Or.* 32.22 presents Homer as

On the other hand, Homer can in certain contexts also be constructed as the people's poet, as has been shown by Graziosi in her book on the ancient reception of Homer. It is in fact one of the great merits of her study that she has seriously attacked the widespread modern belief that in antiquity Homer was regarded as an aristocrat by showing that alleged ancient view to be a projection of the notions of the modern scholars themselves.[81] She makes a good case, although it appears to me that she sometimes downplays important evidence;[82] furthermore, 'democratic' views of Homer often seem to be conscious *reactions*, i.e. attempts to appropriate Homer for the people and wrest him away from the aristocracy. For us it will suffice to say that Homer, although he is mostly associated with the rulers and nobility, could occasionally be presented as a poet of the people.[83]

Even though both Hesiod and Homer cannot be univocally aligned with either the people or the king, it is clear that when the poets are opposed on the socio-political axis, they are firmly placed in their 'corner' of preference. This can, of course, already be seen in the *Certamen*. It is incorrect to assume that Homer's rejection by a king (Panedes) is in any sense typical, since it is clearly part of the surprise of Hesiod's victory that he was chosen by a king; moreover, when after the contest proper Homer starts touring through Greece, he is hired by king Midas' sons on Crete, is the guest of king Medon in Athens, recites for the προεστηκότες ('governors') in Argos, and is honoured with costly gifts like a silver cup

---

'constantly singing of the mob as being cruel and unruly and prone to violence', and it is implied in 7.107 that Homer would only call cities without poor people 'well-inhabited'.

[81] Graziosi 2002, esp. ch. 4 on Homer's 'blindness, poverty and closeness to the gods'; her reconstruction of Homer's image in antiquity agrees very much with that of Schmid-Stählin (1929) 88: '… er ist der Typus eines armen, blinden, nach Rhapsodenart fahrenden Dichters, der für die überall gern angenommenen Gaben seiner Muse schnöden Undank erntet, betrogen und ausgenützt wird'.

[82] Even though she may be right that 'in antiquity Homer was consistently represented as poor' (134), it goes too far to adduce Heraclitus' story on Homer and the lice (DK 22 B 56) as proof for his low social status ('Homer's poverty is implicit: no aristocrat would be said to entertain himself with children on a louse hunt', 162), while it is simply untrue that 'Homer is never said to be an esteemed singer at the court of rulers' (137), on which see more below.

[83] See Graziosi (2002) 157 for some of the most important early texts; an interesting late example is Paus. 1.2.3, who says that Homer, traveling around the world, 'depreciated the help afforded by despots in the acquisition of wealth in comparison with his reputation among ordinary men' (τὴν ὠφέλειαν τὴν ἐς χρήματα παρὰ τῶν δυνατῶν ὑστέραν θέμενος τῆς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξης).

and a bronze statue. Hesiod, on the other hand, after the contest stays 'among the people of Oenoe' (ἐν τοῖς Οἰνοεῦσιν), where he is murdered. The division is very clear-cut.

Instances of such polarized oppositions occur elsewhere. One example is Cleomenes' description (cited above) of Homer as a poet for Spartans and Hesiod for helots—obviously, this division operates not only in respect to the activities of two separate classes (fighting versus farming), but also with regard to their political status: Homer belongs to the rulers, Hesiod to the powerless subjects. The opposition can also be witnessed in Dio's *Second Oration on Kingship*: while Hesiod's verses are fit for craftsmen, farmers, and in short, those 'who lead a slave's life' (an aristocratic exaggeration of their actual low status), the poetry of Homer is 'alone truly noble and lofty and suited to a king, worthy of the attention of a real man, particularly if he expects to rule over all the peoples of the earth'.[84] It is rather interesting to see that later in the same treatise the harsh characterization of Hesiod is somewhat mitigated when Alexander admits that Hesiod's poetry contains at least something useful for kings, too.[85] He then concludes that the 'noble ruler of princely soul' (γενναῖος καὶ βασιλικὸς τὴν ψυχήν) should read 'not all poetry, but only the most beautiful and majestic, such as we know Homer's alone to be, and of Hesiod's the portions akin to Homer's …'.[86] Hesiod, therefore, is only kingly when he is not too Hesiodic.

It is in this context of political polarization that we should understand a remarkable saying attributed to Simonides:

> Σιμωνίδης τὸν Ἡσίοδον κηπουρὸν ἔλεγε, τὸν δὲ Ὅμηρον στεφανηπλόκον, τὸν μὲν ὡς φυτεύσαντα τὰς περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων μυθολογίας, τὸν δὲ ὡς ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπλέξαντα τὸν Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσείας στέφανον.

[84] D.Chrys. 2.6: … μόνην τῷ ὄντι γενναίαν καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ βασιλικήν, ᾗ πρέπει τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν ἄνδρα μάλιστα μὲν ἄρξειν μέλλοντα τῶν ὅποι ποτὲ ἀνθρώπων. See for similar judgements of Homer e.g. 2.44 'Homer seems a competent instructor for an education that is truthfully heroic and kingly' (ἔοικε … ἱκανὸς εἶναι παιδεύειν Ὅμηρος ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ βασιλικὴν τῷ ὄντι παίδευσιν,), and 2.54 'he who tries to give heed to him [= Homer] will be a highly successful and exemplary king' (ὁ τούτῳ πειρώμενος τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν εὐτυχέστατός τε καὶ ἄριστος βασιλεύς).

[85] He is thinking of *Th.* 80–82 (Calliope attending on kings from their earliest childhood), which he interprets as a statement on the necessity of kings studying rhetoric and philosophy (D.Chrys. 2.23–24).

[86] D.Chrys. 2.27: οὐχ ἁπάσῃ, τῇ δὲ καλλίστῃ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτῃ (…), οἵαν μόνην ἴσμεν τὴν Ὁμήρου καὶ τῶν Ἡσιόδου τὰ τοιαῦτα.

> 'Simonides said that Hesiod was a gardener and Homer a weaver of garlands, since the former planted the mythological stories about gods and heroes, while the latter wove together the garland of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* out of them.'[87]

This saying is far more than a mere statement on chronology, indicating Hesiod's priority;[88] it is rather a description of their poetry that typifies the relationship between the poets[89] in terms now strongly familiar to us. On the one hand, there is the farmer-like Hesiod, on his knees with his hands in the dirt, providing the raw and unworked material of myth: a remarkable blend of the *Works and Days* (the poem of 'planting', so to speak)[90] and the *Theogony*. Homer, on the other hand, has the genius and sophistication to transform these materials into pleasurable end-products, which are finished and thus named, *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The (nearly) perfect parallelism between the two descriptions stresses the process of shapeless matter (τὰς περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων μυθολογίας, note the vague περί and the plural) being turned into the perfect 'garland' (singular) consisting of two poems. It is difficult not to interpret the 'gardener' Hesiod as having a low status when compared to Homer, whom he apparently 'serves'. Such a reading is strengthened by the kind of product Homer is preparing, for a στέφανος can also be interpreted as a 'crown', which implies that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are made for kings, and that Homer is significantly higher on the social ladder.[91] On the other hand, the saying of Simonides is much less condemning than that of the Spartan king Cleomenes, and also suggests a picture of complementarity.[92]

The above-mentioned cases of polarization are some of the most outspoken and clear examples of a phenomenon that is fairly widespread: the process that makes the 'typical' qualities of Hesiod and Homer come

---

[87] Campbell T47k (= Most T16).

[88] Most (2006) 170–171 grouped the saying under the testimonia headed 'Hesiod older than Homer'. Svenbro (1972) 188 treats the passage as proof that Homer was regarded as a 'stitching' rhapsode (stringing flowers together into a garland)—but how about Hesiod?

[89] This was already recognized by Harriott (1969) 138, who unfortunately does not proceed beyond the observation that Simonides' description is 'metaphorical'.

[90] The same verb, φυτεύω, is actually used in *WD* 22 and 812.

[91] With this in mind, it is a double paradox that in the *Certamen* it is Hesiod who receives the crown, making Homer 'bow' for him.

[92] Simonides is credited with yet another revealing insight concerning the difference between Hesiod and Homer; see ch. 9, pp. 274–275.

out more strongly when they are opposed.[93] The compatibility of the Hesiod-Homer opposition with some well-known oppositions in the ethico-political sphere suggests that the contrast between the two poets was constructed with the aid of these other oppositions, and perhaps also vice versa. As a result, all such polar concepts as fighting—farming, king—people, and Homer—Hesiod are 'aligned', so to speak, to form one great grid of typical values that gain their meaning from the conceptual opposition to others. Sometimes, however, we find texts where such neat binary structures are consciously upset, i.e. cases of 'boundary crossing' in which Hesiod or Homer are explicitly placed at the a-typical end of the axis. It is this sort of image-construction that we will now briefly look at.

4. *Hesiod's Crossing and Homer's Expansion*

Obviously, the neat binary scheme with the balanced system of opposites does not always hold. There are always cases that do not fit. In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, for instance, the καλός τε κἀγαθός ('perfect gentleman'), much like the kings in Homer, is an expert on both warfare and agriculture, and occupies himself with both.[94] In Aristophanes' *Peace*, it is the typically peace-loving farmers who turn out to be the best fighters because of their hardy way of life, and in similar vein the shepherd-god Pan is often engaged in war.[95] These cases, however, do not at all invalidate the conceptual oppositions, which are there to provide the *typical* picture, which does not have to account for all cases. Moreover, even when boundaries are crossed or blurred, the scheme in some way still holds because such cases are presented as extraordinary. Xenophon's picture of the ideal gentleman, for instance, presupposes the opposition of the activities he manages to combine.

---

[93] See also Athenaeus 5.186f, who says Hesiod has shown a 'Boeotian insensibility' (Βοιωτική ἀναισθησία) in advising us to invite our neighbours to dinner instead of the 'best men and those who are held in esteem' (τοὺς ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἐντίμους) as Homer does.

[94] See e.g. X. *Oec.* 4.12: 'I think that being engaged in agriculture is nothing less than being engaged in warfare' (οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἧττον τῶν γεωργικῶν ἔργων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν), and also e.g. 4.24 and 5.1. See on the historical reality of the Homeric heroes tending sheep and driving ploughs e.g. Starr (1982) 439, and on the conceptual connection between the heroic and the agricultural Murnaghan (2006).

[95] [Longus] *Daphnis et Chloe* 2.23.

Hesiod and Homer can also 'cross', and can thus sometimes be credited with 'a-typical' qualities. In the case of the poets, there are basically two possibilities: Hesiod 'crosses' to Homer's side and receives Homeric qualities; and Homer 'crosses' over to Hesiod's side (sometimes these things happen at the same time). These two scenarios, however, work in a wholly different way, and thus each deserves some special attention.

Hesiod is sometimes seen to cross over to Homer's side, i.e. take a place in the socio-political field that is typically Homer's. As we have seen, Hesiod's remarks on the divine descent of kings, and their Muse-given ability to settle disputes (both qualities described in the *Theogony*, not in the *Works and Days*) made him Homeric to some extent. There is also some crossing of the thematic watershed of fighting versus farming, as is for instance demonstrated by Manilius, who describes Hesiod's agricultural poem as dealing with 'man's warfare with the soil', *militiam soli*.[96] This is an obviously playful remark, describing Hesiod's most unheroic poem in martial terms,[97] but may also prepare the way for the beginning of the third book of the *Astronomica*, where Manilius opposes his difficult task of writing a didactic poem on a less attractive (because peaceful) subject to the relatively easy job of composing war poetry to enchant the audience:

> non ego in excidium caeli nascentia bella,
> fulminis et flammis partus in matre sepultos,
> non coniuratos reges Troiaque cadente
> Hectora venalem cineri Priamumque ferentem …
>
> 'I shall not tell of war conceived for heaven's destruction and offspring buried by the flames of the thunderbolt in its mother's womb; or of the oath-bound kings and how, in Troy's last hour, Hector's body was ransomed for his obsequies and fetched by Priam …'[98]

[96] Man. *Astr*. 2.20. There is another instance of thematic crossing in line 23, where Hesiod's advice on agricultural matters is described as knowledge of 'the grafting of errant fruits on trees as though in illicit union' (*arbusta vagis essent (…) adultera pomis*), the themes of wandering and adultery being of course the stuff that heroic epic is made of.

[97] Modern scholars are sometimes tempted to do the same. See e.g. Jaeger (1945) 57 saying on Hesiod's subject that heroism can be witnessed not only in the fighting heroes of Homer but also 'in the quiet incessant battle of the worker against the elements and the hard earth'.

[98] Man. *Astr*. 3.5–8.

The first two lines refer to the *Theogony*,[99] the others to the *Iliad*—Hesiod and Homer are now both described as war poets.[100] The rhetorical aim of this warped picture of his direct predecessor Hesiod (whom Manilius believed to have written an *Astronomica* as well)[101] is to stress the uniqueness and difficulty of Manilius' own enterprise.[102] In order to present his *Astronomica* as something new, Manilius had to group Hesiod with Homer.

Generally speaking, the instances of Hesiod 'crossing' are relatively implicit and infrequent; they seem to be mostly motivated by the author's wish to play with the well-known Hesiodic stereotype, not to actually question or modify it. The stereotype is thus reinforced, and Hesiod, like his mirror-image of the conservative countryman, essentially remains who he is.

The crossing of Homer is quite different. There are many and very explicit cases that present Homer as associated with values typically belonging to Hesiod, or present him as an expert on matters that are traditionally Hesiodic. In chapter 7, we have already seen how Homer moves on Hesiodic terrain when answering some of the questions in the *Certamen*. These cases are unlike those discussed above because it appears that Homeric 'crossing' is more serious and more permanent. It is therefore perhaps better to speak of 'expansion'—Homer more or less 'annexes' territory that was not his own and expands his own reach and scope. I will give one example of this process, the presentation of Homer as a farmer—perhaps the most obvious case of crossing as Hesiod (in contexts of opposition) is first and foremost seen as a farmer-poet.

In antiquity, Homer was sometimes credited with knowledge of farming, though not so much when alone[103]—it is especially when compared

---

[99] Perhaps to the Titanomachy (wrongly called 'the war of the Giants' by translator Goold, who was perhaps inspired by Van Wageningen (1921) ad loc. suggesting that *Gigantomachiam respuit poeta*), or, more likely, to the Typhoeus-episode.

[100] The two poets are the first in a list of many writers dealing with warfare, such as those who wrote of the Persian Wars or Rome's road to power (*Astr.* 3.9–26).

[101] See Man. *Astr.* 2.15 and 24.

[102] The theme is somewhat of a topos for didactic poets; compare Lucretius' claims of originality (*DRN* 4.1–9 and 5.336–337) and the difficulty of describing science in verse (esp. 1.136–145).

[103] There are only a few explicit references. See Σ *Il.* 18.550–560 (bT): '… with divine power he has depicted every type of agriculture on the shield [of Achilles], about the plough, about reaping. And he also represented the place for planting vines' (… δαιμονίως πᾶσαν ἰδέαν γεωργίας κατέγραψε τῇ ἀσπίδι, περὶ ἀρότρου, περὶ θερισμοῦ.

to Hesiod that Homer steps to the fore as an expert on agriculture. We have already seen how Dio's Alexander turns Homer into an expert on τὰ γεωργικά through the ploughing-metaphor in *Iliad* 11.67–71.[104] This rather brilliant manoeuvre ascribes to Homer the positive values of *both* warfare and agriculture: Homer's poetry is described as both kingly and fit for real men, whereas Hesiod is left with the negative values of both polar opposites: he is associated with 'slavish' poetry, and is accused of writing for φιλήδονοι καὶ μαλακοί ('hedonists and softies').[105]

But there are other cases, less subtle and more explicit. For instance: Cicero, who in his *Cato* claims there is much peace and pleasure in the actual work on a farm, says on the subject of manuring that 'this is a matter about which the learned Hesiod, though he wrote on agriculture, has not one word to say. But Homer, who, I believe, lived many generations earlier, represents Laertes as soothing his sorrow at the absence of his son in cultivating his farm and in manuring it, too.'[106] Philostratus, in a context that speaks of Homer's superiority over Hesiod, claims that the war-poet Homer 'also included all matters pertaining to peace … he touched on agricultural tasks and the appropriate seasons for performing them.'[107] These are both cases in which Hesiod,

---

εἶτα καὶ ἀμπελόφυτον χωρίον διετύπωσεν), and 18.541b (bT): 'After the divinities and the cities he takes up something agricultural. With divine power he has shown by the use of epithets, on what kind of land one should put labour, [namely] on soft and fertile land' (μετὰ γὰρ τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὰς πόλεις γεώργιόν τι παραλαμβάνει. δαιμονίως δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐπιθέτων ὑπέδειξεν, εἰς ὁποίαν ποτὲ γῆν δεῖ πόνον κατατίθεσθαι, εἰς μαλακὴν καὶ εὔβωλον); see also Σ *Il.* 8.93a1 (AT) and 93a2 (b). It is remarkable that [Plutarch]'s *De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, which is very elaborate in crediting Homer with expertise on absolutely everything, mentions Homer's concern with 'farming life' only very briefly, see *Vit.* 176: 'nor does he overlook (…) the farming life, but describes this as well' (οὐ παρεῖδε δ' οὐδὲ (…) τὸν γεωργικόν [*sc.* βίον]· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον ἔδειξε, transl. Keaney/Lamberton 1996)—perhaps, as Keaney and Lamberton comment on [Plutarch]'s brief description of Homer's astronomy, 'the tacit implication may be that, among the early hexameter poets, the precedents … were to be sought in (…) Hesiod, rather than in Homer' (173).

[104] See ch. 7, pp. 262–264.

[105] D.Chrys. 2.8–12. See also Alexander's claim in 2.13 that Hesiod himself 'was not unaware of how much inferior his powers were to Homer's' (οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀγνοεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ὅσον ἐλείπετο Ὁμήρου) and thus composed a *Catalogue of Women* (see on this passage also ch. 7, pp. 264–265).

[106] Cic. *Cat.* 15.54: … *de qua doctus Hesiodus ne verbum quidem fecit, cum de cultura agri scriberet. At Homerus, qui multis ut mihi videtur, ante saeculis fuit, Laerten lenientem desiderium, quod capiebat e filio, colentem agrum et eum stercorantem facit.*

[107] Philostr. *Her.* 25.3: ὁπόσα κατ' εἰρήνην εἰσὶ … ἔργα ὧν γεωργία ἅπτεται, καὶ ὥρας, αἳ σημαίνουσιν ὁπόσα χρὴ ἐς τὴν γῆν πράττειν, transl. Maclean/Aitken (2001).

failing in his own area, is eclipsed by Homer, who in Philostratus' formulation even seems to have written on works and days as well.

This crossing is of a different kind than Hesiod's described above. Homer's 'expansion' on a thematic level is symptomatic of a larger process, accelerated during the Second Sophistic but set in much earlier, whereby Homer's authority and reach completely outgrow the traditional opposition to Hesiod; it is better to see Homer as more and more *including* Hesiod than opposing him:[108] in the end, it seems the sceptre that the Muses gave to Hesiod has passed to Homer.[109] Hesiod becomes less *the* other poet than simply *an*other poet, one example of a great number of artists who must all bow for king Homer.

5. *Conclusion*

In this chapter we have considered the ancient socio-political opposition of Hesiod and Homer. As we have seen, there is much evidence besides the *Certamen* that shows that the two poets were in certain contexts imagined as binary opposites in this respect. In fact, the contrasting values attributed to Hesiod and Homer coincide neatly with those of certain well-known social and political conceptual dichotomies, i.e. that of war versus peace, and king versus people. Obviously, such oppositions are closely related and overlap to a considerable degree, as can be seen, for instance, in king Cleomenes' description of Hesiod and Homer as poets of helots and Spartans, respectively. Since they align and blend together, the compatible oppositions form a very powerful 'scheme' of typical values. It seems fair to conclude that Hesiod and Homer played a role in this typification, a process that at the same time turned them into types as well: describing Hesiod as a helot typifies both the helot and Hesiod.

The characterizations of Hesiod and Homer at one side of the two oppositions discussed varies in frequency and explicitness. Hesiod is first and foremost a farmer-poet, often associated with the people, and sometimes with peace. Homer is the heroic poet *par excellence*, often connected to aristocratic sentiments, and sometimes an advocate of war. But however this may be for the poets when they are alone, their positions are often radicalized when explicitly compared: then Hesiod becomes

[108] See on the same process in matters of style and language ch. 9, esp. pp. 363–366.
[109] Cf. *AP* 7.409, where Homer 'holds the sceptre of song' (ὕμνων σκᾶπτρον ἔχει).

a helot, a gardener, and a slave, with Homer as a Spartan, a weaver of garlands and a king. This type of radicalization can, although to a lesser degree, also be witnessed in modern scholarship, where especially Hesiod is characterized as typically un- or anti-Homeric. For both poets (but Hesiod in particular), the other is necessary to identify the one.

In the fourth section we have briefly examined a trend that undermines the traditionally dichotomous view of the two poets, i.e. that of Homer's expansion. Homer is often seen to be so universal that he 'invades' areas that are usually associated with Hesiod. This trend is to some degree timeless, but grows considerably stronger at the end of the classical period. Aristophanes, for instance, though certainly expressing Homer's superiority, could still voice the supposedly common view presenting Hesiod and Homer as thematically different or separate. Homer's omnipresence was strongly felt, however, and in the hellenistic age the only way to oppose it was by reviving the traditional image of Hesiod as a counter-force to Homer. During the Second Sophistic Homer became more and more the sole icon of Greek art and identity as he irreversibly incorporated Hesiodic themes. Interestingly enough, this 'imperialism' also fits the nucleus of values Homer is traditionally associated with: kingship, power, and dominance. The process was given shape by stories of having Homer 'defeat' Hesiod on his own terrain; this also explains the sophists' unprecedented interest in the story of the contest, which presents a surprisingly different picture. With the expansion of Homer, Hesiod ceases to be the other poet.

It must be said that this developmental scheme is still somewhat sketchy; what is needed, is an examination of the other watershed essential to the story of the *Certamen*: the poetics of Hesiod and Homer ('the effect on the audience: reason versus emotion'). This is the subject of the final and most important chapter of this book.

CHAPTER NINE

THE OTHER POETICS

0. *Introduction*

This is the final chapter of the book, which forms the climax of my study because it deals with the reception of Hesiod as a poet in a strict sense: its main concern is the ancient construction and evaluation of Hesiod's 'poetics', i.e. the more or less coherent theory of poetry that the Greeks ascribed to him. This particular focus is so central to the Hesiodic figure and his Homeric foil that it proved impossible to treat the subject in the same (convenient) way as the other two forms of poetic σοφία (ethico-political orientation and philosophy), i.e. subdivided into chapters on Hesiod together with Homer, Hesiod alone, and Hesiod against Homer. This chapter is thus special in that it discusses all three manifestations of Hesiod bound together by the single theme of poetics.

We will focus the investigation on several aspects of Hesiod's poetry: the relation of his poems to the truth, Hesiod's place in the debate on *ars* and *ingenium*, the intended effect of his poetry on the audience, and the appreciation of his style. This chapter is also the most complicated one, since the four aspects mentioned above are a) so inextricably linked that their separate treatment below may seem arbitrary at times, and b) subject to change over time, so that the thematically organized sections below will have to accommodate the diachronic perspective as well.

The main thread of this chapter, like that of the previous one, is provided by the opposition of Hesiod and Homer in the *Certamen*. As we have seen in chapter 7, Homer's performance in the contest is praised in several instances. The narrator himself tells us twice that Homer responded καλῶς ('well') to Hesiod's challenges, but the real interest lies in the response of the audience: in two cases, they experience a sense of intense 'wonder' or 'admiration' (θαῦμα), and after the recitation 'the Greeks praised Homer, because the verses transcended the fitting' (τὸν Ὅμηρον οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐπῄνουν, ὡς παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον γεγονότων τῶν ἐπῶν).[1] The explanatory clause is emblematic for the difference between

[1] Allen V 205–206.

Hesiod and Homer explored in this chapter: Hesiod remains with the προσῆκον ('fitting') while Homer goes beyond (and θαῦμα is the result).

Throughout this chapter we will see that Hesiod is regularly characterized as writing and composing 'within bounds' in several respects—keeping his eye on truth, neatly applying the rules of his art, and generally speaking in a 'fitting' voice on a subject that is 'fitting'. In all these respects, Homer goes further. The oppositions examined in this chapter can be schematized as follows:

Hesiod		*Homer*
ἔτυμα (truth)	veracity	ψεύδεα (fiction)
τέχνη (craft)	'method'	μανία (madness)
παραίνεσις (advice)	intent	ψυχαγωγία (entertainment)
καθαρότης (purity)	style	ποικιλία (variety)

These oppositions will occupy sections 1–4 of the present chapter. In the first section, on poetic veracity, Hesiod's devotion to truth will be contrasted with Homer's love for fiction. First, we will briefly consider the possibility that Hesiod himself may have been the first to articulate this contrast; furthermore, a precarious attempt is made to connect early philosophical interpretations of Homer with his reputation as a 'liar'. After these preliminaries, we will see how the opposition was framed in antiquity.

Section 2 is mainly concerned with inspiration, and examines how Hesiod and Homer were believed to have composed their poems; more strictly speaking, this section deals with the age-old opposition of *ars* (τέχνη) and *ingenium* (φύσις). Even though Hesiod was closely associated with divine inspiration (the main reason being his own description of the *Dichterweihe*), it was in the end Homer who became the inspired poet *par excellence*, while Hesiodic poetry was turned into an exemplum of *limae labor*. As we will see, this interesting shift is closely connected to changing conceptions of the term 'inspiration' itself.

Section 3 opposes the intent (or function) ascribed to the Hesiodic and Homeric poems in antiquity. In this respect as well, Hesiod is generally presented as 'fitting', his poetry meant to advise mankind on how to honour the gods, seek a livelihood and in general live their life. Homer, on the other hand, is framed not as a didactic poet but instead as one engaged in ψυχαγωγία, the transport of his listener's souls. Of course, the qualities attributed to both Hesiod and Homer can be evaluated very differently.

Section 4 deals with matters of style. It is no surprise that the types of language and diction belonging to poets who were thought to differ in so many respects was constructed as antithetical as well. Homer becomes the foremost representative of the grand style, while Hesiod is slowly turned into a 'slender poet'. The polarization is mainly due to hellenistic poets, who to some degree resisted the universally acclaimed Homeric model and championed Hesiod for their cause, but its traces go back much further.

Obviously, neat binary oppositional schemes are reductionist and do not do full justice to reality. Sometimes boundaries disintegrate: Hesiod can appear alongside with Homer as divinely inspired, while Homer can also be framed as truthful. Such examples of boundary-crossing are discussed in section 5. As we have concluded in chapter 8, the crossing by Hesiod is often an exception confirming the rule, while Homeric crossing is a sign of his ever-increasing influence and stature. In matters of poetics as well, we will conclude, Hesiod changes from the other poet into another poet.

1. *Truth and Fiction*

In this section an attempt is made to frame the opposition between Hesiod and Homer in terms of the dichotomy between truth and fiction. Such an equation may seem obvious enough to anyone familiar with ancient literary criticism (especially from Alexandrian times onwards) and modern scholarship, which both tend to attribute to Hesiod and Homer the didactic and panegyric function of poetry, respectively. This is not to say, of course, that I wish to deny the didactic quality of the Homeric poems, which is (rightly) ascribed to them by ancient Greeks and modern scholars alike; but my focus is on the *opposition* of Hesiod and Homer, which is usually framed in terms of the truth-fiction dichotomy.

This section, however, offers a fresh perspective on this widely-held *communis opinio* in that it argues, first of all, that this dichotomy was recognized by the Greeks in full at an extremely early age, and, secondly, that it was firmly entrenched in early philosophical thought. These two factors, which in my view guaranteed the recurrence of the truth-fiction watershed from earliest antiquity to modern times, are the subject of subsections 1.2 and 1.3. First, however, we will examine the evidence for the claim that Hesiod himself was the first to voice the opposition.

1.1. *Lying Muses*

In the proem to the *Theogony*, 'certainly the most influential and the most imitated passage in the Hesiodic corpus',[2] Hesiod tells us how he 'once' found himself in the unexpected company of the Muses. They speak to him very briefly:

> 'ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἷον,
> ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
> ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.'
>
> 'Field-dwelling shepherds, ignoble disgraces, mere bellies:
> we know how to say many false things similar to genuine ones,
> but we know, when we wish, how to proclaim true things.'[3]

After this short speech the Muses give Hesiod a staff of laurel and breathe a divine voice into him, making him sing of the eternal gods. And so Hesiod became a poet.

Needless to say, this curious address by the Muses has generated an almost literally immeasurable amount of interpretive efforts by modern scholars. It would be a difficult task indeed to find another set of lines in the Hesiodic poems that has been the subject of such intense and diverse speculation. It appears, in fact, that there is only one point of (almost) universal agreement: that the Muses in lines 27–28 mention some kind of opposition (suggested by the repeated ἴδμεν), dealing with ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα on the one hand and ἀληθέα on the other. But this still leaves much room for various interpretations of the 'true things' set against the 'false things similar to genuine ones'. The following overview of different readings does in no way pretend to be exhaustive, but does present a fair impression of the great variety of scholarly interpretations.

The first type of reading places the opposition inside Hesiod's own work, claiming in some way or another that both line 27 and 28 refer to himself and his own poetry. One of the most common-sense approaches, i.e. to view the lines as a 'simple and honest admission that poetry combines truth with invention',[4] is not usually taken, since most readers feel that such a view underrates the contrast that is so powerfully expressed. Some scholars, who include line 26 in their analysis, believed that this contrast should be understood in terms of social class (such as Wilamo-

---

[2] Lamberton (1988) 55.

[3] *Th.* 26–28; the passage is quoted more fully in ch. 6, pp. 200–201.

[4] Bowra (1964) 27; cf. Bowie (1993) 9 *et passim* arguing that hexameter poets were well aware of the fact that their poetry was largely fictitious.

witz),[5] or in terms of a spiritual renewal.[6] Burn believed the ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα were nothing more than the insignificant details 'which the bards made up as they went along', presumably in general sticking to the truth; according to Wade-Gery, Hesiod warns us that some of the (philosophical) hypotheses in the *Theogony* might on further inspection prove false.[7] Many scholars interpret the lines as an indication of Hesiod's dependence on the Muses: *they* can make the poet say the truth or utter lies, and he is but their faithful servant; were he to offend, 'he would be misled into recording a lying vision'[8]—curiously enough, Walcot suggests that the lines may instead be a way 'to disown all responsibility if a god felt himself unfairly portrayed'; for that would then be the Muses' fault.[9] Other notable interpretations are that of Blaise and Rousseau, who argue that Hesiod is actually performing both at the same time, i.e. recycling fiction in order to show the truth, and especially that of Ferrari, who interprets the speech in terms of the theme of good and bad exchange that is so central to the *Works and Days*.[10]

There is a specific branch of such 'intra-poetic' interpretation that calls for particular attention, and that is the rather popular approach I will loosely call 'postmodern'. This type of reading, initiated by Pietro Pucci, credits Hesiod with the postmodern view that language cannot but represent reality with a certain distortion and uncertainty.[11] *Theogony* 27–28 are thus interpreted as a reflection on the problematic relationship between language and reality.[12] Followers of Pucci argue that Hesiod points to 'the *indeterminacy* of the signifying relation, the recognition

---

[5] Wilamowitz (1916) 477: it is to be supposed that since Hesiod had apparently left the 'Bauernstand', he also switched to another kind of poetry.

[6] Schmid-Stählin (1929) 249–250, Jaeger (1945) 75–76. Cf. Epimenides, a Cretan theogonist who also pictures the Muses yelling at him 'Cretans always liars, ignoble disgraces, idle bellies' (DK 3 B 1).

[7] Burn (1936) 34, Wade-Gery (1949) 86. See also Stroh (1976), who thinks the lines define Hesiod's poem as a rhetorical exercise with some fictitious parts. See Verdenius (1972) 235 n.1 for some other scholars who believe *Th.* 27–28 'sanctions the element of fiction in his own work'.

[8] Harriott (1969) 112–113; see further Barmeyer (1968) 106 on disturbing the *Inspirationsakt*, Griffith (1983) 49 saying Hesiod reminds us that 'we should not trust the poet who tries to sing without the Muses' blessing', and Nagler (1992) 81–82 discerning two levels of authoritative speech: that of the human and that of the divine.

[9] Walcot (1960) 37.

[10] Blaise and Rousseau (1996) 224–225; Ferrari (1988), esp. 47–57. See also Stoddard (2004) 79–85, who interprets the ἀληθέα as immortal truth and the ἔτυμα as mortal reality (so also e.g. Tsagalis 2009 133–134).

[11] Pucci (1977), esp. 8–21; see now for a more nuanced view Pucci (2009) 38–39.

[12] Cf. Gagarin (1990) 180.

that language itself (…) is a form of fiction',[13] that Hesiod indicates that 'categories of language are fluid',[14] or that due to the gap lying between himself and the Muses Hesiod 'cannot guarantee the absolute truth of his song'.[15] It is my belief that such deeply anachronistic readings are of relatively little value; as Morgan says, interpreting *Theogony* 27–28 as claiming that all poetic representation may be a lie is probably too advanced for Hesiod.[16] In my view, postmodernist readers pay too little attention to the cultural and intellectual context in which these lines arose, and over-interpret particular formulations, especially the phrase εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ('if we wish'), which does not—I would say—indicate the Muses' fickleness, but their absolute power.[17] For the present study, however, the postmodern interpretation is of interest since it clashes violently with ancient notions, as we will see below.

Apart from readings that seek their explanation primarily in Hesiod's own poetry, there are many 'inter-poetic' interpretations which understand *Theogony* 27–28 as a response to other poets. Obviously, such readings usually take these lines as contrasting truth and fiction: Hesiod

[13] Arthur (1983) 106, cf. Tsagalis (2006) 85 '… the speech of the Muses indicates that the language of the *Theogony* will indeed be a jigsaw puzzle deliberately hard to solve.'

[14] Too (1998) 34.

[15] Clay (2003) 63, who is however quick to state that this does not mean that all language is incapable of conveying truth ('Hesiod is not a Derridean *avant la lettre*', 64).

[16] Morgan (2000) 21.

[17] See e.g. Neitzel (1980) 393–394, who argues that *Th.* 27–28 cannot be taken as a distinction between truth and fiction since the phrase εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν is a clear indication of the Muses' fickleness and unreliability: the Muses, he argues, do not wish to tell the truth all the time, and they are not going to tell it to Hesiod, either. So also Thalmann (1984) 148, who concludes 'there is no way of knowing whether the song with which the Muses inspire him is authentic truth or falsehood that simulates it.' These scholars, however, seem to import certain notions into the text which are not there at all. The expression 'if we wish' does not mean that the Muses are capricious, but that they are in full control: compare the hawk's words to the nightingale in *WD* 209: 'I shall make you my dinner if I wish, or I shall let you go' (δεῖπνον δ' αἴ κ' ἐθέλω ποιήσομαι ἠὲ μεθήσω)—this does not mean that the hawk is going to eat the nightingale at one time and not eat him at another time, or that there will be uncertainty on the part of the nightingale about which choice the hawk will make. See for other such expressions *Il.* 24.343–344 (Hermes putting the eyes 'of those he wishes' (ὧν ἐθέλει) to sleep while waking others) and *Od.* 10.22 (Aeolus making the winds blow or stopping them, 'whichever he wishes' (ὅν κ' ἐθέλῃσι)); these also indicate an absolute (divine) power (cf. West 1978 on *WD* 209) and deal with polar oppositions. The point is that the Muses will turn Hesiod into a good singer or a bad one: it is up to *them*. There is no indication that they will tell him the truth on one occasion, and tell him lies on another, or that he will not be able to tell the difference (cf. Haubold 2010 20: 'the narrator never expresses any doubts about the events he recounts').

claims truth for himself, and ascribes ψεύδεα to others.[18] According to Paley and those taking his lead, these 'others' are older poets, whom Hesiod has set out to improve.[19] Most scholars, however, think that Hesiod is primarily thinking about contemporary poets, perhaps other theogonists, as Nagy has claimed on several occasions,[20] who preserved all kinds of local and incompatible traditions which were to be replaced by one poem that was acceptable to all. Most of these readings, however, understand heroic poetry as Hesiod's prime target, contrasting Hesiod's truth to the 'basically realistic but stylistically ornamented and extensively fictionalized narrative of heroic epic.'[21] Naturally, it is only a small step from here to assume that Hesiod—more specifically—has Homer in mind.

It seems to be the majority view that the Muses' brief speech articulates an opposition between Hesiod's truthfulness and Homeric fiction, although it must be said that this view is often only assumed[22] or rather loosely argued.[23] It appears that most scholars either take the contrast as

[18] In the views of some scholars, the intra- and interpoetic interpretations curiously overlap, as in Marsilio (2000), who argues that even though all *logos* is paradoxical in nature Hesiod 'nevertheless asserts complete access to 'truth' and ascribes to *other* poets the dangerous *logos* of 'lies similar/identical to true things' ' (13). Even Pucci (1977) 31 believes that Hesiod in *Th.* 26 addresses his fellow-poets, 'both his predecessors and contemporary singers.'

[19] Paley (1883) xiii–xiv. See also Jaeger (1947) 11, who states that Hesiod is consciously moving beyond the older poets in claiming the truth 'about the very beings that it is hardest to know anything about: the gods themselves', and Bowra (1952) 40–41, who also believes Hesiod is emphasizing the truth of his message since he is bringing something new.

[20] See Nagy (1990) 45–47, (1992b) 125 on Hesiod promoting his theogony against 'a multiplicity of pseudo-Hesiods', and (1996) 41 speaking of 'un manifeste panhellénique unique en son genre'.

[21] Cole (1983) 22; cf. e.g. Østerud (1976) 28, Verdenius (1972) 234.

[22] See e.g. Diller (1946) 141–142, Mehmel (1954) 19, Kraus (1955) 72–73, Maehler (1963) 40–42, Kambylis (1965) 63, Murray (1981) 91. Häussler (1973) 139 (with bibliography in n.84) curiously defines *Th.* 27–28 as a 'feine Spitze' (but not serious polemic) against Homer.

[23] See e.g. Sikes (1931) 6 claiming the rivalry was 'no doubt' partly due to social class (Homer being a court poet, but Hesiod 'a poet of the people'), Snell (1955) 74–75 arguing that Hesiod opposes the grim reality of everyday life to the beautiful phantasies by Homer, and Clay (2003) 181 stating that Hesiod believes himself to be better than Homer because is poetry is 'far more universal and complete'. Svenbro (1976) 50–59 presents a particularly interesting case connecting Hesiod's truthfulness to his socio-economic independence: no longer a parasitic 'belly' like (Svenbro believes) Homer (to be), he is no longer forced to adjust his poetry to his audience. According to Havelock (1963) 105, *Th.* 27–28 not only contrasts Hesiod and Homer, but also sheds a light on a contrast in Homer, who is both a story-teller and a tribal encyclopaedist.

self-evident or shrink from the task of proving something for which there is in fact very little evidence.[24] On the other hand, we have already seen that it is at least possible that Hesiod does sometimes refer to Homer,[25] and some scholars have rightly pointed out that line 27 shows a remarkable similarity to Homer's description of Odysseus lying to his wife on the occasion of their first meeting after his return: 'Thus he made the many falsehoods of his tale seem like the truth' (ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα), suggesting, perhaps, that the Muses inspired the poet of the *Odyssey* with the capacity of telling ψεύδεα.[26] Furthermore, one might argue that Hesiod's explicit mention of himself invites a polemical reading equally concrete.[27] I think, therefore, that the truth-fiction watershed between Hesiod and Homer in all likelihood goes back to Hesiod himself, who presents himself as a faithful servant of the Muses, while picturing Homer as skilled in the creation of fiction.

There is much to suggest that the Greeks themselves also understood *Theogony* 27–28 this way. It is to the ancient evidence, therefore, that we will soon turn. First, however, we will enter into a brief digression on Homer as a philosopher of language, which will put the truth-fiction dichotomy in a broader context.

1.2. *Homer as a Philosopher of Language*

It is important to note at this point that Hesiod's classification of Homeric poetry as ψεύδεα is polemical in nature and in no way agrees with the heroic poet's view of himself; heroic poetry in general claims to tell the truth, and Homer is no different.[28] We may even say, with Nagy, that on closer examination Hesiod and Homer do not present essentially different attitudes about truth at all.[29] But this book is not about

---

[24] Cf. Rudhardt (1996) 29–30 warning us not to be quick to assume that Hesiod is talking about Homer; he thinks that Hesiod may well be engaged in polemic, but that the lack of material forbids us to say with certainty against whom. Lamberton (1988) 59 rather strangely believes *Th.* 27–28 are probably not aimed at Homer because 'their rivalry is worked out at a far deeper level'.

[25] Cf. ch. 7, pp. 246–247.

[26] *Od.* 19.203; see e.g. Neitzel (1980) 389, Goldhill (1991) 45, Arrighetti (1996) 53–54.

[27] Cf. Ford (1985) 86 stating that a poet can only mention other poets once he has given his own name.

[28] On the truth-claim of heroic poetry in general see Bowra (1952) 40–41, and of Homer e.g. Walsh (1984) 3–21.

[29] Nagy (1992b) 125–126.

their poetry per se, but about its reception; and there are certain clues that Homeric language was in fact regarded from early times onwards as fictional instead of truthful, and creative instead of realistic. This tradition of Homeric reception goes back to the early fifth century at least, and seems to have occupied early philosophers in particular. It is my belief that ancient thinkers about language and truth deliberately articulated such a picture of Homer to contrast with the philosophical image attributed to Hesiod. As we have seen in chapter 6, Hesiod was—in some circles at least—reconstructed as an 'atomistic' thinker who believes in a world neatly made up of all its constituent parts, and in a language that can accurately reflect this 'taxonomic' view of reality and hence be truthful. By contrast, early philosophers seem to associate Homer especially with a more Protagorean or Gorgian view of language as a tool—they trace notions like the conventionality of language, its manipulative power and the preponderance of form over truth to Homer himself.

Obviously, it is far beyond the scope of this book to fully investigate the early philosophers' view of Homer's relation to the qualities of language just mentioned. It is equally obvious, however, that we are in dire need of an exhaustive and systematic treatment of this subject. For the time being, I offer five (closely related) indications for an ancient tradition of a 'proto-Protagorean' Homer which is constructed as a foil to Hesiod's atomism and linguistic puritanism (discussed in chapter 6). The following list, then, is necessarily incomplete, but does contain—I hope—much suggestive and provocative material that might support my thesis of the poets' complementarity.

1) Homer is especially associated with the theory that 'sensory perception = knowledge', which is at ease with a poetics that favours form over content. Heraclitus, who chastized Hesiod's polymathy, ridicules Homer for being concerned with the 'knowledge of visible things' (γνῶσιν τῶν φανερῶν),[30] and it is the main point of his riddle of the lice to indicate Homer's utter failure to understand there is more than meets the eye.[31] Aristotle claims that Democritus referred to Homer in order to prove

[30] DK 22 B 56.

[31] Homer is thus baffled by the boys killing lice saying 'What we have seen and picked up, that we leave behind, but what we have not seen and not picked up, that we carry with us'. How can you 'carry' what you have not seen? See on Homeric 'truth' deriving from autopsy and 'Erscheinung' Schmitter (1991) 63–64.

his theory that thought equals perception; that is why Democritus commends Homer for saying 'Hector lay there thinking other thoughts.'[32] But Aristotle not only reports this particular view of Homer,[33] but also credits Homer with this theory of his own accord,[34] and he has been followed in this respect.[35]

2) Homer seems to be connected somehow to the theory of flux, which asserts that everything is in continual motion and thus denies any fixity to things; hence, it posits that an absolute truth does not exist. Some sort of Heraclitean flux-theory is ascribed to Homer in Plato's *Theaetetus*,[36] where its main purport is the relativity of truth; this is why in the same dialogue, Protagoras' *homo mensura*-statement is similarly traced to Homer. It is immediately obvious that this second indication is closely related to the first (on the equation of perception and knowledge): as Socrates says, 'So you were perfectly right in saying that knowledge is nothing but perception. And it has turned out that these three doctrines coincide—the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all their tribe that all things move like flowing streams, the doctrine of Protagoras, wisest of men, that man is the measure of all things, and Theaetetus' conclusion that, on these grounds, it results that perception is knowledge.'[37] Homer (perhaps partly due to his reputed descent from a river) is usually

---

[32] Arist. *de An*. 404a29–30: καλῶς ποιῆσαι τὸν Ὅμηρον ὡς "Ἕκτωρ κεῖτ' ἀλλοφρονέων'. The reference is to *Il*. 23.698, where it is, however, Euryalus and not Hector who is 'thinking other thoughts' due to a violent blow. The mistake was perhaps Democritus's; see further Delatte (1934) 40–43. It is beside the point to note that Aristotle is mistaken in assuming that this means that Democritus embraced a Protagorean concept of truth; obviously, this way of interpreting Homer made sense to him.

[33] Cf. *Metaph*. 1009b25–31, where Aristotle says people think Homer (the reference is again to *Il*. 23.698) 'clearly' agreed with Anaxagoras who said to his disciples that 'things would be for them as they judged them to be'.

[34] Cf. esp. *de An*. 427a25–26, where Homer on account of *Od*. 18.136 ('such is the nature of man's mind') is ranked among the 'ancient philosophers' (like Empedocles) who all 'look upon thinking as a bodily process like perceiving' (τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, 427a26–27).

[35] See S.E. *P*. 1.86, *M*. 11.44; M.Ant. 4.33. Cf. D.L. 9.73 reporting the sceptics' appropration of Homer on account of *Il*. 20.248–250, where the poet is supposedly speaking of the equal value of contradictory sayings.

[36] See Pl. *Tht*. 152e–153a, 160d, and 179e. See on Homer and flux also Clay (1992) 137.

[37] Pl. *Tht*. 160d: Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν συμπέπτωκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι.

associated with streams and rivers (on which see further below); by contrast, there is no such explicit ancient connection between Hesiod and flux.[38]

3) Homeric language is often described in terms of use and convention. Protagoras' well-known criticism of Homer, for instance, deals with language that is formally right though 'untrue' on the level of meaning;[39] and Homer's name is mentioned in the title of a work of Democritus dealing with the conventional nature of words.[40] Moreover, many ancients regarded Homer as an *onomatothetes*, a word-maker whose very activity belies the notion that language arose naturally but furthers the view that language is the product of convention or imagination.[41] By contrast, Hesiod seems to have been far less known as a creator of words; perhaps his obvious concern for etymology and especially the double nature of words (like ἔρις and αἰδώς) disqualified him as an *onomatothetes*; if he would have been one of the original name-makers, he would not have to separate them.

4) Homeric language is often evaluated in terms of its emotional or spiritual effect. Plato, who thinks of inspiration as an emotionally heightened state (μανία) passed on from the god to the audience *via* the poet,[42] believed that Homer was the inspired poet *par excellence* (a belief he probably borrowed from Democritus, on whom more below). Gorgias, a teacher of rhetoric and persuasion, was also the most Homeric

[38] In Pl. *Cra.* 402a–b Hesiod is mentioned together with Homer in connection with flux-theory, but only as a poet who transmitted the names of gods that might indicate the validity of the flux-theory. Aristotle (*Cael.* 298b25–33) explicitly separates 'Hesiod and his school' (οἱ περὶ Ἡσίοδον) from those who think that 'in general everything is in a state of becoming and flux'.

[39] See DK 80 A 28, where Protagoras objects to Homer's μῆνις being feminine since 'anger' is such a masculine quality, while A 29 criticizes Homer's use of an imperative (ἄειδε) when asking the Muse for her favour.

[40] DK 68 B 20a.

[41] Momigliano (1929) seems to credit Democritus with the view of Homer as an *onomatothetes*, but his evidence is lacking (cf. Cole 1967 67–69 on Democritus' view of language as growing by 'piecemeal, conventional accretions', 69). Homer is explicitly called a creator of words by Demetrius (*Eloc.* 94), Dio Chrysostom (12.68), and Pindarion (ap. S.E. *M.* 1.202, see Fehling 1965 221); see also Keaney and Lamberton (1996) 10–29 on Homer as a creator (instead of a transmitter) in general and [Plu.] *Vit. Po.* 16 on his status as an *onomatothetes* in particular.

[42] Cf. the well-known metaphor of the magnet, see Pl. *Ion* 533d–e.

of the sophists,[43] and it is obvious that Homer was Gorgias' first and foremost role model with regard to style and its concomitant ψυχαγωγία.[44] Plato most interestingly compares Gorgias to the Homeric Gorgo because of the petrifying effect both prodigies exert upon their audience;[45] and O'Sullivan has convincingly demonstrated that this effect of ἔκπληξις indeed connects Homer to Aeschylus and Gorgias.[46] The rhetor Antiphon uses a Homeric word to express his influence on the audience; and Aristotle also comments on the emotional impact of Homer's language.[47]

5) Homer seems to be associated with the notion that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, which is natural for a poet whose main concern it supposedly is to sweep his audience away. I have not been able to find

[43] Gorgias focused on Homer in a way unparalleled by his fellow-sophists. He was interested in Homer's life (DK 82 B 25), and his most famous speeches, the *Encomium of Helen* and the *Defence of Palamedes*, were largely based on Homeric characters and events from the Trojan Cycle. He echoed at least one verse from the *Iliad* (DK 82 B 27) and introduced himself with a Homeric phrase in the *Gorgias* (449a). Incidentally, this introduction in the *Gorgias* is an interesting case. When Socrates asks him if he is a rhetorician, Gorgias answers 'Yes, and a good one, Socrates, if you really want to call me what, in Homer's expression, I boast myself to be (εὔχομαι εἶναι)'. This is most likely a reference to *Il*. 6.211 (Labarbe 1949 310), the last sentence of Glaucus' account of his lineage. In this well-known passage from the *Iliad* the Greek Diomedes and the Trojan Glaucus prepare to do battle but soon find out there exists an old tie of friendship between their families. So instead of a fight there is an exchange of armour, whereby Glaucus gives golden for bronze, 'the worth of one hundred oxen for the worth of nine' (6.236). For people familiar with Homer, Gorgias thus sends out a clear message: 'I am not the alien enemy I may at first look like but in fact an old friend, and although my fee may seem high your investment will pay you back tenfold'. The phrase is very well-suited to Gorgias' purposes.

[44] 'If the word ψυχαγωγία has not survived in our scanty fragments of Gorgias, he can plausibly be deduced to have used it', O'Sullivan (1992) 114. It is not certain (though likely) that he connected the term to poetry, as Kennedy (1963) 63 supposes; it is not in the fragments, and Plato for instance uses the term in its metaphorical sense only for rhetoric (*Phdr*. 261a and 271c).

[45] Pl. *Smp*. 198c.

[46] O'Sullivan (1992) 20, 74–75; Walsh (1984) 89 similarly argues that Homer and Aeschylus enchant their audience, thus turning them into passive consumers (while Euripides, representing the opposite type of poetry, forces them to actively participate in the play's dilemma's).

[47] DK 87 A 6, Arist. *Rh*. 1417b2–4. Naturally, rhetoricians regard either Homer or his protagonists as the first rhetoricians ever; see Brown (1914) for a useful overview of relevant passages, and Sluiter (2005) for a recent discussion of the rhetorician's use of Homer.

much early evidence for this connection,[48] but I am much intrigued by Maximus of Tyre's observation that '[Homer] decided against composing a separate kind of poetry for each group, in the way in which Hesiod detailed the genealogies of the heroes separately, (…) while giving his account of the gods in a separate poem, and his helpful recommendations for human life, the works to be done and the days for doing them, in yet another. This is not how Homer's poetry works; it neither separates everything out (οὐδὲ ἀποκέκριται ἕκαστα χωρίς) nor yet mixes it all indiscriminately together. The external form of this discourse is dictated by the myths he tells, the story of Troy and the experiences of Odysseus, but combined with them is a lucid theology, an account of political forms, and an account of human virtues and vices and experiences and disasters and successes …'[49] Masterfully, Hesiod's atomistic method is here extrapolated to include his very works (which are naturally described as list-like), while he is obviously contrasted to Homer, who does not 'separate everything out' but manages to treat various philosophical themes in the course of a mythical narrative.

Obviously, the five indications for a Protagorean Homer described above are sketchy and based on relatively little evidence. Nonetheless, there appear to be certain leads suggesting that some people considered Homer's poetry and language as fictional and creative, mainly concerned with form and with the effect on the audience. These qualities, however, are not simply deduced from his poetry, but seem to be connected from early times onwards to a coherent philosophy attributed to the poet in certain circles. This philosophy comprises the (related) theories that perception is knowledge, that everything is in flux, that language is conventional, that language conveys and/or manipulates emotion, and that the whole is more than its constituent parts. This particular reconstruction of Homer-the-philosopher-of-language presents a nearly perfect mirror image of that of Hesiod; as we have seen in chapter 6, Hesiod was regarded as an atomistic thinker believing in the truthfulness of language, who separated and categorized until the taxonomy of language matched that of reality.

---

[48] One lead is Arist. *Rh.* 1365a10–15 quoting Homer on the rhetorical effect of enumeration, on the principle that 'the same whole when divided into parts appears greater' (διαιρούμενα δὲ εἰς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται).

[49] Max.Tyr. *Or.* 24.6.

1.3. *Believing the Poet*

It is time now to return to the ancient testimony on the truth-fiction watershed that we have first traced back to Hesiod himself (1.1), and then placed in a broader, philosophical context (1.2). In the present subsection, we will investigate how the opposition between Hesiod and Homer was imagined in antiquity, giving many examples from different periods of time but focusing on one of the earliest poets to do so explicitly: Pindar.

In the archaic, pre-Platonic period, notions of poetic truth and knowledge were closely connected to the concept of inspiration, and it was especially Hesiod who was then associated with such inspiration.[50] As we have seen in chapter 6, the poet-philosophers Parmenides and Empedocles made use of Hesiodic revelation to indicate the truth of their own teaching, while Xenophanes and Heraclitus attacked Hesiodic thought by attacking inspiration as a way of acquiring knowledge. Perhaps Solon was mainly thinking of Hesiod when he wrote that 'poets tell many lies',[51] for this well-known statement gains considerable force when we take it to refer to *Theogony* 27—Hesiod would then be just as guilty of ψεύδεα as the poets he himself reproaches.

The connection between inspiration and truth is particularly visible in the work of Pindar, who explicitly claims his words to be true and presents a close, harmonious and Hesiod-like relationship with the Muse as proof of this. I will now briefly explore Pindar's connection to Hesiod,[52] focusing on four aspects in particular: Pindar's self-assumed persona of the prophet, his status as 'chosen one', his belief that inspiration guarantees truth, and his view of hard work as necessary for great achievements. We will then discuss some interesting Pindaric passages that associate fiction with Homer; this subsection will end with a number of other testimonies concerning the fictionality of Homer and its opposition to the truthfulness of Hesiod.

Pindar pictures the poet as the Muses' protégé and presents himself as highly dependent on the goddesses. His self-presentation as a prophet is very reminiscent of Hesiod. Hesiod's closeness to the divine provided

---

[50] See on Hesiodic inspiration and the reception of his *Dichterweihe* further section 2 below.

[51] Fr. 29 West: πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί.

[52] The link was noted in antiquity: *AP* 2.382 calls Pindar the 'Heliconian swan of Thebes'. See for discussions of the connection of Pindar to Hesiod e.g. Sperduti (1950) 233–237, Bowra (1964) 33–34 and further below.

him with superhuman, mantic powers,[53] and these prophetic capabilities return in Pindar, who in fact calls himself 'the famous prophet of the Pierians' (ἀοίδιμον Πιερίδων προφάταν)[54] and elsewhere says 'give me an oracle, Muse, and I shall be your prophet' (μαντεύεο, Μοῖσα, προφατεύσω δ' ἐγώ).[55] He is not always this explicit, but the notion of extreme intimacy between the poet and his Muse can be found throughout the Pindaric poems;[56] for instance, Pindar is the 'helper' (ἐπίκουρος) of the Muses, he wants to be their 'friend' (φίλος), and even addresses the the Muse as 'our mother' (μάτερ ἁμετέρα).[57] Sometimes Pindar seems to be so close to the Muse that he and the goddess can hardly be distinguished from each other: in *Nemean* 4.3, songs are called the daughters of the Muses, and in *Olympian* 9.81 Pindar can be seen to drive the chariot of the Muses, which is elsewhere the task of the goddesses themselves.[58] In instances like these, Pindar presents himself as almost interchangeable with the Muse; here, as in the picture of the poet as προφήτης, the Hesiodic notion of the mouthpiece of the Muses returns.

Second, Pindar has combined his prophetic status with the Hesiodic notion that he was specifically chosen by the Muses to proclaim a divine message.[59] Sometimes, Pindar suggests that he had no say in his

---

[53] See further ch. 9.2 below, esp. pp. 323–324.

[54] Pi. *Paean* 6.6.

[55] Pi. fr. 150 Maehler. There is reason to assume that in Plato's times the terms 'seer' (μάντις) and 'prophet' (προφήτης) were distinguished, the former speaking from an altered state of mind, giving the actual content of the oracle, while the latter controlled the form, the dactylic hexameter (see Nagy 1989 24–29); the *mantis* would thus function as the 'middle man' (the term is Nagy's) between the god and the prophet. In Pindar's picture, however, there is no middle man (see also *Nem.* 1.61–62, where Tiresias can also do without a *mantis*), and he asks the Muse to become the *mantis* herself; he will then be her prophet, thus directly declaring the voice of the Muse. Tigerstedt (1970) 173–175 oddly denies that Pindar is posing as a *mantis* because she is unwilling to allow for *furor poeticus* before Plato (on which see further 9.2.2 below, pp. 324–328)—but Pindar's seership is not concerned with ecstasy, but with truth.

[56] I cannot find any justification for the view of Walsh (1984) 59 that 'Pindar does not enjoy Hesiod's intimacy with the Muses'.

[57] Pi. *Ol.* 13.96–97, fr. 155.2 Maehler, *Nem.* 3.1 (the Hesiodic character of which was recognized as early as Falter 1934 21).

[58] Pi. *Isthm.* 8.61. See also *Pyth.* 11.41–42, where the poet says: 'Muse, it is your duty, since you have contracted to hire your voice for silver, to keep it moving this way and that …' (Μοῖσα, τὸ δὲ τέον, εἰ μισθοῖο συνέθευ παρέχειν φωνὰν ὑπαργυρον, ἄλλοτ' ἄλλᾳ ταρασσέμεν …).

[59] Sperduti (1950) 233 'Like Hesiod, Pindar was strongly conscious of his priestly role and his mission as a teacher'. See also Maehler (1963) 42 speaking of Hesiod's 'Sendungsbewußtsein'.

transformation into a poet,[60] and was picked to convey a message that is not his own: 'I pray that with the Graces' aid I may celebrate that achievement and surpass many in honoring victory in words, casting my javelin nearest the target of the Muses'[61]—here, it is apparently the Muses who have told the poet what to sing.[62] The 'chosenness' of Pindar elevated him above ordinary people,[63] just as the breath of the god separated Hesiod from his former company. Furthermore, poets are believed to be of divine stock: the Muse is 'our mother', just as Hesiod had explained that 'it is through the Muses and far-shooting Apollo that there are singers and harpers upon the earth' (*Theogony* 94–95).

The third and most important link between Pindar and Hesiod, however, is that both regard inspiration and a close relationship with the Muses as the strongest guarantee of truthfulness of song.[64] To Pindar this is essential, since his poetry revolves around the truthful communication of worthy deeds and κλέος.[65] He mentions the Muse together with the personified Ἀλάθεια ('Truth') in *Olympian* 10.3–4, and in *Olympian* 6 he addresses his χοροδιδάσκαλος, who is asked to oversee the truth of Pindar's words, as the 'message stick of the fair-haired Muses', a metaphor that emphasizes the exactness and precision by which truth can be measured.[66] Moreover, Hesiod is mentioned by name in the context of honest, if not truthful speech in *Isthmian* 6.66–72: this passage deals with the honesty of Lampon, whose 'tongue does not stray from his thoughts' (γλῶσσα δ' οὐκ ἔξω φρενῶν), which is presented as a quality deriving from his life motto, the Hesiodic line that 'industry advances work'.[67]

---

[60] See *Pyth.* 5.65 and *Dith.* 2.23.

[61] Pi. *Nem.* 9.54–55: εὔχομαι ταύταν ἀρετὰν κελαδῆσαι σὺν Χαρίτεσσιν, ὑπὲρ πολλῶν τε τιμαλφεῖν λόγοις / νίκαν, ἀκοντίζων σκοποῦ ἄγχιστα Μοισᾶν.

[62] Cf. the opening lines of *Pyth.* 4 (1–3), where Pindar suggests he cannot begin his song until the Muses have arrived.

[63] Cf. Bowra (1964) 2–11, 41.

[64] Obviously, this goes for Homer as well (cf. n.28 above), at least to a considerable degree (see 2.1 below, p. 321); but it seems that Pindar himself focused on Hesiod as the Muse-inspired truth-teller *par excellence*.

[65] Cf. Griffin (1999) 190: 'Of all Archaic poets, the three who have gained the strongest reputations for devotion to truth are Hesiod, Xenophanes and Pindar'.

[66] Pi. *Ol.* 6.89–91: ἡνκόμων σκυτάλα Μοισᾶν. Race (LCL) ad loc. explains the curious expression: 'The σκυτάλα was a Spartan message stick around which writing material was wound, inscribed, and cut into a strip. Only with a duplicate stick could the strip be correctly wound to reveal the message'.

[67] Pi. *Isthm.* 6.66–67 (μελέταν / ἔργοις ὀπάζων) is from antiquity onwards (Σ *Isthm.* 6.97) thought to refer to *WD* 412 ('industry advances work', μελέτη δέ τοι ἔργον ὀφέλλει).

Interestingly, it is implied here that telling the truth is a hard-won achievement, and that even naturally gifted poets like Pindar have to work hard to attain it. This Hesiodic notion of the necessity of hard work is reflected in the numerous farming-metaphors that Pindar uses to describe his own practice as a poet.[68] Just as for the victors in the games Pindar sings about, success for the poet can come only through a combination of natural talent and training.[69] Pindar is thus in this respect comparable to the protagonists of his epinicians.

The combination of these elements presents a poetic self-image that is reminiscent of Hesiod's portrayal of himself as a servant subjugated to a divine message, a true Μουσάων θεράπων[70]—and this is obviously the persona chosen by Pindar as most beneficial to his own poetry. Through many (mostly) implicit references, Pindar characterizes Hesiodic speech thus: it is divine, toilsome, and truthful. It is of great interest to us to compare this to the rather explicit evaluation of Homeric language in *Nemean 7*. In this hymn, Pindar explains how poets like himself with the aid of Mnemosyne can repay athletes for their labors (μόχθων), and then continues (7.20–27):

> … ἐγὼ δὲ πλέον' ἔλπομαι
> λόγον Ὀδυσσέος ἢ πάθαν
> διὰ τὸν ἀδυεπῆ γενέσθ' Ὅμηρον·
>
> ἐπεὶ ψεύδεσί οἱ ποτανᾷ τε μαχανᾷ
> σεμνὸν ἔπεστί τι· σοφία
> δὲ κλέπτει παράγοισα μύθοις. τυφλὸν δ' ἔχει
> ἦτορ ὅμιλος ἀνδρῶν ὁ πλεῖστος. εἰ γὰρ ἦν
> ἢ τὰν ἀλάθειαν ἰδέμεν, οὔ κεν ὅπλων χολωθείς
> ὁ καρτερὸς Αἴας ἔπαξε διὰ φρενῶν
> λευρὸν ξίφος·
>
> '… I believe that Odysseus' story
> has become greater than his actual suffering
> because of Homer's sweet verse,

[68] In *Ol.* 9.27 he claims to be cultivating the garden of the Graces, in *Pyth.* 6.1–3 he is 'plowing once again the field of bright-eyed Aphrodite or of the Graces'. Athletic champions 'can supply the Pierian plowmen much to sing about' (*Nem.* 6.32–33) or 'give the Muses work for their plow' (*Nem.* 10.26). See Murnaghan (2007) on the connection between farming and truth-telling (although she does not discuss Pindar).

[69] There seems to be little truth, therefore, in the oft-stated belief that Pindar favors *ingenium* to the virtual suppression of *ars* (see e.g. Verdenius 1983 22 'Pindar is the first author who doubts the value of learning').

[70] *Th.* 100. See Barmeyer (1968) 80–81 on the singer as a servant of the deities that inspire him, and Falter (1934) 74–75 for an overview of the expression in Greek literature.

> for upon his fictions and soaring craft
> rests his great majesty, and his skill
> deceives with misleading tales. The great majority
> of men have a blind heart, for if they could have seen
> the truth, mighty Aias, in anger over the arms,
> would not have planted in his chest
> the smooth sword.'

The 'sweet-versed Homer' (ἁδυεπής Ὅμηρος) appears here as very different from Hesiod or Pindar. Homer produces ψεύδεα (contrasted to ἀλάθεια three lines later), and does so through his ability to make a story 'greater' (πλέονα) than it actually is;[71] he is magnificent in the full sense, and that is why Homer is so σεμνός, 'majestic'. His skill is παράγοισα, literally 'past-leading', because his story of Odysseus is bigger than the actual event, so that the listener is led past it instead of straight at it—a remarkable contrast to the accuracy of the Muses' measure-stick. Furthermore, Pindar also connects Odysseus to the suicide of Ajax: the latter hero 'planted the smooth sword' in his own chest because he lost the dispute over the arms of Achilles to Odysseus, who was apparently able to persuade the 'blind' majority of fellow-Greeks of his own ψεύδεα, i.e. that the arms should be rightfully his. Odysseus, I suggest, had to make himself 'bigger' in order to overshadow the rightful heir to Achilles, 'mighty' (καρτερός) Ajax. The λόγος Ὀδυσσέος ('story of Odysseus'), therefore, is ambiguous: it is not only Homer's tale of Odysseus, but also Odysseus' own tale about himself that is fiction.[72] Homer, just like Pindar, resembles his protagonist;[73] but whereas Homer's likeness to Odysseus consists in their method of deception, Pindar, just like the athletes he describes, tries to 'hit the mark'.

It seems that Pindar in these passages distinguishes two kinds of poetry; one is the sweet and majestic but thoroughly deceptive kind of Homer, while the other is connected to toil, truth, the Muses and

---

[71] Cf. Thucydides (1.10.3) arguing that the Trojan War was a relatively small affair which Homer, 'as a poet' (ποιητὴν ὄντα) literally 'adorned for the greater' (ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον . . . κοσμῆσαι).

[72] This was already noted by Most (1985) 150, who offers a thorough discussion of the passage (148–156). He also rightly stresses that the πάθα in 7.21 refers to Odysseus' sufferings in the *Odyssey* and not to events during the Trojan War.

[73] It is wrong to equate Homer with the 'majority of men' (as does Bury 1965a), despite the suggestive τυφλός ('blind'): Homer is like Odysseus the deceiver, not like the masses who are deceived (as is suggested by Most 1985 150, who strangely enough does not use the ambiguity of τυφλός to strenghten this argument).

Hesiod.[74] This distinction between poets is never made wholly explicit, but there is one fragment which does seem to oppose them. This is *Paean* 7b.11–20:

> ʿΟμήρου [δὲ μὴ τρι]πτὸν κατ᾽ ἀμαξιτόν
> ἰόντες, ἀ[λλ᾽ ἀλ]λοτρίαις ἀν᾽ ἵπποις,
> ἐπεὶ αυ[π]τανὸν ἅρμα
> Μοισα[ ]μεν.
> ἐ]πεύχο[μαι] δ᾽ Οὐρανοῦ τ᾽ εὐπέπλῳ θυγατρὶ
> Μναμ[ο]σύ[ν]ᾳ κόραισί τ᾽ εὐ-
> μαχανίαν διδόμεν.
> τ]υφλα[ὶ γὰ]ρ ἀνδρῶν φρένες,
> ὅ]στις ἄνευθ᾽ ʿΕλικωνιάδων
> βαθεῖαν ε..[..]..ων ἐρευνᾷ σοφίας ὁδόν.
>
> '… and not going on the trodden highway of Homer,
> but on another's horses,
> since … winged chariot
> Muse(s) … I (ride?).
> And I pray to Ouranos' well-robed daughter,
> Mnemosyne, and to her children
> to provide facility,
> for blind are the minds of men,
> if anyone without the Helikonians
> seeks the deep path of skill.'[75]

In this passage two types of poetry are contrasted with the aid of the Hesiodic road-image from *Works and Days* 287–292. On the one hand, there is the 'trodden highway' of Homer, which resembles Hesiod's short and easy road to badness; on the other, there is the 'deep path of skill' preferred by Pindar, reminiscent of Hesiod's long and steep road.[76] The main difference between the two appears to be the presence of the Muses. Homer's highway, it is suggested, is travelled without them, while Pindar emphatically asks the Muses to accompany him on his own path. This path, we must infer, leads to truth; for apart from the Muses, there is the presence of their mother Mnemosyne (mentioned as fostering

---

[74] Cf. Walsh (1984) 52–59, who believes Pindar distinguishes two types of poetry, the first consisting of either slander or flattery, corrupting both the encomiast and the audience, and the second a product of 'noble eros', a desire to laud and thus immortalize those worthy of praise, a type engendering excellence.

[75] Transl. slightly altered.

[76] Perhaps this 'deep path' should be contrasted to Homer's 'soaring craft' in *Nem.* 7.22, and linked to the truly wise and 'deep-thinking' (βαθύφρονες) Fates in *Nem.* 7.1. Incidentally, Pindar's road image is an interesting subtext for Callimachus' well-known one (Call. *Aet.* 1.25–28).

poetry that is contrasted to the tale of Odysseus in *Nem.* 7.15–16) and the recurrence of the blindness-motif (as stated in *Nem.* 7.23–25, it is the truth that the blind cannot see). Although Pindar is not explicit, it is fairly certain that the 'other' poet contrasted to Homer is Hesiod. The winged chariot (associated with Hesiodic inspiration by Parmenides and Empedocles) and the name 'Heliconians' (referring to the place of Hesiod's inspiration) are sure hints in this direction,[77] and there is of course the Hesiodic setting of the two roads, which also adds the suggestion that the Homeric road is an easy one, while the deep path is difficult.

In the middle of the fifth century, then, Hesiod and Homer could be employed to illustrate two opposing poetics, Homer exemplifying the sweet and magnificent distortion of reality, and Hesiod representing the toilsome path to truth with the aid of Mnemosyne and the Muses. Although Pindar provides us with this period's fullest and clearest picture of the opposition, there are indications that some of his contemporaries shared the notion of Hesiod being truthful and Homer deceptive. Bacchylides for instance, who described the poet as the 'divine prophet of the Muses',[78] called Hesiod a 'minister of the Muses' in the fifth epinician.[79] After thus mentioning him by name, he continues by citing Hesiod's saying 'He whom the immortals honour is attended also by the good report of men'[80] as the reason for thrusting envy aside and praise, 'for the sake of truth' (ἀλαθείας χάριν), any mortal who is succesful. There is a Pindar-like connection here between Hesiod, the Muses and truth. The historian Herodotus, another contemporary of Pindar's, seems to be particularly aware of Homer's capacity for expressing supposed facts that are belied by careful ἱστορίη (the 'research' of the historian himself). When Herodotus discusses the archaic notion of an earth-encircling Ocean, he says 'the man who spoke of the Ocean referred the story to the realm of uncertainty and has no disproof; for I know of no river of Ocean; and I suppose that Homer or some older poet invented this name and brought it into his poetry.'[81] Herodotus' main point is of course

[77] Cf. Bowra (1964) 33–34.

[78] B. *Epin.* 9.2: Μουσᾶν … θεῖος προφάτας.

[79] B. *Epin.* 5.191–192: πρόπολος Μουσᾶν.

[80] Fr. 344 MW: ὃν ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀθάνατοι τι[μῶσι, τούτωι / καὶ βροτῶν φήμαν ἔπ[εσθαι.

[81] Hdt. *Hist.* 2.23: ὁ δὲ περὶ τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ λέξας ἐς ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνενείκας οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον· οὐ γάρ τινα ἔγωγε οἶδα ποταμὸν Ὠκεανὸν ἐόντα, Ὅμηρον δὲ ἤ τινα τῶν πρότερων γενομένων ποιητέων δοκέω τοὔνομα εὑρόντα ἐς ποίησιν ἐσενείκασθαι.

not that Homer is wrong, but that Homer is no historian: he invents instead of investigates, and tells stories that are not falsifiable (and do not need to be): it is poetry, not history. What is of interest to me, is that it is Homer who is singled out as the example of someone writing untruths.[82]

There are some other early sources, then, for the truthfulness of Hesiod and the fictionality of Homer, although there is no such explicit opposition between the poets comparable to that in Pindar—unless we count a maxim attributed to Simonides.[83] According to this testimony, Simonides, 'on being asked who was the better, Homer or Hesiod, said, "The Muses bore Hesiod, the Graces Homer." '[84] Obviously, both the question and the answer are of interest to us. The question (if genuine) indicates a fifth-century debate on which poet was the better (confirming our hypothesis of an early contest-story), and also shows that this was a serious matter, considering the gravity of some of the other questions presented to Simonides.[85] Furthermore, the form of the question implies that Simonides was expected to *choose* between them, as if the anonymous questioner (representing the Greeks in general) believed that the two poets cannot be liked equally much.[86] The answer of Simonides is also revealing: the poets cannot, in his view, be measured along the same axis—there are different criteria for determining which is κρείσσων ('better' or 'stronger'). The Muses and the Graces, I suggest, indicate truthfulness and beauty, respectively, so that Hesiod's poetry is through his pedigree characterized as truthful, while Homer's ancestry connotates

[82] In *Hist*. 2.116 Herodotus shows a similar awareness of the different demands of different genres: Homer is here said to have rejected the story of Helen visiting Egypt, although he knew it, 'as it suited not so well with epic poetry as the tale of which he made use' (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐς τὴν ἐποποιίην εὐπρεπὴς ἦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ περ ἐχρήσατο).

[83] Gnom. Vat. 514 Sternbach. The fragment's authenticity is uncertain; PMG does not print it, Campbell's LCL edition (1991) does (T 47(j)). More recently Sider (1996) 274–275 took a middle position since he believes it to be a forgery, though 'hiding behind [it] may be a passage in Simonides' poetry where his two predecessors were more artfully set alongside one another'.

[84] ἐρωτηθεὶς πότερος κρείσσων, Ὅμηρος ἢ Ἡσίοδος, εἶπεν· Ἡσίοδον μὲν αἱ Μοῦσαι, Ὅμηρον δὲ αἱ Χάριτες ἐτέκνωσαν. I am following Sternbach's emendation; in the codex, the names of Hesiod and Homer are switched (!).

[85] What or how god is (Campbell T 47c), whether it is better to be wealthy or wise (T 47d), if everything gets old (T 47f), and who the noble are (T 47g); the references are collected under fr. 148 West.

[86] Cf. the way other popular cultural icons are opposed: you either like the Beatles *or* the Stones better (70's), Sean Connery *or* Roger Moore (80's), Nintendo *or* Sega (90's).

the 'majesty' of his 'sweet verse' (in Pindar's words). The question of who is better is thus said to depend on the criteria used—the same lesson that was taught by the *Certamen*.[87]

Needless to say, later references to the truthfulness of Hesiodic speech and the deceptive qualities of Homeric language abound. We have already amply discussed Hesiod's connection to truth in Part Two; and for the tradition of Homer as an author of fiction it must suffice here to refer to Dio's *Trojan Oration*, an epideictic *tour de force* in which Homer's account of the Trojan War is systematically undermined and the poet himself is exposed as 'surpassing all men in bravery when it comes to fiction'.[88] Expressions of the opposition may become more bold and elaborate; but they are already fully articulate in the early fifth century, and perhaps in part go back to the poets themselves.

2. *The Poet's Craft: Inspiration and Perspiration*

This section is concerned with the notion of inspiration in antiquity and its key role in the opposition between Hesiod and Homer. In the previous section, brief mention was already made of inspiration because of its function as a guarantee of truth, especially relevant in the archaic period. In this section, however, we will focus on the classical and hellenistic age, in which the concept of inspiration is less connected to content ('truth', as opposed to falsehood) but more to the creative 'method' or process. This type of inspiration, more congenial to our modern one, is understood

[87] Incidentally, the Muses and Graces have the same father (Zeus). Whether it is intended or not, the statement of Simonides makes Hesiod and Homer relatives (cf. ch. 1, pp. 41–42) and may point to an ultimately common origin of their poetry.

[88] D.Chrys. 11.23: ἀνδρειότατος ἀνθρώπων ἦν πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος Ὅμηρος. See for just a few other examples Eratosthenes fr. I A 11 Berger (declaring 'that not only the commentators on Homer but also Homer himself are dealers in nonsense'); D.H. 2.18.4; Lucian *JTr*. 39 and *Philops*. 2; Pliny the Younger saying (*Epist*. 3.9.28) it is typically Homeric to abandon chronology, one of the Homeric tricks attacked by Dio as well (11.24–25). The very verb Ὁμηρίδδειν means 'to use fiction' (ψεύδεσθαι, Hsch. 2.202.20 Schmidt). The archaic conception of Hesiod whom the Muses gave knowledge and truth resurfaces, for instance, in Dio Chrysostom, who in the 77th oration (ironically) refers to Hesiod as a man 'who composed and chanted his poems, not by human art, but because he held converse with the Muses and had become a pupil of those very beings' (οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ τέχνῃ τὰ ποιήματα ποιῶν τε καὶ ᾄδων, ἀλλὰ ταῖς Μούσαις ἐντυχὼν καὶ μαθητὴς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων γενόμενος, 77.1)—and this turned him into a *sophos*, who 'expressed himself very truthfully as well as with experience of human nature' (ἀπεφήνατο μάλ' ἀληθῶς τε καὶ ἐμπείρως τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, 77.2); cf. Lucian *Ind*. 3.

as an irrational and relatively brief burst of creativity leading instantly to a satisfactory end-product; uninspired art, by contrast, is seen as the never-quite-finished result of painstaking, technical (almost mechanical) labour. The main point of this section is that Hesiod was first associated with inspiration type 1, but later with the opposite of inspiration type 2: the truth-teller became a labourer. By contrast, Homer changed vice versa: the introduction of the new notion of inspiration turned him from a liar into a truly 'possessed' poet. Much attention will be paid to Plato, who seems to have played an essential role in this reversal (2.2), and the hellenistic re-appraisal of Hesiod's image as a 'technical' author (2.3). In the first subsection, however, we will briefly examine modern scholarship on Hesiod's and Homer's inspiration.

2.1. *Modern Scholarship*

Throughout antiquity, inspiration appears as remarkably consistent in its formal aspects; poets of all periods claim a special relationship with their Muse (inspiration personified),[89] whom they call upon to present their poem as partaking of superhuman authority and quality. It is rather more difficult, however, to generalize about the nature and meaning of inspiration. What is it exactly that the Muses are thought to contribute to the creative process? This question has often been posed, but it is clear that there is no univocal answer; different poets, as scholars have shown, ask the Muses for different things[90]—even in one and the same poem, the relationship between Muse and poet can be characterized in different and sometimes even apparently contradictory ways.[91] Obviously, even though the subject of inspiration has been thoroughly studied, its understanding remains an ongoing process. The brief overview in this subsection, therefore, could never aim to be exhaustive or complete. Its main focus is concerned with the way a poet imagines the relationship with the

[89] See Falter (1934) for a systematic and full overview of all invocations of gods and goddesses in Greek and Roman literature. Commager (1967) 2–16 provides a still apt discussion of the Muses as a literary convention.

[90] See e.g. the studies of Maehler (1963), Harriott (1969), and Walsh (1984). The ambitious study of Barmeyer (1968) is somewhat strained by the main hypothesis that there is unity in all (ancient and modern) poets' views of the Muses.

[91] The *Odyssey* is the prime example. The singers Phemius and Demodocus seem to need the god, but can also sing on their own (*Od.* 8.44–45, 8.287–289). Phemius even claims to be self-taught (*Od.* 22.347–348). See further below.

Muse, which in part defines his own poetics. Three aspects seem to be especially relevant in this respect: 1) the poet's share in the creative process, 2) the veracity of his poetry, and 3) its overall aim or function.

Most scholarship has focused on the Homeric poems and the rather equivocal picture of inspiration emerging from them. As to the first question, the contribution of the Muses, it has often been suggested that Homer primarily regards the Muses as all-knowing creatures who can provide him with factual information, since he invokes the Muses only when he has a specific question he needs an answer to.[92] Others have stressed the fact that these questions are quite rare, which implies that in most cases the poet can rely on his own knowledge. This latter view is strenghtened by the fact that the *aoidoi* featuring in Homer's poems, Phemius and Demodocus, usually regarded as Homer's idealized image of himself,[93] do not have such questions for the Muse but rather seem to have acquired a permanent gift which guarantees the quality of their songs. There are also many hints in the poems that the poet conceived of his own art as a τέχνη comparable to other crafts.[94] It is especially Phemius' famous paradox on the origin of his craft[95] that reminds us of our ultimate inability—as demonstrated by the many attempts to explain the apparent inconsistency[96]—to understand exactly what part the Muses play.[97]

---

[92] See e.g. Minton (1960) 292–293.

[93] See e.g. Kraus (1955) 66, De Jong (2002) 391–392. Lamberton (1986) 3 points out that this view was already held in antiquity.

[94] See e.g. *Od*. 17.384 (and for a similar passage *WD* 25–26). This, however, does not necessarily eliminate or even diminish the share of the god, as is advocated by e.g. Murray (1981) 96–97 and Havelock (1963) 155, who regards the Muse not as a symbol of dependence on divine guidance, but of 'the bard's command of professional secrets'. I would say that it is rather proof that any trade or craft is presided over by one god or another. Patron gods were also invoked during 'ordinary' handiwork, such as the baking of pots.

[95] *Od*. 22.347–348: 'I am self-taught, and the god has planted in my heart lays of all sorts' (αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί, θεός δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας / παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν).

[96] According to Maehler (1963) 23, Phemius means he can create new songs; Tigerstedt (1970) 168 solves the paradox by claiming that *autodidaktos* entails *theodidaktos*; Verdenius (1983) 38–39 comments on the common reading that separates between content and technique; Walsh (1984) 13 thinks Phemius cannot conceive himself as independent of the god because he is unable to see he is part of a long tradition; Ritoók (1989) 342 believes Phemius means that human faculties are supplemented by the divine 'faculty to arouse, increase and satisfy desire'; Bowie (1993) 17 interestingly interprets the statement in terms of dual motivation; but there are many more interpretations.

[97] In my view, the problem can be largely evaded if one assumes that Homer sees himself (and the bard portrayed by him) as comparable to the heroes he describes; they too can be 'inspired' with a divine power that makes them 'more truly themselves' (Bowra

Similar ambiguity surrounds the second question, that of the truthfulness of Homeric poetry. As has been noted above, epic poetry obviously claims the truth for itself, and Demodocus, (perhaps) an alter ego of Homer himself, is lauded for singing 'in order' about the fall of Troy[98]—an expression presumably meaning that his words match reality.[99] On the other hand, it has of course often been noted that the greatest storyteller in the *Odyssey* is a crafty liar, whose speech is nonetheless comparable to that of poets. According to some, Odysseus' so-called Cretan lies in Ithaca cast a shadow of doubt over his adventures in books 9–12.[100] It could also be, however, that the truth-fiction dichotomy was relatively unimportant to Homer, who seems to have been less concerned with the contrast between truth and falsehood than that between knowledge and ignorance.[101]

Third and finally, it is of interest to see what it is that the poet asks the Muses *for*. What exactly do the Muses help the poet to attain? Needless to say, there is much debate about the aim and function of Homeric poetry. On the one hand, several studies have demonstrated that the Homeric bard serves as the memory of a community since he repeats before the audience their own values and truths.[102] On the other hand, the poet himself takes pride in his ability to take away cares and to enliven the party during banquets—this is why some scholars believed Homer claims 'the hedonistic function' for his poetry.[103] Naturally, there are all kinds of middle positions.[104] In section 3 we will take a closer look at the poets' place in the opposition between hedonism and didacticism.

1952 89); cf. Latte (1946b) 158 comparing Hesiod's inspiration to the way Homer pictures the gods as inspiring the heroes with 'Spannkraft', and Snell (1955) 40 saying that Homer speaks of divine intervention 'wo immer ein Mensch mehr leistet oder mehr sagt, als man nach seinem bisherigen Verhalten erwarten könnte.'

[98] *Od.* 8.489: κατὰ κόσμον.

[99] See e.g. Walsh (1984) 8–14.

[100] See e.g. Goldhill (1991) 36–56.

[101] Murray (1981) 91.

[102] E.g. Havelock (1963), Svenbro (1976).

[103] Sperduti (1950) 227; see also Ritoók (1989). Latte (1946b) claims that the goal of Homeric song is to convey 'Schmuck des Daseins', not any 'nutbares Wissen' or 'Deutung der Welt' (159). Kraus (1955) also emphatically denies any didactic intent to Homer; Verdenius (1970) 27 states slightly more carefully that ' 'to delight his audience' is Homer's main object.'

[104] Walsh (1984), for instance, argued that all audiences in the *Odyssey* 'assume that song should provide pleasure' (5), but also points out that part of that pleasure in fact derives from receiving knowledge.

On the question of inspiration in its broadest sense, then, Homer's work is decidedly polyvalent; hence, his poetics can be interpreted in many different and even contradictory ways. It is especially with regard to such thorough-going ambiguity that the modern reading of Hesiod's inspiration can be clearly contrasted. Although it is true that Hesiod too mentions the hedonistic function of poetry, and may hint that the Muses' gift makes one persuasive rather than knowledgeable,[105] modern discussions of Hesiod's poetics usually focus on the inspiration scene with its truth-telling Muses from the beginning of the *Theogony*; a much more univocal picture of Hesiod's inspiration thus emerges.

The scholarly pre-occupation with Hesiod's *Dichterweihe* is understandable, since it is one of the most elaborate and emphatic statements of poetic inspiration in Greek (and perhaps even Western) literature. The Muses, as we have seen in the previous section, obviously talk of truth and fiction, so that discussions of Hesiod's poetics are usually couched in similar terms: thus, the inspiration scene is generally interpreted as a claim to truth, and the contribution of the Muses as valuable information otherwise unavailable to mortals. Symptomatic of this particular approach to Hesiod is the lively debate on the question of whether Hesiod's experience with the Muses was 'true' or not, and the tendency of scholars to answer this question with a 'yes' (qualified or not).[106] In my view, the difference with Homeric scholarship could hardly be ex-

[105] See *Th.* 80–93 and 94–103. Walsh (1984) deduced from the former passage that the question of truth was not very important to Hesiod since 'the king need apparently be nothing but eloquent' (25). This is somewhat of an exaggeration, however, as the Muse-nourished king is said to judge 'with straight judgements' (ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν, *Th.* 86) and ends quarrels 'with knowledge' (ἐπισταμένως, *Th.* 87).

[106] Most scholars agree that the encounter with the Muses was 'real' for Hesiod, and that the inspiration scene in the *Th.* in some way or another reflects a 'real' experience. See e.g. Latte (1946b) 157 speaking of Hesiod's inspiration as a 'sehr reales Erlebnis', Bowra (1952) 427–428 offering some good parallels for shepherds becoming poets, and Harriott (1969) 35 saying 'Hesiod is describing what he believes actually happened to him' (cf. Commager 1967 9). Kambylis (1965) 59 argued that the relatively short sentences and somewhat shaky style of the passage indicate a genuinely felt admiration and awe. Some scholars, who apparently do not believe in the physical reality of the Muses, state that the encounter was an inner or dreamlike experience: see e.g. Wade-Gery (1949) 87 speaking of a 'vision', Walcot (1966) 48–50, Neitzel (1980) 394–395 (thus continuing an ancient debate on whether Hesiod was awake or dreaming while meeting the Muses). Most (1991) esp. 73–77 represents the minority view of scholars prepared to see the *Dichterweihe* as part of a carefully wrought persona (cf. Pinsent 1985 122, who suggests that the staff the Muses gave to Hesiod was in fact a graduation gift from a 'professional sacred school of singers').

pressed more clearly than in the belief that Hesiod's vision is utterly free from 'poetische Einkleidung' but should be regarded as 'echt und möglich.'[107]

As a consequence of this view of Hesiod, his relationship to the Muses is generally viewed in terms of a prophet following his calling.[108] It is often pointed out that whereas Homer composes his own narrative and chooses to be steered by the Muses when he is uncertain about his facts, Hesiod's Muses seem to have a far tighter grip on him. The subject of his song is part of his transformation into a poet: '… [they] breathed into me a divine voice to celebrate things that shall be and things that were aforetime; and they bade me sing of the race of the blessed gods that are eternally'[109]—hence the age-old and ever-repeated notion that Hesiod presents himself as an instrument of the Muses.[110] Furthermore, whereas Homer invokes the Muses, the goddesses come to Hesiod of their own accord. They interrupt his normal life, censure his current occupation and change him into a poet. Both their intervention and their specific task mark Hesiod as a 'chosen one', a man with a vocation. Sikes aptly said that 'in Hesiod (…) the singer first becomes an inspired teacher, with a divine message to deliver.'[111] And there are more indications in the *Dichterweihe*

---

[107] So Falter (1934) 14, saying it is too early to think of *poetische Einkleidung*; see for a similarly teleological view the statement of Kambylis (1965) 53 that Hesiod's age 'verbietet' us to think of fiction. Walcot (1960) 36 also explicitly rejects the possibility of literary convention, cf. Athanassakis (1983) 1: 'there is no reason to assume that either Hesiod's shepherding or his vision are fiction or pure literary convention.'

[108] See e.g. Rand (1911) 146 ascribing to Hesiod 'the moral sublimity of a Hebrew prophet', Maehler (1963) 41 saying 'Hesiod fühlt sich als Priester und Prophet', Lamberton (1988) 120 speaking of the 'humanism of [Hesiod's] prophecy', Kirby (1992) 37 describing Hesiod as a '*uates*'. Hesiod was already recognized in antiquity as a seer, perhaps because some believed he had written a poem called *Seercraft* (Paus. 9.31.5); the statue of Hesiod in the gymnasium of Zeuxippus stood between those of seers (*AP* 2.36–44).

[109] *Th.* 31–33: ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν / θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείομι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, / καί μ' ἐκέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων.

[110] A 'Sprachrohr der Musen', in the words of Fakas (2001) 63; cf. Pucci (1996) 198 on Hesiod as a 'porte-parole' or even 'substitut' of the Muse. Of course the poem of Hesiod is also often interpreted as a joint venture (cf. e.g. Clay 2003 51–52 speaking of a 'collaborative production').

[111] Sikes (1931) 4. Many scholars have deduced from *Th.* 32 that the Muses' gift consists of both poetic and prophetic powers; the main proponents of this theory are listed by Tigerstedt (1970) 171 n.41. The idea is of course not unusual, since there is a 'close connexion between poetry and prophecy which is widespread in early literature' (West 1966 166). The few attempts to downplay Hesiod's prophetic image are rather unconvincing. Tigerstedt (1970) 171–172 seems to believe Hesiod's account is too sober for a mystic experience; but there are no rules that say all such experiences should be described in trance-like fashion. Andrews (1943), who compared Hesiod to the

that characterize Hesiod as a seer or prophet.[112] Through his elaborate description of his own transformation, then, Hesiod has apparently left us with a far more univocal image of himself than Homer: chosen, truthful, didactic.[113]

This necessarily brief and sketchy overview shows that modern readers of the poems of Hesiod and Homer understand differences in terms of inspiration in a broad sense. We will now see that their sensitivity to the epic poems is matched by that of ancient readers, who also differentiate between Hesiod and Homer in this respect, and sometimes along similar lines. There is one thing, however, that increases the complexity of the ancient interpretation of inspiration, and that is that the very concept of inspiration itself radically changes over time. Early ages mainly regarded inspired people as vehicles of truth, since the goddess herself supposedly spoke through them. In the fifth century, however, this claim to truth and knowledge became more complex as the inspired poet became 'mad'. We will now see how the concepts of Hesiod and Homer figured in that development.

2.2. *The Impact of Plato: The Manic Poet*

As we have seen in section 1, inspiration was in archaic times conceived as a form of divine empowerment: the all-knowing Muses grant the poet superhuman power, so that he can pass on the 'Glanz eines Wissens'.[114] In this notion of inspiration, the main concern is ultimately with the product, i.e. knowledge of things that are and will be: prophets exist for the message. At the end of the fifth century, however, a new concept of inspiration arises under the influence of Plato. The basic sequence Muse—

Hebrew prophet Amos, found many similarities, yet still claims the former wrote 'without prophetic commission', and was not 'under divine compulsion'; strangely enough, she excludes the *Dichterweihe* from her discussion and focuses on the *WD* instead.

[112] The association of the Muses with water (*Th.* 1–6), which is connected to manticism (Kambylis 1965 23–30), and especially the branch of laurel (an attribute from Aly (1913) onwards interpreted as a link to Apollo, lord of seers). Less convincing are the suggestion of Barmeyer (1968) 107–108 that the oak and rock in *Th.* 35 refer to prophecy and the claim of Beye (1972) 28 that Hesiod's language is similar to that of the Delphic oracle (see on this similarity also Cassio 2009 184–185).

[113] See on the last qualification e.g. Combellack (1974) 124 recognizing two types of literature in the time of Hesiod (poetry and prose oratory), and then claiming that 'it is thoroughly characteristic of Hesiod that neither kind of 'literature' is thought to be for entertainment.'

[114] Otto (1971) 39.

poet—product is still maintained, but the focus shifts from product to poet. Plato investigates the condition of the poet *qua* inspired being, and calls this status μανία ('madness'): the poet is in the Muses' power and has no control over his own song (which is thus not really his own).[115] This new characterization of the poet has important consequences for the art itself; since the poet does not contribute anything, poetry itself cannot be a craft or τέχνη. This means that the poem *can* in theory still bring us the truth, but it surely cannot bring us knowledge, for the poet cannot rationally account for the things he says.[116] Moreover, his inspired art seems to suspend the faculty of reason in his audience too, since those listening to poetry turn into 'enthusiasts'. Even though Plato himself claims that the notion of inspiration as μανία is very old, it has often been noted that it is in fact almost completely new, tailor-made for his specific purpose of disqualifying the poets as authorities on knowledge and education.[117]

It is of great interest to the present study that Plato singles out Homer as the inspired or 'manic' poet *par excellence*. For instance: when the Athenian in the *Laws* says that 'poets as a class are divinely gifted and inspired when they sing, so that with the help of Graces and Muses they frequently hit on how things really happen',[118] it is because he has just quoted a 'very wise and truthful' (κατὰ θεόν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν) saying from Homer. When Socrates concludes, at the end of the *Phaedrus*, that all books and writing are inferior to thoughts and discussion, Homer is mentioned as the prime example of those poets who cannot defend their statements and cannot claim any knowledge of the truth.[119] Most interesting is the short dialogue *Ion*, where Socrates elaborates on the theme of inspiration as divine possession and takes the Homeric rhapsode Ion as an example:

---

[115] Murray (1996) 8–9 overemphasizes Plato's part in the invention of the poet as a 'mouthpiece for the god's message' (9); it is important to realize that the 'mouthpiece-theory' is ancient (in fact going back to Hesiod himself), but it was only in Plato's time that this was thought to disqualify the poet's own input.

[116] The poets' proud claims of seer- or prophet-like capabilities are thus turned against them, cf. e.g. Pl. *Ap*. 22c.

[117] Cf. e.g. Commager (1967) 21 n.36 pointing to Plato as the inventor of manic ecstacy, Harriott (1969) 83 saying that Plato's concept of inspiration is 'almost entirely new and that it is made acceptable by being dressed in language and imagery familiar from tradition', Murray (1981) 85; Kahn (2001) 64 says generally that 'Plato had set the fasion of presenting his newest theories as age-old wisdom'.

[118] Pl. *Leg*. 682a: θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνθεαστικὸν ὂν γένος ὑμνῳδοῦν, πολλῶν τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων σύν τισιν Χάρισιν καὶ Μούσαις ἐφάπτεται ἑκάστοτε.

[119] Pl. *Phdr*. 278c.

Ion can recite and comment on Homer only because of a divine gift, and not because of any knowledge he possesses; and of course the same goes for Homer himself, who is the true target of Plato's critique.[120]

It is highly remarkable that Hesiod, the prototype of the inspired poet for Pindar and Bacchylides, and the ultimate spokesman of the Muses for Parmenides and Empedocles, loses his prophetic status completely in the works of Plato. Hesiod can be called γενναῖος ('worthy'), φρόνιμος ('sensible'), or σοφός ('wise'), but never θεῖος ('divine') or 'inspired' or the like; he is certainly never associated with 'manic' inspiration in a way that Homer clearly is.[121] How could such a shift have come about? Obviously, Plato made Homer his prime target since he had the greatest reputation as a poet and educator. Furthermore, as the passages from *Laws* and *Phaedrus* show, the 'manic' Homer is often characterized as the foremost example of poets, implying that they all (Hesiod included) fall prey to μανία when composing. And finally, Plato's focus on Homer was not all new in that he probably owed much to the inspiration theory of Democritus.[122] Still, that the traditionally inspired Hesiod is never mentioned explicitly as such by Plato remains remarkable. I will argue, however, that this shift can be understood when we recognize that it is that very tradition that has been instrumental in Plato's choice for Homer. Two considerations are especially relevant here.

The first is Plato's concern about the effects of poetry on the audience. Poetry, defined as manic and non-rational, appealed to the non-rational parts of the audience, and thus revealed itself as the enemy of philosophy.

---

[120] Pl. *Ion* 533d–536d.

[121] Hesiod is associated with the Muses in *R.* 546e, and perhaps Plato thinks of Hesiod when he speaks of children of the gods in *Ti.* 40e; but there is no mention of μανία here. I cannot agree with Havelock (1963) 8 who claims that Plato does not distinguish between Homer and Hesiod.

[122] Plato's somewhat older contemporary Democritus was one of the first to develop a physical theory of inspiration. The details of this theory are obscure and controversial, but it is fairly certain that he believed the souls of poets to be particularly light and fiery, a quality which rendered them capable of communicating with light and fiery beings like spirits and gods (Delatte 1934 still offers the most thorough and authoritative discussion of the particulars). Hence Democritus could say that 'what a poet writes with inspiration and the breath of the gods is very fine' (ποιητὴς δὲ ἅσσα μὲν ἂν γράφῃ μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος, καλὰ κάρτα ἐστιν, DK 68 B 18). It is likely that Democritus was mainly thinking about Homer here, since he is also reported to have said that 'Homer, by getting a share in the divine nature, accomplished the ordering of all kinds of verses' (Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτήνατο παντοίων, DK 68 B 21). O'Sullivan (1992) 68–71 plausibly argued on the basis of this fragment and other evidence that Homer was the prototype of the inspired poet for Democritus.

The poet's μανία was proven contagious since it was passed on to his listeners, as the famous comparion between inspiration and magnetism in the *Ion* makes clear.[123] Entire groups of people could thus be cut off from their νοῦς, their faculty of reason. This dangerous effect of irrational poetry is also caused by its mimetic quality: when 'Homer or some other of the makers of tragedy' imitates one of the heroes who is in grief, Socrates says in the *Republic* (605c–d), we feel pleasure and leave our very selves to 'accompany the representation with sympathy' (ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες); and this is what we feel poets need to do: create pathetic scenes to which we can respond emotionally.[124]

Homer was the obvious choice to represent this kind of poetry since he appealed to the people's appetite for beauty, pleasure and rapture. We have already seen that Pindar described Homeric poetry as magnificent and capable of misleading the masses, and we find similar descriptions in the Platonic corpus.[125] The ultimate reason behind Homer's banishment from Plato's state is precisely the fact that he is such a powerful and beautiful poet, and can send the audience in an utter trance. This is obvious from the final words with which Socrates still somewhat reluctantly lets Homer go: 'If the poetry that aims at pleasure and imitation has any argument to bring forward that proves it ought to have a place in a well-governed city, we at least would be glad to admit it, for we are well aware of the charm it exercises. But, be that as it may, to betray what one believes to be the truth is impious. What about you, Glaucon, don't you feel the charm of the pleasure-giving Muse, especially when you study her through the eyes of Homer?'[126] Plato's description of Homer's effect on the audience was in fact widely felt; O'Sullivan plausibly argued that

[123] Pl. *Ion* 535e–536d; the magnet-stone (the god) extended its powers to an iron ring (the poet), who transfers the same powers to a second ring (the rhapsode) and ultimately to a third (the audience). Cf. Else (1986) 196 defining Plato's concept of poetry as 'communication from one soul to another'.

[124] Cf. Pl. *R.* 605d: 'We praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way' (ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ). See for some discussions of this criticism of Homeric poetry as pathetic and irrational Murdoch (1977), Moravcsik (1982) 29–46, Woodruff (1982) 137–150, and Too (1998) 51–81. See also Hunter (2004) 239 describing Homer's language as 'the 'natural' language of suffering and strong emotion'.

[125] Esp. Pl. *Smp.* 195d; *R.* 387b, 595b, and 606e–607a.

[126] Pl. *R.* 607c–d: εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένῃ, ἅσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. ἦ γαρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλῇ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι' Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν;

Homer in the days of Plato and later was felt to represent the *genus grande*, the main characteristic of which was its power to sweep the audience away.[127]

Secondly, Homer was in Plato's times already predetermined as untruthful. As we have seen in section 1.2, he was associated with philosophical notions that presented truth as relative and apparent, and knowledge as fluid, impossible or even nonexistent. It was the main aim of Plato's criticism of Homer to disqualify him as a source of knowledge, especially knowledge of ethical truth,[128] since it was exactly the content of his ethical teaching that he wished to destroy.[129] By focusing on Homer, Plato's attack on the poets' status as a teacher and on their reputation for truth and knowledge thus rested on previous views of the poet and built further on them.

We can see how the first and second consideration combine to make Homer the most eligible candidate for Plato's new type of inspiration. It is also immediately clear why Hesiod was so unsuitable. As we have seen in chapter 6, the Hesiodic type of inspiration was in the fifth century conceived as a revelatory experience which consisted of a transfer of knowledge instead of an appeal to the emotions. Moreover, the language of Hesiod was traditionally regarded as truthful speech, advocating the one-on-one relationship between words and things. These pre-existing interpretations are obviously incompatible with the Platonic stereotype of the inspired poet. Homer, by contrast, in part because of his own reception, could rather easily be molded into a poet that Plato felt himself most capable of attacking. And so Homer could become the inspired poet *par excellence*.

It is unclear, however, whether this denial of manic inspiration to Hesiod also directly landed him in the category of poets who compose through τέχνη. There is ample evidence for Hesiod as a 'technical' writer in the hellenistic age and later (see the next subsection), but earlier evidence is rather circumstantial.[130] It will be of interest, however, to discuss in

[127] O'Sullivan (1992) 106–129.

[128] Cf. Gill (1993) 44: 'The claim that representative poetry is 'three degrees removed from the truth' and 'deceptive' (in *Republic* 10) consists in the claim that poetry deceives people into thinking that it can convey knowledge of ethical truth'.

[129] Cf. Else (1986) 197 saying it was Homer's 'worst sin', according to Plato, 'to present human happiness as tragically incommensurate with goodness.'

[130] One could think, for instance, of the toil involved in composing Hesiodic poetry according to Pindar, and Hesiod's image as a collector (see chapter 6).

some detail a passage from Isocrates' *To Nicocles*. This does not, strictly speaking, deal with inspiration, but does address the obviously related questions of poetry's impact on the audience and lack of truth. In this passage, Hesiod and Homer are explicitly contrasted to each other.

Isocrates' *To Nicocles*, written around 376 BC, is an essay investigating the best conduct of a ruler towards his subjects. Somewhere in the middle, Isocrates mentions the many wise lessons already written down by the ancients:

> [42] … τὰ συμβουλεύοντα καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ τῶν συγγραμμάτων χρησιμώτατα μὲν ἅπαντες νομίζουσιν, οὐ μὴν ἥδιστά γ' αὐτῶν ἀκούουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπόνθασιν ὅπερ πρὸς τοὺς νουθετοῦντας· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνους ἐπαινοῦσι μὲν, πλησιάζειν δὲ βούλονται τοῖς συνεξαμαρτάνουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἀποτρέπουσιν. [43] Σημεῖον δ' ἄν τις ποιήσαιτο τὴν Ἡσιόδου καὶ Θεόγνιδος καὶ Φωκυλίδου ποίησιν· καὶ γὰρ τούτους φασὶ μὲν ἀρίστους γεγενῆσθαι συμβούλους τῷ βίῳ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ταῦτα δὲ λέγοντες αἱροῦνται συνδιατρίβειν ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἀνοίαις μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς ἐκείνων ὑποθήκαις. [44] Ἔτι δ' εἴ τις ἐκλέξειε τῶν προεχόντων ποιητῶν τὰς καλουμένας γνώμας, ἐφ' αἷς ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστ' ἐσπούδασαν, ὁμοίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς ταύτας διατεθεῖεν· ἥδιον γὰρ ἂν κωμῳδίας τῆς φαυλοτάτης ἢ τῶν οὕτω τεχνικῶς πεποιημένων ἀκούσαιεν.
>
> '[42] … while all men think that those compositions, whether in prose or in verse, are the most useful which give us advice, yet it is certainly not to them that they listen with greatest pleasure; on the contrary, they feel about these just as they feel about the people who admonish them; for while they praise the latter, they choose for associates those who share in, and not those who would dissuade them from, their faults. [43] As a case in point, one might cite the poetry of Hesiod and Theognis and Phocylides; for these, they say, have proved the best counsellors for human life; but in spite of what they say, people prefer to occupy themselves with each other's follies rather than with their admonitions. [44] And, again, if one were to make a selection from the leading poets of their maxims, as we call them, into which they have put their best effort, men would show a similar attitude towards them also; for they would rather listen to the cheapest comedy than to poems composed with so much skill.'[131]

This passage on Hesiodic poetry should be compared to the characterization of its opposite. In paragraph 48–49, Isocrates continues the theme of man's aversion to good advice and of his inclination towards pleasure:

> Ἐκεῖνο δ' οὖν φανερὸν, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ γράφειν τι κεχαρισμένον τοῖς πολλοῖς μὴ τοὺς ὠφελιμωτάτους τῶν λόγων ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μυθωδεστάτους· (…) Διὸ καὶ τὴν Ὁμήρου ποίησιν καὶ τοὺς

[131] I have slightly adapted the translation of Norlin (LCL).

> πρώτους εὑρόντας τραγῳδίαν ἄξιον θαυμάζειν, ὅτι κατιδόντες τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἰδέαις ταύταις κατεχρήσαντο πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν. [49] Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τοὺς πολέμους τοὺς τῶν ἡμιθέων ἐμυθολόγησεν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς μύθους εἰς ἀγῶνας καὶ πράξεις κατέστησαν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἀκουστοὺς ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ θεατοὺς γενέσθαι. Τοιούτων οὖν παραδειγμάτων ὑπαρχόντων δέδεικται τοῖς ἐπιθυμοῦσιν τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ψυχαγωγεῖν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν νουθετεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἀφεκτέον, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λεκτέον, οἷς ὁρῶσι τοὺς ὄχλους μάλιστα χαίροντας.
>
> 'This much is clear, that those who aim to write anything in verse or prose which will make a popular appeal should seek out, not the most profitable discourses, but those which most abound in myths; (. . .) That is why we may well admire the poet Homer and the first inventors of tragedy, seeing that they, with true insight in human nature, have embodied both kinds of pleasure [i.e. of ear and eye] in their poetry; [49] for Homer has dressed the contests and battles of the demigods in myths, while the tragic poets have rendered the myths in the form of contests and action, so that they are presented not to our ears alone, but to our eyes as well. With such models, then, before us, it is evident that those who desire to entertain their hearers must abstain from admonition and advice, and must say the things which they see are most pleasing to the crowd.'[132]

In these two passages the dividing lines are sharply drawn. In the one corner, we find Hesiod (with Theognis and Phocylides),[133] and in the other Homer (with his usual associates, the tragedians). The poetry typified by Hesiod is (1) 'most useful', (2) tries to 'advise' the audience, (3) appears to appeal to reason (his 'admonitions' are contrasted with ἀνοίαις or 'follies' in 43) and (4) is not pleasant. Homeric poetry on the other hand is described as (1) 'not the most profitable (. . .) but the richest in myth'; (2) trying to 'entertain' (ψυχαγωγεῖν), (3) appealing to the senses and (4) bringing pleasure to the audience. Hesiodic poetry is not appreciated by the many, whereas they love Homer and the tragedians, because these poets stoop to their level and give them exactly what they want.[134]

---

[132] *Idem*.

[133] The presence of the gnomic poets is a sure indication that Isocrates is referring to Hesiod as the author of the *WD*.

[134] Apart from the obvious oppositions, there are also more subtle ways in which Isocrates contrasts the two types of poetry. See for instance the highly ironic line 'That is why we may well admire (θαυμάζειν) the poet Homer and the first inventors of tragedy, seeing that they, with true insight in human nature, have embodied both kinds of pleasure in their poetry'. That we should 'admire' Homer is a commonplace, usually connected to the idea that Homer's poetry itself is full of θαῦμα (see for wonder in the *Certamen* ch. 7, pp. 253–254 and 267–268, and further below). Here, however, Isocrates ironically

It is perhaps possible to add to this list of oppositions the one between φύσις and τέχνη, or *ars* and *ingenium*.[135] It is true that in the second passage Isocrates does not speak of inspiration or μανία, but Plato's influence is obvious in the description of Homer's poetry as aimed at the senses, hedonistic, and generally setting a bad example. In the first passage, however, we *do* find hints suggesting non-inspired or technical composition. First of all, the poetry of Hesiod (and Theognis and Phocylides) is described as τεχνικῶς πεποιημένα, 'things composed technically'. In Isocrates, a text described as τεχνικός is a text that is intelligent, important and instructive, and can only be written by someone who has had a decent training[136]—obviously, someone like Isocrates himself, whose very speech *To Nicocles* resembles the *Works and Days* in other ways as well.[137] The attribution of τέχνη to Hesiod and his fellows is reinforced by the use of the verb ἐσπούδασαν, which denotes effort and hard work.[138] All this reflects on Homer and the tragedians too, who are thus accused of taking the easy road by pleasing the audience.

---

suggests we should admire Homer for seeing through 'the nature of man' (τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων) and thus being able to manipulate him so well; cf. Too (1995) 31–32, Bons (1996) 42–43. His relationship to mankind is thus totally different from Hesiod's, who wishes to improve 'the life of man' (τῷ βίῳ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων).

[135] See on Isocrates' notion of τέχνη Too (1995) 164–171.

[136] See e.g. *Contra Soph.* 12 and 15, *Ant.* 205 and 206 and especially *Panath.* 271, where Isocrates describes his own speech as belonging to that category of speeches that are 'more weighty and more worthy of serious study, discourses which are instructive and technical (…), which aim at the truth (…) and which rebuke our faults and admonish us' (σπουδαιοτέρους καὶ φιλοσοφωτέρους … τούς τε διδασκαλικοὺς καὶ τεχνικοὺς (…), τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας στοχαζομένους (…) καὶ τοὺς ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις καὶ νουθετοῦντας). This category is here too contrasted (and preferred) to speeches 'written for display or for the law-courts (…), spoken for our pleasure and gratification' (τῶν πρὸς τὰς ἐπιδείξεις καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας γεγραμμένων (…), πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ χάριν λεγομένων). Apart from the obvious similarities to the dichotomy described in *To Nicocles*, it is remarkable that the type of speech denounced here is connected to ἀγῶνες, just like the poetry of Homer and the tragedians. These remarkable similarities between the views of poetry in both speeches make it difficult to argue that the sharp contrast between the two types of poetry in *To Nicocles* is specific to this speech, as is argued by Poulakos (1997) 37, even though he is right to pay attention to the persona Isocrates wishes to create for himself in this oration (i.e. 'the type of adviser to the king who, committed to giving the best advice, speaks without regard to what the interlocuter wishes to hear', *ibid.*).

[137] Cf. Mirhady and Too (2000) 157, who note that 'the presentation of the material in the form of a catalogue of maxims shows the influence of Hesiod'. Interestingly, they also point to the democratic orientation of the treatise (despite its character as a 'mirror for a prince') and Isocrates' care to avoid being seen as a sophist (158).

[138] Cf. Dio Chrysostom's 36th oration, where Dio distinguishes Phocylides from Homer in the following way: '[Phocylides] is not one of those who string together a long

The passage from Isocrates' *To Nicocles* is treated so elaborately in this section because it is the first testimony explicitly linking Hesiod to technical writing, i.e. writing through τέχνη.[139] We can clearly see how, once again, Hesiod is constructed with the aid of his opposite Homer; at roughly the same time that Plato constructs his manic poet Homer, the idea of Hesiod as an uninspired labourer arises. This constitutes a definite downgrade of the traditional prophet of the Muses, and in my view, the de-inspiration (exhalation?) of Hesiod marks a turning-point in the history of Hesiod as a poetic symbol slowly losing its importance to Homer. For some time, however, it was precisely Hesiod's newly gained status as a technical writer that caused a veritable revival of poetic interest—but for this, as we will now see, a 'Callimachean revolution' was necessary.

---

and continuous poem, as your Homer does, who uses more than five thousand verses of continuous narration in describing a single battle; on the contrary, the poems of Phocylides have both beginning and end in two or three verses. And so he adds his name to each sentiment, because it is a serious matter and of great importance (ἅτε σπουδαῖον καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον ἡγούμενος), unlike Homer who nowhere named himself in his poetry' (36.12, transl. slightly altered). So here, too, Phocylides is described as regarding poetry as a serious affair (compare Isocrates' ἐσπούδασαν and Phocylides' σπουδαῖον) and in this being opposed to Homer (who is again characterized as writing on the subject of war).

[139] There are more references to Hesiod as exemplary of the 'technical' way of writing: his maxim to 'add little to little' (Plu. *Mor.* 9E; Doxopater 6.93 Walz) and insistence on hard work (Doxopater 6.96 Walz) were convenient hooks on which to hang this connection. The idea of Hesiod as a writer through τέχνη and training is a persistent one. The most interesting example, perhaps, comes from Lucian's *Professor of Public Speaking*, a satirical treatise in which a ῥητόρων διδάσκαλος promotes the new vogue in rhetorical education: no long training but a crash course in easy tricks. The tough road is presented as the 'narrow, thorny and rough path' (ἀτραπὸς στενὴ καὶ ἀκανθώδης καὶ τραχεῖα, *Rh.Pr.* 7; note the 'thorns', which will return in *AP* 11.20.2 below), which 'Hesiod described so well' (Ἡσίοδος εὖ μάλα ὑποδείξας αὐτὴν, *ibid.*). In a later passage, where the tough road is elaborately described in terms of extreme length and hardship (it was followed by Demosthenes, the example *par excellence* of the writer not naturally gifted but successful through hard work, who was, incidentally, a notorious water-drinker as well, cf. Athen. 2.44e, D. *Phil.* 2.30 and *Fals.Leg.* 46; see on water-drinking further below), Hesiod even appears as the 'guide of the rough road' (τῆς τραχείας ὁδοῦ ἐκείνης ἡγεμών, *Rh.Pr.* 9); he is not explicitly named, but his description says enough (in *Rh.Pr.* 9, he is described in terms that remind one of the cynic, 'a vigorous man with hard muscles and a manly stride, who shows heavy tan on his body' (καρτερός τις ἀνήρ, ὑπόσκληρος, ἀνδρώδης τὸ βάδισμα, πολὺν τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι δεικνύων); this already points to Hesiod, but the identification is made certain through comparison with *Ind.* 3, where Hesiod is called 'a hard-bitten, hairy man displaying rich tan on his body' (see for this passage also ch. 8, p. 279)). Cf. also *Rh.Pr.* 10, where the 'guide of the rough road' is called an 'impostor' (ἀλαζών), the same word used for Hesiod in *Sat.* 5, in a similarly ironic context (see

2.3. *The Hellenistic Hesiod: On Wine and Water*

As is well-known, the hellenistic age witnessed the birth of a new kind of poetry, which modern scholars (as well as the poets themselves) generally regard as breaking radically with the old. The 'revolution' has often been described: instead of traditional epic, characterized by grand themes, a grand style, considerable length and the presence of old-fashioned heroic values, the Alexandrian scholar-poets preferred another type of poem, which deals with humbler themes, seeks a more sophisticated and 'thin' (λεπτός) style, is considerably shorter in length (or strings together several shorter poems) and focuses on less heroic and more human values.[140] Moreover, the self-proclaimed shift from quantity to quality was accompanied by a renewed interest in τέχνη: the carefully crafted and thoroughly learned poems were endlessly polished and reworked. In this subsection, we will briefly discuss the hellenistic re-discovery of Hesiod and the concomitant revival of Hesiodic inspiration. Obviously, an exhaustive discussion of Hesiod's role in hellenistic poetics is far beyond the scope of the present book; and there are some very thorough monographs available.[141] I will focus, therefore, on a motif associated with inspiration by some of the hellenistic poets, i.e. the motif of water. This focus on the much-employed poetical symbol will sufficiently bring to the fore the difference perceived between Hesiodic and Homeric poetry in this period.

That Hesiod played a considerable role in Alexandrian poetics is doubted by no-one; according to one scholar, 'Hesiodic poetry was all the rage'.[142] Callimachus himself presented Hesiod as the prototypical exponent of the new poetry: he gave Hesiod a prominent place in the prologue to his own masterpiece, the *Aetia*,[143] and commended the poem of his fellow-poet Aratus with the following words:

---

further below, p. 359). (The last part of *Rh.Pr.* 10, where the professor advises his listener to 'bid a long good-bye to that hairy, unduly masculine fellow, leaving him to climb us himself, all blown and dripping with sweat', also obviously points to Hesiod.)

[140] See for a good discussion of the 'revolution' Bing (1988) 50–90.

[141] See, e.g. Reinsch-Werner (1976) on Hesiod and Callimachus, and Fakas (2001) on Hesiod and Aratus.

[142] Cameron (1995) 377; see also Sistakou (2009) 219 describing Callimachus and Aratus as the 'New Hesiods'.

[143] Fr. 2.1–5 Pf. Callimachus may have mentioned Hesiod again in the epilogue (depending on whether or not fr. 112 should be placed at the end of the *Aetia*); cf. Lamberton (1988) 151 '[the *Aitia*] opened and closed with Kallimakhos in the role of Hesiod on Mount Helikon'.

Ἡσιόδου τό τ' ἄεισμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος· οὐ τὸν ἀοιδὸν
ἔσχατον, ἀλλ' ὀκνέω μὴ τὸ μελιχρότατον
τῶν ἐπέων ὁ Σολεὺς ἀπεμάξατο· χαίρετε λεπταὶ
ῥήσιες, Ἀρήτου σύντονος ἀγρυπνίη.

'Hesiod's is the theme and Hesiod's the manner. I misdoubt
that not to the utter end but only the most honeysweet
of his verses has the poet of Soli copied. Hail subtle
discourses, the earnest vigil of Aratus.'[144]

Although the poem contains much that is uncertain, all scholars agree that it describes in a nutshell the new ideals of the hellenistic poets:[145] there are the 'subtle discourses' (λεπταὶ ῥήσιες),[146] the search for low-key, 'honeysweet' verses,[147] and the poet's hard work that keeps him up all night—a reflection of the Alexandrian belief that 'dichterische Inspiration allein nicht genügt, sondern unendlicher Fleiß und entsagungsvolle Arbeit bis tief in die Nacht hinein Voraussetzung für das Gelingen eines poetischen Kunstwerkes sind'.[148] These qualities are all

[144] Ep. 27 Pf. (= *AP* 9.507); the epigram is 'vieldiskutiert' (Hose 1994 196) and variant readings have been proposed, esp. with regard to the words ἀοιδὸν ἔσχατον (see on σύντονος ἀγρυπνίη, the other subject of much conjecture, e.g. Cameron 1972 and Hose 1994). Several scholars prefer the reading ἀοιδῶν at the end of the first line, suggested by Scaliger and adopted by Pfeiffer, because it opens up the possibility of Hesiod being contrasted to Homer: 'not the best of the poets [= presumably Homer] did he copy, but only the most honeysweet of his [= Hesiod's] verses' (see e.g. Wilamowitz 1924 I 206, Reinsch-Werner 1976 9–13, Schwinge 1986 13, Riedweg 1994 129, D'Alessio 1996 ad loc.). But this seems to strain the meaning of ἔσχατος, and makes it very difficult to understand the ἐπέων as belonging to Hesiod again (see further the most fervent defender of ἀοιδὸν, Cameron 1995 374–379, for no less than seven objections to ἀοιδῶν). The reading as transmitted must remain as it is.

[145] Cf. Possanza (2004) 88.

[146] The curious expression ῥήσιες is explained by Cameron (1995) 322, who detected a pun on Aratus' name, deliberately misspelled (ῥήσιες Ἀρήτου = 'utterances of the inutterable').

[147] Aratus called the Muses 'honey-sweet' (μειλίχιαι) in the proem to his *Phaenomena* (17); see Fakas (2001) 120 on Aratus' subtle way of claiming Hesiod as a predecessor. See Hunter (2009) 257–258 subtly reading an opposition with Homer in ἀπεμάξατο.

[148] Riedweg (1994) 132; see also Commager (1967) 24 on the 'toiling' poets Philetas, Callimachus, and Erinna. There is *double entendre* here: Aratus also had to stay awake for his studies of the heavenly phenomena. Some scholars believe Callimachus is ironic and hints that it was not so much the stars themselves, but the astronomical work of Eudoxus that Aratus was studying (see e.g. Bing 1988 36, Hose 1994, Nisetich 2001 312).

connected to Hesiod, who has delivered the 'theme' and the 'manner',[149] and whose presence at the very beginning overshadows the entire poem.[150]

How are we to understand this prominence of Hesiod? Two observations seem to be especially relevant here. First of all, we should not overemphasize the relative importance of Hesiod. In the past, it has often been suggested or even explicitly stated that the hellenistic embrace of Hesiod entailed a firm rejection of Homer; the obvious praise for Hesiod by Callimachus was taken as a justification for elaborate comparisons between Hesiod and the new poets, which at the same time tended to characterize Homer as an *a priori* less likely model.[151] This is obviously wrong: even though Hesiod is hailed as the new champion of poetry, Homer is not abandoned at all; the work of the hellenistic poets, including that of Callimachus, abounds with references to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.[152] Homer was still felt to be the greatest of poets, even so much so that he could

[149] Whatever these notions may mean exactly. Cameron (1995) 378 voices the obvious reading (ἄεισμα is subject matter, τρόπος stands for style and metrical technique), and rightfully rejects the interpretation of Reinsch-Werner 1976 ('Here is pure Hesiod'). Riedweg (1994) 127 assumes it is a hendyadyoin ('Hesiodeisch ist die Art dieses Gesangs'). I do not believe Stewart (2008) claiming the epigram says that Aratus' poem is Hesiodic in its 'essential character' (by which she means its didacticism) but Homeric in its style. There seems to have been an ancient debate about whether Aratus was more Hesiodic than Homeric, see Hunter (2009) 259–260.

[150] There is a remarkable echo of this epigram in an epigram preceding the text of the *WD* in two manuscripts (see Σ *WD* Prol. D Pertusi), not so far (to my knowledge) included in the interpretation of *Ep*. 27. The epigram misses its first line and continues: '… / of rams to call it delighted but of mortals. / Hail, Helicon, who nurtured such a man, hail, subtle / discourses from the Muse-inspired mouth of Hesiod' (… / ἀρνειῶν καλέειν εὔαδεν ἀλλὰ βροτῶν· / χαῖρ' Ἑλικὼν ὃς τοῖον ἐθρέψαο, χαίρετε λεπταὶ / ῥήσιες Ἡσιόδου μουσοπνόων στομάτων). The unmistakable references to Hesiod's meeting with the Muses (as described in *Th*. 22–34) make it likely that the first distich must have been something like: 'It delighted the Muses of Helicon (or, possibly, something like 'posterity') to call Hesiod not a shepherd of sheep and of rams but of mortals'.

[151] Reinsch-Werner (1976) *passim*; Schwinge (1986) 14 speaking of Hesiod as the 'Patron, ja in kallimacheischer Perspektive gewissermaßen Archeget der neuen Dichtung' or as the 'die neue Dichtung legitimierende Gegenautorität gegen die von Kallimachos' Gegnern reklamierte Autorität Homer' (*ibid*.); cf. also Fakas (2001) 46 'die Nachahmung Hesiods wird nicht als Selbstzweck betrieben, sondern als Mittel, um Homer zu überwinden'. See also the wholly unfounded remark of Myres (1958) 27 that Homer was 'much out of his element (…) in the dull, gaudy, modern, cosmopolitan Alexandria' or Too's easy claim that 'Hesiod is the evident subtext' for 'the association between the divine, the political, and the library' (1998 118).

[152] Cf. Cameron (1995) 375. We should also note that Callimachus' praise for Hesiod is qualified. Both the *Aetia* and the *Phaenomena* are didactic poems, which are to some degree naturally modelled on Hesiod. On the other hand, it is somewhat over-clever to

not be rivalled[153]—and Hesiod is used to make that point. Callimachus so emphatically picked Hesiod as the new poetical example because he wanted to emphatically reject the neo-Homeric poetry of his own time. Hesiod, so it seems, was not primarily selected for his own poetic qualities, but for his reputation for being the non-Homer. The promotion of Hesiod over Homer is more of a metaphor than a reality, especially useful as a slogan for change. This is not to deny, of course, that there were numerous qualities of Hesiodic poetry that the new poets could relate to.[154]

The second observation is most relevant to this section: in order to promote Hesiod, the story of his inspiration is reinvigorated. As his poethood is reinstated, the connection to the divine is reopened and will never be shut off again. The new poets are both toiling and inspired at the same time, and Hesiod is their most obvious role model; inspiration is linked to learning and knowledge again, since the hellenistic poets are self-proclaimed polymaths like Hesiod himself.[155] There are some explicit references to Hesiod's inspiration in the hellenistic age, notably by Callimachus, whose two descriptions of the event are very similar: in both cases the Muses meet Hesiod 'close to the foot-print of the fiery horse',[156] 'while tending his sheep'.[157] Both circumstances are probably metapoetically significant: the latter calls attention to the modest nature of Hesiodic poetry and is perhaps meant to refer to the genre of bucolic poetry; the former is a reference to the well struck by Pegasus, the Hippocrene, mentioned as a favorite dwelling-place of the

---

point out that epigram 27, speaking of copying 'only the most honeysweet of his verses', suggests that 'there was a substantial residue left behind that was not sweet' (Cameron 1995 378).

[153] Cf. Asper (1997) 122 (and n.66) speaking of Homer as an 'Überdichter'.

[154] See Reinsch-Werner (1976) 16–19 for the formal qualities imitated by Callimachus; her claim that he did not follow's Hesiod *qua* content is somewhat marred by her anachronistic judgement of Hesiod's supposedly 'uneinheitliche, unlogische Gedachtenführung'. Lamberton (1988) 150 is more on the mark in stating that 'the Alexandrians found in Hesiod pre-echoes of their own aestheticism, their own delight in the play of illusion and convention.'

[155] See for the positive evaluation of πολυμαθία (traditionally associated with Hesiod, see ch. 6) Call. fr. 460 Pf., which praises Aratus as 'a very learned and excellent poet', πολυμαθῆ καὶ ἄριστον ποιητήν. For the continuity of Hesiod's inspiration as the transfer of knowledge see e.g. Lucian *Dem.Enc.* 12 (ironically picturing Hesiod's inspiration as the quick and easy equivalent of years of training and education, cf. *Rh.Pr.* 4 and *Ind.* 3, on which see n.175 below).

[156] Call. fr. 2.1 and 112.6: παρ' ἴχνιον ὀξέος ἵππου.

[157] Call. fr. 2.1: μῆλα νέμοντι, and fr. 112.5: πολλὰ νέμοντι βοτά.

Muses in *Theogony* 6—this is an example of the pure and exquisite water that Callimachus often uses to characterize his own poetry and inspiration.[158]

Remarkably enough, water also plays an important part in the other hellenistic descriptions of Hesiod's inspiration, i.e. those of Asclepiades and Alcaeus of Messene. In the epigram by Asclepiades (*AP* 9.64), the Muses meet Hesiod again while he is 'feeding his sheep' (ποιμαίνοντα μῆλα), and give him a laurel and 'inspiring water of the Heliconian spring, that the hoof of the winged horse once struck' (κράνας Ἑλικωνίδος ἔνθεον ὕδωρ, / τὸ πτανοῦ πώλου πρόσθεν ἔκοψεν ὄνυξ); 'after he had his fill' he wrote the *Theogony*, *Works and Days* and *Catalogue*. In *AP* 7.55, Alcaeus tells us how nymphs wash the body of the deceased Hesiod with water, and goat-herds (ποιμένες) pour libations of milk and honey; the poet is then described as the 'old man who had tasted the pure fountains of the nine Muses' (ἐννέα Μουσέων ὁ πρέσβυς καθαρῶν γευσάμενος λιβάδων). We can thus see a recurrence of motifs clearly to be understood as metapoetical: the herding, the honey, and the pure water.[159] Through them, Hesiod is made into a poet both inspired *and* refined.[160]

Using the concept of 'water' as a metaphor for a type of speech is not new.[161] In the fifth century, water was employed as the opposite of wine, which was closely associated with inspiration even earlier.[162] Wine, moreover, was probably thought to lead to a particular kind of poetry,

---

[158] See Kambylis (1965) 98–102, and Commager (1967) 28 commenting dryly that 'some Alexandrian writers boldly declared that the waters of the holy spring were now available as a bottled commodity'. According to Knox (1985) 117, water is not a literary symbol for Callimachus, but it is its source that matters to him: he seeks pure and unfamiliar springs. But the origin is only one aspect of the water-metaphor; see further below.

[159] Cf. Nic. *Ther*. 10–12 situating Hesiod's song 'on the steeps of secluded Melisseeis by the waters of Permessus.' Melisseeis ('Bee-place') is an unknown or imaginary location on Helicon, named after the hard-working bees with which the honeysweet hellenistic poets compared themselves (see the bibliography in Asper 1997 115 n.21).

[160] See for the connection between 'pure' (καθαρός) and the hellenistic ideal of 'refined' (λεπτός) Schwinge (1986) 15.

[161] See on the wine-water debate e.g. Kambylis (1965) 118–122, Crowther (1979), Knox (1985), and the brief but rather thorough discussion of Asper (1997) 128–134.

[162] According to Alcaeus, song and wine belong together (fr. 70 Lobel-Page); Simonides said that wine and music have the same origin (fr. 647 Page), and turned wine into a metaphor for poetry (fr. 602 Page); the epic poet Panyassis claimed that 'every song, every dance, every passionate love, goes with wine' (fr. 14 Kinkel). Of course such beliefs were easily conceived during symposia, where 'poetry circulated amongst the guests like the wine which they drank' (Murray 1996 17).

i.e. the magnificent, bombastic and overwhelming kind, that is often said to release one of all cares.[163] In classical times we find numerous references to the wine-water controversy, especially in Aristophanes; in the *Knights*, for instance, wine is said to inspire great ideas, which is later opposed to speaking on a stomach full of water.[164] Aristophanes' contemporary Phrynichus testifies to water-drinking as a well-known art-metaphor when he calls the musician Lamprus 'a water-drinking mortal, a mincing charlatan surpassing them all, dry bone of the Muses, nightmare to nightingales, a hymn of Hell.'[165] The rise of wine as an artist's favourite drink was undoubtedly connected to the rise of the new concept of inspiration, i.e. that of divine frenzy.[166] It thus appears that wine and water were common symbols for different types of speech as early as the fifth century.[167]

What *does* seem new, however, in the hellenistic use of the concept of water, is the inclusion of Hesiod and Homer into the debate: Hesiod is turned into a water-drinker, and opposed to the consumption of wine. Antipater of Thessaloniki (who perhaps coined the term 'water-drinker') began an epigram addressed to Helicon by referring to Hesiod's drinking from the Hippocrene, and then asks a boy to pour him 'an Ausonian wine from a source even more carefree. And I would rather drink one single cup of that than a thousand from your Pegasus' source.'[168] Another of his epigrams (*AP* 11.20) also illustrates the opposition:

---

[163] Alcaeus fr. 338, 358 Lobel-Page; Archilochus 120 West; Epicharmus fr. 131 K-A.

[164] Ar. *Eq*. 85–96 and 347–350. See also Cratinus fr. 203 K-A, Eubulus fr. 133 K-A, Amphis fr. 41 K-A. Aristophanes is supposed to have asked the audience once to forgive his weak jokes since he had been taken ill earlier and was forced to drink water (fr. 346 K-A).

[165] Phrynichus fr. 74 K-A: ἄνθρωπος ὢν ὑδατοπότης, μινυρὸς ὑπερσοφιστής, / Μουσῶν σκελετός, ἀηδόνων ἠπίαλος, ὕμνος Ἅιδου.

[166] See Ar. *Ran*. 356–357 and O'Sullivan (1992) 118–119; Euripides says that a lot of Dionysus inside one's body will cause prophecy (*Bacch*. 298–301) and Plato compares poets to bacchants, stressing the ecstatic condition of both (*Ion* 534a–b).

[167] Asper's (1997 128–134) discussion of 'Wasser und Wein' is of great use for its bibliographical value and its overview of the most important issues, but his analysis is flawed by his strict (and anachronistic) distinction between the 'Lebensweisen und Arbeitsauffassungen' of poets and their style, which leads him to believe that 'die vorhellenistische Tradition dieses Gegensatzes ist nicht poetologisch' (128). It is beside the point to describe a claim that wine brings inspiration as 'Apologie übermäßigen Weingenusses' (128), and simply misleading to quote only one-fifth of Phrynichus' attack on Lamprus and conclude that this fragment deals with 'eine Kennzeichnung seines Charakters ('ein trockener Typ'), nicht seiner Musik' (130 n.102).

[168] *AP* 11.24: Αὔσονα Βάκχον / οἰνοχοεῖ κρήνης ἐξ ἀμεριμνοτέρης. / βουλοίμην δ' ἂν ἔγωγε πιεῖν παρὰ τοῦδε κύπελλον / ἓν μόνον ἢ παρὰ σεῦ χίλια Πηγασίδος.

Φεύγεθ' ὅσοι λόκκας ἢ λοφνίδας ἢ καμασῆνας
ἄδετε, ποιητῶν φῦλον ἀκανθολόγων,
οἵ τ' ἐπέων κόσμον λελυγισμένον ἀσκήσαντες,
κρήνης ἐξ ἱερῆς πίνετε λιτὸν ὕδωρ.
σήμερον Ἀρχιλόχοιο καὶ ἄρσενος ἦμαρ Ὁμήρου
σπένδομεν· ὁ κρητὴρ οὐ δέχεθ' ὑδροπότας.

'Away with you who sing of *loccae*, *lophnides* or *camasenes*,[169]
race of thorn-gathering poets;
and you who practising effeminately decorative verse
drink only simple water from the holy fount.
Today we pour the wine in honour of the birthday of Archilochus
and virile Homer. Our bowl receives no water-drinkers.'

In this epigram the water-drinkers and their bleak, over-sophisticated poetry are set against the verses of 'virile' Homer. When we combine Antipater's two epigrams, we find Hesiod (implicitly) and Homer (explicitly) connected to the two opposite drinking-camps. It should be noted, however, that the poets are brought into a debate that is much older: the arguments used by Antipater to counter Callimachus' poetics are essentially the same as those used centuries earlier. Euripides, for instance, was ridiculed by Aristophanes for his learned words and effeminacy, whereas the (Homeric) Aeschylus was portrayed as a manly poet.[170] The term ἀκανθολόγοι, with its association with dryness (curiously paradoxical for a water-drinker), reminds us of Phrynichus' Μουσῶν σκελετός ('dry bone of the Muses') just as the κόσμον λελυγισμένον ('effeminate decoration') is foreshadowed by his ὑπερσοφιστής, because the term can refer not only to effeminacy but also to the twistings of a sophist.[171]

Apart from the epigrams, there is other evidence for overlap between the wine-water dichotomy and the opposition between Homer and Hesiod, although it is considerably later.[172] Dio Chrysostom, for instance, in

[169] Obscure and obsolete words denoting 'cloaks', 'torches' and 'fish'.

[170] Cf. O'Sullivan (1992) 146–150.

[171] The Suda offers λελυγισμένος as a gloss for ἁβρός (1.12), but λυγισμοί are also bendings of dancers, wrestlers, and, metaphorically, sophists; it is in fact Euripides who is said to excel in them (Ar. *Ran.* 775).

[172] There are two more epigrams that deserve attention. First, in *AP* 11.61, there is a sick man who is prescribed water by a doctor accused of quackery, because he apparently 'never learnt that Homer calls wine the strength of men' (οὐδ' ἐδιδάχθη, / ὅττι μένος μερόπων οἶνον Ὅμηρος ἔφη—the reference is probably to *Il.* 9.706). As in Aristophanes, water is associated with sickly persons, while wine is credited with the special capacity of imparting power to whomever drinks it. Of greater interest, however, is *AP* 15.22, where a certain Simias sings praise of the Phocian Epeius, who fought in the Trojan War and 'dashed down from their seats the gilded kings, [Epeius,] a man who was not reckoned

the *Trojan Oration* compares Homeric poetry as a 'pleasure-drug' (φάρμακον τῆς ἡδονῆς) to wine.[173] According to Demetrius, people writing in what he calls the 'compacted' (κατεστραμμένη) style, an elaborate but artificial way of composition (contrasted with the simple, untutored 'disjointed' or διῃρημένη style), resemble tipsy men (οἰνώμενοι); examples are Isocrates, Gorgias, Alcidamas, and of course Homer.[174] Lucian, on the other hand, attacks an empty-headed but pretentious book-buyer by contrasting him with Hesiod, pictured again as drinking water from the Hippocrene.[175] In one passage from Plutarch Hesiod is accused of ignorance in the field of vinology,[176] and in another said to have held the belief—just like Pindar—that water is best, since Chaos, the primal principle of the universe, is actually Hesiod's name for water 'because it flows' (παρὰ τὴν χύσιν).[177]

---

among the chieftains of the Achaeans, but one of low degree (δυσκλής) who carried water from the pure fountains (ἀπὸ κρανᾶν ἰθαρᾶν νᾶμα κόμιζε). But now he has entered the path of Homer (νῦν δ' ἐς Ὁμήρειον ἔβα κέλευθον), thanks to thee, holy Pallas of many counsels. Thrice blessed he whom with a gracious mind thou watchest over. This blessedness ever lives and breathes (ὅδ' ὄλβος ἀεὶ πνεῖ)'. This Epeius was a proverbial coward but is nonetheless mentioned as one of the men who helped to build the wooden horse, and as belonging to the select group of volunteers actually entering it; the epigram seems to congratulate him on his career-change from zero to hero. His former status, remarkably enough, is defined by portraying him as drawing water from pure fountains. This changes thanks to Pallas, called 'the manly goddess' in the first line, who gave him the idea of the horse and thus made him 'walk the Homeric path', which evidently means that she turned him into a warrior, a profession not to be associated with water. Although wine is not mentioned, we know it is the warrior's drink, breathing into man the power necessary for combat, and as such associated with Homer. It is interesting that Epeius' blessing, caused by a life-changing moment of inspiration, is said to 'breathe' forever, since Epeius' newly-acquired 'Homerness' is thus expressed on three levels: the originally water-carrying (Hesiodic?) coward, keeping far from battle, through a Homeric type of inspiration (1) turns his efforts to a Homeric occupation (2) and is thus celebrated forever in Homeric fashion (3).

[173] D.Chrys. *Or*. 11.42–43; cf. Plu. *Mor*. 15E–F speaking of the intoxicating wine of the myths which needs be tempered by the water of philosophy.

[174] Demetr. *Eloc*. 12–15.

[175] Lucian *Ind*. 3: 'Come now, do you [= the book-buyer] maintain that without instruction you know as much as we? How can you, unless, like the shepherd of old, you once received a branch of laurel from the Muses? [...] Instead of giving you laurel they would have scourged you with myrtle or sprays of mallow and would have made you keep your distance from those regions, so as not to pollute either Olmeios or the Hippocrene, whose waters only thirsty flocks or the clean lips of shepherds may drink (ἄπερ ἢ ποιμνίοις διψῶσιν ἢ ποιμένων στόμασιν καθαροῖς πότιμα).'

[176] Plu. *Mor*. 701 D-E; cf. Pliny the Elder referring to Hesiod for the medicinal effects of wine but to Homer for its intoxication (*NH* 23.43).

[177] Plu. *Mor*. 955D; cf. *Mor*. 725D, where Hesiod according to Plutarch aptly praises

In the hellenistic re-appraisal of Hesiod, we see ancient and traditional notions of Hesiodic poetry and inspiration recycled and adjusted for new purposes; old water in new bottles, one might say. This blend of tradition and innovation produced a Hesiod that was a fitting symbol for a new age, but nonetheless could not stop the growth of Homer's all-importance. In the end, the shepherd sipping from the Hippocrene was no match for the poet supposedly born from a river.

3. *The Hesiodic Genre: The Rise of a Didactic Poet*

In this section, I will (briefly) deal with a third watershed supposedly separating the poetry of Hesiod and Homer, i.e. that of aim or function: as was noted before, when comparing the two poets most scholars nowadays either implicitly or explicitly assume that whereas Homer composed heroic epic to entertain, Hesiod wrote didactic poetry to instruct.[178] Such simplified typifications exist even though boundaries are admittedly blurry; it is obvious, for instance, that Homeric poetry has a didactic quality that is often commented upon by scholars focusing on his poetry alone.[179] We will now investigate whether or not the ancients believed Hesiod to be didactic, and to what degree they thought didacticism belonged to the Hesiodic 'genre'.

Obviously, 'genre' is a difficult concept to deal with generally,[180] and this seems to be even more so when applied to the study of ancient literature;[181] therefore, I will not concern myself here with a discussion

---

water of ''an ever-flowing and a running spring, and one untroubled'; for that is healthy which is uncorrupted …' (quoting *WD* 595).

[178] See section 2.1 above, pp. 319–324. Nonetheless, such agreement does not definitely settle matters. It is still unclear, for instance, whether didactic poetry can be called epic or not, or how we should classify Hesiod's *Catalogue* and *Shield*.

[179] See e.g. Jaeger (1945) 39–40 ascribing didactic intent to Homer himself; Verdenius (1970) 21–26 believes Homer is generally not didactic, but he can nonetheless pinpoint the passages where 'Homer himself is lecturing' (21). Clay (2003) 69 argues that Hesiod pictures both kings and singers as offering 'not truth, but distraction'; Heath (1985) somewhat overzealously distinguishes between two types of didacticism and argues that Hesiod's poems are not 'finally' didactic (i.e. 'intended to instruct') but 'formally' didactic (i.e. 'purporting to be intended to instruct').

[180] See e.g. Gutzwiller (1991) 9–13 for a brief introduction to genre theory.

[181] Even though notions of genre existed in antiquity (the Greeks spoke of different εἴδη or 'kinds' of literature), there seem to be two fundamental problems in understanding them. First of all, existing notions were considerably less explicit than today, especially in pre-Aristotelian times, which has sometimes caused modern preconceptions to creep

of the implications of this term. What I do wish to point out, however, is that our investigation of Hesiodic and Homeric poetry so far showed us that distinctions, oppositions and general qualifications are sometimes so pronounced, especially in the post-classical age, that it seems that Hesiod was definitely associated with a certain 'kind' of poetry. Apparently, Callimachus could qualify the ἄεισμα and τρόπος of the *Phaenomena*, a didactic poem written in a subtle style, as 'Hesiodic'—and this certainly seems like a 'genre'.[182] It will be worth our while, therefore, to examine how later recipients dealt with the Callimachean description.

Searching for the Hesiodic genre is a nearly impossible enterprise for the archaic and classical period. There are many reasons for this, the most important one being that up to the third century BC there was no broad consensus on the way form, style, or subject matter should be defined in the case of Hesiod. Even the most basic definition of Hesiod, i.e. as a poet, is not unanimously accepted: Hippias and Protagoras, for instance, seem to place him into this category, and so does the oft-heard expression 'Homer and Hesiod and the other poets',[183] but Aristotle, the great systematizer of poetry, does not acknowledge Hesiod as a poet and regards him rather as a primitive thinker. Searching for further specifications, such as Hesiod the didactic poet or Hesiod the gnomic poet, thus becomes rather fruitless; of course such specifications can be found in certain cases,[184] but they are on the whole limited to a certain context.[185]

---

in and blur the picture. Secondly, in times that *do* show an obvious explicit and implicit interest in genre and tradition, boundaries between ancient genres (insofar as we can understand and reconstruct them) were often considered rather fluid, and were in fact constantly crossed and redefined by the authors themselves—this holds especially true for the hellenistic period (see e.g. Harder e.a. 1998, Hinds 1998).

[182] Call. *Ep*. 27 (see pp. 334–336 above). Cf. Fakas (2001) 40 on Aratus honouring Hesiod as the 'πρῶτος εὑρετής und Archeget der didaktischen Dichtung'.

[183] See ch. 3.2.1 above, p. 115.

[184] See, for instance, the scholion on *Od*. 15.74, noting that Menelaus' maxim 'One should welcome the present guest, and send off him that would go' is not often transmitted in Homeric texts; he concludes that the 'expression' (τῆς φράσεως ὁ χαρακτήρ) is too Hesiodic, while another scholion adds that the discourse mode (σχῆμα) is 'gnomic' (γνωμικόν).

[185] We should also consider that both Hesiod and Homer, as the only really ἀρχαῖοι poets of Greece and the *fontes* of all education and learning, because of this special status to some degree resist classification. It is only after the poems of Hesiod and Homer were created, it was believed, that literature diversified and different genres crystallized, so that the earliest poets more or less pervade them all (and this goes especially for Homer, see section 5 below).

This is not to say, of course, that there were no discernible tendencies considering Hesiod's form, style, or subject matter; we have discussed them above. But it is especially in the hellenistic age that they could be unified so as to turn Hesiod into a poetic symbol of a distinct kind. In many respects, the Alexandrian circle with its literary awareness and metapoetical interest seems the obvious place for such a development. The transformation of Hesiod into the quiet writer of subtle themes is also clearly in part due to the Alexandrians' need to come up with a literary champion that could compete with the Homer that everybody else was following. They needed a non-Homer to whom they could attribute their own, coherent system of poetics (which of course corresponded to a large degree to typifications of Hesiod already current). We should further note that the emergence of Hesiod as a poet of a distinct kind (as opposed to a thinker or moralist) occurs in the context of a *group* of poets sharing certain ideas about literature and looking for some way of grounding their own, new and different poetical identity—and they did this by reinvigorating a cultural emblem from the past.[186] It is only when there is a group of intellectuals and artists who share a certain view of literature that the concept of genre can exist. This is why it can be argued that the concept of genre (however framed exactly) fully developed among the hellenistic poets. And Hesiod, their poetic champion, formed part of their tools to describe it.

The investigation into the Hesiodic 'genre' in this section is very limited. First, we will see how Callimachus passed on the name of Hesiod as an important metapoetical signpost to his Roman successors, who maintained a fairly rigid system of genre and seem to have had a clear idea about how to categorize Hesiod. We will then see how the didacticism attributed to Hesiod typified him in later Greek rhetorical handbooks, where his name is connected to (morally) instructive subgenres like the maxim or the fable.

3.1. *The* interpretatio latina

In this brief subsection, I will focus on some passages from Ovid, Virgil, and Propertius, because they show the most explicit references to Hesiod

[186] This is different from the mnemonic mechanism discussed in chapter 2.1, i.e. that every recipient of Hesiod defines his relationship to the earlier poet to a large degree in his own individual way, and models the poet after his own image.

as a poetic symbol.[187] In the works of the golden poets, Hesiod's status as a farmer or shepherd is conspicuously stressed. Virgil characterizes his *Georgics* as an 'Ascraean song' (*Ascraeum carmen*),[188] and Propertius refers to this work of Virgil as 'the precepts of the old bard of Ascra, in what soil flourishes the corn, on what hill the grape.'[189] The grape and the grain return in Ovid's description of Hesiodic poetry, which he contrasts to that of Homer:

> vivet Maeonides, Tenedos dum stabit et Ide,
> dum rapidas Simois in mare volvet aquas;
> vivet et Ascraeus, dum mustis uva tumebit,
> dum cadet incurva falce resecta Ceres.
>
> 'Maeonia's son [= Homer] will live as long as Tenedos will stand, and Ida, as long as Simois shall roll his waters rushing to the sea; the poet of Ascra, too, will live as long as the grape shall swell for the vintage, as long as Ceres shall fall beneath the stroke of the curving sickle.'[190]

Obviously, the agricultural quality of Hesiodic poetry is set against the heroic themes of Homer here—the island Tenedos, Mt. Ida and the river Simois are all connected to the Trojan Cycle. In the *Culex*, a work falsely attributed to Virgil, mention is made of shepherds who live a carefree life in the Tempe-valley, 'vying each for himself with the bard of Ascra',[191] and Ovid, who described Hesiod as 'keeping flocks' (*servans pecudes*) in the *Ars Amatoria* (1.28), combined the two professions of farmer and shepherd in the *Fasti* where he says he was inspired by a special goddess, 'not those whom the teacher of ploughing beheld when he followed his Ascraean sheep.'[192]

These citations show that the Latin poets concentrated on the *Works and Days* as the Hesiodic work *par excellence*.[193] They also show that they considered this a didactic work (see Propertius' *praecepta* and Ovid's *praeceptor*).[194] But the Hesiod of the *Theogony* was not forgotten; it was

---

[187] See for a more inclusive treatment Rosati (2009).

[188] *Georg.* 2.176. *Ascraeus* refers not only to Hesiod but to Callimachus c.s. as well, cf. Thomas (1988) ad loc. and Clausen (1994) 203. See for an analysis of the relationship between the *Georgics* and the *WD* Nelson (1998).

[189] Prop. 2.34.77–78: *Ascraei veteris praecepta poetae, / quo seges in campo, quo viret uva iugo.*

[190] Ovid *Amores* 1.15.9–12.

[191] [Virg.] *Culex* 96: *aemulus Ascraeo pastor sibi quisque poetae.*

[192] Ovid *Fasti* 6.13–14: *non quas praeceptor arandi / viderat, Ascraeas cum sequeretur oves.*

[193] Cf. Rosati (2009) 349.

[194] Cf. Rosati (2009) 356: 'Hesiod (. . .) is above all the *auctor* of the didactic tradition.'

in fact the authorship of this serious and grand poem that made him useful for the Latin writers as a means of legitimizing their own kind of poetry, which they took seriously as well. This much is clear from a much-discussed passage from Virgil's *Eclogues*, in which the poet Gallus, 'wandering by the streams of Permessus' (*errantem Permessi ad flumina*, 6.64), is met by the legendary Linus, 'a shepherd of immortal song' (*divino carmine pastor*, 6.67), who addresses him thus (6.69–71):

> Hos tibi dant calamos, en accipe, Musae,
> Ascraeo quos ante seni, quibus ille solebat
> cantando rigidas deducere montibus ornos.
> his tibi Grynei nemoris dicatur origo …
>
> 'These reeds—see, take them—the Muses give you—even those they once gave the old Ascraean, wherewith, as he sang, he would draw the unyielding ash trees down the mountain sides. With these do you tell of the birth of the Grynean wood …'

This scene is generally taken to refer to Gallus' switch from love poetry to the 'higher' genre of pastoral.[195] The poet receives the reed-pipe, a symbol of pastoral or bucolic poetry, and is thus transferred to the 'loftier company' of Hesiod,[196] to whom the Muses once presented a similar gift. That Gallus is ordered to speak of the *origo* of the Grynean wood is another indication that he is placed in the tradition of Hesiod and Callimachus, both singers of *origines*. Propertius too speaks of the difference in status between love poetry and Hesiodic poetry.[197]

It is not just the 'theme', however, that defines Hesiodic poetry for the Romans; it is obvious that they had to some degree inherited the stylistic characteristics attributed to Hesiod by the hellenistic poets. Homer's Ida and the rushing waters of the Simois (from Ovid's *Amores* quoted

---

[195] The Permessus is in Propertius 2.10.25–26 the stream that inspires love-elegy, and *errare* is a verb typically used of unhappy lovers and love-poets (Putnam 1970 212); cf. Hunter (2006) 27.

[196] Putnam (1970) 213.

[197] Prop. 2.10.25–26: *nondum etiam Ascraeos norunt mea carmina fontes, / sed modo Permessi flumine lavit Amor* ('not as yet are my verses acquainted with the springs of Ascra; Love has dipped them only in Permessus' stream'). A similar opposition between love poetry and Hesiodic poetry may be behind *AP* 9.161, also composed during the reign of Augustus. Interestingly enough, it seems that Hesiod is sometimes associated with love-poetry as well, see e.g. Verg. *Georg.* 4.35–437 and Rosati (2009) 360–365. It was undoubtedly the *Catalogue* (that exerted a great influence on hellenistic poetry as well, see Sistakou 2009 238 with note 61) that created this association.

above) form not only a thematic, but also a stylistic opposition with Hesiod's grape and grain. Mountains and rivers are usual metaphors for epic in the Homeric, magnificent and overwhelming style;[198] by contrast, the symbols used for Hesiodic poetry are small, useful, and connected to intense labour. Hesiod's Ceres is *resecta*, not only 'cut off' but also 'restrained',[199] and the only things 'swelling' in his work are grapes (*tumidus*, 'swollen', is a technical term used to describe a bombastic and pompous style). Similarly, Virgil's description of Hesiod as one who *solebat cantando rigidas deducere montibus ornos* not only indicates, on a superficial level, the immense charm of his verse,[200] but also on a metapoetical level congratulates him on having treated a difficult epic subject in such a fine and delicate way: the *rigidas ornos* likely refer to the *Theogony* (*orni* are common symbols for epic subject matter, and *rigidus* points to the 'tough' subject of the birth of the cosmos), and *deducere* is a technical term for the fine, subtle or λεπτός style.[201]

With respect to both theme and style, then, the Augustan poets seem to have a very consistent and almost rigid conception of Hesiodic poetry: Hesiod wrote didactic epic in a subtle style, differing in theme and style from Homer.

---

[198] Homer himself is often associated with rivers, cf. *AP* 9.184, 9.522; we should not forget the tradition making him the son of the river Meles (cf. e.g. *AP* 2.407–408, Cert. 9–10 Allen, [Plu.] *Vit. Po.* 2, Hsch. s.v. Suda 3.524.27, Anon. *Vita Romana* 3).

[199] *Reseco* is—to my knowledge—not a very marked metapoetical word, but it can be used metaphorically for 'checking' or 'curtailing' language (cf. Plin. *Ep.* 2.5.4).

[200] Being able to move inanimate objects through song was a sign of tremendous poetical power; Orpheus is the poet most often associated with this capability (and, according to some sources, the father of Hesiod). This is the only passage in antiquity crediting Hesiod with such powers. This 'superficial' reading is the only one allowed by the modern commentators Coleman, Clausen, and Putnam.

[201] It is interesting to compare this passage to Prop. 2.13.3–9, where the poet says that Love 'suffered me not to scorn these delicate muses (*me tam graciles vetuit contemnere Musas*), but commanded me to dwell, as I do, in Ascra's grove' (*iussit et Ascraeum sic habitare nemus*); not that Pierian oaks should follow my words (…), but rather that Cynthia be held spellbound by my verse: then would my skill bring me greater fame than Linus of Argos'. Because Hesiod's name is here obviously connected to love poetry, it has been suggested that the *Ascraeum nemus* simply represents poetic excellence in general (so Camps 1967 ad loc., cf. Kambylis 1965 179 describing the *nemus* as an *Oberbegriff*), but this is unlikely: it is obviously Hesiod's sweet and seductive style which Propertius is anxious to adopt, but he clearly says his theme will be different: his poem will not be about oaks (indicating an epic subject), but about love.

3.2. *Hesiod in the Handbooks*

Proof for the didacticism of Hesiod can also be found in the rhetorical handbooks of later times. Hesiod does not feature prominently in these writings, but when he does, he is usually associated with two text types typical of wisdom poetry: the *chreia* or 'maxim',[202] and especially the *ainos* or 'fable',[203] which will be briefly discussed here.

There are some indications that the *ainos* had always been seen as something connected to Hesiod,[204] but the first explicit link is made by Quintilian, in an age and a treatise quite concerned with the definition and delimitation of text types. When Quintilian called Hesiod the *fabella*'s *primus auctor* (5.11.19), he was probably reporting a common belief. What is more interesting, is that he immediately seems to try to connect this to what is further known of Hesiod since he remarks that 'they [fables] often attract the mind, particularly that of uneducated rustics, who listen to fiction in a simpler spirit and, in their delight, readily assent to things that they enjoy hearing'[205]—it is hard not to understand the image of the audience of uneducated rustics as summoned by the farmer-poet himself. Hermogenes in a somewhat similar vein mentions *ainoi* as very fit for children since *ainoi* can shape their still malleable souls; Hesiod is here the example as well.[206]

Plutarch, unwilling—as usual—to depreciate Hesiod in any sense, first stresses Hesiod's knowledge concerning everyday life and then suggests Aesop was a pupil of Hesiod, 'for the words of the hawk to the nightingale first suggested to Aesop the idea of this beautiful and ingenious wisdom uttered by many different tongues.'[207] Other sources connecting the

---

[202] See Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.52; Plu. *Thes*. 3.2; Hermog. *Prog*. 1.23 Walz; Doxopater 2.251 Walz.

[203] The *ainos* in Hesiod's (and Homer's) time denotes a kind of enigmatic discourse invested with a persuasive agenda (see Mordine 2006 364–365); in later times, the term is more specifically used for the '(animal) fable'. I have nevertheless chosen to use the conventional translation 'fable' above because I will discuss rather late sources anyway.

[204] See Irwin (1998) 181–182, esp. n.36.

[205] Quint. *Inst*. 5.11.19: *ducere animos solent praecipue rusticorum et imperitorum, qui et simplicius quae ficta sunt audiunt, et capit voluptate facile iis quibus delectantur consentiunt*. Cf. p. 164 n.17 above.

[206] Hermog. *Prog*. 1.10 Walz.

[207] Plu. *Mor*. 158B: τούτῳ γὰρ ἀρχὴν τῆς καλῆς ταύτης καὶ ποικίλης καὶ πολυγλώσσου σοφίας ὁ πρὸς τὴν ἀηδόνα λόγος τοῦ ἱέρακος.

ainos to Hesiod also leave out the lack of intellectual maturation in the audience, and emphasize its didactic function.[208] Of special interest is the explanation of *ainos* in the Suda (2.173):

> Αἶνος: λόγος παροιμιώδης. (…) αἶνός τίς ἐστιν· ὡς ἀνήρ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνήρ, ὄρνιθα κοὐκ ὄρνιθα, ὄρνιθα δ' ὅμως, ἐπὶ ξύλου με κοὐ ξύλου καθημένην, λίθῳ τε κοὐ λίθῳ με βαλὼν διώλεσεν. εὐνοῦχος, νυκτερίς, νάρθηξ, κίσσηρις. αἶνος διαφέρει μύθου τῷ τὸν αἶνον μὴ πρὸς παῖδας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄνδρας πεποιῆσθαι καὶ μὴ πρὸς ψυχαγωγίαν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παραίνεσιν ἔχειν τινά. βούλεται γὰρ ἐπικρυπτόμενος παραινεῖν τι καὶ διδάσκειν· ὅπερ καὶ Ἡσίοδος φαίνεται πεποιηκώς.
>
> *'Ainos*: a type of speech with proverbial power. (…) Here is an example of an *ainos*: a man and not a man, killed me, a bird and not a bird, but a bird nonetheless, sitting on wood and not wood, hitting me with a stone and not a stone. The answer is a eunuch who kills a bat sitting on a fennel stalk with a pumice-stone. An *ainos* differs from a *mythos* in that an *ainos* is not written for children, but for adults, and does not only aim at entertainment, but also at advice. For it, being hidden, wants to give advice and teach; this is also what Hesiod appears to have written.'

This description of *ainos* focuses on the wisdom hidden in the story; what an *ainos* really wants to do, is give advice and teach—that is also the reason why they are not for children but for adults: because they are not (only) for entertainment but (also) for advice.[209]

It is most interesting to compare this Suda entry with two passages of Doxopater's commentary on Aphthonius. In both passages Doxopater discusses μῦθος ('fiction'), a difficult concept variously defined and used. 'Some', he says, 'also call it [μῦθος] *ainos*, because of the advice that is in it; an example is Hesiod who says in his book on the works and days 'now

---

[208] This definition is more in keeping with the original meaning of the *ainos* than Quintilian's description, since the *ainos* in Hesiod and Homer presumes a sophisticated audience who need to employ their interpretative abilities in order to understand it; cf. Mordine (2006) 364–366.

[209] That this advice is 'hidden' perhaps makes the *ainos* suitable for adults instead of children. This, together with the example of the eunuch, suggests that the writer of this entry was thinking of the text type of the *ainigma* ('riddling story'), etymologically linked to the *ainos* and also connected to Hesiod; see Tryphon 3.194.10 Spengel and Gregory of Corinth 3.225.1 Spengel. See also Jul. *Or.* 7.207a–b: 'Then when the myth was gaining ground and coming into favour in Greece, poets developed from it the fable (*ainos*) with a moral, which differs from the myth in that the latter is addressed to children and the former to men, and is designed not merely to entertain them but conveys moral exhortation besides. For the man who employs fable aims at moral exhortation and instruction (παραινεῖν τε καὶ διδάσκειν), though he conceals his aim and takes care not to speak openly, for fear of alienating his hearers. Hesiod, for instance, seems to have written with this in view …'.

I will tell an *ainos* to kings who will understand."[210] And later he says of Aphthonius that 'he demonstrated that even though μῦθος is common to both poets and rhetoricians, the poets and rhetoricians nevertheless do not use it for the same reason; for the rhetoricians employ it for advice, but the poets mostly just for entertainment. I said 'mostly', because it sometimes happens that poets too use it for advice, for instance the one about the nightingale by Hesiod.'[211] What these passages make clear is that the *ainos* is a Hesiodic text type, and that it is so because of its παραίνεσις or 'advice', which is also characteristic of Hesiod.

Obviously, this classification of Hesiod as an 'adviser' and 'non-entertainer' rests on age-old conceptions.[212] Generally speaking, the typification of Hesiod as such becomes more and more explicit over time—see, for instance, the scholia on the *Works and Days*: 'The purpose of the book, then, is educational; the meter has been cast over this purpose of explanation as a kind of dressing, which enchants the souls and fills them with love for the book. That[213] also explains why its poetical style is old-fashioned; for the book is mostly free of embellishments, adjectival ornaments and metaphors; for the unadorned and unartificial obviously suit moral discourse.'[214] It is clear from this passage that the didactic intent attributed to Hesiod is connected to concepts of style as well. It is to this last of the three major poetic watersheds between Hesiod and Homer that we now turn.

---

[210] Doxopater 2.143 Walz: Τινὲς δὲ καὶ αἶνον αὐτὸν ὠνόμασαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ παραινέσεως, ὡς Ἡσίοδος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν ἔργων καὶ ἡμερῶν βιβλίῳ λέγων· Νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεῦσ' ἐρέω φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς (*WD* 202).

[211] *Ibid*. 2.149: ἔδειξε γὰρ ὅτι εἰ καὶ κοινός ἐστι τῶν τε ποιητῶν καὶ ῥητόρων ὁ μῦθος, ὅμως οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν αὐτῷ χρῶνται οἵ τε ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ῥήτορες διὰ παραίνεσιν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸ μόνην ψυχαγωγίαν ἐμποιεῖν. Ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ εἶπον, διότι ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πρὸς παραίνεσιν αὐτῷ χρῶνται, ὡς ὁ τῆς ἀηδόνος ἔχει παρὰ τῷ Ἡσιόδῳ.

[212] There is in fact a striking resemblance between the comments of Doxopater and the passage from Isocrates' *To Nicocles* (see above, pp. 329–332)—only the word for 'giving advice' (συμβουλεύω in Isocrates) changed for reasons of etymology (presumably to aid the process of learning these rhetorical precepts by heart). See also the Helicon-stèlè presenting Hesiod as a writer of ὑποθήκαι (cf. Hurst 1996 60, 63–64).

[213] I.e. the fact that the book has a didactic purpose.

[214] Σ *WD* prol. Ab: Ὁ μὲν οὖν σκοπὸς τοῦ βιβλίου παιδευτικός· τὸ δὲ μέτρον ὥσπερ ἥδυσμά τι τῷ σκοπῷ τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἐπιβέβληται θέλγον τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ κατέχον εἰς τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸ φιλίαν. διὸ καὶ ἀρχαιότροπός ἐστιν ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἰδέα· τῶν γὰρ καλλωπισμῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιθέτων κόσμων καὶ μεταφορῶν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καθαρεύει· τὸ γὰρ ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς πρέπει τοῖς ἠθικοῖς λόγοις· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον. Cf. Σ *WD* prol. Ac and esp. Fa.

4. *Beauty and Style*

In the discussion of Hesiod's inspiration and genre mention has been made of his style as well, especially as it was described by the hellenistic and Roman poets. In this section, we will focus more specifically on the style and the esthetic quality of poetry, and investigate the notions of Hesiodic style in periods both earlier and later than the hellenistic age.[215] We will see that despite some differences and inconsistencies through time there is a remarkable continuity in the conception of Hesiodic style.[216]

O'Sullivan, who in his book on the beginnings of literary criticism set out to show that 'ancient rhetoric is a single, great, traditional theory', convincingly demonstrated that a notion of stylistic typification, such as we see more rigidly expressed in the theories on *genera dicendi*, already existed in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. His investigation of stylistic evaluation in especially Isocrates, Alcidamas and Aristophanes reveals the early existence of a rather developed and remarkably consistent way of describing two opposite styles. On the one hand, there is the so-called *genus grande* (which O'Sullivan aligns with what Aristotle calls the λέξις ἀγωνιστική, which Demetrius calls the μεγαλοπρεπής or δεινὸς χαρακτήρ, and which was also associated with the 'spoken' style), which is 'majestic' (σεμνός), grand, and bombastic, uses archaisms, metaphors and unclear words, and is often compared to impressive natural phenomena like mountains and thunderstorms. Opposed to this is the *genus tenue* (also known as the λέξις γραφική, the ἰσχνὸς χαρακτήρ or the 'written style'), a style that depends on τέχνη and is 'fine' (λεπτός), 'pure' (καθαρός), 'polished' (ἐξεργαζόμενος), 'well-rounded' (στρογγύλος) and 'precise' (ἀκριβής).[217]

O'Sullivan of course noticed the similarities between this stylistic opposition and the one propagated by the hellenistic poets, who connected it to the opposition between Homer and Hesiod, and he sub-

[215] See now also Hunter (2009) on the ancient analysis of Hesiod's style; he discusses not only the most relevant evaluations, but also investigates to what degree Hesiod's own text could have given rise to them.

[216] Cf. O'Sullivan (1992) 4 rightly pointing out that the rather inconsistent use of terms in ancient literary criticism ('connotation rather than denotation is the mode of ancient critical language') should not hide its general continuity. Segal (1992) 4 rightly remarks that the Greeks were used to regard poetry as performance and as 'the living voice of song', so that criticism focused on vocal qualities (e.g. sweetness, flow, abundance, strength).

[217] O'Sullivan (1992) 8–14 *et passim*.

sequently argued that 'there are a number of reasons why we should suspect that some sort of polarization of the two was extant before the literary activities of the scholar-poets' (68); his main reasons are Democritus' (and Plato's) classification of Homer as a grand-style poet who composes through *enthousiasmos*, the connection of Gorgias (and his pupil Alcidamas) to Homer, and Hesiod's link to the 'precise' master of ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων Prodicus.[218] Although all his evidence is circumstantial and Hesiod and Homer are never explicitly involved in any stylistic evaluation, his argument is very cogent. There are, however, two important points to further improve his argument.[219]

The first one has to do with focus. It is true that Hesiod and Homer are not involved in the stylistic dichotomy of the fifth and fourth century in any explicit way, but the poets clearly *are* contrasted with regard to the *effects* of the two kinds of poetry. The *genus grande* and *genus tenue* have, according to traditional rhetorical theory, an opposite function, i.e. to move and to teach, respectively—and this is a typification very easily applied to Homer and Hesiod in early times: we have seen how Pindar contrasts Hesiod as a truthful mouthpiece of the Muses with the 'majestic' (σεμνός) Homer who makes stories bigger.[220] 'Simonides' similarly claimed that Hesiod was a son of the Muses, and Homer of the Graces; and, in another fragment, that Hesiod was a gardener and Homer a garland-maker—apart from the oppositions in this fragment already discussed,[221] this contrast may also indicate Hesiod's hard work as a poet and Homer's aim for pleasure and connection to feasts.[222]

---

[218] O'Sullivan (1992) 68–79.

[219] It is clear that the opposition of Hesiod and Homer was not the main aim of O'Sullivan's book. This perhaps also explains the very curious oversight in his treatment of Isocrates *To Nicocles*; while he notices Homer is here associated with ψυχαγωγία (p. 72), he does not mention the contrast to the earlier-mentioned poetry of Hesiod, connected to advice and τέχνη. Instead, he is a bit careless in saying that Isocrates attributes the power of ψυχαγωγία to 'the poets' (114).

[220] See section 1.3 above, pp. 313–314.

[221] See section 1.3 above and ch. 8, pp. 288–289.

[222] Plutarch sees such great oppositions recurring even in the smallest details, cf. his comments on *WD* 580–581 ('Dawn, which when it shows itself sets many men on their way and puts the yoke on many oxen'): 'Plutarch says that Homer has adorned dawn with epithets that strive for pleasure by calling her 'saffron-robed' and 'rosy-fingered'; Hesiod, on the other hand, (describes dawn) rather from the works to which she sets mankind when she advances, and changes mankind from their feebleness into an active life' (τὸν μὲν οὖν Ὅμηρόν φησιν ὁ Πλούταρχος ἐπιθέτοις εἰς τέρψιν εὐδοκιμοῦσι κοσμῆσαι τὴν ἠῶ 'κροκόπεπλον' αὐτὴν λέγοντα καί 'ῥοδοδάκτυλον'· τὸν δ' Ἡσίοδον μειζόνως ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων, ἐφ' ἃ δὴ προϊοῦσα κινεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκλύσεως εἰς τὴν ἐνεργὸν μεθίστησι ζωήν, Σ *WD* 578–581).

Even when the poets are not explicitly opposed, there are nonetheless hints of a comparable contrast.[223]

The second point is that Hesiod and Homer are virtually never mentioned together, i.e. as equals, in contexts containing a stylistic evaluation of some sort. They can be mentioned as comparable with regard to other things, but hardly in the aesthetic sphere. Searching through ancient sources I have been able to find only one passage, and a very late one at that (Plutarch's *De Pythiae oraculis*), in which Homer and Hesiod are equated on stylistic grounds and both credited with 'elegance of diction' (λογιότητος τὸ καλόν), 'sweetness of sound' (εὐφωνίας) and excellence of versification (εὐεπείᾳ); presented as comparable in regard to 'force, grace, and diction' (δυνάμει δὲ καὶ χάριτι καὶ κατασκευῇ περὶ λέξιν); and implied to have produced the 'best and fairest' (ἄριστα καὶ κάλλιστα) of poetic compositions.[224] This passage is a highly exceptional case in which stylistic characteristics often attributed to Homer are said to be shared by both epic poets. The anomaly, to the best of my knowledge not noted before, is difficult to explain.[225] But it does serve to illustrate my point, since it seems the exception to the general rule that Hesiod and Homer cannot both be said to be beautiful,[226] and are on the whole perceived to be stylistically incomparable.

---

[223] See for such hints sections 1, 2 and 3 above.

[224] Plu. *Mor*. 396F.

[225] In this passage from the dialogue, some friends are discussing the deplorable quality of the hexameter lines pronounced by the oracle. It could be that Hesiod is added to Homer because one of the friends is a poet (perhaps) affiliated with Hesiod since he wrote poems 'in a philosophic and restrained style' (φιλοσόφως καὶ αὐστηρῶς). Perhaps the oddity is due to Plutarch's fondness for Hesiod (cf. e.g. pp. 42, 186, 198, 261–262, 347).

[226] Plato called Hesiod and Homer 'pleasant' and 'beautiful' but his comments are not purely stylistic since he does not separate the poetic-aesthetic from the educational-ethic. There is a good example in *Lg*. 658a–659d, where the Athenian investigates the hypothesis that the best kind of art is that most capable at pleasing the audience; he ends up, however, concluding that beauty and pleasure are not dependent on the whole audience but only those who are the best educated and thus most suited to vote. Through this move, the criterium of ἡδονή transforms into a criterium of ἀρετή. (See also Bravo 2003 106: '… exprimé dans ces termes ce critère [of judging art] devient purement éthique', and Schöpsdau (1994) ad loc., who similarly notes that the poet is turned into an *Erzieher* again.)

We find a similar case at the beginning of the *Timaeus*. One of Socrates' interlocutors, Critias, talks of a conversation his grandfather (and namesake) Critias once had. Since the father of Critias *senior* was a good friend of Solon's, someone praised Solon as 'not only the wisest of men, but also the noblest of poets' (σοφώτατον γεγονέναι Σόλωνα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν αὖ τῶν ποιητῶν πάντων ἐλευθεριώτατον, *Ti*. 21c). To this the old man replied that if Solon would have become a poet instead of a statesman, 'in my opinion he would have been as famous as Homer or Hesiod, or any poet' (κατὰ γε ἐμὴν δόξαν

As we have seen, this incomparatibility can be traced back to a stylistic dichotomy between Hesiod and Homer in classical times, and the opposition was overtly propagated in the hellenistic age. Another indication of the poets' polarization, not mentioned before, is the appropriation of archaic poets through family ties. The poet Stesichorus, for instance, was said to be a descendant (or even the son) of Hesiod, but countervoices claimed him for Homer.[227] Such a tug-of-war is in fact an evaluation of Stesichorus' poetry, with Hesiod and Homer as opposing criteria. Simonides is similarly linked to both Hesiod and Homer,[228] and perhaps the diplomatic statements ascribed to him (see above) reflect an attempt to mediate between the two poets. Generally speaking, then, the poets are regarded as stylistic opposites.

However this may be, from the imperial period onwards another view arises that soon becomes the dominant one: the view that Homer is the best in *any* kind of style, and that his superior genius is shown by the brilliant way he can change his diction, style, and tone.[229] This development

---

οὔτε Ἡσίοδος οὔτε Ὅμηρος οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ποιητὴς εὐδοκιμώτερος ἐγένετο ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ, *Ti*. 21d). There are basically two ways this passage has been interpreted. The first is to take the text at face value, and believe that the comparison with Hesiod and Homer is meant to reflect on Critias *junior*'s character; it shows that Critias is someone 'indoctrinated with the importance and seriousness of poetry' (Welliver 1977 13). The second is to point to the fact that poetry is rejected since Solon did not choose to become a full-time poet because there were more important things to do—and this of course reflects well on Critias *senior* expressing his contempt for poetry (Johansen 2004 34; this interpretation was already put forward by Proclus, see Taylor 1928 ad loc.). The advocates of both interpretations refer to *R*. 599d, where it is said that Homer is not by any city credited as a good legislator, whereas Solon is; and both interpretations agree on the negative evaluation of Hesiod and Homer. I would like to suggest, however, that the most relevant parallel to this passage is not *R*. 599d, but *Smp*. 209d. In this passage, Hesiod *and* Homer are compared to Solon and Lycurgus: the point there is that all four of them live on forever because of the immortal children they have created. Fame is the main point of comparison, and that seems to be the case here as well. The parallel from the *Symposium* shows us what is wrong about the interpretations offered so far: they draw a too sharp distinction between the poet and the legislator. Wisdom and a free-born spirit are characteristics attributed to both poets and legislators, exactly because they were not easily separated in the days of Plato.

[227] For Stesichorus as a (grand)son of Hesiod see Arist. fr. 565 Rose, Cic. *De Rep*. 2.20, Procl. Σ *WD* 291, Suda 4.433; for the affiliation with Homer *AP* 7.75, 9.184, [Long.] *De Subl*. 13.3, Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.62, D.Chrys. 55.6.

[228] The same goes for Terpander, 'he who brings pleasure to men' (cf. Suda 4.527).

[229] On Homer's capability at switching from one style to another esp. D.H. *Dem*. 5.220 U-R, Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.46–47, Hermog. *Id*. 3.260 Walz. See on Homer's polymorphism further below, pp. 363–366.

may be connected to the emergence of a third *genus dicendi*, an invention usually attributed to Theophrastus but at least firmly attested in the first century BC.[230] The concept of a third and best style, perhaps originally described as a blend of the earlier two,[231] destroys the age-old notion of a stylistic dichotomy. With Homer as the prime example of stylistic excellence, Hesiod slowly disappears as a foil in this respect. Once again, Homer becomes all-comprehensive and comes to 'include' Hesiod. That is why Homer can be said to have qualities that were in an earlier time typically ascribed to Hesiod, but not the other way around.

It should be noted, however, that traces of the old characterization of Hesiod still remain. Quintilian praises 'the smoothness of his vocabulary and composition' (*levitas verborum et compositionis*, 10.1.52), and Plutarch too mentions Hesiod's 'ornament and smoothness' (κόσμου καὶ λειότητος, *Mor.* 747E). Dionysius ranks Hesiod among the poets employing the λέξις γλαφυρά, which uses the smoothest (λειότατα) and blandest (μαλακώτατα) words, and aims to be decorative rather than dignified (*Dem.* 5.217 U-R). When Dionysius has discussed the γλαφυρὰ σύνθεσις or 'polished composition',[232] a composition that 'requires not only that its words shall be properly fitted and smoothed together, but also that the clauses should be effectively interwoven with one another', he names Hesiod as 'the one who seems to me to have developed the type most successfully.'[233] It is especially Hesiod's simplicity, sweetness and purity, the qualities best stressed in the hellenistic period, that still remain known as 'Hesiodic',[234] although Hermogenes demonstrates the predominance of Homer when he writes that 'it should be clear to everyone what kind of diction is typical of poetry, and that the most beautiful of poetic dictions is that of Homer. His diction is probably the only one that is pure,

[230] Cf. Kennedy (1994) 86; see on the invention of the third style and the role of Theophrastus Innes (1985) 260–263 and the bibliography in Kennedy (1963) 278 n.25.

[231] Cf. Innes (1985) 260; it should be noted that the concept of the three styles as it was widely known in the times of Cicero and later (grand-middle-plain) differs considerably from this (largely postulated) theory of Theophrastus, who (presumably) regarded the middle style as a mean between extremes.

[232] It seems that λέξις ('style') and σύνθεσις ('composition') are slightly different concepts (see De Jonge 2008 204 n.145), though we do not need to go into the particulars here.

[233] D.H. *Comp.* 6.114 U-R: ἐποποιῶν μὲν οὖν ἥμοιγε κάλλιστα τουτονὶ δοκεῖ τὸν χαρακτῆρα ἐξεργάσασθαι.

[234] See Σ *WD* prol. Ab (purity), Velleius Paterculus 1.7.1 (sweetness), Theon 2.74 Spengel (simplicity), Hermog. *Id.* 3.320 Walz (sweetness and simplicity), Men.Rh. 3.340 Spengel (purity), Doxopater 6.397 Walz (sweetness), Vacca *Vit. Luc.* 403.21–26 Badalì (sweetness).

so far as poetry allows, with the possible exception of Hesiod.'[235] Here we see the omnipresent Homer scoring higher points than Hesiod even where purity is concerned.[236]

That Homer can be Hesiodic but Hesiod cannot be Homeric is demonstrated by Quintilian, who first elaborately praises Homer for his many qualities and then says that 'Hesiod rarely rises to heights' (*raro adsurgit*, 10.1.52); Hesiod cannot reach the Homeric altitude of the grand style and is awarded the 'palm in the middle style' instead.[237] The clearest indication of Hesiod's disqualification for grandness is his near-absence from the treatise *On the Sublime*. This may not surprise us, since the author believes that one of the most important sources of the sublime (apart from the subject, figures, diction and composition) is the 'inspiration of vehement emotion' (σφοδρὸν καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν πάθος, 8.1).[238] It takes a natural genius to produce sublimity, which means 'not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves (ἔκστασιν). Invariably what inspires wonder, with its power of amazing us (σὺν ἐκπλήξει), always prevails over what is merely convincing and pleasing (τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν). For our persuasions are usually under our own control, while such passages exercise an irresistable power of mastery, and get the better of every listener' (1.4). It is, of course, above all Homer whom 'Longinus' selects to illustrate the sublime in poetry.[239]

According to the treatise, the sublime is not concerned with details and accuracy. What is beautiful is always at the same time great and

---

[235] Hermog. *Id.* 3.378 Walz: λέξις γε μὴν φανερὰ πᾶσιν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ ποιητική, καὶ ὡς τῶν κατὰ ποίησιν καλλίστη λέξεων ἡ Ὁμήρου. καθαρὸς γὰρ ἐν ποιήσει κινδυνεύει μόνος ἢ σύν γε Ἡσιόδῳ κατ' αὐτὴν εἶναι.

[236] We can clearly see that Homer's dominance and exemplarity in every style is a topos. In the chapter devoted to the quality of purity (3.202–210 Walz), Hermogenes quotes Homer only once, and in this case to demonstrate that Homer's unusual word 'track' is the *opposite* of words that belong to the 'pure' type of style.

[237] Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.52: *palma in illo medio genere dicendi*.

[238] Even though the sublime can be achieved without emotion (*Subl.* 8.2, cf. Innes 2002), Hesiod's lack of μανία puts him *a priori* at a disadvantage; furthermore, the vehement experience of ἔκπληξις must always be present in the audience.

[239] Perhaps the passage most clearly doing so is to be found in 9.11. Homer has just been cited to show 'his habit of entering into the sublimity of his heroic theme', after which the author comments: 'Here indeed Homer is swept away by the whirlwind of the battle (Ὅμηρος μὲν ἐνθάδε οὔριος συνεμπνεῖ τοῖς ἀγῶσιν) and so affected by it that he too 'Stormily raves (μαίνεται), as the War-god, the spearman, or Fire, the destroyer, / Stormily raves on the hills in the deep-lying thickets of woodland; / Fringed are his lips with the foam-froth.' Here the genius Homer has even transported himself, 'breathing together with the battles' and behaving like one of his characters, *in casu* Hector (*Il.* 15.605–607).

extraordinary too.[240] 'So it is by some natural instinct that we admire, not the small streams, clear and useful as they are (εἰ καὶ διαυγῆ καὶ χρήσιμα), but the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, and above all the Ocean' (35.4). And again, in 35.5: '… that what is useful or necessary is easily obtained by man; it is always the unusual which wins our wonder'. That is why even though Homer, Demosthenes and Plato (the three are mentioned together often) have made countless mistakes, this does not in the least tarnish 'the true successes to be found everywhere in the work of these heroes' (36.2). Implicitly, the ocean that is Homer[241] is compared to the hellenistic icon of small streams, the composer of clear and useful poetry Hesiod. One passage explicitly compares the two and disqualifies Hesiod for magnificence. In 9.4, Longinus mentions Homer's description of Strife, which causes him to think of Hesiod:[242]

> ᾧ ἀνόμοιόν γε τὸ Ἡσιόδειον ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀχλύος, εἴγε Ἡσιόδου καὶ τὴν Ἀσπίδα θετέον,
>
> τῆς ἐκ μὲν ῥινῶν μύξαι ῥέον·
>
> οὐ γὰρ δεινὸν ἐποίησε τὸ εἴδωλον, ἀλλὰ μισητόν. ὁ δὲ πῶς μεγεθύνει τὰ δαιμόνια·
>
> ὅσσον δ' ἠεροειδὲς ἀνὴρ ἴδεν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν,
> ἥμενος ἐν σκοπιῇ, λεύσσων ἐπὶ οἶνοπα πόντον·
> τόσσον ἐπιθρώσκουσι θεῶν ὑψηχέες ἵπποι.
>
> τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν κοσμικῷ διαστήματι καταμετρεῖ. τίς οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ μεγέθους ἐπιφθέγξαιτο, ὅτι ἂν δὶς ἓξῆς ἐφορμήσωσιν οἱ τῶν θεῶν ἵπποι, οὐκέθ' εὑρήσουσιν ἐν κόσμῳ τόπον. ὑπερφυᾶ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς θεομαχίας φαντάσματα …

---

[240] *Subl.* 35.3: 'Look at life from all sides and see how in all things the extraordinary, the great, the beautiful (τὸ περιττὸν … καὶ μέγα καὶ καλόν) stand supreme …'.

[241] This is a very common image for Homer (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.46, [Long.] *Subl.*13.3, D.H. *Comp.* 6.121 U-R).

[242] It is unclear why. Longinus had just quoted Homer's larger-than-life description of Eris, and it is unlikely that this makes him think of the Hesiodic Gloom (Ἀχλύς) because she was also 'preternaturally large herself' (so Usher 2007 294); there is nothing in the *Shield*-passage that indicates her supernatural size. It is more likely that the battle-scene in Homer, where the personifications Terror, Rout, and Strife are present, reminds Longinus of the battle depicted on Hesiod's shield, also attended by several personifications. But there may be another explanation. As Usher (2007) has brilliantly shown, all quotations from Homer (and the one from Genesis, in which Usher is most interested) in *Subl.* 9 are connected by thematic associations, mostly concerned with light and darkness. It is possible that it was this string of associations that made Longinus think of Hesiod's Gloom, especially since 'gloom' (ἀχλύς) returns later (*Subl.* 9.10) in a passage referring to Ajax begging Zeus to rescue the Greeks from darkness.

> 'Quite unlike this is Hesiod's description of Gloom, if indeed we are right in adding the *Shield* to the list of Hesiod's works:
>
> 'Rheum from her nostrils was running.'
>
> He has not made the image terrible, but offensive. But see how Homer magnifies the powers of heaven:
>
> 'Far as a man can see with his eyes in the shadowy distance,
> Keeping his watch on a hill-top, agaze o'er the wine-dark ocean,
> So far leap at a bound the high-neighing horses of heaven.'
>
> He makes their stride as far as the East is from the West. So supreme is the grandeur of this, one might well say that if the horses of heaven take two consecutive strides there will then be no place found for them in the world. Again he shows the imagination of genius in his Battle of the Gods …'[243]

The passage from Hesiod is obviously selected to show us how it is *not* supposed to be done; Longinus selected personifications by both Homer and Hesiod to enhance Hesiod's function as the foil for Homer, illustrating all the more clearly the latter's poetic excellence.[244] What makes Homeric poetry apparently so great is the fact that he can 'magnify' (μεγεθύνει), employ supreme greatness (τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ μεγέθους), and use imagery beyond what is natural (ὑπερφυᾶ φαντάσματα)—and it is to these powers that Hesiod is contrasted. At the same time, Longinus in picking this passage from the Hesiodic corpus is brilliantly ridiculing the stream Hesiod is so often associated with—compared with Homer, who oversees 'the wine-dark ocean', the 'clear and useful stream' is just a trail of mucus.[245]

---

[243] [Long.] *Subl.* 9.4–5; the citations are *Sc.* 267 and *Il.* 5.770–772.

[244] This is especially obvious because Longinus' reference to Hesiod's Eris (see next note) is preceded by Homer's description of Eris in *Il.* 4.442–443, which endows her with cosmic proportions. Since Hesiod was particularly associated with the figure of Eris as mentioned in the *WD* (see also next note), Longinus' criticism may include an implicit denial of his truly 'epic' qualities (because he does not elaborate on the bad Eris). Such denial is perhaps continued elsewhere in the treatise, where Longinus comments on the sublime nature of theomachies (evoking traditional elements well-known from Hesiod's Titanomachy and Typhoeus-episode, cf. Usher 2007 299), but quotes Homeric passages only.

[245] There is one other passage where *On the Sublime* mentions Hesiod. In chapter 13, Longinus speaks of the debt of other authors to Homer, naming Plato above all. He continues: 'So many of these qualities would never have flourished among Plato's philosophical tenets, nor would he have entered so often into the subjects and language of poetry, had he not striven, with heart and soul, to contest the prize with Homer, like a young antagonist with one who had already won his spurs (…). For, as Hesiod says, 'Good is this strife (ἔρις) for mankind'. Fair indeed is the crown, and the fight for fame well worth the winning, where even to be worsted by our forerunners is not without glory' (13.4). That

5. *Boundary Crossing*

It has been the main concern of this chapter to reconstruct the conceptual opposition of Hesiod and Homer as poets, and gather evidence on four major watersheds: truth versus fiction, *ars* versus *ingenium*, didactic versus hedonistic, and plain versus grand. It is my belief that the evidence constitutes abundant proof that the poetic opposition of Hesiod and Homer was a real one, and that it shows a remarkable consistency and continuity through time. However, no watershed is absolute, and the boundaries drawn so far allow for some transgression. Such boundary crossing is the subject of this final section.

The final section consists of two parts. First, I will take a look at some of the most interesting examples of boundary crossing, i.e. passages in which Hesiod is temporarily credited with Homeric qualities, or vice versa. The focus here will be not so much on the mere fact of such crossing, but on the question why it is there. The second part will be concerned with a special type of 'crossing' we have already encountered in the previous chapter: that of Homer's 'expansion'. The main focus of this part will be on Aristotle's *Poetics*, but there are many more interesting examples.

5.1. *Crossing*

Generally speaking, Hesiod can temporarily acquire several Homeric qualities, although it must be said that judging from the evidence some boundaries are apparently harder to cross than others. Of the four oppositions indicated above, the stylistic one is the most rigid by far: whereas Homer demonstrates his genius by easily switching between styles and excelling in each of them, Hesiod's poetry is practically never said to be grand or magnificent. Even Plutarch's elaborate praise in *De Pythiae Oraculis*[246] does not include terms traditionally associated with Homer.

---

this Hesiodic description on Eris, coming from the *WD* (24), *is* approved by Longinus is interesting in itself (see previous note), but the passage gains considerable force if we see it in the light of the well-known story of the contest of Hesiod and Homer. There is a contest of stylistic excellence going on, crown and all, but this time Homer wins, and it is not Hesiod who is the competitor—it is the 'young antagonist' Plato. In this competition, the only one that matters according to Longinus, Hesiod can only watch from the sideline and give comments.

[246] See above, p. 352. The only possible exception I have been able to find is *AP* 7.52, a funerary epigram (composed by an otherwise unknown Demiurgus) calling Hesiod the

The watershed between truth and fiction is slightly less rigid, as an example from Lucian's *Saturnalia* will make clear. In this passage, Cronus is asked by a priest whether the story, told by Hesiod and Homer, of him eating his children is really true. The agitated god then replies: 'Do you imagine that that shepherd, that impostor, has any sound knowledge of me?'[247] His angry defence is extended to Homer, who was probably too 'blind' to see the truth. The passage reminds us of the traditional critique of the representation of the gods by Hesiod and Homer, but Lucian has taken a novel approach by suggesting Hesiod was a lying fool: his description of Hesiod as a shepherd anticipates the *Dichterweihe*, but instead Cronus leaves him in his unenlightened state. Hesiod was a shepherd, and a fraud: he made things up, just like Homer.[248] Why he did so is not made clear; it is presumably to seem important.[249] That is the reason, at least, that Aelius Aristides in one of his speeches presented Hesiod as a 'fraud'. Aristides does so in order to defend himself against charges of boastfulness by his fellows. 'Compare my remark in passing with Hesiod's tale', he says, and you will see that Hesiod 'was such a wretched and brazen fellow' (σχέτλιος ἦν καὶ ὕβριστης) that he counted his inspiration among the achievements of the Muses. And that was not all: 'he was such a fraud and so ambitious (ἀλαζὼν καὶ φιλότιμος), that he said that he also received a scepter from them (…). And he did not even stop here in his wantonness (ὕβρεως). As if he were purposefully making you burst with laughter he added: 'and they inspired me with song."[250] Like Lucian, Aristides focuses on the inspiration scene, Hesiod's guarantee of truth, to mark the poet as a liar. We should note, however, that both passages are highly ironic, and thus in fact strengthen the traditional view of Hesiod as a faithful truthteller.

Occasionally, Hesiod features alongside Homer as a poet aiming to enchant instead of to edify. We have already seen that Agatharchides, singling out Hesiod and Homer in particular, concluded that 'every poet

---

'crown of spacious Hellas' (Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόρου στέφανον) and the 'ornament of poetry' (κόσμον ἀοιδῆς).

[247] Lucian *Sat*. 6: Οἴει γὰρ τὸν ποιμένα ἐκεῖνον, τὸν ἀλαζόνα, ὑγιές τι περὶ ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι; (Transl. slightly adapted.)

[248] We should note the parallel treatment of Homer, whose blindness (a biographical datum like Hesiod's profession) is here not an indication of a great inner vision, but of a lack of perception.

[249] Cf. Theophr. *Char*. 23 on 'fraudulence' or ἀλαζονεία.

[250] Aristid. 28.19–23, containing references to *Th*. 11, 18, 22, 30, and 31.

strives more to give pleasure than to tell the truth.'[251] Other critics are less polemical and state that both Hesiod and Homer actually do both at the same time. Maximus of Tyre presents the poetry of Hesiod and Homer (together with that of Orpheus) as having 'the power to enchant and guide the souls of the young, gently mingling sound argument with their habitual pleasure.'[252] In a similar vein, Clemens points out that the poets, though educated in theogony by the prophets, often 'teach their wisdom through allegory', and use their 'poetical enchantment' (ποιητικὴ ψυχαγωγία) as a 'curtain for the masses' (παραπέτασμα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς).[253] The scholiast shows a similar awareness.[254] In such examples, Hesiod through affiliation with Homer becomes an enchanter and crowd-pleaser like him. It is only in generalizing contexts that such claims can be made.

Finally, Hesiod's status as a mouthpiece of the Muses (inspiration type a) obviously facilitated his occasional appearance as a 'manic' poet of the Homeric type. Ovid, for instance, in the opening of his didactic work on the art of love, says he was not inspired by any god; he can vouch for the truth of his work since he has found it all out by himself.[255] He contrasts this 'rational' way of composition with the case of Hesiod: '… neither did Clio and Clio's sisters appear to me while I kept flocks in thy vale, O Ascra.'[256] Furthermore, it is likely that many did not perceive (or acknowledge) the difference between the two types of inspiration, as is witnessed by Maximus of Tyre arguing against the view that Hesiod when he received the laurel 'was immediately transformed from a shepherd into a poet and began to sing, just as they say the Corybants become possessed and ecstatic whenever they hear a pipe'.[257] In some cases, ancient

---

[251] See ch. 3, p. 120.

[252] Max.Tyr. *Or*. 17.3: κατεπᾴδειν ἱκανὴ τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, καὶ δημαγωγεῖν, καὶ ἡδονῇ συνήθει ἀνακιρνάναι πράως ἀληθεῖς λόγους (transl. Trapp).

[253] Clem.Al. *Strom*. 5.4.24.1; he names Orpheus, Linus, Musaeus, Homer and Hesiod.

[254] Σ *WD* Prol. Aa: Hesiod is 'not simply aiming at the pleasure of his readers, but putting that rather in second place, while he makes the advantage to one's disposition the principal aim' (οὐχ ἁπλῶς εἰς ἡδονὴν ἀποβλέπων τῶν ἐντευξομένων, ἀλλὰ ταύτην μὲν πάρεργον θέμενος, τὴν δὲ ὠφέλειαν τὴν εἰς τὸ ἦθος προηγούμενον σκοπὸν ποιησάμενος).

[255] Ovid *Ars Amat*. 1.29–30: *Usus opus movet hoc: vati parete perito; / vera canam* … ('Experience (*usus*) inspires this work: give ear to an experienced bard; true will be my song …').

[256] Ovid *Ars Amat*. 1.27–28: *Nec mihi sunt visae Clio Cliusque sorores / Servanti pecudes vallibus, Ascra, tuis*.

[257] Max.Tyr. *Or*. 38.2: εὐθὺς ᾄδειν, γενόμενον ποιητὴν ἐκ ποιμένος, ὥσπερ φασὶν τοὺς κορυβαντιῶντας ἐπειδὰν ἀκούωσιν αὐλοῦ ἐνθουσιᾶν, τῶν προτέρων λογισμῶν

boundaries can be seen to simply dissolve, as in a passage from the Borysthenitic oration by Dio Chrysostom, where Hesiod as a possessed poet is even put on a par with Homer. In this treatise, Dio gives his audience a Stoic lecture about the best way gods and men should live together. Earthly monarchies are shown to be a reflection of the organization of the universe as a whole, with Zeus as the supreme leader of it all. That is why the divine poets are right when they, instructed by the Muses (μαθόντες ἐκ Μουσῶν), call him 'the father of gods and men'. He then continues:

> 'For the chances are, indeed, that poets as a class (τὸ ποιητικὸν γένος) are not utterly bad marksmen when they speak of sacred things and that they are not missing the mark when they use such expressions as that repeatedly; on the other hand, it is not likely that they have received a real initiation according to the rites and regulations of true initiates, or that with reference to the universe they, if I may say so, have any clear knowledge of the truth (περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας σαφές). But we may think of them as merely like the attendants at the rites, who stand outside the doors, decking portals and the altars which are in full view and attending to the other preparations of that kind but never passing within. Indeed that is the very reason why the poets call themselves 'attendants of the Muses' (θεράποντας Μουσῶν), not initiates or any other august name. So, as I was saying, it is reasonable to suppose that not only do those who busy themselves near some ritual, hard by the entrance to the sanctuary, gain some inkling of what is going on within, when either a lone mystic phrase rings out loudly, or fire appears above the enclosure, but also that there comes sometimes to the poets—I mean the very ancient poets (λέγω δὲ τοῖς πάνυ ἀρχαίοις)—some utterance from the Muses, however brief, some inspiration of divine nature and of divine truth, like a flash of fire from the invisible (φωνή τις ἐκ Μουσῶν ἀφίκετο βραχεῖα καί πού τις ἐπίπνοια θείας φύσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, καθάπερ αὐγὴ πυρὸς ἐξ ἀφανοῦς λάμψαντος). This is what happened to Homer and Hesiod when they were possessed by the Muses (ἃ ἔπασχον ἐκ Μουσῶν καὶ κατείχοντο Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος). But the poets who came after them in later days, bringing to stage and theatre naught but their own wisdom, uninitiate addressing uninitiate, have ofttimes disclosed imperfect patterns of holy rites; but, being applauded by the multitude, they tried in their own right to initiate the mob, actually, as we might say, building open booths for Bacchic rites at tragic crossroads …'.[258]

ἐξισταμένους. Instead, Maximus argues, Hesiod is telling us through his *Dichterweihe* that he was not trained by a professional.

[258] D.Chrys. 36.33–35 (transl. slightly altered).

Dio's debt to the Platonic theory of divinely sent 'madness' is obvious: we see here again how the poets, without knowing this themselves, may hit upon the truth when they are inspired by the Muses.[259] There is, however, one considerable difference. In Plato, Homer is associated with the tragedians as those composing through madness, but here it is Hesiod who figures as Homer's partner, and both of them are contrasted to the tragedians who play the crowd and tell them lies. Obviously, older boundaries dissolve, and inspiration becomes a looser term that can be employed as the context demands.[260]

---

[259] Cf. Jul. *Or*. 4.136a–137c. It goes too far, however, to call this passage from Dio a 'ornata rielaborazione' of Pl. *Phdr*. 245c, as Luzzatto (1983) does (74 n.84). On the other hand, the differences between Plato's and Dio's presentation of divine inspiration as noted by Nesselrath (2003) 134–135 are not altogether impressive.

[260] The passage in question is a very good example of the decisive influence of context. It is obvious that the distinction between the inspired epic poets and the uninspired tragedians is based on a chronological difference, and I believe Luzzatto (1983) 73 is right to perceive here a theory of an 'evoluzione della letterature greca in due tappe'. But we should remember that Dio's lecture on the organization of the universe is a largely Stoic one, and it may be that in his treatment of Hesiod and Homer he is influenced by the Stoic theory on the truth of poetry. This theory held, in a nutshell, that poetry can be a source of wisdom since it sometimes goes back to the sayings of the original namegivers and wise men, but that it has become distorted over time. The most ancient poets are the best preserved links, since they are closest to the wise men who lived at the beginning of time. This is why Hesiod and Homer have no '*clear* knowledge of the truth', but are likened to the attendants of the holy rites who sometimes catch a mystic phrase from olden times. That is also, I believe, why Dio can say (36.40) that the myth of the chariot of Zeus, told by the Persian Magi, is even truer than the sayings of Hesiod and Homer: for the Magi hold a knowledge that is far older than that of the Greek poets (as is suggested in 36.49, where the Magi accuse the Greeks of 'youthful ignorance and faulty memory', νεότητος τε καὶ μνήμης ἀσθενοῦς). Whereas in narrating myths Hesiod and Homer 'present each detail with much plausibility' (ἕκαστα φράζουσι μετὰ πολλῆς πειθοῦς, 42) and sing 'pleasing songs' (χαρίεντα ᾄσματα, 43), the Magi insist on the truthfulness of their myths and sing a barbarian song. They are, it is suggested here, the true initiates, whereas Hesiod and Homer are mere 'prophets' of the Muses (προφῆται τῶν Μουσῶν), a term used not for the inspired oracle but the priest who translates the divine utterance. It appears, then, that the 'evolution' of poetry consists not of two but of three stages, in which Hesiod and Homer represent the second: in the Greek epic poems, insistence upon the truth has already made way for mere plausibility, and the 'barbarian' sound has already been made 'graceful'; the trend will end in poetry that only aims at pleasure and has no more tie with the divine. (I believe, with Nesselrath (2003) 135–136, that Dio takes the message of Zarathustra and the Magi seriously; and of course the teachings of the Magi turn out to be so adapted that they are in perfect accord with the Stoic philosophical view of the world.) In this particular view of poetry, Hesiod and Homer occupy a special place, a sort of twilight zone between the perfectly true poetry of most ancient times and the utterly untrue poetry of modern times. They are somewhere in between, not initiated but not uninitiated either. They see the truth, but it is not clear.

5.2. *Homeric expansion*

The relationship between Hesiod and Homer changes over time. Whereas the two poets could be regarded as more or less equal in archaic and classical times, Homer soon becomes the dominant partner: his sphere of interest and expertise expands into areas previously (almost) uniquely associated with Hesiod. Eventually, Homeric poetry is seen to be so 'total' as to wholly include Hesiod. The expansion of Homer begins rather early but becomes more visible over time. It is apparent in all three aspects of the poets' σοφία—ethical orientation, knowledge, poetical quality—but can be witnessed most clearly in the last of these, i.e. that aspect that deals with poetry in a stricter sense: style, intent, and skill.

Homer's expansion was significantly helped on its way by Plato, who conceived of a divine poet who—during moments of inspiration—could be both truthful and pleasing; obviously, he saw Homer as the prime example of this new type of poet. That this means an invasion of Hesiodic territory can be gleaned from a supposedly casual remark describing Homer's poetry as composed 'with the help of Graces and Muses' (ξύν τισι Χάρισι καὶ Μούσαις).[261] However innocent this remark may seem, it indicates a breach with a strong tradition seeing Hesiod as truthful and Homer as beautiful, exemplified by Simonides' maxim that 'the Muses bore Hesiod, the Graces Homer.'[262]

Due to the efforts of Plato, who wanted to disqualify poetry as a form of knowledge based on τέχνη, Homer became 'manic' and thus (occasionally) truthful. Aristotle, however, the next great literary critic, rejected the notion of the manic poet and conceived all poetry as a human τέχνη or craft; remarkably enough, Homer remains for him the poet *par excellence*. This is presumably so for at least two reasons. The first is that the aim of poetry, according to Aristotle, is to create a powerful emotional response in the audience; as we have seen, this is traditionally what Homer is good at. Second, poetry is on the whole not to be judged according to its faithful depiction of the particulars of everyday reality, but to its concern with universality in its highest degree. Therefore, 'realism' or truth may occasionally be sacrificed for a higher goal, and petty untruths should not be in the way of the general effect of a certain

[261] Pl. *Lg.* 682a; cf. *AP* 7.1 (Alcaeus of Messene) describing Homer as the 'star of the Muses and Graces' (Μουσάων ἀστέρα καὶ Χαρίτων).

[262] See above, pp. 317–318.

scene.[263] Homer, 'who has above all taught the others the proper way of creating fiction',[264] is the best at thus manipulating the audience: 'even in the *Odyssey* the inexplicable elements in the story of his landing would obviously have been intolerable, had they been written by an inferior poet. As it is, Homer conceals the absurdity by the charm of all his other merits.'[265] Here the sweet verse of Homer re-appears, but this time his manipulative powers are positively evaluated, for it is a general rule of literature that 'what is convincing though impossible should always be preferred to what is possible and unconvincing.'[266] Thus in Aristotle it is not the concept of the 'lying' Homer that has changed; it is just that 'lying' has become an integral part of poetry.

Whereas Homer is lavishly praised in the *Poetics* for doing virtually everything right, Hesiod is not even mentioned in the treatise.[267] The two places where Aristotle *does* attribute poetical qualities to Hesiod, he only seems to do so in order to disqualify him as a natural philosopher. In *Metaphysics* 1000, Hesiod is ranked among the θεολόγοι ('speakers on gods') and μυθικῶς σοφιζομένοι ('mythological thinkers'), and the main objection against these supposed cosmologists is that they 'considered only what was significant to themselves':[268] since their archaic model of explaining the world uses terms of mythology instead of science, 'where the actual application of these causes is concerned, their statements are beyond our comprehension.'[269] A 'mythological thinker', Aristotle argues, should not be taken seriously as a philosopher. The only other

---

[263] Cf. Arist. *Po.* 1460b22–26: '… if an impossibility has been portrayed, an error has been made [as in the case of a portrait of a horse advancing both its right legs]. But it is justifiable if the poet thus achieves the object of poetry (…) and makes that part or some other part of the poem more striking. The pursuit of Hector is an example of this' (… ἂν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατα πεποίηται, ἡμάρτηται. ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὑτῆς (…), εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος. παράδειγμα ἡ τοῦ Ἕκτορος δίωξις). It is clear that Aristotle is here arguing against the nitpicking of Homer, points of critique he labels 'accidental' (κατὰ συμβεβηκός, 1460b16).

[264] Arist. *Po.* 1460a18–19: δεδίδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ.

[265] Arist. *Po.* 1460a35–b2: καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἀνεκτά, δῆλον ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ αὐτὰ φαῦλος ποιητὴς ποιήσειεν· νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον.

[266] Arist. *Po.* 1460a26–27: προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα.

[267] This is in part due to Hesiod's lack of *mimesis*, see ch. 3, pp. 116–117. Cf. Else (1986) 76 saying that according to Aristotle, 'poetry and *mimesis* are practically identical.'

[268] Arist. *Metaph.* 1000a10: μόνον ἐφρόντισαν τοῦ πιθανοῦ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτούς.

[269] Arist. *Metaph.* 1000a14–15: περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς προσφορᾶς τῶν αἰτίων τούτων ὑπὲρ

passage ascribing poetical qualities to Hesiod is *Meteorologica* 353, where the poet is not named though most likely referred to. When speaking of the sea, Aristotle begins by discussing the earliest conceptions of it:

> οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαῖοι καὶ διατρίβοντες περὶ τὰς θεολογίας ποιοῦσιν αὐτῆς πηγάς, ἵν' αὐτοῖς ὦσιν ἀρχαὶ καὶ ῥίζαι γῆς καὶ θαλάττης· τραγικώτερον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ σεμνότερον ὑπέλαβον ἴσως εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς μέγα τι τοῦ παντὸς τοῦτο μόριον ὄν·
>
> 'The ancients who concerned themselves with theology make it [= the sea] have sources, their purpose being to provide both land and sea with origins and roots. They perhaps supposed that this would give a more dramatic and grander air to their theories, according to which the earth was an important part of the universe …'[270]

This is the only passage in Aristotle (or in fact, the whole of classical literature) where Hesiod, whom I believe Aristotle is thinking of here,[271] is described with the (Homeric) qualities σεμνός and τραγικός, qualities that allow one to magnify beyond reality. But the passages from *Metaphysics* and *Meteorologica* do not turn Hesiod into a fully-fledged poet, of course, or indicate any 'expansion' on Hesiod's side; the attribution of poethood only serves to disqualify him as a philosopher. Not a philosopher and not a poet, Hesiod's status in Aristotle is rather unclear: he is most of all ἀρχαῖος, almost as primal and undifferentiated as the ἀρχαί of the earliest φυσιολογήσαντες. A good start for a discussion, which should then quickly take a more sophisticated turn.

The use of Homer by Plato and Aristotle demonstrates his polyvalence as a symbol of poetry: in the same time at the same place, two great intellectuals could construe wholly antithetical views of one and the same poet. Needless to say, both the notion of Homer the inspired genius and Homer the perfect artisan were widely followed, allowing for countless other subdivisions and specifications. In fact, it is often the polyvalence of Homer that seems his primary quality: throughout antiquity we hear that Homer tells all the stories, speaks all languages, masters all styles, knows

---

ἡμᾶς εἰρήκασιν. One is reminded of Herodotus disqualifying Homer as a historian: what Homer says 'has no disproof' (οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον, *Hist.* 2.25).

[270] Arist. *Mete.* 353a34–b3.

[271] Hesiod is called an ἀρχαῖος elsewhere (*Metaph.* 989a10–12, perhaps *Metaph.* 983b33–984a3), has concerned himself with θεολογία (*Metaph.* 1000a9–15, perhaps *Metaph.* 983b27–32), and in fact did write that the sea has sources (*Th.* 282).

all the tricks;[272] similarly, his scope is all-inclusive.[273] Incidentally, this quality is widely recognized by modern scholars as well.[274] By contrast, Hesiod remains more or less the same.

6. *Conclusion*

In this chapter I have discussed the reception of Hesiod as a poet; I investigated certain tendencies regarding the way his poems were viewed, the way he was believed to have composed them, and the evaluation of his style. Throughout all five sections we have encountered two factors of decisive importance in the development of the poetic appreciation of Hesiod. These are here summarily presented.

The first factor is the continuous appreciation of Hesiod's poetry as truthful, useful, and didactic. Hesiod's inspiration was initially conceived as a succesful transfer of data which corresponded neatly to the facts of life. He is invariably associated with a style fit for teaching (fine, pure, polished and precise), and grouped with poets that are famous for their good advice and ethical exhortations. When in the hellenistic age poetry became not only didactic but learned as well, Hesiod remained the example with regard to both theme and style. With the solidification of rhetorical categories in Roman and later times, Hesiod became permanently connected to the smooth and simple style and to the genre of didactic epic and other text types aiming to teach. Like the *synthesis* ascribed

---

[272] Cf. e.g. *AP* 15.36 (Cometas) calling Homer the 'teller of many tales' (πολύμυθε); D.Chrys. 10.24 calling Homer 'bilingual' because he also understands the language of the gods (cf. 11.22), and in 12.66 claiming that Homer 'mingled together every Hellenic dialect which before his time were separate' (πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν γλῶτταν διῃρημένην τέως ἀνέμιξε), cf. 53.5 'Homer is capably of everything and reproduces literally every sound' (ἱκανὸν παντὸς χρήματος καὶ πάσας ἀτεχνῶς ἀφιέντα φωνάς); Dionysius tells us in *Im*. 6.204 U-R that Hesiod excels in one style only whereas Homer is good at all of them, cf. Demetrius citing Homer as the example in his discussion of all styles, and Cicero *Orat*. 31.109 naming Homer as the prime example of an artist shifting styles; examples of Homer's literary omnipotence abound in [Plutarch]'s *De Vita et Poesi Homeri* (even though such claims may be 'polemical bluster', Struck 2004 156). Too (1998) 22 retraces the appreciation for 'multiple voices and the ability to produce all kinds of voices' to early Greek poetry; to the examples he mentions should be added Helen speaking with the voices of the wives of the heroes inside the Trojan Horse (*Od*. 4.266–289).

[273] Cf. e.g. *AP* 7.6, 7.7, 9.24, 16.303. In such epigrams, Homer is often compared to the sun, emphasizing his all-inclusive scope and his great value for all mankind.

[274] On the 'practically super-generic' influence of Homer see e.g. Dowden (2004) 188–205 and Hunter (2004); according to Foley (2004) 181–182, epic enjoys the status of 'master-genre' all over the world.

to Hesiod by Dionysius—'… it requires that the words shall keep on the move, swept forward and riding along on top of one another, all sustained in their movement by mutual support, like the current of a stream that never rests. (…) This result is achieved by the exact fitting together of the words, so that no perceptible interval between them is allowed. (…) It requires not only that its words shall be properly fitted and smoothed together, but also that the clauses should be effectively interwoven with one another and achieve their final form together as a period'[275]—this factor shows tradition smoothing over and fitting together several strands of Hesiod's reception, ultimately presenting a Hesiod as remarkably the same throughout the centuries.

But the reception of Hesiod is not only determined by this constant factor, given shape by tradition. It is also the influence of Homer, here more than in any of the other chapters, that is of great importance. This is clear at once from the highly significant fact that from the sixth century BC to the third century AD Hesiod and Homer are virtually never put on a par with regard to style, beauty and impact. As we have seen, Hesiod and Homer continuously take opposite sides: when Pindar compares himself to the truthful and toiling Hesiod, Homer is described as making stories bigger, seducing his audience away from ἀλάθεια with his sweet verse. When Plato turns Homer into a manic poet composing in frenzy, there is no comparable treatment of Hesiod. Homer is the ultimate dramatist, playing at the emotions of the audience, and thus the great example for verbal magicians like Gorgias—Hesiod, by contrast, is ultimately un-dramatic and a symbol of linguistic correctness. These are just a few examples. I do not wish to claim, of course, that Homer in the early and classical period is never credited with poetical qualities that have above been described as Hesiodic (e.g. truthfulness, purity, and precision); he regularly is. What I *do* claim, however, is that there is a clear tendency to describe Homeric poetry as un-Hesiodic, and that every time Hesiod is compared to Homer, Homer takes shape as his antagonist.

---

[275] D.H. *Comp.* 6.112–113 U-R: κεκινῆσθαι βούλεται τὴν ὀνομασίαν καὶ φέρεσθαι θάτερα κατὰ τῶν ἑτέρων ὀνομάτων καὶ ὀχεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλληλουχίαν λαμβάνοντα βάσιν ὥσπερ τὰ ῥέοντα καὶ μηδέποτε ἀτρεμοῦντα· (…) τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἀκρίβειαι χρόνον αἰσθητὸν οὐδένα τὸν μεταξὺ τῶν ὀνομάτων περιλαμβάνουσαι· (…) οὐ μόνον δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐπιτηδείως συνηρμόσθαι βούλεται καὶ συνεξέσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κῶλα τοῖς κώλοις εὖ συνυφάνθαι καὶ πάντα εἰς περίοδον τελευτᾶν.

This antithetical view of Hesiod and Homer in antiquity is complemented by another one that presents a Hesiod who is slowly paling in comparison with Homer, the greatest poet of all times. As Homer grew in importance, he began to include qualities that were traditionally associated with Hesiod. Significant contributions to this development were Plato's depiction of Homer as truthful without knowledge, and Aristotle's view of Homer as the master craftsman; perhaps the modification of an originally dichotomous theory of style also played a part. In the end, it seems that the most important difference between Hesiod and Homer is that the first is stable and one-sided, while the other is polyvalent and dynamic. Against such a shape-shifting deity, Hesiod could never remain the other poet.

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

The reception of Hesiod in antiquity amounts to more than the sum total of all references by later Greeks to the enshrined poetic corpus of a cultural icon. In fact, Hesiod's image is far from a static and univocal given. Every time the poet is named, quoted, mentioned or otherwise referred to, he is more than just being integrally 'received': in each case, he is refashioned and redefined to fit the demands and aims of the recipient, and takes on a new shape in every new context. One and the same poet can thus appear as a blasphemous teller of monstrous tales, a keeper of arcane knowledge, a slow-witted farmer, a philosopher with a cosmic outlook, a teacher of justice and reciprocity, and a truth-telling seer. The panhellenic symbol Hesiod can be employed in many different ways and places, and each recipient contributes to its diversity.

This is not to say, however, that Hesiod can mean almost *anything*: there are limits to the symbol's semantic range, put there by traditions that determine Hesiod's employability. There seem to be two main factors which thus define how Hesiod can be used, and what themes and subjects are Hesiodic or not. The most important of these factors is undoubtedly the poet's own text, especially the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*. Obviously, Hesiod's own words determine to a considerable degree the boundaries of his reception, however interpretive and far-fetched. The second factor, I have argued, is Homer. It is the main argument of this book that the ancient image of Homer is crucial to the understanding of Hesiod's reception. Homer defines Hesiod (and, to a smaller degree, vice versa), and this happens in three different ways: by association, by absence, and by opposition. The picture of Hesiod changes fundamentally when he is presented together with Homer, when he is alone (which still often means that Homer is present in the background), or when he is framed as Homer's opposite. There is not *one* Hesiod, nor are there infinitely many; I would say there are three. In this conclusion, I call them the sacred Hesiod (when combined with Homer), the modern Hesiod (when alone), and the typical Hesiod (when opposed to Homer).

The tripartite view of Hesiod is expressed in the structure of the book, which is organized into three Parts, each dealing with one particular

Hesiod. Each Part is further subdivided according to the three more or less separate qualities of σοφία attributed to poets in antiquity: 'moral and educational integrity', 'knowledge and factual accuracy', and 'technical skill and aesthetic/emotional impact'. (The last of these qualities, however, is treated integrally in chapter 9, since it has proven too strained to discuss the strictly 'poetical' evaluation of Hesiod in three separate Parts.) In this last chapter, I will summarize the findings of the three Parts and offer my final conclusions. As was stated in the introduction to this book, the rather large scope of my study has often led to abstraction and generalization; this naturally holds true for the conclusion as well.

Part One: The sacred Hesiod

The first Part of the book was concerned with the image of Hesiod when equated or associated with Homer. In its introductory chapter (1), which was mainly concerned with ancient notions about Hesiod's place in time and society, we have seen that the Greeks—much like modern scholars—were used to assimilating (or 'lumping' together) Hesiod and Homer. The poets were generally regarded as roughly contemporary, sometimes even related—a sure indication of a widespread belief that their poetry is alike. Such a view is confirmed by teachers and scholiasts using Hesiod to explain Homer (and vice versa), and the way they are commonly set apart from the younger poets as 'ancients' (ἀρχαῖοι). Furthermore, Hesiod's place in society appears to have been comparable to that of Homer: his poetry was studied in schools, sung during symposia and performed at religious festivals. The fact that most of the references to the study or performance of Hesiod also mention Homer suggests that the Greeks were usually confronted with Hesiodic poetry in a wider context, which was largely determined by Homer. It must have been natural and normal for them to understand Hesiod and Homer as a combination.

Chapter 2 set out to examine more precisely that combination and offers a discussion of the ethico-religious import of Hesiod when together with Homer. It turns out that the combination of the two poets in the field of ethics and education was extremely strong. An analysis of the material suggested that at the outset of their reception, Hesiod and Homer were regarded as (almost) equally important teachers and moral authorities. From the earliest times onwards, their poems' morals and maxims were credited with a great prescriptive value, often amounting to a law-like pertinence—one example is Herodotus' comment on the poets' decisive

influence on the development of Greek religion. It is significant that the earliest (and heaviest) attacks on poetry are generally aimed at Hesiod and Homer together; one can think, for instance, of Xenophanes' dismissive portrayal of epic poetry, and Plato complaining in *Republic* 3 about the pernicious effects that the poets' lies have on society. Ancient criticism in general often focuses on the immoral behaviour of the gods and the fantastic descriptions of the underworld, and is usually aimed at the Homeric poems in combination with the *Theogony*. Not surprisingly, Hesiod and Homer were also the primary objects of the earliest and most elaborate defences of poetry. Among the several strategies of defence discussed (selection, altering the surface, allegorical reading, poetic licence, and harmonization), it is especially the process of harmonization that demonstrates the central position of Hesiod and Homer as moral guides and teachers; apparently, their poetry was thought important enough to merit the trouble of harmonizing it with the accounts of the two other ethical authorities in the Greek world, i.e. the lawgivers and philosophers.

The connection between Hesiod and Homer as sources of 'encyclopaedic' knowledge was rather strong among the Greeks: as we have seen in chapter 3, the poets together are credited with a vast scope and could offer their students detailed, sometimes even technical information on virtually every topic. Together, Hesiod and Homer can be set against other poetic or prose sources to form a separate and exclusive category of their own. Most often, their knowledge is regarded as more respectable and trustworthy than that of the tragedians and historians. It is interesting that Hesiod and Homer, revered storekeepers of ancient knowledge, are never pictured as philosophers together; even though they were both regarded as great philosophers individually, they are never presented as propagating similar doctrines. Apparently, in this particular field the Greeks chose to differentiate instead of assimilate (as was further argued in chapters 6 and 9).

The Hesiod of the first Part, we may conclude, can be characterized as 'sacred' in several ways. His poems were performed in religious contexts, and they were typically thought to deal with religious subjects, more specifically the behaviour of the gods and the particulars of the underworld. Moreover, his poetry itself is hallowed or 'enshrined'—it is pictured as ancient, at the cradle of Greek culture, religion, and civilization. His poems are 'identitätsfundierend' for the Greeks, in a way that also holds for the *Torah*, the *Epic of Gilgamesh* and the *Book of the Dead* for their respective cultures. This formative character of his works finds expression in the great ethical and more generally prescriptive

value attributed to them. Countervoices, attacking the very foundations of Hesiod's authority and thus denying him the status of an educator, are mostly smothered by an elaborate educational system of exegetes at all levels, who are continually teaching, interpreting and explaining Hesiod, which had the effect, if not the intention, of keeping him at the heart of Greek culture and identity. This first Hesiod, the sacred Hesiod, is thoroughly affected by association with Homer, whose status as an ancient and enshrined educator reinforces these qualities in Hesiod.

Part Two: The modern Hesiod

As we have seen, Hesiod's image is essentially different when he is alone (i.e. when he is referred to in passages that do not mention Homer anywhere in the immediate context). One could argue that this Hesiod—since he is least affected by Homer—is the 'real' one, but such a qualification should be between quotation marks for at least two reasons: first and foremost, because it has been shown that Hesiod, even in contexts without Homer, is to some degree implicitly determined by the other poet; and secondly, because the other Hesiods (those either explicitly associated with or opposed to Homer) are no less real—Homer is a crucial part of Hesiod's image and reception. Still, we must conclude that Hesiod alone is strikingly different from the others. This Hesiod is the subject of Part Two.

Chapter 4 investigated the fundamentals underlying the Greek (re-) construction of Hesiod. It started out with an examination of the biographical tradition, which appears to be largely based on the constructive elements suggested by the (famously self-reflective) works of Hesiod themselves: Hesiod is regarded as an inspired shepherd and a prize-winning poet because he says so himself. Another part of the *vita*, it was argued, is the result of a more creative use of the source text by posterity. I believe that the stories of Hesiod's violent death, his double burial and his posthumous power are caused by an imaginative reworking of his own well-known statements on demons and their benign influence on mankind. Hesiod is thus deliberately heroized, even if it is unclear whether he had a cult or not. Hesiod's heroic status contrasts with that of Homer, who is often pictured as a god—this is one good example of how Homer defines Hesiod even when he is not mentioned anywhere.

The second section of chapter 4 is concerned with so-called 'mechanisms of memory', the six (in my view) most important mnemonic pro-

cesses that determine why some parts of Hesiod are forgotten, while others are remembered as essentially Hesiodic. They are the practice of assimilation, by which Hesiod is consciously or unconsciously made to resemble the recipient (which makes that, for instance, Heraclitus can criticize Hesiod as if he were a philosopher); the catchword-factor, explaining the afterlife of certain verses or passages through their sheer catchiness (the best example being Hesiod's verses on the road to virtue, which—often altered or misquoted—found their way into many different contexts); the principle of snowballing, when recipient B refers to recipients A's reference to Hesiod (as is the case with some Muse-inspired philosophers, who refer to each other's use of the Hesiodic source); the principle of clustering, according to which a recipient consciously or unconsciously creates a consistent Hesiod by clustering similar references (so that Aristotle can create a consistent picture of Hesiod as an 'originator'); the Homeric factor (the most obvious proof that Homer is still somehow present even though Hesiod is 'alone'), which dictates that Hesiod will not be associated with themes that are distinctly Homeric (the theme of war being the most important one); and the persona's paradox, which explains why Hesiod is practically never explicitly associated with either works or days (themes whose Hesiodic quality it is too obvious to mention). The six mechanisms are usually combined and are only separated in this study for the sake of convenience. Together, they explain a great part of the dynamics underlying the collective memory of Hesiod.

Chapter 5 dealt with the ethico-political orientation of Hesiod when he is alone. Four ethical themes seem to be most regularly associated with this Hesiod in antiquity: demonology, justice in the polis, human interaction, and moderation. The themes share the concept of balance or proportionate compensation and their main focus on human behaviour in the context of the city-state. The chapter illustrates how crucial the absence or presence of Homer is to the image of Hesiod: with Homer, he is often blamed for inspiring particularly antisocial behaviour, but without Homer, Hesiod becomes the paragon of polis-minded thinking: he continually promotes cooperative values and warns against greed and violence. Perhaps it is this part of Hesiod's image, almost completely based on the *Works and Days* alone, which explains why Hesiod is generally regarded as 'wise' (σοφός). Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates how easily the past is adjusted to fit the present. The original context of Hesiod's advice (aimed at farmers in a small village) is wholly erased as his admonitions are brought up to date and seen to be equally valid in (or

perhaps even meant for) the new context of the nascent polis. Here, too, some aspects of Hesiod are forgotten while others are reinforced through repetition and adaptation.

The philosophical Hesiod is the subject of chapter 6. As we have seen, Hesiod (when alone) was in antiquity credited with a distinct and remarkably coherent philosophy. Three topics are associated with him most frequently: 1) physics and cosmology, 2) epistemology and the acquiring of knowledge, and 3) the truthfulness of language. In all three areas of interest, Hesiod is rather consistently pictured as displaying three related qualities. First, there is the immense scope of his investigations: the entire cosmos is his object of study, and he is said to know everything. The breadth of his enterprise results in both heavy criticism (such as that of Xenophanes and Heraclitus) and serious imitation (from the natural philosophers and Empedocles, for instance). Second, there is his 'atomist' (as opposed to holistic) approach to acquiring knowledge, i.e. the careful collecting and categorizing of all constituent parts that together account for the whole. This 'method' was originally attributed to Hesiod because of his cosmological speculations, but the image soon spilled over into other areas of interest; this is most clearly visible in Plato, who presents Hesiod as someone who knows a wagon because he can list all its parts. And third, Hesiod is often thought to assume or teach that there is a transparent, one-to-one relationship between words and things, which turns him into a predecessor of linguistic purists like Prodicus. As was already stated, these three qualities are closely related and mutually reinforcing. A polymath will naturally be a collector and an organizer, who will naturally have an all-encompassing scope and aim at completeness. Such a spirit (constructed or not) will naturally seek meaning in the apparent structure instead of postulating deeper layers of unity: in other words, the items in the list represent the bigger picture, as words directly represent reality. We must conclude that Hesiod the philosopher is a univocal and powerful figure, taken seriously by the earliest philosophers and often recurring in later thought.

The second Hesiod, then, is unlike the first because he is not so much enshrined as he is modernized. Association with Homer evidently makes Hesiod ancient and sacred, but Hesiod alone is regarded as a topical thinker reflecting on and contributing to modern issues. He is employed in contemporary discussions on key themes such as moderation, justice in the city, the way to achieve knowledge, and the truthfulness of language. In such cases, the original setting of Hesiod's wisdom and admonitions is forgotten as he is being turned into a modern thinker through the

process of assimilation: Hesiod can thus become like Solon or Prodicus. Furthermore, Hesiod's image as an 'atomist' philosopher is a strikingly consistent one, just like his reconstruction as a teacher of reciprocity. Common to both the 'ethical' and the 'philosophical' Hesiod of chapters 5 and 6 is the emphasis on balance and measurement: in Hesiod's view, language, social and political behaviour, and the universe as a whole all consist of elemental units that can be categorized, classified, and balanced. The just and the wise know how to categorize and classify, and they see this balance. Hesiod the wise is their guide, and though he may have died long ago, as a hero his presence continues into later times.

Part Three: The typical Hesiod

The last Part of this study dealt with the third Hesiod, i.e. the poet who is defined through opposition with Homer. This Hesiod is found most explicitly in the many contest stories that present Hesiod as Homer's opponent in a wisdom contest, the subject of chapter 7. An analysis of its most interesting versions, which focuses on the *Certamen*, has suggested that the traditional tale was not meant to offer a final verdict on the difficult question who the greatest poet is. Hesiod's victory—the only consistent element in all the versions and thus the only part of the story that the audience knew beforehand—is not there to conclusively crown either Hesiod or (as is held by those who believe in Panedes' *Fehlurteil*) Homer, but rather provides a stimulating point of departure for a tale concerned with the question of how to judge the σοφία of poets. Hesiod and Homer feature in this tale not only because they are the most famous of Greek poets (and because their meeting was thought historically possible), but also because their poetry can be constructed as antithetical. The criteria of the judge(s) gain force because the duelling poets are so unlike as to be regarded as opposites. As we have seen, the main watersheds between them are the content of their poetry (farming versus fighting), its ethico-political orientation (people versus king), and its effect on the audience (reason versus emotion). The qualifications of Hesiod and Homer in the *Certamen* are not peculiar to this story, nor specifically invented for it; they are the reflection of centuries of literary criticism employing Hesiod and Homer as metapoetic symbols. The process witnessed in the stories of the contest can in fact be seen throughout antiquity: when the poets are opposed, their typical qualities come out most clearly, and this is especially true for Hesiod.

Chapter 8 further investigated two of the main watersheds mentioned above, and has shown that the contrasting values attached to Hesiod and Homer correspond rather neatly to broader cultural dichotomies such as farming versus fighting, people versus king, and peace versus war. Since these compatible sets of oppositions align and overlap, they form a powerful 'grid' of typical values with which Hesiod and Homer are associated. A good example of such overlap is Simonides comparing Hesiod to a gardener and Homer to a weaver of garlands, thus tapping into a complex system of cultural values in order to define the poets as poets. I believe it is indicative of the poets' cultural significance that they are so firmly embedded in this complex scheme. In the case of Hesiod in particular, it is clearly visible that certain of his qualities are focused on and blown up when he is implicitly or explicitly contrasted with Homer. Interestingly enough, it is mostly through opposition that he becomes a farmer-poet, a spokesman of the people, or an advocate of peace. These are the qualities that *we* (the modern audience) usually think of as most typically Hesiodic, but we must now conclude that they are to a considerable degree caused by his opposition to Homer; we have not encountered the farmer or the pacifist so clearly in Parts One and Two. Hesiod's image, then, radicalizes into a type by means of the contrast with Homer. Hesiod, in this Part, features as the anti-Homer.

A similar process can be witnessed in chapter 9, which was concerned with the opposition of Hesiod and Homer as poets in the strictest sense (and thus dealt with the 'technical skill and aesthetic/emotional impact' of poetic σοφία). We have seen that Hesiod—in contexts that set the two poets against each other—is rather consistently depicted as having qualities that are opposite to those of Homer: he is truthful and didactic, composes through τέχνη instead of μανία, and employs a pure and low-key style. Obviously, I do not wish to claim that these qualities are exclusively Hesiodic: the Greeks also attributed all these qualities to Homer, but not when he is opposed to Hesiod. In such contexts, didacticism, τέχνη, and pure or simple speech they are typically characteristic of Hesiod alone.

Some of these qualifications are clearly at least in part derived from his own poetry, especially the truthfulness and didacticism. Others, however, may seem rather odd to someone engaging with Hesiod's poetry for the first time: despite his oft-celebrated encounter with the Muses, Hesiod is not manic or ecstatic but rational and technical; despite his obvious share in the language of epic, his style is characterized as pure and simple.

We can only understand this once we see that *all* such qualifications of Hesiod as a poet are either established or reinforced through opposition with Homer. In these cases, Hesiod is truthful because Homer is fictional, Hesiod is didactic because Homer is entertaining, Hesiod is a technical writer because Homer is a manic poet, and Hesiod's language is low-key because Homer's is magnificent. That Hesiod and Homer can be used as symbols of opposing poetics is borne out by the telling fact that in Greek (and Roman) literature, Hesiod and Homer are almost never equated with regard to style, beauty, and emotional impact. It is thus as poets in the strictest sense that Hesiod and Homer are most clearly 'split'; the greatest watershed is found in the field of poetics.

As we have seen, much of the evidence discussed in chapters 8 and 9 called for a modification of a strictly antithetical view of the two poets. In both chapters, Homer was seen to 'invade' areas that were typically associated with Hesiod, and to include qualities formerly attributed to the other poet. Through the influence of Plato's concept of inspiration, Aristotle's views on Homeric craftsmanship, and the rise of rhetorical theory (among other things), Homer became the ultimate icon of poetic excellence *tout court* because of his polyvalence or perhaps even omnivalence: he became the poet who knew everything, taught and exemplified every virtue, and availed himself of all poetic styles and registers. Topics that were regarded as truly Hesiodic in classical times (such as the distinction between words), are at least also Homeric in later periods, and in some cases even almost exclusively connected to Homer. By consequence, Hesiod slowly disappeared into the background.

Generally speaking, the story of Hesiod's relative significance can be viewed as one of continuous decline, with one remarkable revival in the hellenistic age. For the sake of clarity, I discern five phases in this development. The first phase (ca. 1200–700) is the time of oral composition and performance, in which the poems were not fixed yet but spread through Greece by way of singers (*aoidoi*), among whom I count Hesiod and Homer as well (even though the genesis of the Hesiodic poems may not be wholly parallel to those of Homer). The only evidence we have for this phase comes from the poems themselves, which seem to picture their two traditions as complementary but distinct; they are clearly interdependent but can refer to each other in a critical way. There are no clear indications (as indeed all proof of such interaction is rather circumstantial) that one poetic tradition was thought to be more important than the other.

The second phase roughly coincides with the archaic age (ca. 700–450) and is concerned with the poets' earliest reception. Even though Homer's lyric and tragic qualities have by this time already made him a more popular poet, there are some indications that Hesiod is hardly inferior with regard to cultural significance. His *Theogony* was an important source for the Milesian philosophers, and for Parmenides and Empedocles; the *Works and Days* were intensely studied by Solon and Theognis. Equally interesting, however, are the cases of criticism instead of imitation. The earliest explicit attacks on poetry by Xenophanes, Heraclitus and (pseudo-)Pythagoras are levelled against Hesiod and Homer *together*, which shows that Hesiod's status as an educator was almost equal to Homer's.

This situation changes notably in the third phase (ca. 450–300), in which Hesiod's gradual disappearance has definitely begun (some indication of this is the ratio of references to Hesiod and Homer in the works of Plato and Aristotle, which comes to about 1:3). The main cause behind this development is that Hesiod lost his monopoly on certain qualities formerly almost uniquely associated with him: the allegorists turned Homer into a natural philosopher as well, Plato propagated the extremely succesful notion of Homer as the inspired poet *par excellence* (not even mentioning Hesiod in this respect), and Aristotle focused solely on Homer's poetic τέχνη, presenting Hesiod as a failed physiologist. Obviously, some themes and qualities remained Hesiodic (farming, atomism, truthful speech), and he is often presented on a par with Homer, but his importance is waning.

In the fourth phase, that of the hellenistic period, interest in Hesiod resurges as he is turned into the champion of a new poetics. Some of his traditional characteristics—an obsession with hard work, a concern with small things, and simple and pure speech—align with his more recent qualification as an 'uninspired' poet to make him the symbol of the learned and labouring poets of the new, un-Homeric kind. Interestingly, this revival is accompanied by a renewed interest in Hesiod's more 'heroic' epic, the *Theogony*, whose interest in beginnings and cataloguing character was congenial to the Alexandrians. Nonetheless, as was stated in chapter 9, the hellenistic embrace of Hesiod did not entail a rejection of Homer; in fact, he was regarded as forming an unsurpassable class of his own.

After this recovery, however, Hesiod's gradual disappearance continues during the fifth and final phase, the Second Sophistic. Even though most Hesiodic references from antiquity come from this period (see

table 1 in the Introduction), the ratio between references to Hesiod and Homer drops to about 1:5 (as calculated in the works of Lucian and Dio Chrysostom, which seem to be representative; the rate is lowest at 1:9 in the *Palatine Anthology*). Much of this can be explained by Homer's continuing invasion of fields formerly thought of as Hesiodic. Incidentally, this could help to explain the popularity of the contest-story in the Second Sophistic, where Hesiod's victory was far more sensational than in earlier times. As has been concluded before, there is too little of the original Hesiod left for him to remain a poet 'besides' Homer: Hesiod has stopped being the other poet, and has become another poet.

The diachronic sketch above brings together the many observations on the development of Hesiod's relative significance, which are somewhat scattered throughout this study; the historical perspective, however, forms the necessary counterpart to the essentially thematic approach that has organized the chapters. Both emphasize the main hypothesis of this book, i.e. that Hesiod's reception can only be understood when the ancient image of Homer is taken into account. The three Hesiods we have encountered are all fundamentally different; moreover, they are remarkably consistent. The reception of Hesiod, then, is characterized by these three different traditions, which—as we have seen above—are all grounded in the Hesiodic poems themselves, mostly take shape in the fifth and fourth century BC, and leave their traces throughout antiquity. Interestingly, these traditions appear to largely neglect or override the distinction between the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, which is so essential to modern studies of Hesiod. Generally speaking, Hesiod's image in antiquity is mostly determined by ad hoc (clustering) references from both works (the *Works and Days* being about twice as popular), without taking much account of the character of the poems as a whole. Aristotle's consistent picture of Hesiod as an 'originator', for instance, is made up of references to both the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* (the *Theogony* in this case presumably providing the most obvious leads for such a representation).

For the sake of convenience, the most important differences between the three Hesiods are presented in the overview below:

Capacity 'σοφία'	**Sacred Hesiod** with Homer	**Modern Hesiod** without Homer	**Typical Hesiod** against Homer
Ethics / Politics			
Description	Educator	Teacher of Justice/Balance	Pacifist and People's Poet
Themes	– Behaviour of the gods and the Underworld (*Th.*) – Proper religious behaviour (*WD*)	– Demonology (*WD*) – Proper (= reciprocal) behaviour in the polis (*WD*) – Moderation (*WD*)	– Peace and Farming (*WD*) – Abuse of Power (*WD*)
Philosophy			
Description	– (Old Knower)	Categorizing Polymath	Atomist & Linguistic Purist
Themes	Empty category (focus on historical and geographical knowledge instead)	– Chaos, Love and the elements (*Th.*) – Truth and Falsehood (*Th.*)	– The elements (*Th.*) – Word-distinctions (*WD*)
Poetry			
Description	– (Ancient poet)	Sweet and Pure Composer	Low-key Technical Writer
Style	Empty category (Hesiod and Homer do not share any stylistic features)	Smooth, sweet, pure	– Simple, didactic – Technical, uninspired

The overview is very schematic and unavoidably obscures much of the details and nuances discussed in the book; nonetheless, it does present the three Hesiods and their interdependence in a clear fashion. The first one is the Hesiod created by association with Homer: he is a culture hero grounding in his poetry the right way to live for 'all the Greeks'. As a hallowed teacher and moral authority, he is the object of continuous study and imitation. It is obvious that this Hesiod only exists side by side with Homer in the field of ethics and education; in the areas of philosophy and poetry, they are presented as having nothing in common. It is all the more striking that this Hesiod is so frequent: as we have seen in the introduction, in about one third of all ancient references to Hesiod, he is combined with Homer.

The third one is the Hesiod best known to us: it is the farmer-poet straining his poetical powers to write down his lists of gods and chores. The typical Hesiod was constructed by the Greeks through opposition with Homer, and as the anti- or non-Homer he occupies a central place in

an extensive system of social, cultural and poetic values. Although Hesiod is explicitly contrasted to Homer in only 9 % of all cases, the characteristics resulting from them are sometimes visible in the modern Hesiod as well. In matters of style, for instance, the typical and the modern Hesiod are quite compatible. Even so, the relatively low percentage does reflect on our own present-day conception of Hesiod: we usually think of Hesiod as different from Homer, creating either an oppositional or a complementary picture by focusing on certain passages and leaving out others. In this, we are like the Greeks—but in our day, this point of view has perhaps become disproportionally dominant, obscuring the second Hesiod.

The second Hesiod, with whom 60 % of all references is concerned, is caught in the middle: he is tied to the other two, but nonetheless shows a distinct and highly intriguing profile. He was presumably considered a hero, whose careful admonitions on justice and reciprocity made him a valuable teacher on how to live in the polis. Furthermore, he was regarded as an important philosopher, explaining total structures (like the cosmos or language) from an atomist perspective, and believing in the one-to-one relationship between words and things. His poetry was seen as pure and sweet. It is this modern Hesiod that we often fail to see, because we tend to look at Hesiod through Homer, and thus conceive of him as the other poet. But Hesiod was originally a poet *sui generis*, and there were contexts in which he would make Homer appear as 'the other poet.'

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adam, H. (1974), *Plutarchs Schrift 'non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum'*, Amsterdam.

Adkins, A.W.H. (1960), *Merit and Responsibility*, Oxford.

——— (1972), *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece*, London.

——— (1973), 'ἀρετή, τέχνη, Democracy and Sophists: Protagoras 316b–328d', *JHS* 93:3–12.

Angier, C. (1964), 'Verbal Patterns in Hesiod's *Theogony*', *HSCP* 68:329–344.

Alcock, S. (2002), *Archaeologies of the Greek Past. Landscape, Monuments, and Memories*, Cambridge.

Algra, K. (2001), 'Comments or Commentary? Zeno of Citium and Hesiod's *Theogonia*', *Mnemosyne* 54:562–581.

Allen, T.W. (1912), *Homeri Opera, Tomus V*, Oxford.

——— (1915), 'The Date of Hesiod', *JHS* 35:85–99.

Almeida, J. (2003), *Justice as an aspect of the polis idea in Solon's political poems* (*Mnemosyne* suppl. 243), Leiden.

Aly, W. (1913a), *Hesiods Theogonie*, Heidelberg.

——— (1913b), 'Hesiodos von Askra und der Verfasser der *Theogonie*', *RM* 68:22–67.

Arrighetti, G. and F. Montanari (eds.) (1993), *La Componente autobiografica nella poesia greca e latina fra realtà e artificio letterario*, Pisa.

Arrighetti, G. (1996), 'Hésiode et les Muses: Le Don de la Vérité et la Conquête de la Parole', in Blaise e.a. (1996), pp. 53–70.

Arthur, M.B. (1983), 'The Dream of a World Without Women: Poetics and the Circles of Order in the *Theogony* Prooemium', *Arethusa* 16:97–116.

Asper, M. (1997), *Onomata allotria: zur Genese, Struktur und Funktion poetologischer Metaphern bei Kallimachos*, Stuttgart.

Assman, J. (1997), *Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism*, Cambridge (MA).

——— (2000), *Religion und kulturelles Gedächtnis*, München.

——— (2005[5]), *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*, München.

Athanassakis, A.N. (1983), *Hesiod: Theogony, Works and Days, Shield*, Baltimore.

——— (1992), 'Cattle and Honour in Homer and Hesiod', *Ramus* 21:156–186.

Babut, D. (1974), 'Xénophane critique des poètes', *AntCl* 43:83–117.

——— (1976), 'Héraclite critique des poètes et des savants', *AntCl* 45:464–496.

Baldry, H.C. (1952), 'Who Invented the Golden Age?', *CQ* n.s. 2:83–92.

Banks, J. (1879), *The Works of Hesiod, Callimachus and Theognis*, London.

Barron, J.P. and P.E. Easterling (1985), 'Hesiod', in Easterling and Knox (1985), pp. 92–105.

Bastianini, G. and A. Casanova (eds.) (2008), *Esiodo, cent' anni di papiri*, Florence.

Beaulieu, M.C. (2004), 'L'héroisation du poète Hésiode en Grèce ancienne', *Kernos* 17:103–117.
Becker, O. (1937), *Das Bild des Weges und verwandte Vorstellungen im frühgriechischen Denken* (*Hermes* Einzelschriften 4), Berlin.
Beissinger, M. (et al.) (1999), *Epic Traditions in the Contemporary World*, Berkeley.
Bekkum, W. van (ed.) (1997), *The Emergence of Semantics in Four Linguistic Traditions. Hebrew, Sanskrit, Greek, Arabic* (Studies in the History of the Language Sciences 82), Amsterdam.
Beloch, K.J. (1912[2]), *Griechiche Geschichte 1.1*, Strassburg.
Benardete, S. (1963), 'Some Misquotations of Homer in Plato', *Phronesis* 8:173–178.
Berger, H. (1880), *Die geographischen Fragmente des Eratosthenes*, Leipzig.
Berke, S. (e.a.) (2009), *2000 Jahre Varusschlacht. Mythos*, Wemding.
Bett, R. (1989), 'The Sophists and Relativism', *Phronesis* 34:139–169.
Beye, C.R. (1972), 'The Rhythm of Hesiod's *Works and Days*', *HSCP* 76:23–43.
Bierl, A., R. Lämmle and K. Wesselmann (eds.) (2007), *Literatur und Religion 1*, Berlin.
Bing, P. (1988), *The Well-Read Muse*, Göttingen.
Blaise, F. (1995), 'Solon. Fragment 36W. Pratique et fondation des normes politiques', *REG* 108:24–37.
——— (1996), 'Individualité d'un sens ou individu historique?', in Blaise (1996), 255–262.
Blaise, F., P. Judet de La Combe and P. Rousseau (1996), *Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode* (Cahiers de Philologie 16), Paris.
Blaise, F. and P. Rousseau (1996), 'La guerre (*Théogonie*, v. 617–720)', in Blaise e.a. (1996), 213–233.
Blumenberg, H. (1979), *Arbeit am Mythos*, Frankfurt am Main.
Blundell, M.W. (1998), *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies. A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics*, Cambridge.
Boardman, J. (2002), *The Archaeology of Nostalgia. How the Greeks re-created their Mythical Past*, London.
Boardman, J. and C.E. Vaphopoulou-Richardson (eds.) (1986), *Chios. A Conference at the Homereion in Chios 1984*, Oxford.
Böhme, R. (1986), *Die verkannte Muse. Dichtersprache und geistige Tradition des Parmenides*, Bern.
Bons, J.A.E. (1996), *Poetikon pragma. Isocrates' theory of rhetorical composition*, diss. Nijmegen.
Bowie, E.L. (1986), 'Early Greek Elegy, Symposium and Public Festival', *JHS* 106:13–35.
——— (1993), *Lies, Fiction and Slander in Early Greek Poetry*, in Gill and Wiseman (1993), 1–37.
Bowra, C.M. (1952), *Heroic Poetry*, London.
——— (1963), 'Arion and the Dolphin', *MH* 20:121–134.
Boys-Stones, G.R. (2010), 'Hesiod and Plato's history of philosophy', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 31–51.

Boys-Stones, G.R. and J.H. Haubold (eds.) (2010), *Plato and Hesiod*, Oxford.
Braund, S.M. (2004), '*Libertas* or *Licentia*? Freedom and Criticism in Roman Satire', in Sluiter and Rosen (2004), pp. 409–428.
Bravo, B. (1977), 'Remarques sur les assises sociales, les formes d'organisation et la terminologie du commerce maritime grec à l'époque archaïque', *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 3:1–59.
Bravo, F. (2003), 'Le Platon est-il hédoniste?', in Scolnicov and Brisson (2003), pp. 103–115.
Brelich, A. (1958), *Gli eroi greci: un problema storico-religioso*, Rome.
Bremmer, J.N. (1990), 'Adolescents, *Symposion*, and Pederasty', in Murray (1990), pp. 135–148.
Brenk, F.E. (1986), 'In the Light of the Moon: Demonology in the Early Imperial Period', *ANRW* II.16.3:2068–2145.
Briggs, W.W. (1997), *Ancient Greek Authors* (Dictionary of Literary Biography Vol. 176), Detroit.
Broich, U. and M. Pfister (1985), *Intertextualität. Formen, Funktionen, anglistische Fallstudien*, Tübingen.
Brunschwig, J. and M. Nussbaum (eds.) (1993), *Passions and Perceptions*, Cambridge.
Burn, A.R. (1936), *The World of Hesiod*, London.
Buzio, C. (1938), *Esiodo nel mondo greco sino alla fine dell'età classica*, Milan.
Burkert, W. (1964), 'Review of Detienne (1963a)', *Gnomon* 36:563–567.
——— (1983), *Homo Necans* (transl. by P. Bing), London.
——— (1985), 'Herodot über die Namen der Götter: Polytheismus als historisches Problem', *MH* 42:121–132.
Burstein, S. (1989), *Agatharchides of Cnidus. On the Erythraean Sea*, London.
Bury, J.B. (1965a), *The Nemean Odes of Pindar*, Amsterdam.
——— (1965b), *The Isthmian Odes of Pindar*, Amsterdam.
Busse, A. (1909), 'Der Agon zwischen Homer und Hesiod', *RM* 64:108–119.
Cadoux, C.J. (1929), 'Hesiod, a neglected Pioneer-Poet', *The Nineteenth Century* 105:256–268.
Calame, C. (1996), 'Montagne des Muses et Mouseia: la consécration des Travaux et l'héroisation d'Hésiode', in Hurst and Schachter (1996), pp. 43–56.
Cameron, A. (1972), 'Callimachus on Aratus' Sleepless Nights', *CR* 22:169–170.
——— (1995), *Callimachus and his Critics*, Princeton.
Camps, W.A. (1967), *Propertius, Elegies. Book II*, Cambridge.
Cartledge, P. (1993), *The Greeks. A Portrait of Self and Others*, Oxford.
Cartledge, P., P. Millett and S. von Reden (eds.) (1998), *Kosmos. Essays in order, conflict and community in classical Athens*, Cambridge.
Capra, A. (2005), 'Protagoras' Achilles: Homeric allusion as a satirical weapon (Pl. *Prt*. 340a)', *CP* 100:274–277.
Cassio, A.C. (2009), 'The Language of Hesiod and the *Corpus Hesiodeum*', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 179–201.
Caston, V. and D.W. Graham (eds.) (2002), *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, Aldershot.
Chantraine, P. (1954), 'Le divin et les dieux chez Homère', *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* 1:47–94.

Chroust, A.-H. (1973), *Aristotle: New Lights on his Life and Some of his Lost Works*, London.
Cingano, E. (2009), 'The Hesiodic Corpus', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 91–130.
Clark, G. (1989), *Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Life*, Liverpool.
Claus, D.B. (1977), 'Defining Moral Terms in the *Works and Days*', *TAPA* 107:73–84.
Clausen, W. (1994), *A Commentary on Virgil: Eclogues*, Oxford.
Clay, D. (1992), 'The World of Hesiod', *Ramus* 21:131–155.
——— (2004), *Archilochos Heros. The Cult of Poets in the Greek Polis*, Cambridge (Mass.).
Clay, J.S. (1994), 'The Education of Perses: From 'Mega Nepios' to 'Dion Genos' and Back', in Schiesaro (1994), 23–33.
——— (2003), *Hesiod's Cosmos*, Cambridge.
——— (2009), '*Works and Days*', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 71–90.
Cohoon, J.W. (1932), *Dio Chrysostom. Vol. I*, London and New York (LCL).
Cole, T. (1983), 'Archaic Truth', *QUCC* 42:7–28.
Coleman, R. (1977), *Eclogues*, Cambridge.
Collins, D. (2004), *Master of the Game. Competition and Performance in Greek Poetry*, Cambridge (Mass.).
Combellack, F.M. (1974), 'Hesiod's Kings and Nicarchus' Nestor', *CP* 69:124.
Confino, A. (1997), 'Collective memory and cultural history: problems of method', *American Historical Review* 102:1386–1404.
Conte, G.B. (1986), *The Rhetoric of Imitation. Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other Latin Poets*, Ithaca.
Cook, R.M. (1989), 'Hesiod's Father', *JHS* 109:170–171.
Cooper, J.M. (ed.) (1997), *Plato. Complete Works*, Indianapolis.
Corbey, R. and J. Leerssen (eds.) (1991), *Alterity, Identity, Image. Selves and Others in Society and Scholarship*, Amsterdam and Atlanta 1991.
Cornford, F.M. (1950), 'A Ritual Basis for Hesiod's *Theogony*', in *The Unwritten Philosophy and other Essays*, Cambridge, pp. 95–116.
——— (1952), *Principium sapientiae. The origins of Greek philosophical thought*, Cambridge.
Coser, L.A. (1992), 'Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs 1877–1945', in L.A. Coser (ed.) *Maurice Halbwachs: On Collective Memory*, Chicago and London, pp. 1–34.
Coulter, J.A. (1976), *The Literary Microcosm. Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonists*, Leiden.
Crane, S. (1997), 'Writing the individual back into collective memory', *American Historical Review* 102: 1372–1385.
Cribiore, R. (2001), *Gymnastics of the Mind. Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, Princeton.
Croiset, M. (1910^3), *Histoire de la littérature Grecque. Tome premier*, Paris.
Crotty, K. (1982), *Song and action: The victory odes of Pindar*, Baltimore.
Csapo, E. (2005), *Theories of Mythology*, Malden (MA).
Dalby, A. (1995), 'The *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* and their audiences', *CQ* 45:269–279.
D'Alessio, G.B. (1996), *Callimaco. Inni, epigrammi, frammenti. Vol. I*, Milan.

Daly, L.W. (1961), 'Hesiod's Fable', *TAPA* 92:45–51.
Davison, J.A. (1955a), 'Peisistratus and Homer', *TAPA* 86:1–21.
—— (1955b) 'Quotations and Allusions in Early Greek Literature', *Eranos* 53: 125–140.
Deichgräber, K. (1958), 'Parmenides' Auffahrt zur Göttin des Rechts. Untersuchungen zum Prooimion seines Lehrgedichts', *Abh. der Geistes- und Sozialwiss. Klasse* 11:629–734.
Delatte, A. (1934), 'Les conceptions de l'enthousiasme chez les philosophes présocratiques', *L'Antiquité Classique* 3:5–79 (1934).
Desmond, W.D. (2006), *The Greek praise of poverty*, Notre Dame.
Detienne, M. (1959), 'La 'démonologie' d'Empédocle', *REG* 72:1–17.
—— (1962), *Homère, Hésiode et Pythagore* (Latomus 57), Brussels.
—— (1963a), *La Notion de Daïmon dans le Pythagorisme ancien*, Paris.
—— (1963b), *Crise agraire et attitude religieuse chez Hésiode* (Latomus 68), Brussels.
—— (1981), *L'invention de la Mythologie*, Poitiers.
—— (1990[2]), *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque*, Paris.
Dickey, E. (2007), *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, Oxford.
Dijk, J.G.M. van (1997), *AINOI, ΛΟΓΟΙ, ΜΥΘΟΙ. Fables in Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Greek Literature*, Leiden.
Diller, H. (1946), 'Hesiod und die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie', *AuA* 2:140–151.
Dodds, E.R. (1952), 'The Alcidamas-Papyrus Again', *CQ* n.s. 2:187–188.
Dolin, E.F. (1962), 'Parmenides and Hesiod', *HSCP* 66:93–98.
Donlan, W. (1973), 'The tradition of anti-aristocratic thought in early Greek poetry', *Historia* 22:145–154.
—— (1998), 'Political Reciprocity in Dark Age Greece: Odysseus and his *hetairoi*', in Gill e.a. (1998), pp. 51–71.
Dornseiff, F. (1944), 'Review of Schadewaldt (1942)', *Gnomon* 20:134–140.
Dowden, K. (2004), 'The epic tradition in Greece', in Fowler (2004), pp. 188–205.
DuBois, P. (1992), 'Eros and the Woman', *Ramus* 21:97–116.
Duchemin, J. (1960), 'Aspects Pastoraux de la poésie Homérique: les comparaisons dans l'*Iliade*', *REG* 73:362–415.
Dupont, F. (1999), *The Invention of Literature* (transl. by J. Loyd), Baltimore.
Eagleton, T. (1983), *Literary Theory: an Introduction*, Oxford.
Easterling, P.E. and B.M.W. Knox (eds.) (1985), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature. Vol. I Greek literature*, Cambridge.
Edwards, A.T. (2004), *Hesiod's Ascra*, Berkeley.
Edwards, G.P. (1971), *The Language of Hesiod in Its Traditional Context*, Oxford.
Edmonds, R.G. III: 'Review of Morgan (2000)', Bryn Mawr online 2001.06.18.
Edmunds, L. (1975), 'Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis', *HSCP* 79:82–88.
Einarson, B. and P.H. De Lacy (1967), *Plutarch's Moralia. Vol. XIV*, Cambridge (Mass.).
El Murr, D. (2010), 'Hesiod, Plato, and the Golden Age', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 276–297.
Else, G.F (1986), *Plato and Aristotle on Poetry*, Chapel Hill.

Evelyn-White, H.G. (1914), *Hesiod, the Homeric hymns and homerica*, Cambridge (Mass.).
——— (1920), 'Miscellanea Hesiodea', *CQ* 14:126–131.
Fabian, J. (2002[2]), *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, New York.
Fakas, C. (2001), *Der hellenistische Hesiod. Arats Phainomena und die Tradition der antiken Lehrepik*, Wiesbaden.
Falter, O. (1934), *Der Dichter und sein Gott bei den Griechen und Römern*, Würzburg.
Fehling, D. (1965), 'Zwei Untersuchungen zur griechischen Sprachphilosophie', *RM* 108:212–229.
Ferrari, G.R.F. (1984), 'Orality and Literacy in the Origin of Philosophy', *AncPhil* 4:194–205.
Ferrarin, A. (2000), 'Homo faber, homo sapiens, or homo politicus? Protagoras and the myth of Prometheus', *Review of Metaphysics* 54:289–319.
Finley, M.I. (1979[2]), *The World of Odysseus*, London.
Finnegan, R. (1988), *Literacy and Orality. Studies in the Technology of Communication*, Oxford.
Foley, J.M. (2004), 'Epic as genre', in Fowler (2004), pp. 171–187.
Fontenrose, J. (1974), 'Work, Justice, and Hesiod's Five Ages', *CP* 69:1–16.
Ford, G.B. (1965), 'An Interpretation of the Fable of the Hawk and the Nightingale in Hesiod's *Works and Days*', *Orpheus* 12:3–9.
Ford, A. (1999a), 'Reading Homer from the rostrum: poems and laws in Aeschines' *Against Timarchus*', in Goldhill and Osborne (1999), pp. 281–313.
——— (1999b), 'Performing Interpretation: Early Allegorical Exegesis of Homer', in Beissinger (e.a.), pp. 33–53.
——— (2010), 'Plato's two Hesiods', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 133–154.
Forrest, W.G.G. (1982), 'Central Greece and Thessaly', in CAH III.3[2], 286–320.
Fortenbaugh, W.W., P.M. Huby and A.A. Long (eds.) (1985), *Theophrastus of Eresus. On his life and work*, New Brunswick.
Fortenbaugh, W.W. and S.A. White (2004), *Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes. Text, Translation and Discussion*, New Jersey.
Fossey, J.M. and H. Giroux (1985), *Actes du troisième congres international sur la Boétie antique*, Amsterdam.
Fowler, R.L. (1987), *The Nature of Early Greek Lyric: Three Preliminary Studies* (*Phoenix* supplementary volume 21), Toronto.
Fowler, R. (ed.) (2004a), *The Cambridge Companion to Homer*, Cambridge.
——— (2004b), 'The Homeric Question', in Fowler (2004a), pp. 206–232.
François, G. (1957), *Le Polythéisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots ΘΕΟΣ, ΔΑΙΜΩΝ dans la littérature grecque d'Homère à Platon* (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, Fascicule 147), Paris.
Fraser, P.M. (1972), *Ptolemaic Alexandria. Vol. 2*, Oxford.
Fritz, K. von (1962), 'Das Hesiodische in den Werken Hesiods', *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* 7:1–47.

——— (1963), 'Pythagoras', in Paulys Real-Encyclopädie, 47er Halbband, Stuttgart, pp. 171–209.
Froleyks, W.J. (1973), *Der ΑΓΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ in der antiken Literatur*, Bonn.
Gabba, E. (ed.) (1983), *Tria corda: scritti in onore di Arnaldo Momigliano*, Como.
Gagarin, M. (1973), 'Dike in the *Works and Days*', *CP* 68:81–94.
——— (1974a), '*Dike* in Archaic Greek Thought', *CP* 69:186–197.
——— (1974b), 'Hesiod's dispute with Perses', *TAPA* 104:103–111.
——— (1992), 'The Poetry of Justice: Hesiod and the Origins of Greek Law', *Ramus* 21:61–78.
Gaisford, T. (1823), *Poetae Minores Graeci. Vol. II*, Leipzig.
Gallini, C. (1963), 'Katapontismos', *SMSR* 34:61–90.
Geffcken, J. (1926), *Griechische Literaturgeschichte. Erster Band*, Heidelberg.
Gehrke, H.-J. (2001), 'Myth, History, and Collective Identity: Uses of the Past in Ancient Greece and Beyond', in Luraghi (2001), pp. 286–313.
Georgiadou, A. and David H.J. Larmour (1998), *Lucian's Science Fiction Novel True Histories. Interpretation and Commentary*, Leiden.
Germain, G. (1961), 'Poésie d'Homère et Poésie Orale des Yougoslaves', *REG* 74:469–476.
Gigon, O.A. (1945), *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie. Von Hesiod bis Parmenides*, Basel.
Gill, C. (1993), 'Plato on Falsehood—not Fiction', in Gill and Wiseman (1993), pp. 38–87.
——— (2003), 'Is Rivalry a Virtue or a Vice?', in Konstan and Rutter (2003), pp. 29–51.
Gill, C. and T.P. Wiseman (eds.) (1993), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, Exeter.
Gill, C., N. Postlethwaite and R. Seaford (eds.) (1998), *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*, Oxford.
Goldhill, S. (1986), *Reading Greek Tragedy*, Cambridge.
——— (1991), *The Poet's Voice*, Cambridge.
——— (ed.) (2001), *Being Greek under Rome. Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire*, Cambridge.
——— (2002), *The Invention of Prose*, Oxford.
Goldhill, S. and R. Osborne (eds.) (1999), *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, Cambridge.
Goold, G.P. (1960), 'Homer and the Alphabet', *TAPA* 91:272–291.
Görgemans, H. and E.A. Schmidt (eds.) (1976), *Studien zum antiken Epos*, Meisenheim.
Granger, H. (2002), 'The Cosmology of Mortals', in Caston and Graham (2002), pp. 101–116.
——— (2004), 'Heraclitus' Quarrel with Polymathy and Historiē', *TAPA* 134:235–261.
Graziosi, B. (2002), *Inventing Homer: The Early Reception of Epic*, Cambridge.
——— (2010), 'Hesiod in classical Athens', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 111–132.
Graziosi, B. and J. Haubold (2005), *Homer: the Resonance of Epic*, London.

Gribble, D. (1999), *Alcibiades and Athens. A Study in Literary Presentation*, Oxford.
Griffin, J. (1986), 'Heroic and Unheroic Attitudes in Homer', in Boardman and Vaphopoulou-Richardson (1986), pp. 3–13.
Griffith, M. (1983), 'Personality in Hesiod', *ClAnt* 2:37–65.
—— (1990), 'Contest and Contradiction in Early Greek Poetry', in Griffith and Mastronarde (1990), pp. 185–207.
Griffith, M., and D.J. Mastronarde (eds.) (1990), *Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer*, Atlanta.
Griffiths, J.G. (1956), 'Archaeology and Hesiod's Five Ages', *JHI* 17:109–119.
Groningen, B.A. van (1957), 'Hésiode et Persès', *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde* 20.6:153–166.
—— (1958), *La Composition littéraire archaïque grecque*, Amsterdam.
Gross, D. (2000), *Lost Time. On Remembering and Forgetting in Late Modern Culture*, Amherst.
Grube, G.M.A. (1965), *The Greek and Roman Critics*, London.
Guthrie, W.K.C. (1957), *In the Beginning: Some Views on the Origins of Life and the Early State of Man*, New York.
—— (1962), *A history of Greek philosophy, vol. 1: The earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*, Cambridge.
Gutzwiller, K.J. (1991), *Theocritus' Pastoral Analogies. The Formation of a Genre*, Madison.
Hall, E. (1989), *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*, Oxford.
Hamilton, R. (1989), *The Architecture of Hesiodic Poetry*, Baltimore.
Harder, M.A., R.F. Regtuit and G.C. Wakker (1998), *Genre in Hellenistic Poetry*, Groningen.
Harriott, R. (1969), *Poetry and Criticism Before Plato*, London.
Hartog, F. (1980), *Le miroir d'Hérodote. Essai sur la représentation de l'autre*, Paris.
—— (2001), *Memories of Odysseus* (transl. J. Loyd), Edinburgh.
Haslam, M. (1997), 'Homeric Papyri and Transmission of the Text', in Morris and Powell (1997), pp. 53–100.
Hathaway, N. (2001), *The friendly guide to Mythology*, New York.
Haubold, J.H. (2010), 'Shepherd, farmer, poet, sophist: Hesiod on his own reception', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 11–30.
Havelock, E.H. (1958), 'Parmenides and Odysseus', *HSCP* 63:133–143.
—— (1963), *Preface to Plato*, Cambridge (Mass.).
—— (1983), 'The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics', in Robb (1983), pp. 7–82.
Hegel, G.W.F. (1923[2]), *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, III. Band: die griechische und die römische Welt*, Leipzig.
Heiden, B. (2008), 'Common People and Leaders in *Iliad* Book 2: the Invocation of the Muses and the Catalogue of Ships', *TAPA* 138:127–154.
Heirman, L.J.R. (1972), *Plutarchus 'De Audiendis Poetis'. Introduction, Translation, Commentary*, diss. Leiden.

Heitsch, E. (ed.) (1966), *Hesiod*, Darmstadt.
——— (1966) 'Das Wissen von Xenophanes', *RM* 109:193–235.
——— (1988), 'Review of Böhme (1986)', *Gnomon* 60:97–106.
Heldmann, K (1982), *Die Niederlage Homers im Dichterwettstreit mit Hesiod* (*Hypomnemata* 75), Göttingen.
Herbermann, C.-P. (1996): 'Antike Etymologie', in Schmitter (1996), pp. 353–376.
Hershbell, J.P. (1970), 'Hesiod and Empedocles', *CJ* 65:145–161.
Hess, K. (1960), *Der Agon zwischen Homer und Hesiod*, Zürich.
Heubeck, A., S. West and J.B. Hainsworth (1988), *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey. Vol. I*, Oxford.
Hiller, E. (1872), *Eratosthenis Carminum Reliquiae*, Leipzig.
Hinds, S. (1998), *Allusion and intertext. Dynamics of appropiation in Roman poetry*, Cambridge.
Hoekstra, A. (1957), 'Hésiode et la tradition orale. Contribution a l'étude du style formulaire', *Mnemosyne* 10:193–225.
Hogan, J.C. (1973), 'Aristotle's Criticism of Homer in the *Poetics*', *CP* 68:95–108.
Hommel, H. (1950), 'Per aspera ad astra', *Würzburger Jahrbücher* 4:157–165.
Hose, M. (1994), 'Σύντονος ἀγρυπνίη (Kallimachos Epigramm 27 Pf.)', *Glotta* 72:196–199.
Howe, T.P. (1958), 'Linear B and Hesiod's Breadwinners', *TAPA* 89:44–65.
Hunter, R. (2004), 'Homer and Greek literature', in Fowler (2004), pp. 235–253.
——— (2006), *The Shadow of Callimachus: Studies in the Reception of Hellenistic Poetry at Rome*, Cambridge.
——— (2008), 'Hesiod, Callimachus, and the Invention of Morality', in Bastianini and Casanova (2008), pp. 153–164.
——— (2009), 'Hesiod's Style: Towards an Ancient Analysis', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 253–269.
Hurst, A. and A. Schachter (eds.) (1996), *La Montagne des Muses*, Genève.
Hurst, A. (1996), 'La stèle de l'Hélicon', in Hurst and Schachter (1996), pp. 57–71.
Hussey, E. (1982), 'Epistemology and meaning in Heraclitus', in Schofield and Nussbaum (1982), pp. 33–59.
Innes, D.C. (1985), 'Theophrastus and the Theory of Style', in Fortenbaugh e.a. (1985), pp. 251–267.
——— (2002), 'Longinus and Caecilius: Models of the Sublime', *Mnemosyne* 55: 259–284.
Inwood, B. (2001[2]), *The Poem of Empedocles*, Toronto.
Irwin, E. (1998), 'Biography, Fiction, and the Archilochean *ainos*', *JHS* 118:177–183.
——— (2005), *Solon and Early Greek Poetry*, Cambridge.
Jacoby, F. (1926), 'Hesiodstudien zur Theogonie', *Hermes* 61:157–191.
Jaeger, W. (1945), *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture. Volume I* (transl. by G. Highet), Oxford.
——— (1947), *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, London.
Janko, R. (1982), *Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns: Diachronic development in epic diction*, Cambridge.
Janko, R. and G.S. Kirk (1992), *The* Iliad: *a commentary*, Cambridge.

Jensen, M.S. (1966), 'Tradition and Individuality in Hesiod's *Works and Days*', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 27:1–27.
——— (1980), *The Homeric Question and the Oral-Formulaic Theory*, Copenhagen.
Johansen, T.K. (2004), *Plato's Natural Philosophy. A study of the Timaeus-Critias*, Cambridge.
Jong, I.J.F. de (1991), 'Narratology and Oral Poetry', *Poetics Today* 12:405–423.
——— (1999), 'Aspects narratologiques des *Histoires* d'Hérodote', *Lalies* 19:217–274.
——— (2002), 'Van *poeta* tot *persona* in de vroegste Griekse literatuur (Homerus, Hesiodus, Herodotus)', *Lampas* 35:387–398.
Jong, I.J.F. de and N. van der Ben (1984), 'Daimon in *Ilias* en *Odyssee*', *Lampas* 17:301–316.
Jonge, C.C. de (2008), *Between Grammar and Rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Language, Linguistics and Literature*, Leiden.
Jowett, B. and L. Campbell (1894), *Plato's Republic. Vol. III*, Oxford.
Joyal, M.A. (1991), 'Hesiod's Heracles: *Theogony* 526, 950', *Glotta* 69:184–186.
Kaczynska, E. (1998), 'Remarks on μίτρην λύειν in Callimachus and Hesiod', *ZAnt* 48:43–46.
Kahn, C. (2001), *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. A Brief History*, Indianapolis.
Kambylis, A. (1965), *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik*, Heidelberg.
Kassies, W. (1989), *Hesiodus, Werken en Dagen en De wedstrijd tussen Homerus en Hesiodus*, Leiden.
Keaney, J.J. and R. Lamberton (eds.) (1996), *[Plutarch] Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer*, Atlanta.
Kennedy, G.A. (1963), *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, London.
——— (1994), *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, Princeton.
Kerferd, G.B. (1965), 'Review of Detienne (1963a)', *CR* 15:77–79.
——— (1981), *The sophistic movement*, Cambridge.
Kindstrand, J.F. (1973), *Homer in der zweiten Sophistik*, Uppsala.
Kirby, J.T. (1992), 'Rhetorics and Poetics in Hesiod', *Ramus* 21:34–60.
Kirk, A. (2005), 'Social and Cultural Memory', in Kirk and Thatcher (2005), pp. 1–24.
Kirk, A, and T. Thatcher (2005), *Memory, Tradition and Text. Uses of the Past in Early Christianity*, Leiden.
Kirk, G.S. (1950), 'The Michigan Alcidamas-papyrus; Heraclitus fr. 56D; The riddle of the Lice', *CQ* 44:149–167.
——— (1954), *Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge.
——— (1962), 'The Structure and Aim of the Theogony', *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* 7:61–107.
——— (1970), *Myth. Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures*, Cambridge.
Kirk, G.S., J.E. Raven and M. Schofield (1983[2]), *The Presocratic Philosophers. A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, Cambridge.
Knox, P. (1985), 'Wine, Water, and Callimachean Polemics', *HSCP* 89:107–120.
Kommers, J. (1991), 'Between Structure and Context: Sources, Source Criticism, and Alterity Studies', in Corbey and Leerssen (1991), pp. 105–121.

Koniaris, G.L. (1971), 'Michigan Papyrus 2754 and the *Certamen*', *HSCP* 75: 107–129.
Koning, H.H. (2010), 'Plato's Hesiod: Not Plato's Alone', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 89–110.
Konstan, D (1996), 'Greek Friendship', *AJP* 117:71–94.
Konstan, D. and N. Keith Rutter (eds.) (2003), *Envy, Spite and Jealousy. The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece*, Edinburgh.
Krafft, F. (1963), *Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod*, Göttingen.
Kumaniecki, K. (1963), 'The Structure of Hesiod's *Works and Days*', *BICS* 10:79–96.
Labarbe, J. (1949), *L'Homère de Platon*, Paris.
Laín Entralgo, P. (1970), *The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity* (edited and translated by L.J. Rather and J.M. Sharp), New York.
Laird, A. (ed.) (2006), *Oxford Readings in Ancient Literary Criticism*, Oxford.
Lamberton, R. (1986), *Homer the Theologian*, Berkeley.
——— (1988), *Hesiod*, New Haven.
Lamberton, R. and J.J. Keaney (eds.) (1992), *Homer's Ancient Readers. The hermeneutics of Greek epic's earliest exegetes*, New Jersey.
Lang, G.E. and K.L. Lang (1990), *Etched in Memory: The Building and Survival of Artistic Representation*, Chapel Hill.
Lardinois, A.P.M.H. (2003), 'The Wrath of Hesiod: Angry Homeric Speeches and the Structure of Hesiod's *Works and Days*', *Arethusa* 36:1–20.
Latimer, J.F. (1930), 'Perses versus Hesiod', *TAPA* 61:70–79.
Latte, K. (1946a), 'Der Rechtsgedanke im archaischen Griechentum', *AuA* 2:63–76.
——— (1946b), 'Hesiods Dichterweihe', *AuA* 2:152–163 (1946).
Leclerc, M.-C. (1993), *La parole chez Hésiode: À la recherche de l'harmonie perdue*, Paris.
Lefkowitz, M. (1981), *The Lives of the Greek Poets*, London.
Lennep, D.J. van (1823), *De Werken en Dagen van Hesiodus*, Amsterdam.
Lesher, J.H. (1992), *Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments*, Toronto.
——— (1999), 'Early interest in knowledge', in Long (1999), pp. 225–249.
Lesky, A. (1971^3), *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, Bern.
Levin, S.B. (1996), 'Platonic Eponymy and the Literary Tradition', *Phoenix* 50: 197–207.
——— (1997), 'Greek Conceptions of Naming: Three Forms of Appropriateness in Plato and the Literary Tradition', *CP* 92:46–57.
Levy, H.L. (1954), 'The Study of Language as a Social Science', *Assoc. of Amer. Coll. Bulletin* 40:404–405.
——— (1963), 'The Odyssean Suitors and the Host-Guest Relationship', *TAPA* 94:145–153.
L'Homme-Wéry, L.-M. (1996), 'La notion d'harmonie dans la pensée politique de Solon', *Kernos* 9:145–154.
Lincoln, B. (1999), *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship*, Chicago and London.
Livingstone, N. (2001), *A Commentary on Isocrates'* Busiris, Leiden.

Lloyd, A.B. (1976), *Herodotus Book II: Commentary 1–98*, Leiden.
Lloyd, G.E.R. (1966), *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought*, Cambridge.
Lloyd-Jones, H. (1983), *The Justice of Zeus*, Berkeley.
Long, A.A. (1963), 'The Principles of Parmenides' Cosmogony', *Phronesis* 8:90–107.
——— (1970), 'Morals and values in Homer', *JHS* 90:121–139.
——— (1992), 'Stoic Readings of Homer', in Lamberton and Keaney (1992), 41–66.
——— (ed.) (1999), *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, Cambridge.
Luraghi, N. (ed.) (2001), *The Historian's Craft in the Age of Herodotus*, Oxford.
Machor, J.L. and P. Goldstein (eds.) (2001), *Reception Study. From Literary Theory to Cultural Studies*, New York.
Mackenzie, M.M. (1988), 'Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox', *OSAPh* 6:1–37.
Maclean, J.K.B and E.B. Aitken (2001): *Flavius Philostratus. Heroikos. Translated with an Introduction and Notes*, Atlanta.
Maehler, H. (1963), *Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum bis zur Zeit Pindars* (Hypomnemata 3), Göttingen.
Manuwald, B. (1989), 'Zu Solons Gedankenwelt', *RM* 132:1–25.
Marckscheffel, G. (1840), *Hesiodi, Eumeli, Cinaethonis, Asii et carminis Naupactii fragmenta*, Leipzig.
Marks, J. (2005), 'The Ongoing Neikos: Thersites, Odysseus, and Achilles', *AJPh* 126:1–31.
Marsilio, M.S. (2000), *Farming and Poetry in Hesiod's* Works and Days, Lanham.
Martin, R.P. (1984), 'Hesiod, Odysseus, and the Instruction of Princes', *TAPA* 114:29–48.
——— (1992), 'Hesiod's Metanastic Poetics', *Ramus* 21:11–33 (1992).
McGrane, B. (1989), *Beyond Anthropology. Society and the Other*, New York.
McKay, K.J. (1959), 'Hesiod's Rejuvenation', *CQ* n.s. 9:1–5.
Mehmel, F. (1954), 'Homer und die Griechen', *AuA* 4:16–41.
Meier-Brügger, M. (1990), 'Zu Hesiods Namen', *Glotta* 68:62–67.
Meijer, P.A. (1984), 'Parmenides' fr. 1 of 'Hoe maak ik een mythe'', *Lampas* 17:142–161.
Meijering, R. (1987), *Literary and Rhetorical Theories in the Greek Scholia*, Groningen.
Mele, A. (1979), *Il commercio Greco arcaico. Prexis ed emporie*, Naples.
Mendels, D. (2004), *Memory in Jewish, Pagan and Christian Societies of the Graeco-Roman World*, London.
Merkelbach, R. (1952), 'Die pisistratische Redaktion der homerischen Gedichte', *RM* 95:23–47.
Miller, M. (2001), ''First of all': On the Semantics and Ethics of Hesiod's Cosmogony', *Anc. Phil.* 21:251–276.
Millett, P. (1984), 'Hesiod and His World', *PCPS* n.s. 30:84–115.
Mirhady, D.C. and Y.L. Too (2000), *Isocrates I*, Austin.
Mondi, R. (1986), 'Tradition and Innovation in Hesiod's Titanomachy', *TAPA* 116:25–48.

Montanari, F. (2009), 'Ancient Scholarship on Hesiod', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 313–342.
Montanari, F., A. Rengakos and C. Tsagalis (eds.) (2009), *Brill's Companion to Hesiod*, Leiden.
Moravcsik, J. and P. Temko (1982), *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts*, Totowa.
Mordine, M.J. (2006), 'Speaking to Kings: Hesiods AINOΣ and the Rhetoric of Allusion in the *Works and Days*', *CQ* n.s. 56:363–373.
Morgan, K. (2000), *Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato*, Cambridge.
Morris, I. (1986), 'The use and abuse of Homer', *CA* 5:81–138.
Morris, I. and B.B. Powell (1997), *A New Companion to Homer* (*Mnemosyne* supplement 163), Leiden.
Morrison, J.S. (1955), 'Parmenides and Er', *JHS* 75:59–68.
Most, G.W. (1985), *The Measures of Praise. Structure and Function in Pindar's Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes* (Hypomnemata 83), Göttingen.
——— (1989), 'Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis: A Preliminary Report', *ANRW* 2.36.3:2014–2065.
——— (1991), 'Hesiod and the Textualization of Personal Temporality', in Arrighetti and Montanari (1991), pp. 73–92.
——— (1993), 'Die frühest erhaltene griechische Dichterallegorese', *RM* 136: 209–212.
——— (1997), 'Hesiod's myth of the five (or three or four) races', *PCPS* 43:104–127.
——— (2003), 'Epinician Envies', in Konstan and Rutter (2003), pp. 123–142.
——— (2006), *Hesiod: Theogony, Works and Days, Testimonia*, Cambridge (Mass.).
——— (2007), 'ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται. Presocratic Philosophy and Traditional Greek Epic', in Bierl (2007), pp. 271–302.
——— (2008), 'Two Hesiodic Papyri', in Bastianini and Casanova (2008), pp. 55–70.
——— (2010), 'Plato's Hesiod: an acquired taste?', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 52–67.
Mourelatos, A.P.D. (1970), *The Route of Parmenides: A Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments*, New Haven.
Munding, H. (1984), 'Ein nachhomerischer Streit um die wahre areté. Fachwissenschaftliche und didaktische Überlegungen zu Tyrtaios 9 Diehl und Hesiod, *Erga* 286–292', *AU* 27.5:5–19.
Murnaghan, S. (2006), 'Farming, Authority, and Truth-telling in the Greek Tradition', in Sluiter and Rosen (2006), pp. 93–118.
Murray, O. (1983), 'The Greek Symposion in History', in Gabba (1983), pp. 257–272.
——— (ed.) (1990), *Sympotica. A Symposium on the* Symposion, Oxford.
——— (1990), 'Sympotic History', in Murray (1990), pp. 3–13.
Murray, P (1981), 'Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece', *JHS* 101:87–100.
Myres, J.L. (1958), *Homer and His Critics*, London.
Nagy, G. (1979), *The Best of the Achaeans*, Baltimore and London.

——— (1990), *Greek Mythology and Poetics*, Ithaca.
——— (1992a), 'Homeric Questions', *TAPA* 122:17–60.
——— (1992b), 'Authorisation and Authorship in the Hesiodic *Theogony*', *Ramus* 21:119–130.
——— (1996), 'Autorité et Auteur dans la *Théogonie* Hésiodique', in Blaise e.a. (1996), pp. 41–52.
——— (2002), *Plato's Rhapsody and Homer's Music: the Poetics of the Panathenaic Festival in Classical Athens*, Cambridge.
——— (2009), 'Hesiod and the Ancient Biographical Traditions', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 271–311.
Needham, R. (1987), *Counterpoints*, Berkeley.
Neitzel, H. (1975), *Homer-Rezeption bei Hesiod*, Bonn.
Nelson, S.A. (1998), *God and the Land. The Metaphysics of Farming in Hesiod and Vergil*, Oxford.
Nesselrath, H.-G. (e.a.) (2003), *Dion von Prusa. Menschliche Gemeinschaft und göttliche Ordnung: die Borysthenes-Rede*, Darmstadt.
Nettel, H. (1976), 'Pandora und das Fass', *Hermes* 104:387–419.
Neubecker, A.J. (1986), *Philodemus: Über die Musik, IV. Buch*, Naples.
Nicole, J. (1905), *Recueil de mémoires de philologie classique et d'archéologie offerts à Jules Nicole*, Genève.
Nietzsche, F. (1870), 'Die Florentinische Tractat über Homer und Hesiod, ihr Geschlecht und ihren Wettkampf I–II', *RM* 25:528–540.
——— (1873), 'Die Florentinische Tractat über Homer und Hesiod, ihr Geschlecht und ihren Wettkampf III–V', *RM* 28:211–249.
Nisetich, F.J. (2001), *The poems of Callimachus*, Oxford.
Nilsson, M.P. (1906), *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung*, Leipzig.
Nora, P. (1989), 'Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*', *Representations* 26:7–24.
Notopoulos, J.A. (1960), 'Homer, Hesiod and the Achaean Heritage of Oral Poetry', *Hesperia* 29:177–197.
——— (1964), 'Studies in Early Greek Oral Poetry', *HSCP* 68:1–77.
Nünlist, R. (2009), *The Ancient Critic at Work. Terms and Concepts of Literary Criticism in Greek Scholia*, Cambridge.
Nussbaum, G. (1960), 'Labour and Status in the *Works and Days*', *CQ* 10:213–220.
Nussbaum, M. (1993), 'Poetry and the Passions: Two Stoic Views', in Brunschwig and Nussbaum (1993), pp. 97–149.
Olick, J.K. and J. Robbins (1998), 'Social memory studies: from 'collective memory' to the historical sociology of mnemonic practices', *Annual Review of Sociology* 22:105–140.
Osborne, R. (1987), *Classical Landscapes with Figures. The Ancient Greek City and its Countryside*, London.
Østerud, S. (1976), 'The Individuality of Hesiod', *Hermes* 104:13–29.
O'Sullivan, N. (1992), *Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory*, (*Hermes* Einzelschriften 60), Stuttgart.
Paley, F. (1883), *Epics of Hesiod*, London.
Panofsky, E. (1930), *Hercules am Scheidewege*, Leipzig and Berlin.

Parsons, P.J. (1983), '3537. Hexameter Verse: Ethopoea and Encomium', *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 50:59–66.
Pelikan, J. (1997), *The illustrated Jesus Through the Centuries*, New Haven and London.
Pellikaan-Engel, M.E. (1974), *Hesiod and Parmenides. A new View on their Cosmologies and on Parmenides' Proem*, Amsterdam.
Perlman, S. (1965), 'Quotations from Poetry in Attic Orators of the Fourth Century BC', *AJP* 85:155–172.
Pertusi, A. (1955), *Scholia vetera in Hesiodi Opera et Dies*, Milan.
Philips, F.C. (1973), 'Narrative compression and the Myths of Prometheus in Hesiod', *CJ* 68:289–305.
Philippson, P. (1966), 'Genealogie als mythische Form: Studien zur *Theogonie* des Hesiod', in Heitsch (1966), pp. 651–688.
Pinkwart, D. (1965), *Das Relief des Archelaos von Priene und die 'Musen des Philiskos'*, Kallmünz.
Pinsent, J. (1985), 'Boeotian Epic', in Fossey and Hiroux (1985), pp. 119–125.
Pöhlmann, R. von (1925[3]), *Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt*, München.
Possanza, D.M. (2004), *Translating the Heavens. Aratus, Germanicus, and the Poetics of Latin Translation*, New York.
Poulakos, T. (1997), *Speaking for the Polis. Isocrates' Rhetorical Education*, Columbia.
Pucci, P. (1977), *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry*, Baltimore.
——— (1996), 'Auteur et Destinataires dans les *Travaux* d'Hésiode', in Blaise e.a. (1996), pp. 191–210.
——— (2009), 'The Poetry of the *Theogony*', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 37–70.
Putnam, M.C.J. (1970), *Virgil's Pastoral Art: studies in the* Eclogues, Princeton.
Raaflaub, K. (2004), 'Aristocracy and Freedom of Speech in the Greco-Roman World', in Sluiter and Rosen (2004), pp. 41–61.
Rademaker, A. (2005), Sophrosyne *and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint*, Leiden.
Rand, E.K. (1911), 'Horatian urbanity in the *Works and Days*', *AJP* 32:131–165.
Rank, O. (1990), 'The Myth of the Birth of the Hero', in O. Rank, F.R.S. Raglan and A. Dundes, *In Quest of the Hero* (1990), pp. 1–86 (originally published as *Mythus von der Geburt des Helden*, Leipzig 1909).
Renehan, R. (1971), 'The Michigan Alcidamas-Papyrus: A Problem in Methodology', *HSCP* 75:85–105.
——— (1980), 'Progress in Hesiod', *CP* 75:339–358.
Rengakos, A. (2009), 'Hesiod's Narrative', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 203–218.
Richardson, N.J. (1975), 'Homeric Professors in the Age of the Sophists', *PCPhS* 201:65–81.
——— (1981), 'The Contest of Homer and Hesiod and Alcidamas' *Mouseion*', *CQ* n.s. 31:1–10.
——— (1992), 'Aristotle's Reading of Homer and Its Background', in Lamberton and Keaney (1992), pp. 30–40.
——— (2006), 'Literary Criticism in Scholia to the *Iliad*', in Laird (2006), pp. 176–210.

Riedweg, C. (1994), 'Reflexe hellenistischer Dichtungstheorie im griechischen Epigramm', *ICS* 19:123–150.
Rijksbaron, A. (2007), *Plato. Ion, Or: On the Iliad*, Leiden.
Robb, K. (ed.) (1983), *Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy*, La Salle.
——— (1994), *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece*, Oxford.
Robbiano, C. (2005), *Becoming Being. On Parmenides' Transformative Philosophy*, diss. Leiden.
Robert, C. (1905), 'Zu Hesiods Theogonie', in Nicole (1905), pp. 461–487; reprinted in Heitsch (1966), pp. 135–174.
Robinson, T.M. (1987), *Heraclitus. Fragments*, Toronto.
Roemer, A. (1924), *Die Homerexegese Aristarchs in ihren Grundzügen*, Paderborn.
Roesch, P. (1982), *Études Béotiennes*, Paris.
Rosati, G. (2009), 'The Latin Reception of Hesiod', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 343–374.
Rose, H.J. (1961), *A Handbook of Greek Literature*, London.
Rose, P. (1988), 'Thersites and the plural voices of Homer', *Arethusa* 21:5–25.
Rosen, R.M. (1997), 'Homer and Hesiod', in Morris and Powell (1997), pp. 463–488.
——— (2004), 'Aristophanes' *Frogs* and the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*', *TAPA* 134:295–322.
Rosen, R. and I. Sluiter (eds.) (2006), *City, countryside, and the spatial organization of value in classical thought*, Leiden.
Roth, C.P. (1976), 'The Kings and the Muses in Hesiod's *Theogony*', *TAPA* 106:331–338.
Rowe, C.J. (1983a), 'Thoughtful Hesiod', *JHS* 103:124–135.
——— (1983b), 'The Nature of Homeric Morality', in Rubino and Shelmerdine (1983), pp. 248–275.
Rousseau, P. (1993), 'Un héritage disputé', in Arrighetti and Montanari (1993), pp. 41–72.
——— (1996), 'Instruire Persès. Notes sur l'ouvertures des *Travaux* d'Hésiode', in Blaise (1996), 93–167.
Rubino, C.A. and C.W. Shelmerdine (1983) (eds.), *Approaches to Homer*, Austin.
Rubinstein, L. (1998), 'The Athenian political perception of the *idiotes*', in Cartledge (1998), pp. 125–143.
Rudhardt, J. (1996), 'La Préambule de la *Théogonie*. La Vocation du Poète. Le Langage des Muses', in Blaise (1996), pp. 25–39.
Rzach, A. (1913), *Hesiodos*, in Paulys Real-Encyclopädie, 8er Band, Stuttgart, pp. 1179–1240.
Sale, W. (1961), 'Aphrodite in the *Theogony*', *TAPA* 92:508–521.
Sancisi-Weerdenburg, H. (ed.) (2000), *Peisistratos and the Tyranny: A Reappraisal of the Evidence*, Amsterdam.
Schenkeveld, D.M. (1976), 'Strabo on Homer', *Mnemosyne* 29:52–64.
Schiesaro, A. (e.a.) (1994), *Mega nepios: il destinatario nell' epos didascalio*, Pisa.
Schmid, W. and O. Stählin (1929), *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur. Erster Teil, erster Band*, München.

Schmitter, P. (ed.) (1996), *Geschichte der Sprachtheorie 2: Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike*, Tübingen.
Schofield, M. and M.C. Nussbaum (eds.) (1982), *Language and Logos*, Cambridge.
Schöpsdau, K (1994), *Platon: Nomoi (Gesetze). Buch I–III*, Göttingen.
Schwabl, H. (1957), 'Zur 'Theogonie' bei Parmenides und Empedokles', *Wiener Studien* 70:278–289.
——— (1963), 'Hesiodus und Parmenides. Zur Formung des parmenideischen Prooimions', *RM* 106:134–142.
Schwinge, E. (1986), *Künstlichkeit von Kunst. Zur Geschichtlichkeit der alexandrinischen Poesie*, München.
Scodel, R. (1980), 'Hesiod Redivivus', *GRBS* 21:301–320.
Scolnicov, S. and L. Brisson (eds.) (2003), *Plato's Laws: From Theory into Practice*, Sankt Augustin.
Sedley, D. (2003), *Plato's Cratylus*, Cambridge.
——— (2010), 'Hesiod's *Theogony* and Plato's *Timaeus*', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 246–258.
Segal, C. (1992), 'Bard and Audience in Homer', in Lamberton and Keaney (1992), pp. 3–29.
——— (2001^2), *Oedipus Tyrannus. Tragic Heroism and the Limits of Knowledge*, Oxford.
Sellschopp, I. (1934), *Stilistische Untersuchungen zu Hesiod*, Hamburg.
Sider, D. (1996), 'As is the generation of leaves in Homer, Simonides, Horace, and Stobaeus', *Arethusa* 29:263–282.
Sihler, E.G. (1902), 'Studies in Hesiod', *TAPA* 33:xxvi–xxxii.
Sihvola, J. (1989), *Decay, Progress, the Good Life? Hesiod and Protagoras on the Development of Culture*, Helsinki.
Sikes, E.E. (1931), *The Greek View of Poetry*, London.
Sinclair, T.A. (1966), *Hesiod: Works and Days*, Hildesheim.
Sistakou, E. (2009), 'Callimachus Hesiodicus Revisited', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 219–252.
Skiadas, A.D. (1965), *Homer im griechischen Epigramm*, Athens.
Slings, S.R. (2000), 'Literature in Athens, 566–510 BC', in Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2000), pp. 57–77.
Sluiter, I. (1997), 'The Greek Tradition', in Bekkum (1997), pp. 147–224.
——— (2005), 'Homer in the Dining Room: An Ancient Rhetorical Interpretation of the Duel between Paris and Menelaus (Plut. Quaest. Conv. IX 13)', *Classical World* 98:379–396.
——— (2009), 'Socrates als de ideale man', *Lampas* 42:3–14.
Sluiter, I. and R. Rosen (eds.) (2004), *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity*, Leiden.
Small, G.P. (1949), 'On Allegory in Homer', *CJ* 44:423–430.
Snell, B. (1944), 'Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales und die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte', *Philologus* 96:170–182.
——— (1955), *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, Hamburg.
——— (1982), *The Discovery of the Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature* (transl. T.G. Rosenmeyer), Mineola.

Solmsen, F. (1949), *Hesiod and Aeschylus*, New York.
——— (1954), 'The 'Gift' of Speech in Homer and Hesiod', *TAPA* 85:1–5.
——— (1960), 'Hesiodic Motifs in Plato', *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* 7:171–211.
——— (1982), 'The Earliest Stages in the History of Hesiod's Text', *HSCP* 86:1–32.
Soury, G. (1942), *La démonologie de Plutarque*, Paris.
Sperduti, A. (1950), 'The divine nature of poetry in antiquity', *TAPA* 81:209–240.
Stanford, W.B. (1959^2), *The Odyssey of Homer, Vol. I (Books I–XII)*, New York.
Starr, C.G. (1977), *The economic and social growth of early Greece, 800–500 BC*, New York.
——— (1982), 'Economic and social conditions in the Greek world', in CAH III. 3^2, 417–441.
Ste. Croix, G.E.M. (1981), *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, Ithaca.
Steiner, D. (2005), 'Nautical Matters: Hesiod's *Nautilia* and Ibycus fr. 282 PMG', *CP* 100:347–355.
——— (2007), 'Feathers Flying: Avian Poetics in Hesiod, Pindar and Callimachus', *AJPh* 128:177–208.
Steinmetz, P. (1986), 'Allegorische Deutung und allegorische Dichtung in der alten Stoa', *RM* 129:18–30.
Stewart, S. (2008), 'Emending Aratus' Insomnia: Callimachus Epigr. 27', *Mnemosyne* 61:586–600.
Stoddard, K. (2004), *The Narrative Voice in the* Theogony *of Hesiod*, Leiden.
Stokes, M.C. (1962), 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies—I', *Phronesis* 7:1–37.
——— (1963), 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies—II', *Phronesis* 8: 1–34.
Stroh, W. (1976), 'Hesiods lügende Musen', in Görgemans and Schmidt (1976), pp. 85–112.
Struck, P.T. (2004), *Birth of the Symbol. Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts*, Princeton.
Svenbro, J. (1976), *La parole et le marbre*, Lund.
Tandy, D.W. and W.C. Neale (1996), *Hesiod's Works and Days: A Translation and Commentary for the Social Sciences*, Berkeley.
Tarán, L. (1965), *Parmenides*, Princeton.
Tate, J. (1927), 'The Beginnings of Greek Allegory', *CR* 41:214–215.
——— (1929), 'Plato and Allegorical Interpretation', *CQ* 23:142–154.
——— (1934), 'On the History of Allegorism', *CQ* 28:105–115.
Taylor, C.C.W. (1991), *Plato. Protagoras*, Oxford.
Thalmann, W.G. (1984), *Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry*, Baltimore.
——— (1988), 'Thersites: Comedy, Scapegoats, and heroic Ideology in the *Iliad*', *TAPA* 118:1–28.
Thomas, R. (2000), *Herodotus in Context. Etnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion*, Cambridge.
Thomas, R.F. (1988), *Virgil, Georgics. Volume 1*, Cambridge.
Thomson, J.A.K. (1914), *Studies in the Odyssey*, Oxford.
Thummer, E. (1969), *Pindar. Die Isthmischen Gedichte* (Band II), Heidelberg.

Too, Y.L. (1995), *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates*, Cambridge.
—— (1998), *The Idea of Ancient Literary Criticism*, Oxford.
Trapp, M.B. (1997), *Maximus of Tyre: The Philosophical Orations*, Oxford.
Tress, H. van (2004), *Poetic Memory*, Leiden.
Trever, A.A. (1924), 'The Age of Hesiod: A Study in economic History', *CP* 19:157–168.
Tsagalis, C.C. (2006), 'Poet and Audience: From Homer to Hesiod', *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* 52:79–134.
—— (2009), 'Poetry and Poetics in the Hesiodic Corpus', in Montanari e.a. (2009), pp. 131–177.
Tsagarakis, O. (1986), 'On the question of priority of Homer and Hesiod', *Emerita* 54:189–202.
Untersteiner, M. (1954), *The Sophists*. Oxford.
—— (1955), *Senofane. Testimonianze e frammenti*, Florence.
Usher, M.D. (2007), 'Theomachy, Creation, and the Poetics of Quotation in Longinus Chapter 9', *CP* 102: 292–303.
Verdenius, W.J. (1962), 'Aufbau und Absicht der Erga', *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* 7:109–159.
—— (1970), 'Homer, the Educator of the Greeks', *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde* 33 (5):205–231.
—— (1972), 'Notes on the Proem of Hesiod's *Theogony*', *Mnemosyne* 25:225–260.
—— (1983), 'The Principles of Greek Literary Criticism', *Mnemosyne* 36:14–59.
—— (1985), *A commentary on Hesiod:* Works and Days, *vv. 1–382*, Leiden.
Vernant, J.-P. (1965), *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Études de psychologie historique*, Paris.
Vogt, E. (1959), 'Die Schrift vom Wettkampf Homers und Hesiods', *RM* 102:193–221.
Vos, H. (1963), 'Die Bahnen von Nacht und Tag', *Mnemosyne* 16:18–34.
Vrugt-Lentz, J. ter (1974), 'Geister (Dämonen). Vorhellenistisches Griechenland', *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 9:598–615.
Wade-Gery, H.T. (1949), 'Hesiod', *Phoenix* 3:81–93.
Wageningen, J. van (1921), *Commentarius in M. Manilii Astronomica*, Amsterdam.
Walcot, P. (1960), 'Allusion in Hesiod', *REG* 73:36–39.
—— (1961), 'The Composition of the *Works and Days*', *REG* 74:1–19.
—— (1962), 'Hesiod and the Didactic Literature of the Near East', *REG* 75:13–36.
—— (1963), 'Hesiod and the Law', *SO* 38:5–21.
—— (1966), *Hesiod and the Near East*, Cardiff.
—— (1970), *Greek Peasants, Ancient and Modern*, Manchester.
Wallace, D. (1999), 'Que représente la fresque de la paroi Ouest de la Tombe 'du plongeur' de Poseidonia?', *Kernos* 12:195–206.
Walsh, G.B. (1984), *The varieties of enchantment: early Greek views of the nature and function of poetry*, Chapel Hill.
West, M.L. (1966), *Hesiod: Theogony*, Oxford.
—— (1967), 'The Contest of Homer and Hesiod', *CQ* n.s. 17:433–450.

——— (1974), *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, Berlin and New York.
——— (1978), *Hesiod: Works and Days*, Oxford.
——— (1984), 'A New Poem about Hesiod', *ZPE* 57:33–36.
——— (19892), *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, Oxford.
——— (1996), 'Hesiod', in OCD[3], p. 700.
——— (1997), *The East Face of Helicon*, Oxford.
——— (2003), *Homeric Hymns, Homeric Apocrypha, Lives of Homer*, Cambridge (Mass.).
White, H. (1978), 'The Historical Text as a Literary Artifact', in *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, Baltimore, pp. 81–100.
White, S.A. (2004), 'Hieronymus of Rhodes: The Sources, Text and Translation', in Fortenbaugh and White (2004), pp. 79–276.
Whittaker, M. (1935), 'The comic fragments in their relation to the structure of old Attic comedy', *CQ* 29:181–191.
Wiedemann, A. (1890), *Herodots zweite Buch*, Leipzig.
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von (1879), 'Parerga', *Hermes* 14:161–186.
——— (1890), 'Zu Plutarchs Gastmahl der sieben Weisen', *Hermes* 25:196–227.
——— (1916a), *Die Ilias und Homer*, Berlin.
——— (1916b), *Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi*, Bonn.
——— (1924), *Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos*, Berlin.
——— (1928), *Hesiodus: Erga*, Berlin.
Will, E. (1965), 'Hésiode: Crise agraire? Ou Recul de l'Aristocratie?', *REG* 78:542–556.
Woodruff, P. (1982), 'What could go wrong with Inspiration? Why Plato's Poets Fail', in Moravcsik (1982), pp. 137–150.
Wörhle, G. (1993), *Anaximenes aus Milet. Die Fragmente zu seiner Lehre*, Stuttgart.
Wright, M.R. (1981), *Empedocles: the extant fragments*, New Haven.
Yamagata, N. (2010), 'Hesiod in Plato', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (2010), pp. 68–88.
Young, D. (1971), *Theognis*, Leipzig.
Zacher, K.-D. (1982), *Plutarchs Kritik an der Lustlehre Epikurs. Ein Kommentar zu 'Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum': Kap. 1–8*, diss. Berlin.
Zanker, G. (1985), 'A Hesiodic Reminiscence in Virgil, E. 9.11–13', *CQ* n.s. 35:235–237.
Zanker, P. (1995), *The Mask of Socrates: The Image of the Intellectual in Antiquity* (transl. by A. Shapiro), Berkeley and Los Angeles.
Zanker, A.T. (2009), 'A Dove and a Nightingale: *Mahābhārata* 3.130.18–131.32 and Hesiod, *Works and Days* 202–213', *Philologus* 153:20–25.
Zeitlin, F.I.: 'Visions and revisions of Homer', in Goldhill (2001), pp. 195–266.
Zerubavel, E. (2003), *Time maps. Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past*, Chicago.
Zimmern, A. (1915[2]), *The Greek Commonwealth. Politics and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens*, Oxford.
Zintzen, C. (1974), 'Geister (Dämonen). Hellenistische und kaiserzeitliche Philosophie', *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 9:640–668.
Zuntz, G. (1971), *Persephone*, Oxford.

GENERAL INDEX

Achilles, 62, 76 n.65, 92 n.130, 111, 218, 225 n.144, 256 n.71, 272 n.9, 277, 285 n.72, 285 n.73, 292 n.103, 314
Aeschines, 149–150, 176, 226 n.150
Aeschylus, 44, 62, 92 n.133, 101, 108 n.7, 119, 120 n.56, 122–123, 278, 308, 339
Aesop, 347
afterlife, 79–80, 86, 138, 161–162, 169–172, 186, 188
Agamemnon, 72, 226 n.148, 272 n.8, 277, 284, 285
Agatharchides, 119, 120, 359
Alcaeus, 53, 68 n.39, 79 n.80, 140, 141 n.59, 141 n.62, 143, 181, 337 n.162
Alcidamas, 245 n.18, 248, 249 n.37, 254 n.59, 255 n.63, 340, 350, 351
Alcman, 81, 122–123
Alexandria(n), 36 n.43, 48, 67 n.33, 93 n.138, 243, 299, 333–341, 343, 378
allegory, 60–62, 82, 80 n.84, 82, 86 n.110, 87, 88 n.116, 89, 91–93, 96, 103, 170, 193–194, 199, 206, 207–208, 217, 220, 234, 360, 371, 378
alterity, 244 n.15, 244 n.16
Amphidamas, 131, 246 n.25, 249, 259–260
Anacreon, 8 n.24, 49 n.107, 53, 141 n.62
Anaxagoras, 62, 196, 306 n.33
Anaximander, 189, 190, **192–193**, 195, 233
Anaximenes, 190, **192–193**, 199, 233
Antimachus, 17 n.34, 49, 53
aoidos, 8, 47 n.95, 64 n.24, 72, 246 n.22, 272 n.8, 272 n.9, 320, 377; *see also* bard
Apollodorus, 42 n.76, 120, **122–123**, 125
Aratus, **333–335**, 336 n.155, 342 n.182
archaic period, 17, 20, 21, 27, 36, 58, 102, 140–144, 155–156, 187 n.128, 245 n.18, 274 n.27, 310, 318, 324, 342, 363, 378
(οἱ) ἀρχαῖοι, 28, 46, 118 n.50, 240, 245, 342 n.185, 361, 365, 370
Archilochus, 27, 47 n.96, 48 n.102, 79 n.80, 115 n.35, 135 n.37, 137 n.45, 140, 141 n.59, 141 n.62, 143, 178, 181 n.95, 206, 339
aristocracy, 98 n.154, 147 n.88, 188, 226, 269–273, 274, 275, 284–290, 294
Aristarchus, 42 n.76, 44 n.83, 50 n.113, 96, 224 n.138
Aristophanes (comicus), 62, 98 n.153, 155 n.115, 181, 196, 247 n.28, 256 n.68, 278, 290, 295, 338, 339, 350
Aristophanes of Byzantium, 50 n.113, 265 n.101
Aristotle, 44, 50 n.113, 74 n.59, 76, 93, 107, 116, 148 n.93, 151–153, 164, 179, 181, 183, 187, 191, 196–197, 198, 281, 285–286, 305–306, 342, 363–365, 368, 373, 377, 378, 379 *et passim*
ars, 243, 297, 298, 313 n.69, 331, 358; *see also* τέχνη
Ascra, 32, 39, 41 n.66, 44, 52 n.120, 122, 157, 163, 281 n.58, 282, 283, 344, 345, 346 n.201, 360
assimilation, **10–11**, 14, 26–28, 34–39, 48, 57, 125, 239, 240–245, 258, 370–372
  as a 'mechanism' 112, 130, **139–144**, 153, 158–159, 193, 200, 373, 374–375

atomism, **230–233**, 234, 235, 305, 309, 374–375, 378, 380, 381
autobiography, 31–32, 34 n.37, 38, 130–133, 138, 139, 158, 255, 274

Bacchylides, 175 n.66, 316, 326
barbarian, 112–113, 118 n.49, 244 n.14, 362 n.260
bard, 8, 47 n.95, 116, 169 n.33, 225 n.144, 246, 271 n.7, 273 n.19, 277, 301, 320 n.94, 320 n.97, 321; *see also aoidos*
biographical tradition, 26, 130–138, 139, 158–159, 197 n.37, 247, 372
Boeotia, 30 n.18, 31 n.23, 32 n.24, 36 n.43, 40, 132 n.13, 134, 137 n.51, 163 n.9, 273 n.16, 273 n.17, 279 n.47, 290 n.93
Boeotian School, 31, 36
bucolic poetry, 282, 283, 336, 345

Calchas, 33 n.33, 245 n.22
Callimachus, 181–182, 196, 315 n.76, 333–337, 339, 342, 343, 344 n.188, 345
canon, 4 n.10, 8–9, 45, 50, 60, 82, 96, 99, 105
catabasis, 80 n.84, 136
catalogue (poetry), 31, 36, 108 n.10, 153, 157 n.118, 234, 331 n.137, 378
Catalogue, 30 n.18, 32 n.27, 154, 155 n.114, 264, 282, 283 n.64, 293 n.105, 337, 341 n.178, 345 n.197
catchword-factor, 130, 139, **144–149**, 158–159, 373
Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, 15, 41, 49, 52, 83 n.98, 87 n.112, 239–240, 244–245, 246 n.27, 247, **248–259**, 260–268, 287, 289 n.91, 292, 294, 295, 297, 318, 330 n.134, 375
Chalcis, 32 n.27, 246 n.25, 259–260, 262–263
Chaos, 19, 140, 151, 182, 193–194, **195–198**, 199, 233, 340, 380
classical period, 11, 17, 21, 27, 48, 51, 52 n.120, 54, 74, 89, 92 n.131, 92 n.134, 102, 107, 108, 109, 133, 155–157, 173, 177, 187 n.128, 189, 196, 201, 223, 242, 286, 295, 318, 338, 342, 353, 363, 365, 367, 377
Cleomenes, king of Sparta, 278–279, 280, 288, 289, 294
clustering, 130, 139, **151–153**, 158–159, 235, 373, 379
collective memory (studies), 1, **2–7**, 7–11, 22, 26–28, 58, 139–159, 269, 373
comedy, 48, 116 n.38, 116 n.39, 117, 172, 195–196, 278, 329
commemogram, **18–22**, 139, 144 n.74, 153, **155–156**, 187 n.128, 195
communicative memory, 4 n.9
correctness of names, 224–233, 305, 367, 374, 380
Cornutus, 72 n.54, 88 n.116, 107 n.5, 197 n.38
cosmogony, 91, 107 n.2, 151, 164, 192–193, 194–198, 199, 224, 230, 277 n.38
cosmology, 15, 54 n.125, 61 n.11, 91, 107 n.2, 167 n.27, 189, 192–200, 207, 230, 233, 243 n.12, 364, 374
craftsmanship, 35, 50, 95, 368, 377; *see further* τέχνη
Crates of Mallus, 50 n.113, 120
Cronus, 79, 92 n.131, 98 n.153, 170, 185 n.116, 185 n.118, 228, 279, 359
cultural icon, 1, 5, 8, 9, 15, 17, 26, 28, 139, 186, 258, 295, 317 n.86, 356, 369, 377
cultural memory (studies), 4 n.9; *see further* collective memory (studies)
Cymae, 41 n.66, 42 n.73, 79 n.80, 283
cynicism, 99, 332 n.139

days (as a subject), 20, 153, 155–157, 253, 294, 309, 348, 373
De vita et poesi Homeri, 110, 228 n.155, 293 n.103, 366 n.272
democracy, 74 n.58, 90, 97, 98 n.154, 178, 188, 219, 226, 272 n.14, 284–290, 331 n.137
Democritus, 10, 181 n.96, 184, 305–306, 307, 326, 351
Demodocus, 72 n.53, 272 n.8, 272 n.13, 319 n.91, 320, 321
demon(s), 16 n.33, 79 n.81, 100, 133 n.20, 135 n.37, 138, 139, 148 n.91, 158, 161–162, **165–172**, 186–188, 228 n.154, 372, 373, 380
Demosthenes, 149–150, 176, 227 n.150, 332 n.139, 356
didacticism, 30, 33 n.33, 120–121, 194 n.21, 250 n.41, 271 n.7, 282 n.63, 291, 292 n.102, 298, 299, 321, 324, 329–331, 335 n.149, 335 n.152, 341–349, 358, 359–360, 366, 376–377, 380
differentiation, 11, 14, **26–28**, 30–39, 109, 239, 240–245, 258, 324, 371
Dio Chrysostom, 52 n.120, 62 n.19, 101 n.163, 118, 185, 262–265, 281, 286, 318 n.88, 331 n.138, 339–340, 361–362, 379
Diogenes Laertius, 40, 191, 197 n.37

Earth, 19, 140, 196, 199 n.48, 200
Egypt, 64–65, 68, 69, 70 n.49, 122–123, 156, 317 n.82
element(s), 139, 151, 152, 167, 169, 190, 193, 194–195, 197–199, 200, 206, 214, 216, 223, 230–233, 235, 375, 380
emotion, 13, 15, 249, 258, 267–268, 269, 295, 307–308, 309, 327–328, 355, 363, 367, 370, 375, 367, 377
Empedocles, 107, 136, 158, 166–169, 170, 179, 189, 191, 194–195, 199, 201, 210, 213–217, 223, 233, 234, 286 n.74, 306 n.34, 310, 316, 326, 374, 378
Ephorus, 41, 110, 119 n.53, 121 n.62, 135 n.32
epic, 16, 30 n.17, 31 n.23, 33 n.33, 34 n.38, 36, 37 n.50, 40, 47 n.95, 63, 67 n.36, 76, 77, 81, 84, 86, 87 n.111, 88 n.116, 91, 110, 112, 113 n.28, 117, 118, 119, 120, 141, 154, 155, 158, 186, 246 n.25, 253 n.56, 256, 261 n.88, 264 n.98, 265 n.100, 271 n.7, 274 n.28, 277, 282, 285, 291 n.96, 303, 317 n.82, 321, 333, 341, 346, 357 n.244, 362 n.260, 366, 371, 376, 378
Epicurus, 98, 197
epigram, 49, 76 n.70, 132, 136, 163–164, 246 n.27, 254, 263, 334–336, 337, 338–339, 358 n.246, 366 n.273
Epimetheus, 219–221
epistemology, 15, 107, 109, 190, 200–223, 374
ἐπωνυμία, 64, 67, 69–72
Eratosthenes, 42 n.76, 120–121, 123–125
eris/Eris, 20, 61 n.10, 195, 205 n.68, 224 n.138, 258, **276–277**, 285, 356 n.242, 357 n.244, 357 n.245
Eros, 91, 113, 140, 194–195, 198–199, 230 n.164, 380
eschatology, 86, 166–172
etymology, 38 n.54, 69 n.46, 169 n.32, 220 n.127, **227–230**, 232, 235, 307, 349 n.212
Euripides, 44, 53, 76 n.70, 81 n.90, 92 n.133, 101, 108 n.7, 115 n.35, 119, 120 n.56, 125 n.72, 179, 277, 308 n.46, 338 n.166, 339
ἐξουσία, *see* poetic licence
extemporaneous speech, 248 n.34, 261–262, 267–268

fable, 164 n.17, 178, 343, 347–349
of hawk and nightingale **178**, 212 n.99, 284, 302 n.17, 347

farming, 15, 20, 147, 153–154, 155–157, 173, 175, 180, 187, 252–253, 254, 262–264, 267, 269, 272, 273, 276–284, 288, 290, 291–292, 294–295, 313, 375, 376, 378, 380
festival, 4, 46, 51, 57, 59, 71, 134 n.28, 137 n.45, 141 n.60, 240, 271 n.7, 370
fiction, 38, 59, 80, 84 n.100, 91 n.126, 106, 121, 130, 131 n.7, 164 n.17, 204–205, 298, **299–318**, 321, 322–323, 347, 348, 358, 359, 364, 377
fighting, 15, 267, 269, 276–284, 288, 290, 291–292, 294–295, 375, 376
Five Races, myth of the, 20, 37 n.50, 38 n.51, 165–166, 171, 277 n.38
flux, 108, 113, 306–307, 309
forgetting, 1, 8, 11, 16, 19, 27, 153–155, 158–159
friendship, 148, 179–181, 183 n.108, 286 n.74

genealogy, 17 n.34, 31, 36, 37 n.49, 41 n.65, 41 n.69, 42, 50 n.112, 110 n.16, 119, 153, 155, 227 n.151, 227 n.152, **228–230**, 234, 255, 309
genera dicendi, 350, 354
genre, 26, 31, 34, 67, 112 n.23, 113, 115, 116 n.39, 123, 126, 140–144, 151, 170, 197, 240, 241, 277 n.36, 285 n.71, 303 n.20, 317 n.82, 336, 341–349, 350, 366
genus grande, 299, 328, 350–351, 355, 358
genus tenue, 350–351
gnomè, 36, 50 n.112, 74 n.59, 80, 164 n.16, 329, 330 n.133, 342
Golden Age, 166–167, 170, 183, 185 n.116, 185 n.118
Golden Race, 138, 147 n.91, 154, 165–166, 167, 169, 170
Gorgias, 218, 232, 248, 305, 307–308, 340, 351, 367
Grace(s), 312, 313 n.68, 317–318, 325, 351, 363
grammarian, 51, 57, 61 n.11, 89, 231–232, 260 n.84

Hades, 73, 79–80, 84–86, 98
Halbwachs, 2–3
harmonization, 26, 44–45, 79 n.81, 82, 87, **96–101**, 103, 122, 371
Hecataeus, 119 n.53, 206, 208, 209 n.87
hedonism, 264, 293, 321–322, 330–331, 358, 359–360
Helicon, 40, 47 n.96, 131, 132 n.13, 137, 164 n.14, 182 n.101, 200–201, 202, 254, 263, 310 n.52, 315–316, 333 n.143, 335 n.150, 337, 338, 349 n.212
Hellanicus, 41, 42, 119 n.53, 121
hellenistic period, 11, 20–22, 49 n.104, 50, 82, 89, 170, 242, 295, 299, 283 n.66, 318–319, 328, **333–341**, 342 n.181, 343, 345, 350, 353, 354, 356, 366, 377, 378
Hephaestus, 34–35, 92 n.131, 193 n.17, 219 n.125
Hera, 61, 79, 92 n.131, 194, 216–217
Heracles, 118 n.49, 121 n.61, 145, 154, 218 n.123, 219, 222, 224, 256 n.71
Heraclides Ponticus, 40, 50, 53 n.122
Heraclitus, 17 n.33, 49–50, 63, 108, 110 n.16, 140, 156, 179, 201, 195, 201, 202, 203 n.57, **206–210**, 212, 215, 217, 223, 233, 234, 286 n.74, 287 n.82, 305, 306, 310, 373, 374, 378
Hermes, 142, 219–221, 302 n.17
Herodotus, 25, 45, 53, 58, **63–72**, 78, 86 n.107, 86 n.108, 102, 110, 118, 119, 121, 156, 241, 316–317, 365 n.269, 370
heroic poetry, 25, 30 n.17, 30 n.18, 31, 35 n.39, 154–155, 186, 264 n.98, 273 n.17, 274 n.28, 275, 277, 282 n.63, 285, 291, 294, 303, 304, 333, 341, 344

Hesiod
as an astronomer 110–111, 281 n.59, 292, 293 n.103
as a cultural icon 1, 8, 9, 15, 28, 139, 186, 258, 356, 369
as a didactic poet 30, 194 n.21, 250 n.41, 282 n.63, 298, 299, 322–324, 329–330, 335 n.149, **341–349**, 358–360, 366–367, 376–377, 380
as an educator 26, 39, 49–50, 57–58, 68, 77–81, 82, 84, 88, 96, 97, 100, 101 n.163, 102–103, 105, 109, 114–115, 125, 146, 275 n.32, 342 n.185, 349, 370–372, 378, 380
as a farmer(-poet) 15, 21, 30 n.18, 31 n.23, 38, 110, 132 n.13, 138, 147, 154, 156, 157, 173, 175, 180, 187–188, 191 n.4, 252–254, 256, 262–263, 264, 267, 269, **273–275**, 276–284, 288–290, 292, 294–295, 313, 344, 347, 369, 373, 376, 378, 380
as a geographer 14, 106, 109–111, 122–125, 380
as a hero **134–138**, 158, 169, 190, 246 n.25, 255, 372, 375, 380, 381
as a historian 14, 110–111, 119–125, 380
as a historical person 31–32, 38–39, 69, 131 n.7
as a legislator 14, 58, 68–72, 72–81, 98, 102, 129, 161–162, 176 n.69, 188, 241, 353 n.226, 370–371
as a linguist 224, **225–233**, 305, 367, 374, 380
as a moral authority 14, 39, 57, 58, 78–79, 80, 82–84, 84–86, 86–101, 102–103, 105, 109, 145, 191, 222, 226, 240, 258–259, 267, 268, 343, 347–349, 369, 370–371, 380
as a mythographer 50 n.112, 88, 78–80, 121–123, 126, 151, 240, 362 n.260
as a people's poet 188, 262–264, 267, 269, 270, 273 n.19, 274, **284–290**, 294–295, 303 n.23, 376, 380
as a poet of peace 154–155, 188, 252, 254, 277, 278–279, 281–282, 294–295, 376, 380
as a philosopher 14, 15, 79–80, 101, 105–109, 125–126, 129, 140, 151–153, 161, 164 n.17, 170 n.38, 181–182, 187, 188, 189–235, 242, 250 n.41, 285–286, 305, 352 n.225, 364–365, 369, 371, 373, 374–375, 380, 381–382
as a relative of Homer 41–42, 46, 240, 370
as a religious authority 14, 25–26, 39, 45, 57–58, 64–65, 68, 72, 77–81, 83 n.94, 84–86, 105, 118 n.50, 129, 151, 191 n.8, 370–372, 380
as a technical writer 297–299, 318–319, **328–332**, 333–341, 376–377, 380
as a truthteller **310–318**, 328, 359, 363, 366–367, 369, 376–377, 378
in Roman literature 157, 162 n.5, **343–346**, 350, 366, 377
individuality of 31–32, 35, 38–39, 130–131, 240
on justice 14, 21, 33, 73–74, 89 n.120, 98 n.153, 138, 158, 161–162, 165, **172–177**, 178–179, 181, 186–188, 195, 275, 369, 373–374, 380, 381
on moderation 161, 165, 183–186, 186–188, 281, 373–374, 380
on reciprocity 14–15, **177–183**, 186–188, 369, 373–375, 380, 381

Hesiod (*continued*)
persona of 38, 131–132, 133, 138, 144, 155–157, 158, 161, 188, 200, 283, 313, 322 n.106
statue of 40, 47 n.96, 51 n.115, 131 n.11, 137, 323 n.108
style of 15, 29, 41, 242, 268, 294 n.108, 297–299, 333–341, 342, 343–346, 349, **350–357**, 366–368, 376–377, 380, 381
the 'wise' 14, 77, 87, 136–138, 150, 151, 157, **161–165**, 173, 185, 191, 226, 280–281, 318 n.88, 326, 373, 375
Hesiod's father (Dius), 32, 38, 41 n.65, 41 n.66, 42 n.73, 79 n.80, 133 n.21, 135 n.32, 283, 346 n.200
Hippias, 108 n.10, **112–115**, 126, 241, 342
Hippocrene, 182 n.101, 336, 338, 340, 341
history, 3, 10–11, 27, 36–37, 71, 105, 110, 116 n.39, 119–125, 241–242, 317
Homer
anonimity of 31, 130–133
as an aristocrat 98 n.154, 226, 262–264, 267, 269–270, **270–273**, 275, 284–290, 294–295, 303 n.23
as an author of fiction 106, 120–121, 298, 303–304, 305, 309, 310, **313–318**, 321, 358, 359, 364, 377
as a cultural icon 9, 17, 26, 28, 186, 258, 295, 377
as an educator 26, 39, 57–55, **58–63**, 68, 77–81, 82, 84, 88, 96, 97, 100, 101 n.163, 102–103, 105, 109, 114–115, 125, 203, 207 n.79, 286, 288 n.84, 325, 326, 342 n.185, 370–372, 378, 380
as an entertainer 94, 120, 298, 299, 326–328, 330, 341, 351, 359–360, 363, 367, 377
as a geographer 14, 94, 106, 109–111, **119–125**, 380
as a historian 14, 105–106, 109–111, 116 n.39, **119–125**, 126, 316–317, 365 n.269, 380
as a legislator 14, 58, 68–72, 72–81, 98, 102, 161, 241, 353 n.226, 370–371
as a moral authority 14, 57–58, 60–63, 78–79, 80, 82–84, 84–86, 86–101, 102–103, 105, 109, 191, 226, 240, 259 n.82, 265 n.100, 267–268, 370–371, 380
as a mythographer 88, 121–125, 126, 172 n.47, 240, 309, 362 n.260
as a philosopher 14, 79–80, 101, 105–109, 110 n.15, 120 n.54, 125–126, 161, 189, 191, 206, 228 n.155, 298, 304–309, 328, 371, 378
as a relative of Hesiod 41–42, 46, 240, 370
as a religious authority 14, 25–26, 57–58, 64–65, 68, 72, 77–81, 129, 370–371, 380
as a war poet 30, 153–154, 253–254, 256, 262–264, 267, 269, 271 n.7, 275, 276–279, 281, 286, 292, 293, 294–295, 332 n.138, 373, 376
as θεῖος or 'divine' 66 n.32, 69, **132–133**, 134 n.29, 158, 254, 278, 326 n.122, 361, 363, 372
as inspired 292 n.103, 298–299, 325–328, 332, 360–361, 363, 367, 377
style of 268, 298–299, 340, 346, **350–357**, 358, 365–366, 367, 377, 380
Homeric factor, 130, 139, **153–155**, 158–159, 373
Homeridae, 29, 46, 48 n.101, 88 n.115, 116
Homerocentrism, **16**, 42 n.72, 58, 63, 66, 77 n.71, 78, 83 n.94, 84 n.99, 97, 205, 226 n.144, 254–256
homo mensura statement, 221, 306

Ibycus, 135 n.37, 278 n.43
Ideal State, 170, 172, 185, 327
identity
  of a group 2–3, 8, 11, 70, 71
  of the Greeks 1, 7–9, 69, 72, 102, 295, 371–372
Iliad, 25, 33, 34, 36, 37 n.48, 37 n.50, 33 n.33, 44, 46, 48, 62, 66, 71, 79, 109, 116 n.40, 117, 133 n.22, 155, 194, 226, 246 n.25, 253 n.56, 271, 272 n.14, 275, 277, 284–285, 288–289, 308 n.43, 335 *et passim*
ingenium, 243, 297–298, 313 n.69, 331, 358
inspiration, 17, 88 n.116, 94, 131–132, 133, 158, 164, 196, 200–201, 202–203, 209, 214 n.106, 223, 244, 282–283, 298, 299, 301 n.8, 302 n.17, 304, 307–308, 310–316, 312, 313 n.70, 316, 318–341, 344, 350, 355, 359, 360–362, 363, 365, 366, 372, 373, 377, 378, 380
Iron Race, 154, 175, 180
Isocrates, 16 n.33, 50, 79 n.80, 97 n.151, 248 n.34, 329–331, 332, 340, 349 n.212, 350, 351 n.219

king, 15, 69, 70 n.49, 72, 74 n.57, 118, 165 n.17, 170, 178 n.76, 183 n.108, 185, 249, 252, 254, 258, 262–264, 265 n.101, 267, 269, 270–273, 274, 275, 278–279, **284–290**, 291, 293–295, 322 n.105, 331 n.136, 341 n.179, 349, 375–376

law(s), 58, 63, 68, 69, 70–72, 72–81, 82, 83, 84, 94, 95 n.144, 98–101, 102, 105, 129, 161, 173, 176 n.69, 178, 179 n.80, 188, 253, 370–371
λεπτός, 333, 334, 346, 350
linguistics, 107, 224–226, 231–233, 305, 367, 374, 380

Linus, 54, 345, 346 n.201, 360 n.253
Lucian, 40, 48 n.102, 49 n.107, 50, 52 n.120, 73, 77, 79, 80 n.83, 94–95, 98, 110–111, 115, 121 n.62, 133 n.20, 146, 147 n.90, 202, 279–280, 332 n.139, 336 n.155, 340, 359, 379
lumping, *see* assimilation
lyric, 34, 49, 115, 121 n.61, 140, 143 n.72, 378

μανία, 241, 298, 307, **324–332**, 360–362, 363, 367, 376–377
maxim, 76, 100, 102, 164 n.16, 184, 246, 317, 329, 331 n.137, 332 n.139, 342 n.184, 343, 347, 363, 370; *see also* gnomè
Melicertes, 135, 137, 169 n.34
Metrodorus of Lampsacus, 61, 194
mimesis, 116–117, 327, 364 n.267
Mimnermus, 48 n.102, 49, 53
misogynism, 140–143
mnemonic density, 19, 21, 187 n.128
Mnemosyne, 49, 313, 315, 316
Musaeus, 17 n.33, 42 n.75, 52, 53–54, 65, 73, 112–114, 278, 360 n.253
Muse(s), 33 n.33, 48 n.102, 49, 88 n.116, 95 n.144, 132 n.15, 136, 137 n.45, 137 n.50, 138, 182, 206, 210, 213–215, 221–222, 254, 257 n.73, 259, 261, 262–263, 269, 274 n.28, 291, 307 n.39, 310–318, 319–324, 324–325, 326, 327, 332, 334 n.147, 335 n.150, 337, 338, 339, 345, 346 n.201, 351, 361–362, 363, 373
  meeting with Hesiod 19, 38, 131, 136, 150, 190, **200–201**, 202–206, 210–217, 212, 246 n.23, 280, 282–283, 294, **300–304**, 322–324, 335 n.150, 336–337, 340 n.175, 359, 360, 373, 376
music, 49, 86, 114, 337 n.162, 338

myth, 5 n.14, 6, 7, 8 n.24, 35 n.41, 37 n.50, 38 n.51, 50 n.112, 51 n.113, 61, 70 n.48, 96, 99 n.157, 107 n.5, 110 n.17, 112, 115, 131 n.7, 134 n.28, 136, 143, 165 n.20, 166 n.22, 167, 170, 172 n.47, 174 n.57, 190, 192 n.9, 193 n.18, 197 n.38, 204, 224, 228, 230, 240, 244 n.17, 254, 255, 256, 277 n.38, 288–289, 329–330, 340 n.173, 348, 362 n.260
as opposed to truth 73, 79, 80, 88, 94, 96, 120–125, 126, 191 n.9
the language of 61 n.11, 85–86, 151, 193 n.19, 216–217, 217–223, 235, 309, 364

natural philosophy, 61 n.11, 91, 105, 106–107, 125 n.71, 139, 189, **190–200**, 206–207, 223, 230, 233, 235, 364, 374, 378
Nile, 43, 123, 124 n.70, 356
nomos, 73, 216–217, 225

Odysseus, 37 n.50, 62 n.21, 90 n.123, 99 n.158, 109, 124, 195 n.23, 218, 226 n.148, 272, 274, 285, 304, 309, 313–314, 316, 321
Odyssey, 33 n.29, 37 n.48, 37 n.50, 44, 46, 48, 62, 109, 116 n.40, 133 n.22, 173 n.54, 182 n.107, 194 n.23, 271, 275, 288–289, 304, 314 n.72, 319 n.91, 321, 335, 364
onomatothetes, 229, 307, 362 n.260
oracle, 69 n.42, 134, 176, 249, 255 n.64, 278, 311, 324 n.112, 352 n.225, 362 n.260
oral poetry, 25, 31, 34–35, 46, 77 n.70, 240, 271 n.7, 276–277, 377
oratory, 62, 76–77, 202, 324 n.113
Orchomenus, 134, 137 n.51, 138, 255
Orpheus, 17 n.33, 41, 42 n.75, 52, 53–54, 65, 73, 79 n.80, 112–114, 136, 137 n.46, 192 n.10, 230 n.164, 278, 346 n.200, 360
Ovid, 157, 343–345, 360

paideia, 17 n.33, 50, 59 n.4, 63, 84, 88 n.115, 125, 240
(οἱ) παλαιοί, 28, 46 n.91, 74 n.59, 107 n.5, 240
Pandora, 34, 43, 45 n.85, 51 n.113, 61 n.10, 142, 143, 179, 193 n.17, 220 n.127, 221 n.128
Pane(i)des, 249, 252, 254–255, 258, 264 n.97, 276, 278, 287, 375
Panhellenism, 31 n.23, 58, 132 n.15, 270, 303 n.20, 369
Parmenides, 107, 191, 194, 198, 201, 208 n.83, 210–213, 215, 217, 223, 234, 310, 316, 326, 378
Pausanias, 40, 45, 47 n.96, 52 n.120, 132 n.13, 133 n.22, 134, 163 n.9, 280, 283 n.65
Peisistratean redaction, 47, 74 n.58, 246 n.23
periodization, 10, 27–28, 241–242, 244 n.15
Perses, 32 n.24, 32 n.27, 38, 41, 131 n.7, 133 n.21, 139, 142, 162, 178 n.76, 184 n.116, 218 n.123, 252 n.52, 277 n.38
persona's paradox, 130, 139, **155–157**, 158–159, 373
Phemius, 72 n.53, 272 n.8, 272 n.13, 319 n.91, 320
Pherecydes, 41, 61, 80 n.84, 192 n.10, 194, 230 n.164
Philo of Alexandria, 79, 93, 146
Philodemus, 49, 286
philosophy, 13, 14, 15, 61 n.11, 62, 72 n.54, 73, 80, 82, 96, 98–101, 105, 106–109, 110 n.15, 111–112, 113, 119 n.54, 125, 129, 140, 146, 147, 151–152, 161, 164 n.17, 166–169, 170, 172 n.47, 181, 182, 187, 188, 189–235, 242, 250 n.41, 265, 285, 288 n.85, 297, 298, 304–309, 310, 326, 328, 340 n.173, 352 n.225, 361–362, 364–365, 371, 373, 374–375, 378, 380, 381; *see also* natural philosophy

physics, 15, 61 n.11, 189, 192, 198, 233, 235, 374; *see also* natural philosophy
Phocylides, 48 n.102, 140, 181 n.96, 329, 330, 331
Pindar, 44, 48 n.102, 49 n.107, 81 n.90, 92 n.133, 101, 108 n.7, 115 n.35, 132, 136, 162, 163 n.12, 175, 310–316, 317, 318, 326, 327, 328 n.130, 340, 351, 367
Plato, 12, 17, 44, 47, 48, 50, 52 n.120, 53, 62, 63, 73, 74–75, 78, 82, 92, 97–98, 100–101, 102, 105, 107, 108, 113–115, 116, 147, 151, 152, 169–170, 172, 179, 182, 183, 185, 191, 198, 218 n.121, 224–233, 235, 306, 307–308, 319, 324–332, 351, 352 n.226, 356, 357 n.245, 362, 363, 365, 367, 368, 371, 374, 377, 378 *et passim*
Plutarch, 42, 50, 51 n.113, 52 n.120, 72 n.54, 79 n.81, 81, 89, 94, 95, 99–101, 110, 118, 121 n.61, 134, 145, 146, 147, 164, 170–172, 179, 182, 184, 186, 191, 196, 198, 233 n.174, 241, 259–262, 265, 268, 280, 281 n.53, 340, 347, 351 n.222, 352, 354, 358
poetic licence, 82, 87, **93–96**, 103, 371
polarization, 30 n.18, 65 n.27, 239, 240–245, 284, 288–290, 293, 299, 351, 353
polis, 14–15, 33, 61 n.10, 62 n.18, 83, 148 n.91, 150 n.98, 158, 161–162, 165, 172–177, 180–183, 185, 186–188, 242, 255, 256 n.67, 373–374, 380, 381
polymathy, 17 n.33, 58, 208–209, 215, 223, 224 n.139, 233, 234, 305, 336, 374, 380
presocratics, 10, 27, 28, 190, 191, 207
priority (of Hesiod or Homer), 32–34, 40–46, 52–55, 66 n.32
Proclus, 41, 50, 51 n.113, 61, 91 n.126, 100 n.161, 117, 171, 181 n.100, 265 n.99, 353 n.226
Prodicus, 145, 155 n.115, 201, 219, 222–223, 223–226, 227 n.152, 233, 235, 351, 374, 375
Prometheus, 35 n.41, 85, 178 n.76, 205, 218 n.123, 219–221, 276 n.35
Propertius, 157, 343–346
prophet, 69, 132, 169 n.33, 188, 310–311, 316, 323–324, 325 n.136, 326, 332, 360, 362 n.260
prose, 111, 112–113, 324 n.113, 329, 330, 371
Protagoras, 113–115, 126, 201, 217, 219–222, 223, 225, 305, 306, 307, 309, 342
psychagogia, 120, 298, 308, 330, 351 n.219, 359–360
purity (of style), 84 n.100, 298, 337, 350, 354–355, 366, 367, 376, 378, 380, 381
Pythagoras, 79, 80 n.84, 82, 84–86, 100 n.160, 101 n.163, 102, 105, 136, 166, 169 n.35, 206, 208–209, 378
Pythagoreans, 85 n.102, 87–88, 166, 170, 181 n.98

Race of Heroes, 111, 154, 166 n.20
reason, 15, 267–268, 269, 295, 325, 326–327, 330, 375
relativism, 221, 223, 225, 232, 306, 328
revelation, 190, 200–223, 233–234, 235, 310, 328
rhapsode, 16 n.33, 29, 31 n.23, 33 n.33, 38, 41 n.69, 46–48, 51, 57, 62, 71, 96, 116, 207 n.79, 241, 245, 246, 287 n.81, 289 n.88, 325, 327 n.123
rhetoric, 38 n.52, 44, 46, 47 n.96, 51, 72, 74 n.59, 76 n.69, 77, 95 n.144, 146, 150, 175, 176 n.69, 218, 222, 223, 225, 232, 272 n.10, 288 n.85, 292, 301 n.7, 307–308, 309 n.48, 332 n.139, 343, 347, 349, 350, 351, 366, 377

riddle, 49, 83 n.98, 107 n.5, 245 n.22, 250–251, 259–261, 305, 348 n.209

scepticism, 204, 205, 209, 211, 223, 306 n.35
school, 43, 46, 49–50, 51, 59 n.4, 89, 96, 97 n.151, 100 n.160, 197 n.337, 240, 370
Second Sophistic, 17, 21, 59 n.2, 98, 99, 202, 294, 295, 378, 379
selection, 77, 82, **87–88**, 96, 103, 107, 371
Semonides, 140–141, 142, 143
Shield, 43 n.79, 256 n.71, 279 n.47, 341 n.178, 356 n.242, 357
Simonides, 114, 141 n.62, 146–147, 225, 288–289, 317, 318 n.87, 337 n.162, 351, 353, 363, 376
snowballing, 130, 139, **149–150**, 153, 158–159, 213–216, 235, 373
Socrates, 10, 27, 62, 79 n.81, 89–90, 92 n.131, 98 n.154, 101 n.163, 113–114, 118, 146 n.81, 218 n.121, 225, 226, 228–229, 230, 231–232, 296, 325 *et passim*
Solon, 6, 7, 27, 74, 76 n.70, 77, 100 n.160, 101 n.165, 173–175, 176 n.67, 176 n.69, 177, 187, 310, 352 n.226, 375, 378
σοφία, 13, 14, 15, 249, 255–256, 258, 297, 370, 375
sophist(s), 50, 61, 62, 96, 97, 106, 107, 111–115, 191, 201, 217–223, 224–225, 241, 307–308, 331 n.137, 339
Sophocles, 53, 76 n.70, 81, 92 n.133, 101, 108 n.7, 125 n.72
splitting, 11, 14, 26–28, 32–34, 39, 239, 240–245, 258, 377; *see also* differentiation
Stesichorus, 41 n.70, 102 n.167, 110, 115 n.35, 136, 353
Stoicism, 49 n.105, 51 n.113, 60 n.8, 60 n.9, 86 n.110, 88, 91 n.126, 92, 98, 101 n.163, 107, 124 n.68, 146, 147 n.90, 170, 190, 197–198, 199, 281, 361, 362 n.260
Strabo, 94, 95, 110, 115, 118, 119–125, 126, 170 n.40, 241, 281 n.58
symposium, 46, 49, 51, 57, 87 n.112, 141–144, 204, 240, 337 n.162, 370

Tartarus, 78 n.75, 85, 168–169, 195 n.27, 196
τέχνη, 67, 69, 75, 298, 320, 325, 328–332, 333, 363, 376–377, 378
Thales, 10, 192 n.10
Thamyris, 54, 137 n.46, 246 n.22, 272 n.8
Theagenes of Rhegium, 61 n.10, 82 n.91, 194
Theognis, 38 n.52, 74 n.59, 140, 141–142, 145, 175 n.66, 179, 183, 187, 281, 329, 330, 331, 378
theogony, 31 n.23, 53, 64, 66–67, 68, 136 n.40, 139, 192 n.10, 193–194, 217, 229–230, 274 n.28, 277 n.36, 301 n.6, 303, 360
theology, 39, 45, 54 n.125, 63–72, 82, 83 n.94, 84, 88 n.116, 99 n.157, 102, 118 n.50, 151, 174 n.57, 191 n.8, 197 n.36, 230 n.166, 309, 364–365
theomachy, 79, 194, 271 n.6, 357 n.244
Thersites, 284–285
τιμή, 67, 69
Titan(s), 19, 84 n.100, 85 n.105, 154–155, 199, 204–205, 292 n.99, 357 n.244
tragedy, 6, 18, 46, 48, 62, 101 n.166, 111, 115, **116–119**, 120, 125 n.72, 126, 166 n.21, 241, 286 n.77, 327, 330–331, 361–362, 367, 371, 378
Trojan War, 62, 66, 119, 154, 218, 254 n.58, 257 n.73, 257 n.74, 263, 264, 277, 278, 284–285, 291, 308 n.43, 309, 314 n.71, 314 n.72, 318, 321, 339 n.172, 344
truth, 60 n.8, 86, 88, 89, 93, 94 n.140, 99 n.157, 99 n.158, 111, 117–118, 119–125, 126, 150, 175 n.66, 185, 190, 191 n.9, 193 n.18, 200–201, 202–206, 209, 210–

213, 214, 215, 216–217, 217–223, 223–233, 233–235, 283, 297–298, **299–318**, 319, 321–324, 325, 327–329, 331 n.136, 341 n.179, 351, 358, 359–360, 361–362, 363, 366–368, 376–377, 378, 380
truthfulness of language, 15, 88, 189, 190, 217–223, **223–235**, 301–302, 304–309, 328, 374, 380, 381
Typhoeus, 19, 111, 154, 292 n.99, 357 n.244
Tyrtaeus, 76 n.70, 146–147, 278 n.40, 282 n.60

underworld, 58, 74, 78, **79–80**, 85, 102, 109, 136, 138, 161, 167, 371, 380
ὑπόνοια, 60, 91–92
Uranus, 53, 79, 92 n.131, 185 n.116, 228, 315

Virgil, 62 n.18, 141, 142, 157, 343–346
vita of Hesiod, 14, **130–138**, 139, 158, 161, 372

war poetry, 30, 153–155, 254, 277–278, 282 n.60, 291–292, 293, 373; *see also* Homer as a war poet
water, 49 n.104, 186, 283 n.66, 324 n.112, 332 n.139, 333–341
watershed, 10–11, 27, 45, 242
between Hesiod and Homer 15, 28–34, 43, 45, 239–245, 265, **267–268**, 284, 291, 295, 299, 304, 310, 341, 349, 358, 359, 375–377
wine, 333–341, 357
witness, 74–75, 76, 102, 179, 226
wonder (θαῦμα), 229, 249, 251, 267–268, 297–298, 330 n.134, 355–356
work (as a subject), 20, 30 n.18, 90, 155 n.115, 147 n.87, 156, 172 n.51, 226, 252–253, 276 n.33, 281, 309, 373

Xenophanes, 25, 42, 45, 63, 78–79, 82–84, 85, 93 n.136, 102, 191, 195 n.23, 201, 202–210, 211–212, 214–215, 217, 223, 233, 234, 310, 312 n.65, 371, 374, 378
Xenophon, 16 n.33, 62, 74 n.59, 89–90, 98 n.153, 98 n.154, 193 n.16, 226, 277, 290

Zeno the Stoic, 51 n.113, 92 n.134, 181, 197, 199 n.50
Zenodotus of Ephesus, 44, 50 n.113, 122, 157 n.118
Zeus, 19, 43, 61, 67 n.37, 69 n.43, 79, 85, 91, 98 n.153, 133 n.21, 134, 148 n.91, 154–155, 165, 166 n.21, 178, 185 n.116, 194, 198 n.41, 216–217, 219–222, 228, 255, 275, 318 n.87, 361 *et passim*

INDEX LOCORUM

Accius (Warmington)
p. 578 42 n.75

Aelius Aristides
Orationes
2.97 202 n.55
2.438 101 n.163
4.45 78 n.77
23.23–24 74 n.58
24.13/15 180 n.90
26.106 219 n.125
27.18 111 n.20
28.19–23 359 n.250
34.42 74 n.59

Aeschines
De Falsa Legatione
144 150 n.99, 227 n.150
158 150 n.98, 176 n.67
In Ctesiphontem
134–135 176 n.68
135 50 n.108
135–136 150 n.98
136 176
In Timarchum
129 76 n.70, 149–150, 227 n.150
148–150 76 n.66

Aeschylus (TGF)
3.431 123 n.66
3.441 123 n.66
3.434a 123 n.66

Agatharchides (Burstein)
fr. 8 119 n.51, 120 n.56

Alcaeus (Lobel-Page)
fr. 70 337 n.162
fr. 338 338 n.163
fr. 341 181 n.100
fr. 347 140, 141 n.62
fr. 358 338 n.163

[Alcidamas]
Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi (Allen)
1–17 131 n.6
1–53 249
2–6 254 n.60
7–43 254 n.60
9–10 346 n.198
44–45 41 n.68
45–53 41 n.69
54–214 249
62–66 249
65 249, 256 n.67
68–70 249, 252
70–72 249 n.39
72 250, 258
72–94 250
72–101 248 n.35
78–79 248 n.34
84–89 257 n.73
85 251 n.48
90–92 250
94–102 250
94–95 250
94–101 256 n.72
95 251 n.48, 261 n.87
102 250
102–138 250
103 250
107–137 257 n.74
138 250
138–139 251
138–149 251

[Alcidamas], *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (*continued*)
148–149 251
149 257
149–150 251
149–177 251
153 257 n.74
153–154 251 n.48
156–157 257
161 257 n.74
176 250 n.42
176–177 252 n.50
177–178 251, 252
178 252
185 253
189 252 n.52
199 253
204 253
205 250 n.42
205–206 254, 297 n.1
205–207 252 n.50
208–209 276 n.33
208–210 254
210–214 254
210–254 254 n.60
214 132 n.15
215–338 249
229–254 255 n.64
238–240 255 n.63
239–240 248 n.34
240–247 134 n.31
250–253 163 n.9
254–338 254 n.60
332–338 255 n.64
339 132 n.15

Alcman (PMGF)
148 123 n.66

Amphis (Kassel-Austin 2)
fr. 41 338 n.164

Anacreon (Bergk)
fr. 154 142 n.65

Anaxagoras (Diels-Kranz 59)
A 1 62 n.17
B 1 196 n.32

Anaximander (Diels-Kranz 12)
A 10 192 n.11
A 30 193 n.17
B 1 195 n.28

Anaximenes (Diels-Kranz 13)
A 6 192 n.11

Anonymus
Ilias Parva (Bernabé)
fr. 1 260 n.83
Vita Hesiodi (Allen)
2–5 42 n.75
Vita Homeri (Wilamowitz)
27.11–19 247 n.29
Vita Romana
3 346 n.198

Anthologia Palatina
2.36–44 323 n.108
2.382 310 n.52
2.407–408 346 n.198
7.1 363 n.261
7.6 366 n.273
7.7 366 n.273
7.52 358 n.246
7.54 163 n.9
7.55 137, 337
7.75 41 n.70, 353 n.227
7.409 294 n.109
7.745 135 n.37
9.24 366 n.273
9.64 337
9.97 68 n.41
9.161 345 n.197
9.165 143 n.72
9.183 182 n.102
9.184 41 n.70, 346 n.198, 353 n.227
9.455 132 n.18
9.507 334–335
9.522 346 n.198
11.20 332 n.139, **338–339**

11.24 338 n.168
11.61 339 n.172
12.168 49 n.106
15.22 339 n.172
15.36 366 n.272
16.293 132 n.18
16.295 68 n.41, 132 n.18
16.296 68 n.41, 132 n.18
16.301 132 n.18
16.303 366 n.273
16.304 278 n.41

Antimachus (Matthews)
fr. 51 17 n.34

Antiphon (Diels-Kranz 87)
A 6 308 n.47

Antisthenes (Caizzi)
fr. 14–15 218 n.119

Aphthonius (Walz)
1.66 74 n.59, 191 n.5

Apollodorus
Bibliotheca
2.3.1 119 n.53

Aratus
Phaenomena
17 334 n.147

Archilochus (West)
fr. 23.14 181 n.95
fr. 120 338 n.163
fr. 177 178 n.77
fr. 196a 140, 141 n.62, 143

Aristophanes
Aves
690–692 225 n.141
693 196 n.31
909–914 45 n.86
Equites
85–96 338 n.164
347–350 338 n.164
Fragmenta (Kassel-Austin 3)
346 338 n.164
Pax
1282–1283 257 n.74
Plutus
253 17 n.34
Ranae
356–357 338 n.166
775 339 n.171
1030–1031 203 n.61
1032–1036 53, 54 n.123
1033–1036 278 n.44
1034 155 n.115
1035–1036 62 n.15
Vespae
725 181 n.96

Aristotle
De Anima
404a29–30 306 n.32
427a25–27 306 n.34
De Caelo
298b25–29 191 n.6
298b25–33 307 n.38
De Xenophane
975a7–14 151 n.102, 197 n.36, 198 n.43
975a10 164 n.15
976b14–18 151 n.102, 197 n.36
Ethica Eudemia
1230a16–21 177 n.70
1235a18 152 n.104, 179 n.83
Ethica Nicomachea
1095b8–13 152 n.105
1113a7–8 286 n.78
1113b21–23 63 n.76
1116a15–26 177 n.70
1132b25–26 181 n.98
1132b31–34 181 n.99
1153b27–28 149 n.95
1155a15 183 n.108
1155a32–b8 164 n.17, 179 n.83, 286 n.74
1155b15 152 n.104
1160b24–27 183 n.108, 286 n.78
1161a10–15 183 n.108, 286 n.78

Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* (*continued*)
1170b20–23 179 n.84
1170b21–22 152 n.104
Fragmenta (Rose)
fr. 16.243 50 n.113
fr. 75 80 n.84, 85 n.102
fr. 565 41 n.70, 353 n.227
fr. 611.38 180 n.89
Historia Animalium
591a4 110 n.16
Magna Moralia
1191a5–9 177 n.70
Metaphysica
982b7–983b20 107 n.5
983b27–32 151 n.101, 365 n.271
983b33–984a3 365 n.271
984b23–31 151 n.102, 191 n.6, 198 n.43, 198 n.44
989a5–12 197 n.40
989a8–12 164 n.17, 286 n.74
989a10–12 365 n.271
995a7–8 76 n.68
1000a9–15 170 n.38, 191 n.8, 365 n.271
1000a10 364 n.268
1000a14–15 364 n.269
1000a18–19 151 n.101
1009b25–31 306 n.33
Meteorologica
353a34–b3 118 n.50, 365 n.270
Oeconomica
1343a18–21 110 n.16, 151 n.103, 286 n.74
1344a15–18 179 n.84
Physica
208b27–33 151 n.102, 196 n.34
Poetica
1448a19–25 116 n.38
1448b34–38 116 n.37
1451a24–29 116 n.37
1454b11–14 116 n.37
1454b25–30 116 n.37
1460a5–11 116 n.37
1460a18–19 364 n.264
1460a26–27 364 n.266
1460a35–b2 364 n.265
1460b6–1461b26 93 n.136
1460b16 364 n.263
1460b22–26 364 n.263
1460b23–24 94 n.139
Politica
1252b9–12 281 n.58
1252b11–12 151 n.103
1252b20–23 286 n.78
1253a1–9 177 n.70
1278a34–38 177 n.70
1259b10–14 286 n.78
1285a10–15 286 n.78
1292a13–15 286 n.78
Rhetorica
1365a10–15 309 n.48
1375b26–1376a17 76 n.68
1375b28–30 59 n.3, 74 n.59
1375b28–35 74 n.58
1376a16–17 76 n.69
1417b2–4 308 n.47

Athenaeus
2.44e 332 n.139
3.101f 286 n.74
4.172e 41 n.70
5.186f 290 n.93
12.546c 73 n.56
13.557a 119 n.53
14.620b 48 n.101
14.620c 48 n.102
14.620d 48 n.103

Aulus Gellius
Noctes Atticae
1.15 162 n.5

Bacchylides (Snell-Maehler)
5. 191–197 175 n.66, 316 n.79
9.2 316 n.78

Callimachus (Pfeiffer)
Aetia
fr. 1.25–28 315 n.76
fr. 2 182 n.101, 196 n.34, 333 n.143, 336 n.156, 336 n.157
fr. 112 333 n.143, 336 n.156, 336 n.157
Epigrammata
27 **334–335**, 335 n.152, 342 n.182
Fragmenta
fr.460 336 n.155
Iambi
fr. 200a 224 n.138
Hymnus in Jovem
78 284 n.68

Catullus
64.382–408 154 n.108

Chrysippus (SVF)
2.501 199 n.50
2.208–209 92 n.134
2.256 67 n.33
2.906 107 n.6
3.138 281 n.56

Cicero
Ad Familiares
6.18.5 146 n.80
Brutus
4.15 181 n.97
Cato
15.54 157 n.119, 293 n.106
De Natura Deorum
1.41 107 n.6
De Officiis
1.15.48 181 n.97
De Oratore
31.109 366 n.272
De Republica
2.20 41 n.70, 353 n.227
De Senectute
15.54 42 n.76
Epistulae ad Atticum
13.12 181 n.97
Tusculanae Disputationes
1.1.3 45 n.88
1.41.98 54

Clemens of Alexandria
Protrepticus
2.26.6 79 n.80
2.41.1–2 170 n.41
Stromateis
1.21.107.5 45 n.88
1.21.117.4–5 45 n.88
1.21.131.5 80 n.84
1.14.61.2 50 n.113
5.4.24.1 54, 107 n.5, 163 n.7, 360 n.253
5.14.100.3 101 n.163
5.14.107.2 101 n.163
5.14.112.3 101 n.163
5.14.129.5–6 101 n.163
6.2.26.7 119 n.53

Cornutus
Epidrome
14 72 n.54
17 88 n.116, 198 n.43

Cratinus (Kassel-Austin 4)
fr. 203 338 n.164

Damastes (FGH 5)
11b 41 n.65

Demetrius
De Elocutione
12–15 340 n.174
94 307 n.41

Democritus (Diels-Kranz 68)
B 3 184 n.113
B 18 326 n.122
B 20a 307 n.40
B 21 326 n.122
B 204 184 n.113
B 218 90 n.124, 84 n.113
B 220 184 n.112

Democritus (Diels-Kranz 68) (*continued*)
B 221 184 n.112
B 238 184 n.113
B 252 184 n.113

Demosthenes
De falsa legatione
46 332 n.139
243 74 n.59, 162 n.5, 227 n.150
243–244 150 n.96
255–256 176 n.69
In Philippum II
30 332 n.139

Dio Chrysostom
2.2–13 247 n.29
2.6 62 n.19, 264, 288 n.84
2.8 131 n.10, 157 n.119
2.8–9 280 n.49, 280 n.50
2.8–12 293 n.105
2.9–12 262–265
2.13 264 n.98, 293 n.105
2.23–24 286 n.75, 288 n.85
2.27 288 n.86
2.44 288 n.84
2.54 288 n.84
3.11–12 135 n.37
7.1 164 n.15
7.107 286 n.78
7.110–111 90 n.124, 162 n.5, 185 n.121
7.116 281 n.56
10.24 366 n.272
11.22 366 n.272
11.23 318 n.88
11.24–25 318 n.88
11.42–43 340 n.173
12.23 162 n.5
12.66 366 n.272
12.68 307 n.41
14.21 79 n.80, 115 n.34, 163 n.7
17.12 185 n.119
18.8 59 n.5
32.22 286 n.78
33.11 207 n.79
36.10–13 132 n.18
36.33–35 46 n.91, **361–362**
36.35 118 n.48
36.40–49 362 n.260
53.2 80 n.84
53.5 366 n.272
53.10 132 n.17
53.11–12 286 n.78
55 101 n.163
55.6 207 n.79, 353 n.227
61.1 286 n.80
77.1 164 n.14, 318 n.88
77.2 318 n.88
77.5 **164 n.16**, 180 n.89, 281 n.54
80.12 185 n.120

Diogenes Laertius
1.38 45 n.88, 46 n.91
1.57 74 n.58
2.11 62 n.17
5.87 40 n.61, 50 n.113
5.92 40 n.61, 50 n.113
8.21 79 n.82
9.22 191 n.7
9.73 306 n.35
9.71 228 n.155
10.2 197 n.37

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Usener-Radermacher)
De compositione verborum
6.47 278 n.42
6.114 354 n.233
6.121 41 n.70, 356 n.241
De Imitatione
6.204 366 n.272
Demosthenes
5.217 354
5.220 353 n.229

Doxopater (Walz)
2.143 349 n.210
2.149 349 n.211
2.251 347 n.202

6.93 332 n.139
6.96 332 n.139
6.397 354 n.234

Empedocles (Diels-Kranz 31)
B 2 215 n.107
B 3 214–216
B 4 215 n.109
B 6 195 n.26, 214
B 8 216 n.112
B 9 216 n.112
B 15 216 n.112
B 17.14 215 n.110
B 20 195 n.25
B 22 195 n.25
B 30 195 n.25
B 80 216
B 115 167–169
B 118/122 167 n.28
B 129–130 167 n.28
B 131 214 n.106, 215 n.107
B 140/141 167 n.28
B 146/147 169 n.33

Ephorus (FGH 70)
3a 41 n.66
3b 41 n.67
42 110 n.19
169 135 n.32

Epicharmus (Kassel-Austin 1)
fr. 131 338 n.163
fr. 275.4 196 n.30

Epigram
EG 428 136 n.38, 164 n.13, 224 n.138

Epimenides (Diels-Kranz 3)
B 1 301 n.6

Eratosthenes
fr. I A 11 (Berger) 318 n.88
fr. I A 20 (Berger) 120 n.57
fr. 17 (Powell) 134 n.31

Eubulus (Kassel-Austin 5)
fr. 133 338 n.164

Euripides
Bacchae
298–301 338 n.166
Hippolytus
385–386 224 n.138

Eustathius (Van der Valk)
1.6.38 247 n.29

Fronto
2.67 132 n.15

Galen (Kühn)
5.89 146 n.80
5.300 107 n.6
6.652 280 n.51
10.7 133 n.20
15.103 231 n.167

Gorgias (Diels-Kranz 82)
B 11 a 29 203 n.61
B 25 308 n.43
B 27 308 n.43

Gregory of Corinth (Spengel)
3.225.1 348 n.209

Hecataeus (FGH 1)
14 119 n.53
18a–b 119 n.53
19 110 n.16, 119 n.53

Hellanicus (FGH 4)
5b 41 n.65
74 119 n.53
88 119 n.53
94 119 n.53
95 119 n.53
156 119 n.53

Heraclides Ponticus (Wehrli)
fr. 177 40 n.61

Heraclitus (Diels-Kranz 22)
B 2 209 n.89
B 22 203 n.57, 209 n.86, 209 n.89
B 40 110 n.16, 206 n.79, 207 n.80, **208–209**, 215 n.110
B 42 206 n.79, 207 n.80
B 55 208 n.85
B 56 207 n.79, 207 n.80, 207 n.81, 287 n.82, 305 n.30
B 57 50 n.108, 207, **208–209**
B 80 195
B 93 69 n.42
B 95 208 n.85
B 101 203 n.57, 209 n.86, 209 n.89
B 104 209 n.89
B 105 207 n.80
B 106 157 n.117, **207–208**
B 113 209 n.89
B 123 208 n.85
B 129 208 n.85

Heraclitus (grammaticus)
Quaestiones Homericae
1.5–7 59 n.5

Hermesianax (Powell)
fr. 7.22 119 n.53
fr. 7.28 132 n.15

Hermogenes (Walz)
Περὶ ἰδεῶν
3.202–210 355 n.236
3.260 353 n.229
3.320 354 n.234
3.375 277 n.40
3.378 355 n.235
Προγυμνάσματα
1.10 164 n.17, 347 n.206
1.23 347 n.202

Herodian (Lentz)
1.404.6–10 44 n.83
2.10.22–25 44 n.83
2.25.26 44 n.83
2.367.27 227 n.153

Herodotus
1.5 69 n.42
1.23 67 n.36
1.34 69 n.42
1.43 69 n.42
1.75 69 n.42
1.78 69 n.42
1.89 69 n.42
1.94 70 n.49
1.108 69 n.42
1.132 67 n.36
2.17 70 n.49
2.20 69 n.42
2.23 66 n.31, 119 n.52, 316 n.81
2.25 365 n.269
2.37 65 n.26
2.49 69 n.44, 69 n.45
2.50–52 65 n.26
2.52 65 n.29
2.53 25 n.3, 45 n.88, 53, 54 n.124, **63–72**, 83 n.95, 163 n.11, 241
2.54–58 65 n.26
2.82 157 n.117
2.116 68 n.38, 119 n.52, 317 n.82
2.145 66 n.30
2.164 69
2.216 66 n.31
3.89 69
4.13 67 n.36
4.16 68 n.38
4.32 110 n.17
4.35 67 n.36, 68 n.39
4.45 70 n.49
4.99 69 n.42
4.107 70 n.47
4.155 70 n.50
4.179 69 n.42
5.54 69 n.42

5.65 70 n.50
5.66 70
5.67 71 n.51
5.68 71
5.69 71
5.95 68 n.39
6.21 67 n.36, 68 n.39
7.26 86 n.107
7.61 70 n.47
7.77 69 n.42
7.161 59 n.3, 71 n.52
7.192 69 n.42
7.213 69 n.42
8.41 69 n.42
8.59 207 n.79
8.62 69 n.42
8.111 69 n.42
9.34 69 n.44

Hesiod
Fragmenta (Merkelbach-West)
153 123 n.66
181 122 n.65
278 246 n.22
280 80 n.84, 136 n.40
286 181 n.98
298 47 n.99
304 198 n.42
338 181 n.96
344 175 n.66, 316 n.80
357 246 n.26
Opera et Dies
5–8 173 n.53
11 276 n.34, 359 n.250
11–16 174 n.59
11–24 180 n.90
11–26 184 n.113, 195 n.25, 224 n.138, 276 n.34
18 359 n.250
21–24 258 n.79
22 289 n.90, 359 n.250
24 358 n.245
25 148, 151–152, 164 n.17, 286 n.74
25–26 179, 320 n.94
26 246 n.24, 258
27 147 n.88, 162 n.2
30 359 n.250
31 359 n.250
39 284
40 100, 148, **184–185**
41 17 n.34, 137 n.49, 184 n.116
42 184
60–61 219 n.125
67 142
70–71 219 n.125
83–85 220 n.127
94–98 45 n.85
108 219 n.125
109–120 167 n.28
121–123 147 n.91, 170
121–126 138 n.54
122–123 165–166
124 138
131 162 n.1
134 174 n.59
156–173 154
174–201 175, 275
185 180
189 180 n.88
202 165 n.17, 349
202–212 178, 284
209 212 n.99, 302 n.17
210–211 184 n.113
220–221 173 n.53, 185 n.121
221 284
225–227 175 n.65, **175 n.66**
238–273 284 n.69
240–241 173 n.53, 174 n.59, 176
240–247 150 n.98
240–243 176
246–247 176
248–273 173 n.53
252–255 166 n.21
255 73 n.56
260 174 n.59
263–264 185 n.121
264 284
265 182 n.101
266 100
267–273 89 n.120

Hesiod, *Opera et Dies* (*continued*)
270–274 135 n.34
274–280 178
287–290 75
287–292 **144–148**, 315
289 225
291 282 n.60
291–292 184 n.113, 225
293–294 162
293–297 152
297 147 n.88
299 133 n.21
311 90, 150, 184, 226, 281
313 89
317–319 224 n.138
342 164 n.17
342–351 180
348 180 n.89
350 181
352 184 n.112, 224 n.138
353 181 n.95
354 180
356 180
361 232 n.172
368–369 280 n.50
372 148, 179 n.87
373–374 142 n.65
383 253 n.53
383–384 263, 263 n.91
383–392 252
397 162 n.1
405 151
405–821 186 n.124
412 175 n.62, 312 n.67
423–425 280 n.50
456 155, 162 n.1, 231
491 147 n.88, 162 n.2
498–501 99 n.158
548–553 107 n.2
580–581 351 n.222
582–587 143, 155–156
595 341 n.177
635–640 42 n.73
637–638 79 n.80
639 175 n.65
640 122 n.64
646–662 131
654–655 32 n.27
654–659 246
689–691 184 n.113
699 179 n.84
700–705 140, 141, 142–143
705 184
710–711 181 n.95
712 181
715 152, 179 n.84
717–718 183 n.109, **183 n.110**, 281 n.57
724–764 167 n.28
735–736 186 n.124
737–741 186 n.124
744–745 186 n.124
750–752 186 n.124
753–755 186 n.124
763–764 148, **149–150**
764 155
797 147 n.88
812 289 n.90
Scutum
237–285 256 n.71
267 357 n.243
Theogonia
1–6 324 n.112
6 337
22 31
22–34 131, **200–201**, 335 n.150
22–35 280 n.50
26 303 n.18
26–28 300 n.2
27 205, 310
27–28 150, 211, 246 n.23, **300–304**
30 47 n.96
31–33 323 n.109
32 204, 323 n.111
35 324 n.112
36–38 33 n.33
38 257 n.73
45 204 n.62
74 67 n.37, 69 n.43; 72
79–103

80–82 288 n.85
80–93 322 n.105
81–92 284 n.68
82 284 n.68
86 322 n.105
87 322 n.105
88 284 n.68
94–95 312
94–103 322 n.105
96 284 n.68
100 4 n.101, 313 n.70
112 67 n.37
115 204 n.62
115–116 20 n.42
115–122 148 n.93
116 195
116–117 196, 198 n.43
116–120 19, 139–140
116–132 193 n.19
117 199 n.48
119–120 198 n.43
120 198 n.43
123 196 n.31
123–124 198 n.43
123–125 194, 208 n.83
225–232 276 n.34
228–232 167 n.28
240–264 157 n.118
266 229
282 194 n.22, 365 n.271
326 229 n.163
337 108 n.10
397 198 n.41
418 67 n.37
426 67 n.37
426–428 69 n.43
462 67 n.37
491 67 n.37
521–522 85 n.106
585 224 n.138
617–720 154–155
726 85 n.105
728 195
733 85 n.105
736–744 168
739 169 n.32
743–744 169
746–758 207 n.83
749–750 85 n.105
755 169 n.32
775–806 167
780 229
782 167
793 167
793–804 169 n.32
800 169 n.32
810 169 n.32
820–880 154
882 67 n.37
885 67 n.37, 69 n.43
892 67 n.37
904 67 n.37, 69 n.43
991 166 n.22

Hesychius (Schmidt)
2.202.20 318 n.88

Hippias (DK 86)
B 6 53, 54 n.123, **112–113**, 241 n.6

Homer
Ilias
1.6–7 206 n.76
2.123–128 257 n.73
2.188–191 90, 226 n.148
2. 198–202 90, 226 n.148
2.211–277 284–285
2.507 122
2.557–558 59 n.3
2.594–600 246 n.22
3.6 123 n.66
4.442–443 357 n.244
5.428–429 99
5.770–772 357 n.243
6.211 308 n.43
6.236 308 n.43
8.16 193 n.16
8.18–27 91 n.128
9.186–188 272 n.9
9.497–501 75
9.706 339 n.172
11.67–71 263 n.91, 293

Homer, *Ilias* (*continued*)
11.218 206 n.76
13.126–133 253 n.55
13.339–344 253 n.55
14.201 108 n.10
14.302 108 n.10
15.18–22 61
15.605–607 355 n.239
16.112 206 n.76
18.39–49 157 n.118
18.478–608 92 n.130
18.490–540 256 n.71
20.248–250 306 n.35
21.308 225 n.144
23.100 85 n.105
23.644–645 73 n.56
23.698 306 n.32, 206 n.33
24.343–344 302 n.17
Odyssea
1.34 174 n.59
3.267–271 72
4.266–289 366 n.272
8.44–45 319 n.91
8.287–289 319 n.91
8.489 321 n.98
9.6–11 257 n.73
10.22 302 n.17
14.222–225 99 n.158
17.384 320 n.94
17.487 73 n.56
18.136 306 n.34
19.203 304 n.26
21.295–304 205 n.69
22.347–348 319 n.91, 320 n.95
24.5 85 n.105
24.7 85 n.105

Iamblichus
De Vita Pythagorica
48 85 n.104
50 85 n.104
111 88 n.113
132 85 n.104
164 88 n.113
218 85 n.103
259 90, 286 n.77

Isocrates
Ad Nicoclem
42–43 329–331
48–49 329–331
Antidosis
205–206 331 n.136
Busiris
38 79 n.80
Contra Sophistas
12 331 n.136
15 331 n.136
Panathenaicus
18 16 n.33, 50 n.109, 97 n.151
33 16 n.33, 50 n.109
271 331 n.136

Josephus
Antiquitates Judaicae
1.108 110 n.16
Contra Apionem
1.7 65 n.28
11.6 110 n.16, 119 n.53
1.118 119 n.53

Julianus
Caesares
314a 181 n.98
Epistulae
387d 162 n.5
409b 180 n.89
423b 79 n.80
Misopogon
347c 45 n.86
Orationes
4.136a–137c 362 n.259
7.207a–b 348 n.209

Libanius
Declamationes
1.65 247 n.29
Epistulae
181.4 115 n.34
Orationes
16.46 16 n.33, 50 n.108
16.46–47 101 n.163

Sententiae
1 277 n.40

[Longinus]
De Sublimitate
1.4 355
8.1 355
8.2 355 n.238
9.4–5 356–357
9.10 356 n.242
9.11 355 n.239
13.3 41 n.70, 353 n.227, 356 n.241
13.4 357 n.345
35.3 356 n.240
35.4 356
35.5 356
36.2 356

[Longus]
Daphnis et Chloe
2.23 290 n.95

Lucian
Adversus Indoctum
3 131 n.10, 279 n.48, 318 n.88, 332 n.139, 336 n.155, 340 n.175
[Amores]
37 224 n.138
Anacharsis
21 53 n.122, 77–78, 101 n.165
Bis Accusatus
21 146 n.83
De Astrologia
22 46 n.91, 111 n.20
De Luctu
2 73 n.55, 115 n.34
2–10 79 n.82
Demosthenis Encomium
9 40 n.62
12 202 n.55, 336 n.115

De Sacrificiis
8.3 80 n.83
De Saltatione
24 133 n.20
61 115 n.34
Hermotimus
2 146 n.83
Hesiodus
1 253 n.53
4–6 95 n.144
5 50 n.111, **94–95**
7 131 n.10, 332 n.139
Icaromenippus
27.13 48 n.102
Jupiter Tragoedus
39 318 n.88
Necyomantia
3 73 n.56, 79 n.79, 98
4 98 n.155, 99 n.156, 146 n.83
21 80 n.83
Philopseudes
2 318 n.88
Quomodo historia conscribenda sit
8 94 n.139
Rhetorum Praeceptor
3 146 n.84
4 202 n.54, 336 n.155
7 146 n.84, 332 n.139
9 279 n.48, 332 n.139
10 332 n.139
Saturnalia
5 53 n.122, 157 n.119, 332 n.139
6 279 n.48, 359 n.247
Symposium
17.6 49 n.107
Verae Historiae
2.22 247 n.29

Lucretius
De rerum natura
1.136–145 292 n.102
4.1–9 292 n.102
5.336–337 292 n.102

Lycurgus
In Leocratem
102 48 n.99, 73 n.56
110 76 n.66

Lysias
[2.12] 178 n.79
[2.19] 178 n.79

Manilius
Astronomica
1.125–127 196 n.32
2.1–24 281 n.59
2.11–12 45 n.87
2.15 292 n.101
2.20 154 n.111, 291 n.96
2.23 291 n.96
2.24 292 n.101
3.5–8 291 n.98
3.9–26 292 n.100

Marcus Antoninus
4.33 306 n.35

Maximus of Tyre
4.1 101 n.164
4.3 45 n.87, 54 n.124, 101 n.164, 107 n.5
15.7 146 n.82
17.3 45 n.87, 54 n.124, 360 n.252
23.2 278 n.40
24 282 n.60
24.6 309 n.49
26.1 110 n.15
26.2 46 n.91, 107 n.5
26.4 110 n.15
29.2 278 n.40
35.1 45 n.86
37.4 54 n.124
38.2 360 n.257

Menander Rhetor (Spengel)
3.339 110 n.16, 115 n.34
3.340 354 n.234
3.393 50 n.109

Metrodorus (DK 61)
A 4 61 n.13

Nicander
Theriaca
10–12 110 n.16, 337 n.159

Nicolaus (Walz)
1.281 191 n.5
1.332 162 n.5

Nonnus
Dionysiaca
13.76 157 n.119

Ovid
Amores
1.15.9–12 344 n.190
Ars Amatoria
1.27–28 360 n.256
1.28 344
1.29–30 360 n.255
2.4 52 n.120
Epistulae ex Ponto
4.8.57 196 n.32
4.14.32 157 n.119
Fasti
6.13–14 110 n.16, 157 n.119, 344 n.192

Panyassis (Kinkel)
fr. 14 337 n.162

Papyri
Michigan 2745 248 n.35, 248 n.36
P.Oxy 3537 132 n.14, **282–283**
P.Petrie 1.25.1 248 n.35

Parian Marble (FHG 239)
A 27–28 42 n.75

Parmenides (Diels-Kranz 28)
A 37 194 n.22
B 1.22–23 212 n.98

B 1.24–32 211–213
B 1.30 215 n.108
B 7.5–8.1 212
B 8.53–61 194
B 13 194

Pausanias
1.2.3 47 n.97, 53 n.122, 280 n.51, 283 n.65, 287 n.83
2.6.5 110 n.16
2.26.7 47 n.99
5.26 51 n.115
8.18.1 133 n.22
9.27.2 133 n.22, 198 n.43
9.30.2–4 137 n.46
9.30.3 40, 47 n.96, 53 n.122
9.31.4 132 n.13, 137 n.51
9.31.4–5 133 n.22
9.31.5 323 n.108
9.31.6 134 n.31
9.35.5 133 n.22
9.38.3–4 134 n.27
9.38.4 163 n.9
10.7.3 47 n.96, 54

Pherecydes of Athens (FGH 3)
167 41 n.65

Pherecydes of Syros (Diels-Kranz 7)
B 5 61 n.13

Philo
De Aeternitate Mundi
17 101 n.163
De Ebrietate
150 146 n.82
De Providentia
2.34–37 79 n.78
2.40 52 n.120
2.40–41 93 n.135

Philochorus (FGH 3 B 328)
fr. 213 41 n.70

Philodemus
De musica
p. 83 (Kemke) 49 n.105
De pietate
13 53, 92 n.133, 101 n.163, 107 n.6
Epigrams (Sider)
23 181 n.95
34 135 n.36, 148 n.91, 169 n.34

Philostratus
Heroicus
18.2 247 n.29
25.3 293 n.107
25.7 43 n.79, 54
43.2–7 45 n.88
43.5 132 n.15
43.7 252 n.50
43.9 268

Phocylides (Diehl)
fr. 2 140, 143 n.67

Phrynichus (Kassel-Austin 7)
fr. 74 338 n.165

Pindar
Dithyrambs
2.23 312 n.60
Fragmenta (Maehler)
fr. 52h (= Paean 7b) 162 n.5
fr. 108a 147 n.88
fr. 150 311 n.55
fr. 155.2 311 n.57
Isthmian Odes
3.55 132 n.15
6.66–72 175 n.63, 312
8.61 311 n.58
Nemean Odes
1.61–62 311 n.55
3.1 311 n.57
4.3 311
6.23 147 n.88
6.32–33 313 n.68

Pindar, *Nemean Odes* (*continued*)
7.1 315 n.76
7.15–16 316
7.20–27 313–314
7.21 314 n.72
7.22 315 n.76
7.23–25 316
9.54–55 312 n.61
10.26 313 n.68
Olympian Odes
6.89–91 312 n.66
9.27 313 n.68
9.81 311
9.107–108 146 n.82
10.3–4 312
13.96–97 311 n.57
Paeans
6.6 311 n.54
7b.11–20 162 n.5, **315–316**
Pythian Odes
4.1–3 312 n.62
5.65 312 n.60
6.1–3 313 n.68
10.67 163 n.12
11.41–42 311 n.58

Planudes (Walz)
5.448 115 n.34

Plato
Apologia
22c 325 n.116
28c–d 62 n.21
40e–41b 73, 79 n.81
41a 53, 54 n.123
Charmides
163b 90 n.124
163c 226 n.146
Cratylus
384b 224 n.141
396b–c **228–229**, 230
397e 92 n.133, **147 n.91**, 228 n.154
397e–398c 170 n.36
402a 92 n.133, 108 n.8
402a–b 307 n.38
402b 92 n.133, 108 n.9
404e–406a 230 n.164
406c 227 n.153
407a 92 n.133
408a 229 n.160
414c–d 229 n.163
414d 228 n.154
428a 232 n.171
431[e] 231 n.170
[Demodocus]
383b 181 n.96
[Epinomis]
990a 110 n.16, 164 n.17
Euthydemus
277e 224 n.141
Euthyphro
5e–6a 98 n.153
Gorgias
449a 308 n.43
473a 100 n.159
474c 100 n.159
525d 62 n.20
Ion
530c 46 n.92
531a–e 245 n.21
531a–532a 48
531c 79 n.81, 177 n.73, 241 n.5
531c–e 78 n.74
533d–e 307 n.42
533d–536d 326 n.120
534a–b 338 n.166
535e–536d 327 n.123
541a–b 277 n.39
Leges
658a–659d 352 n.226
658d 48
659a 252 n.50
677e 110 n.16, 138 n.53, 186 n.123
682a 325 n.118, 363 n.261
713c–e 170
858e 73 n.56, 74 n.58
690e 185 n.118
713c–714a 185 n.118

Lysis
215c 92 n.133
217c 179 n.82
[Minos]
318e 118 n.46
Phaedo
94d–95a 62 n.20
95a 132 n.15
107d 170
Phaedrus
245c 362 n.259
252b 92 n.133
261a 308 n.44
271c 308 n.44
272b 146 n.84
278c 325 n.119
Philebus
17b 231 n.170
Politicus
285d 231 n.170
Protagoras
316d–e 113–114
315e–316a 224 n.139
316d 92 n.133, 217 n.118
320c–323a 219–222
337a 225 n.141
338e–339a 114 n.32
338e–341a 225
339a–347a 114 n.32
340a 225 n.141
340a–b 225 n.144
341 225 n.141
341a 162 n.5
348c 62 n.20
358a 225 n.141
Respublica
334d 100 n.159
354a 100 n.159
363a 53
363a–c 98 n.153
363b–c 54 n.124
363e 75 n.61, 76 n.64
364c 147 n.90
364c–d 74–75
364c–e 98 n.153
364d 53
377c 50 n.108
377c–378d 78
377d 154 n.111
377e–378e 92 n.131
387a 85 n.105
387b 327 n.125
378d 92 n.133
389e 62 n.20
393a–394c 116 n.38
402b 231 n.170
441b–c 62 n.20
466c 162 n.5, 185 n.117
468b–c 62 n.20
468d 87 n.111
468d–469a 172
468e 92 n.133, **147 n.91**, 170
546e 92 n.133, 326 n.121
595b 116 n.36, 327 n.125
598d 116 n.36
598d–e 59 n.5
599c 286 n.76
599d 353 n.226
599e 73 n.56
600c–d 78 n.77
600d 47 n.97, 163 n.7, 225 n.144
605c–d 327
606e 59 n.5
606e–607a 327 n.125
607a 116 n.36
607c–d 327 n.126
612b 53 n.122
615e–616a 86 n.109
620d 170
Sophista
216a 62 n.20
253a 231 n.170
Symposium
178b 148 n.93, 191 n.6, 194, 198 n.43
179b 92 n.133
195c 198 n.43, **198–199**
195d 327 n.125
198c 308 n.45
202d–203a 170 n.37

Plato, *Symposium* (*continued*)
203b–d 230 n.164
209c–e 74
209d 115 n.34, 353 n.226
Theaetetus
152e 116 n.36
152e–153a 306 n.36
153a 108 n.11
153d 91 n.128, 92 n.133, 108 n.11
155d 92 n.133, **229**, 230
160d 92 n.133, 108 n.11, 306 n.36, 306 n.37
170e–171a 221 n.131
179e 92 n.133, 108 n.11, 306 n.36
194c 62 n.20, 92 n.133
201d–207c 230–232
207c–208b 232 n.171
Timaeus
21c–d 352 n.226
40e 133 n.21, 170 n.38, 216 n.115, 326 n.121
50b 197 n.35
51a 197 n.35

Pliny the Elder
Naturalis Historia
14.3 110 n.16, 157 n.119
15.3 110 n.16
18.201 110 n.16, 157 n.119
18.213 110 n.16
22.67 137 n.49
23.43 340 n.176
25.12 54, 110 n.16

Pliny the Younger
Epistulae
2.5.4 346 n.199
3.9.28 318 n.88

Plutarch
Caesar
41 59 n.5
Comparatio Aristidis et Catonis
3.3.2 99 n.158
[De vita et poesi Homeri]
2 346 n.198
16 307 n.41
176 293 n.103
Fragmenta (Sandbach)
157.124–129 186 n.124
178.79–91 108 n.12
178.88 162 n.5
Moralia
9E 332 n.139
15E–F 340 n.173
17B 81 n.88
22F 89 n.117
23E–F 89 n.118
24E 89 n.118, **145**
28B 50 n.110, 73 n.56, 94 n.142
34B 180 n.89
35F 100 n.160
36A–B 99–100, 241 n.6
49F 179 n.85
77D 146 n.82, 147 n.89
92A 179 n.85
105D 42 n.76
153F–154A 247 n.29, **259–262**
157E–158B 138 n.53
157F 110 n.16, 186 n.122, 186 n.123
156F 163 n.9
158A–B 186 n.124, 280 n.52
158B 164 n.17, 347 n.207
162C 133 n.24
169B 111 n.20
223A 279 n.46
275A 17 n.34
361B 45 n.85, 79 n.81, 171, 171 n.44
373C 50 n.109
374C 196 n.35, 198 n.43, 198 n.45
396D–E 53 n.122
396F 352 n.224
402E 110 n.16, 191 n.7
415A–B 172 n.47
415B 171 n.42, 171 n.44

415C–416B 171 n.43
415F 198 n.42
417B 171 n.43
423A 172 n.47
426C–D 172 n.47
431B 171 n.43
431E 133 n.20, 171 n.43
433E 191 n.5
473A 179 n.85
480E 131 n.7
491F 179 n.85
526F–527A 184 n.114
527B 185 n.121
527B–C 280 n.51
530D **164 n.17**, 281 n.53
553F–554A 182 n.103
560E 135 n.37
562A 162 n.5
593D 111 n.20, 171 n.43
667F 59 n.5
674F 247 n.29, 260 n.84, 261 n.88
678F 195 n.29, 196 n.32
701D–E 340 n.176
725D 340 n.177
746D 72 n.54
747E 354
753A 110 n.16
756F 198 n.45
756E 191 n.7
763E 100 n.160
801E 72 n.54, 286 n.75
857A 118 n.49
857E 121 n.61
857F 118 n.49
927A 198 n.45
927E 191 n.7
940C 110 n.16, 186 n.123
948E–F 107 n.6
955D 340 n.177
978F 110 n.16
984D 134 n.26
969E 162 n.5
1088D 108 n.12
1125A 179 n.80

Numa
4.6.3 135 n.37

Scholia in Opera et Dies (Pertusi)
270–273 89 n.120
423–427 233 n.174, 281 n.53
578–581 351 n.222
650–662 260 n.84
797–799 281 n.53

Theseus
3.2 164 n.16, 280 n.52, 286 n.74, 347 n.202
16.2–3 118 n.47
20.2 47 n.99

Porphyry
De antro nympharum
30 45 n.85

Posidonius (Theiler)
fr. 459 42 n.77

Proclus
Chrestomathia
1.6 41 n.71

In Opera et Dies commentarii (Pertusi)
Prol. 117
15 100 n.161
119–110 171 n.46
111 100 n.161, 171 n.46
113–115 100 n.161, 171 n.46
116–117 171 n.46
121–124 171 n.46
130–131 100 n.161
200–201 100 n.161
274–280 100 n.161
286 100 n.161
290–292 100 n.161
291 353 n.227
423–427 100 n.161
448–452 100 n.161
695–698 100 n.161
689–694 100 n.161
706 100 n.161
709 100 n.161
721 181 n.100

In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii
1.85 91 n.126

Prodicus (Diels-Kranz 84)
B 2 145, 222

Propertius
2.10.25–26 345 n.195, 345 n.197
2.13.3–9 346 n.201
2.34.77–78 110 n.16, 157 n.119, 344 n.189

Protagoras (Diels-Kranz)
A 28 307 n.39
A 29 307 n.39
A 30 225 n.144

Pythagoras (Wehrli)
fr. 42 79 n.82, 84–86

Quintilian
1.8.5 62 n.18
5.11.19 **164 n.17**, 347
5.11.40 59 n.3
10.1.28–30 94 n.139
10.1.46 356 n.241
10.1.46–47 353 n.229
10.1.52 347 n.202, 354, 355
10.1.56 278 n.40
10.1.62 41 n.70, 353 n.227

Scholia in Dionysium Thracem
448.6 50 n.113

Scholia in Euripidis *Medeam*
296 146 n.82

Scholia in Hesiodi *Opera et Dies*
Prol. Aa 360 n.254
Prol. Ab 349 n.214, 354 n.234
Prol. Ac 349 n.214
Prol. B 132 n.14, 153 n.107;
Prol. D 335 n.150
Prol. Fa 349 n.214
3 117 n.43
27a 131 n.7
30 89 n.120
37–38 44 n.83
42a 89 n.119
48f 117 n.45
94a 43 n.81
97a 224 n.138
104a 44 n.83
122a 100 n.161, 171 n.45, 172
123 171 n.45
124a 100 n.161, 171 n.45
127b 44 n.83
130a 100 n.161, 191 n.5
130–131 191 n.5
150b 43 n.81
151a 44 n.83
159a 111 n.21
160–161 89 n.120
171 44 n.83
266a 100 n.161
286 191 n.5
287–290 89 n.120
302–303 89 n.119
311 89 n.119
311–312 44 n.83
315–316 89 n.119
317–318 43 n.79
324–326 89 n.119
353–354 89 n.120
712a 44 n.83
759a 100 n.161

Scholia in Hesiodi *Theogoniam*
10 44 n.83
22 44 n.83
28b 44 n.83
75 44 n.83, 117 n.42
84 44 n.83
93 72 n.54
99b 72 n.54
116c1 197 n.35
134 199
187 199
233 199
276 199
304 111 n.21
338 43 n.81
397 198 n.41

507 199
522 85 n.106
691 117 n.43
713b 44 n.83
746 43 n.81
927b 43 n.81
1013 43 n.81

SCHOLIA IN HOMERI *ILIADEM*
1.7 (D) 117 n.45
1.175c (T) 72 n.54, 286 n.75
1.222 (D) 172 n.48
1.250b (AbT) 110 n.16
1.332b (AbT) 116 n.39
2.45a (A) 94 n.138
2.199b (AT) 117 n.45
2.360b (bT) 286 n.75
2.478–479a (AbT) 116 n.39
2.484–877 (b) 117 n.42
2.496a (A) 45 n.85, 111 n.21, 122 n.65
2.156 (bT) 116 n.39
2.507a (A) 44
2.523a (b) 110 n.16
2.604 (test.) 110 n.16
3.16b (bT) 73 n.56
4.59b (AbT) 43 n.79
4.222a (A) 44 n.83
4.413–417 (b and T) 73 n.56
5.299b (T) 44 n.83
5.385 (D) 96 n.146
5.487 (test.), 44 n.83
5.741 (bT) 43 n.79
5.880 (bT) 43 n.79
6.181b (bT) 110 n.16
6.466 (bT) 116 n.39
8.367–368 (AbT) 110 n.16
8.368 (A) 43 n.80
8.428–429 (AbT) 96 n.147
8.455 (A) 44 n.83
8.93a1 (AT), 293 n.103
8.93a2 (b) 293 n.103
9.145 (D) 117 n.45
9.246 (A) 43 n.80
9.448 (A) 117 n.45
9.457 (T) 44 n.83
9.481a2 (T) 117 n.45
11.36b (bT) 43 n.79
11.84 (T) 45 n.86
11.155 (A) 44 n.83
11.306 (T) 44
11.710 (T) 45 n.85
11.736 (T) 44 n.83
12.22 (A) 42 n.77
12.292–293 (T) 110 n.16
12.386d (T) 101 n.162
13.484 (bT) 45 n.85
13.637a (T) 116 n.39
13.733a (bT) 44 n.83
14.114b (T) 117 n.45
14.176 (bT) 96 n.147
14.176b (bT) 101 n.162
14.275–277 (A) 43 n.80
14.309 (bT) 73 n.56
14.342–351 (bT) 101 n.162
15.349–351 (bT) 73 n.56
15.713b (bT) 45 n.86
16.175a (T) 111 n.21
16.336a (A) 117 n.43
16.385 (T) 43 n.79
16.748a (A) 45 n.85
16.748b (T) 45 n.85
17.98–99a–d (A and T) 172 n.48
17.251a (A) 72 n.54, 286 n.75
18.22–35a (A) 101 n.162
18.100d (T) 44 n.83
18.113b (A) 101 n.162
18.488b (T) 44 n.83
18.541b (bT) 293 n.103
18.550–560 (bT) 292 n.103

Scholia in Homeri *Iliadem* (*continued*)
19.167 (bT) 101 n.162
21.430b (A) 117 n.43
23.644–645a[2] (b) 73 n.56
23.638–642 (A) 45 n.85
23.683 (T) 42 n.78
23.679 (T) 111 n.21
23.679b (T) 117 n.45
24.45a (A) 224 n.138
24.371 (T) 101 n.162
24.527–528a (A) 43 n.79
24.527–528b (T) 43 n.79, 101 n.162
24.611 (bT) 44 n.83
24.624 (A) 44

Scholia in Homeri *Odysseam*
1.8 43 n.79
1.85 110 n.16
1.152 116 n.39
3.267 72 n.54, 116 n.39
4.477 43 n.80
5.478 43 n.79
7.54 43 n.79
7.104 111 n.21
8.74 116 n.39
8.362 43 n.79
8.499 116 n.39
8.542 116 n.39
9.106 43 n.79
10.2 110 n.16
10.323 172 n.48
10.139 110 n.16
11.260 117 n.45
11.271 117 n.45
11.360 43 n.79
11.563 117 n.45
12.69 110 n.16
12.168 111 n.21
15.74 342 n.184
24.13 111 n.21

Scholia in Pindari Carmina
Isthmian Odes
6.97 312 n.67
Nemean Odes
2.1 47 n.96, 247 n.29

Scholia in Sophoclis *Electram*
86 108 n.7

Semonides (West)
fr. 6 140, 141 n.62, 142
fr. 7.110–111 140, 141 n.60, 141 n.62, **142**

Seneca
Epistulae
27.6 115 n.34
88.5 110 n.15
88.6 40 n.62

Servius
Commentarius in Vergilii Bucolica
6.42 143 n.70

Sextus Empiricus
Adversus Mathematicos
1.202 307 n.41
1.204 40 n.62, 46 n.91
9.7 108 n.12, 198 n.43
9.15 73 n.56
11.44 306 n.35
Πυρρώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις
1.86 306 n.35
3.121 196 n.35
3.123 191 n.5
3.210–211 79 n.80

Simonides
fr. 579 (Page) 146 n.86, 147 n.87, 147 n.88
fr. 602 (Page) 337 n.162
fr. 647 (Page) 337 n.162
T 47c (Campbell) 317 n.85
T 47d (Campbell) 317 n.85

T 47f (Campbell) 317 n.85
T 47g (Campbell) 317 n.85
T 47k (Campbell) 289 n.87
Gnom. Vat. 514 (Sternbach) 317 n.83

Solon (West)
fr. 4 **173–175**, 176 n.69
fr. 13 173
fr. 29 310 n.51

Stesichorus (PMG)
fr. 193 102 n.167, 110 n.18

Stoic Fragments (SVF)
2.445 199 n.47
2.565 198 n.41
2.573 198 n.41
3.648 281 n.56

Stobaeus
4.52.22 248 n.34

Strabo
1.1.1 120 n.54
1.1.2 119 n.54
1.1.11 119 n.53
1.2.8–9 121 n.59
1.2.13–14 **124**, 241 n.6
1.2.14 94 n.141
1.2.17 94 n.140, 120 n.54
1.2.19 121 n.59
1.2.20 125 n.72
1.2.22 124 n.70
1.2.34 45 n.88, 110 n.19, 121
1.2.35 94, 94 n.141, **122–123**, 241 n.6
1.12.14 45 n.85
7.3.6 123 n.67
7.3.7 45 n.88, 110 n.19
7.3.9 121 n.62
7.7.2 110 n.16
7.7.9 121
7.7.10 110 n.19
8.3.11 110 n.16
8.6.8 110 n.16
9.1.9 110 n.16
9.2.24 281 n.58
9.2.34 44 n.84, 110 n.19
9.2.35 122 n.65
9.3.16 110 n.19
9.5.22 110 n.16
10.3.9 170 n.40
11.6.3 115 n.34, 118, 121
13.3.6 131 n.6
14.5.17 110 n.16

Suda
1.12 339 n.171
1.44.30–31 79 n.80
1.80 135 n.37
1.356 50 n.113
1.376 135 n.37
2.41 50 n.113;
2.47 50 n.113
2.110 50 n.113
2.173 348
2.213 50 n.113
2.348 115 n.34
2.506 50 n.113
2.592 40 n.63, 41 n.69
3.25.10–11 132 n.17
3.524.27 346 n.198
3.569 184 n.115
4.210 51 n.113
4.433 41 n.70, 353 n.227
4.527 41 n.70, 353 n.228

Theagenes of Rhegium (Diels-Kranz 8)
A 2 61 n.10

Themistius
Orationes
15.198c 278 n.40
30.348c 164 n.15
30.348d 247 n.29

Theocritus
Idylls
7.13–19 279 n.48

Theognis
1.77–78 142 n.64
1.119–124 142 n.64
1.155–156 183 n.109, 183 n.109, 281 n.57
1.299–300 142 n.64
1.599–600 142 n.64
1.792–794 175 n.66
1.821 179 n.87
1.831–832 179 n.87
1.851–852 140, **142 n.65**, 179 n.86
1.873–876 224 n.138
1.923–924 185 n.121
1.963–970 179 n.86
1.965–966 140, **142**
1.1027–1028 145 n.77
1.1061–1062 184 n.111
1.1062 183 n.109, 281 n.57
1.1090 181 n.95
1.1197–1202 246 n.25

Theon (Spengel)
2.74 164 n.17, 354 n.234
2.93 110 n.16

Theophrastus
Characteres
23 359 n.249

Thucydides
1.9.3 119 n.53
1.10.3 119 n.53, 314 n.71
3.82–83 175
3.95–96 134

Tryphon (Spengel)
3.194.10 348 n.209

Tyrtaeus (West)
12.43–44 146 n.85, 147 n.87, 147 n.88

Tzetzes
Ad Hesiodi Opera et Dies (Gaisford)
144.31–146.6 247 n.29
159.1 247 n.29
161.1–8 247 n.29, 264 n.96
164.2–12 247 n.29, 264 n.96
164.10–11 247 n.30
304.19–27 247 n.29
Vita Hesiodi (Wilamowitz)
p. 48.26–49.11 247 n.29
p. 49.10 252 n.50
p. 51.4–7 163 n.9

Vacca
Vita Lucani (Badalì)
403.21–26 354 n.234

Varro
De Lingua Latina
4.20 196 n.32
De Re Rustica
1.1.9 110 n.16
Fragmenta (Cardauns)
6 99 n.157
7 99 n.157

Velleius Paterculus
1.7.1 42 n.76, 131 n.6, 354 n.234

Virgil
Eclogae
4 154 n.108
6.64–71 345
Georgica
2.176 110 n.16, 157 n.119, 344 n.188
4.35–37 345 n.197
4.347 196 n.32
[Culex]
96 131 n.10, 157 n.119, 344 n.191

Vitruvius
De Architectura
7.4–7 265 n.101

Xenophanes (Diels-Kranz 21)
B 1 84 n.100, 204 n.66
B 2 256 n.67, 283 n.63
B 8 206 n.74
B 10 84, 203, 206 n.77
B 11 25 n.3, 52 n.119, 78, 82–84, 206
B 13 42 n.76
B 18 203–204, B 34, 204 n.64
B 35 205–206

Xenophon
Memorabilia
1.2.56–57 **89–90**, 98 n.153, 98 n.154, 226 n.147, 286 n.77
2.1.20 146 n.81
2.1.21–34 222 n.132
Oeconomicus
4.12 290 n.94
4.24 290 n.94
5.1 290 n.94
Symposium
3.5 62 n.16
3.6 193 n.16
4.6 277 n.39

Zeno (SVF)
1.27 199 n.50
1.28 199 n.50
1.78 181 n.96
1.100 199 n.49
1.103–105 197 n.40, 198 n.43
1.104 197 n.40, 199 n.47
1.118 92 n.134, 199 n.49